FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai [2015] FCA 1386
Citation: Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai [2015] FCA 1386 Parties: LOW MOOI KWEE (ALSO KNOWN AS MONICA LOW) v KATHERINE BARNET AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MATHEW KERALAVAKAYIL MATHAI; IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MATHEW KERALAVAKAYIL MATHAI File number: NSD 310 of 2014 and NSD 769 of 2014 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 4 December 2015 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – whether, under s 109(10) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the Court has the power to award the only creditor in a bankrupt estate any amount over and above the quantum of that creditor’s proven debts by way of uplift or risk premium as a reward for that creditor’s having funded successful recovery litigation – whether, in the event that the Court has such power, in the circumstances of the present case, the Court ought award to an indemnifying creditor such an uplift amount or risk premium – whether certain expenses incurred by a creditor are properly characterised as expenses of the administration of the bankruptcy within the meaning of s 109(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth), s 84(2)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 5, 32, 58, 77C, 81, 82, 91, 107, 108, 109, 116, 120, 121, 153A, 153B, 154 and 178
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 564
Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), s 6
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996, reg 6.01
Explanatory Memorandum to the Bankruptcy Amendment Bill 1985Cases cited: Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai [2014] FCA 728; (2014) 12 ABC(NS) 107
Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai [2014] FCA 1187
Mathai v Kwee [2005] FCA 932
Mathai v Nelson (2012) 208 FCR 165
Anscor Pty Ltd v Clout (Trustee) (2004) 135 FCR 469
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v TJF EBC Pty Ltd (2006) 24 ACLC 327
Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v EPS GroupPty Ltd (In Liq) [2006] NSWSC 1080
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Vintage Gold Investments Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2009) 27 ACLC 1393
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1999) 91 FCR 353
Grandsky Pty Ltd v Horne [2014] FCA 119
Green; Re Oz-US Film Productions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 249
Jarbin Pty Ltd v Clutha Ltd (In Liq) (2004) 180 FLR 393
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy; in the Matter of Matson v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 914
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Pastro [2004] FCA 713; (2004) 2 ABC(NS) 257
Public Transport Commission of NSW v J Murray-More (NSW) Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 336
Re Ayoub; Ex Parte Silvia (1983) 67 FLR 144
Re Babcock and Brown Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 107
Re Ehrat and Danglmaier (1976) 12 ALR 566
Re Last; Ex Parte Butterell (1994) 124 ALR 219
Re MacDonald; Ex Parte McCullum [1920] 1 KB 205
Re Parry; Ex Parte Salaman [1904] 1…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1386
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether, under section 109(10) of the Act, the court had the power to award the only creditor in a bankrupt estate any amount over and above the quantum of that creditor’s proven debts by way of an uplift or risk premium as a reward for that creditor’s having funded successful recovery litigation. If the court had such power, the court needed to determine whether, in the circumstances of the present case, it ought to award an indemnifying creditor such an uplift amount or risk premium. Another issue was whether certain expenses incurred by Low were properly characterised as expenses of the administration of the bankruptcy within the meaning of section 109(1)(a) of the Act.
The court considered the relevant authorities and found that section 109(10) of the Act was intended to encourage creditors to indemnify trustees in bankruptcy who wish to pursue claims in the administration of bankrupt estates and to reward creditors who bear the burden and take the risks of litigation. The court held that the provision was not punitive and should not be used to punish the bankrupt for his conduct over the years in resisting paying Low the amounts which the courts had held she was owed. The court found that the threshold requirements specified in section 109(10)(a) had been satisfied in the present case. However, the court exercised its discretion not to award an uplift amount or risk premium to Low, as it considered the amount already awarded to her was sufficient. The court also found that certain expenses incurred by Low were properly characterised as expenses of the administration of the bankruptcy and should be reimbursed.
