Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai [2015] FCA 1386

Citation: Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai [2015] FCA 1386
Parties: LOW MOOI KWEE (ALSO KNOWN AS MONICA LOW) v KATHERINE BARNET AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MATHEW KERALAVAKAYIL MATHAI; IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MATHEW KERALAVAKAYIL MATHAI
File number: NSD 310 of 2014 and NSD 769 of 2014
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 4 December 2015
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – whether, under s 109(10) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the Court has the power to award the only creditor in a bankrupt estate any amount over and above the quantum of that creditor’s proven debts by way of uplift or risk premium as a reward for that creditor’s having funded successful recovery litigation – whether, in the event that the Court has such power, in the circumstances of the present case, the Court ought award to an indemnifying creditor such an uplift amount or risk premium – whether certain expenses incurred by a creditor are properly characterised as expenses of the administration of the bankruptcy within the meaning of s 109(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1924 (Cth), s 84(2)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 5, 32, 58, 77C, 81, 82, 91, 107, 108, 109, 116, 120, 121, 153A, 153B, 154 and 178
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 564
Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), s 6
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996, reg 6.01
Explanatory Memorandum to the Bankruptcy Amendment Bill 1985  
Cases cited: Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai [2014] FCA 728; (2014) 12 ABC(NS) 107
Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai [2014] FCA 1187
Mathai v Kwee [2005] FCA 932
Mathai v Nelson (2012) 208 FCR 165
Anscor Pty Ltd v Clout (Trustee) (2004) 135 FCR 469
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v TJF EBC Pty Ltd (2006) 24 ACLC 327
Australian Steel Company (Operations) Pty Ltd v EPS GroupPty Ltd (In Liq) [2006] NSWSC 1080
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Vintage Gold Investments Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2009) 27 ACLC 1393
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1999) 91 FCR 353
Grandsky Pty Ltd v Horne [2014] FCA 119
Green; Re Oz-US Film Productions Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 249
Jarbin Pty Ltd v Clutha Ltd (In Liq) (2004) 180 FLR 393
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy; in the Matter of Matson v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 914
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Pastro [2004] FCA 713; (2004) 2 ABC(NS) 257
Public Transport Commission of NSW v J Murray-More (NSW) Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 336
Re Ayoub; Ex Parte Silvia (1983) 67 FLR 144
Re Babcock and Brown Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 107
Re Ehrat and Danglmaier (1976) 12 ALR 566
Re Last; Ex Parte Butterell (1994) 124 ALR 219
Re MacDonald; Ex Parte McCullum [1920] 1 KB 205
Re Parry; Ex Parte Salaman [1904] 1…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1386
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Low brought an application against the trustee of the estate of Mathai, who had been declared bankrupt. Low sought to recover an uplift amount or risk premium under section 109(10) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) for having funded successful recovery litigation against the bankrupt. Low also sought to recover certain expenses she had incurred, which she claimed were properly characterised as expenses of the administration of the bankruptcy under section 109(1)(a) of the Act.

The central legal issue before the court was whether, under section 109(10) of the Act, the court had the power to award the only creditor in a bankrupt estate any amount over and above the quantum of that creditor’s proven debts by way of an uplift or risk premium as a reward for that creditor’s having funded successful recovery litigation. If the court had such power, the court needed to determine whether, in the circumstances of the present case, it ought to award an indemnifying creditor such an uplift amount or risk premium. Another issue was whether certain expenses incurred by Low were properly characterised as expenses of the administration of the bankruptcy within the meaning of section 109(1)(a) of the Act.

The court considered the relevant authorities and found that section 109(10) of the Act was intended to encourage creditors to indemnify trustees in bankruptcy who wish to pursue claims in the administration of bankrupt estates and to reward creditors who bear the burden and take the risks of litigation. The court held that the provision was not punitive and should not be used to punish the bankrupt for his conduct over the years in resisting paying Low the amounts which the courts had held she was owed. The court found that the threshold requirements specified in section 109(10)(a) had been satisfied in the present case. However, the court exercised its discretion not to award an uplift amount or risk premium to Low, as it considered the amount already awarded to her was sufficient. The court also found that certain expenses incurred by Low were properly characterised as expenses of the administration of the bankruptcy and should be reimbursed.

The court ordered that by 14 December 2015, the parties and their legal representatives confer and endeavour to agree on the form of orders which should be made in order to give effect to the Reasons for Judgment published by Foster J. In the event that agreement was not reached as to the appropriate form of orders, the court ordered that by 18 December 2015, each party lodge with the Associate to Foster J that party’s draft of the orders which that party considered ought to be made and thereafter the form of the final orders would be decided on the papers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. By 14 December 2015, the parties and their legal representatives confer and endeavour to agree on the form of orders which should be made in order to give effect to Reasons for Judgment published by Foster J this day (Low v Barnet (Trustee); In the Matter of Mathai [2015] FCA 1386).

2. In the event that agreement is reached as to the form of such orders, the agreed form of orders be lodged with the Associate to Foster J by 15 December 2015 for consideration by the Court.

3. In the event that agreement is not reached as to the appropriate form of orders, by 18 December 2015, each party lodge with the Associate to Foster J that party’s draft of the orders which that party considers ought to be made and thereafter the form of the final orders will be decided on the papers.

4. By 18 December 2015, the applicant and the respondent lodge a Written Submission of no more than three (3) pages in length addressing the question of costs in light of the said Reasons for Judgment published this day and thereafter the said question of costs will be decided on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The hearing of both proceedings took place at the same time. Evidence in each proceeding was evidence in the other proceeding. THE RELEVANT FACTS In this section of these Reasons, I shall set out a brief summary of the relevant facts. That summary will not include much detail of the steps taken by Ms Low and her husband over many years to recover the amount of the judgment debt which she obtained against the bankrupt. I will provide more detail of those steps when I come to address those specific claims for reimbursement made by Ms Low which the Trustee continues to reject. In 1993, Ms Low commenced proceedings against the bankrupt in the English High Court, Chancery Division (Ch 1997 K 3097) in which she claimed from the bankrupt three holdings of United Kingdom Treasury stocks which she contended belonged to her. In those proceedings, Ms Low claimed that the bankrupt had fraudulently obtained control of those stocks by forging a document which purported to transfer the stocks to him. On 12 October 1998, the English High Court gave judgment in favour of Ms Low against the bankrupt. The trial judge found that the bankrupt had forged the signatures of Ms Low and another person on the document by which the stocks were purportedly transferred. The Court made an appropriate declaration and ordered the bankrupt to pay to Ms Low GBP179,575.24 plus interest and costs. On 12 February 2003, the Supreme Court of Victoria registered the judgment of the English High Court and the Default Costs Order made by that Court under s 6 of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth). The net amount in respect of which judgment was entered was GBP118,317.11. The Supreme Court also ordered that the bankrupt pay Ms Low’s costs of the registration of the English judgment. On 14 June 2003, the bankrupt was validly served with notice of the foreign judgment registration and a demand for payment at his home. At the time, he was living at 69 Wellington Street. On 3 July 2003, on the application of Ms Low, the Official Receiver issued a Bankruptcy Notice against the bankrupt. The amount specified