The court ordered that by 14 December 2015, the parties and their legal representatives confer and endeavour to agree on the form of orders which should be made in order to give effect to the Reasons for Judgment published by Foster J. In the event that agreement was not reached as to the appropriate form of orders, the court ordered that by 18 December 2015, each party lodge with the Associate to Foster J that party’s draft of the orders which that party considered ought to be made and thereafter the form of the final orders would be decided on the papers.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. By 14 December 2015, the parties and their legal representatives confer and endeavour to agree on the form of orders which should be made in order to give effect to Reasons for Judgment published by Foster J this day (Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai [2015] FCA 1386).
2. In the event that agreement is reached as to the form of such orders, the agreed form of orders be lodged with the Associate to Foster J by 15 December 2015 for consideration by the Court.
3. In the event that agreement is not reached as to the appropriate form of orders, by 18 December 2015, each party lodge with the Associate to Foster J that party’s draft of the orders which that party considers ought to be made and thereafter the form of the final orders will be decided on the papers.
4. By 18 December 2015, the applicant and the respondent lodge a Written Submission of no more than three (3) pages in length addressing the question of costs in light of the said Reasons for Judgment published this day and thereafter the said question of costs will be decided on the papers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 564 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) derives from the original form of s 109(10). It is in the following terms:564 Power of Court to make orders in favour of certain creditorsWhere in any winding up:(a)property has been recovered under an indemnity for costs of litigation given by certain creditors, or has been protected or preserved by the payment of money or the giving of indemnity by creditors; or(b)expenses in relation to which a creditor has indemnified a liquidator have been recovered;the Court may make such orders, as it deems just with respect to the distribution of that property and the amount of those expenses so recovered with a view to giving those creditors an advantage over others in consideration of the risk assumed by them. It can readily be seen that the effect of s 564 is substantially the same as s 109(10) of the Act. Ms Low’s Arguments Senior Counsel who appeared for Ms Low at the hearing before me correctly submitted that, in circumstances where property has been realised after recovery under an indemnity for costs of litigation given by a creditor or creditors, the proceeds of the property recovered in respect of which an order may be made under s 109(10) are the net proceeds after deduction of relevant remuneration, legal costs and expenses (Re Ehrat and Danglmaier (1976) 12 ALR 566 at 567–568 per White J). These deductions will not include the cost of work done prior to the receipt of the relevant indemnity (Re Ehrat and Danglmaier at 568). It was also submitted on behalf of Ms Low that the principles relating to the application of s 109(10) were considered in Grandsky Pty Ltd v Horne [2014] FCA 119 (Grandsky) at [6]–[20] per Jagot J. In those paragraphs of her Honour’s judgment, her Honour extracted various observations of general application from a number of cases. Counsel also referred to Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Pastro [2004] FCA 713 (Pastro) at [20]–[21]; (2004) 2 ABC(NS) 257 at 262–263 where Mansfield J said: 20In my view, in the circumstances the Court has power to order that the whole amount recovered by the litigation be distributed amongst the creditors who had indemnified the trustee against the costs of the litigation. The discretion under s 109(10) is unqualified. In Re the Estate of Lawrence Robert Connell (Deceased) [2001] FCA 51, Carr J at [24] described the policy behind s 109(10) as being at least twofold: to encourage creditors to indemnify trustees in bankruptcy who wish to pursue claims in the administration of bankrupt estates, and to reward creditors who bear the burden and take the risks of litigation. See e.g. Re Glenisia Investments Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (1996) 14 ACLC 237. It is in the public interest that the property of a bankrupt should be available to the creditors of the bankrupt, including where the property of the bankrupt may be secured only through litigation. There is no presumption that the indemnity creditors should not receive the full benefit of the net proceeds of the property or expenses recovered under an indemnity for costs of litigation: see the remarks of Barrett J in Re Home Corp Projects [2002] NSWSC 879 (Re Home Corp Projects) at [12]. That case concerned the provisions analogous to s 109(10) of the Act in s 564 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 21The way in which the discretion should be exercised is of course dependent upon the facts of the particular case, and is often ultimately a matter of impression: see per Paine J in Re Bavistock (1946) 14 ABC 30 at 32.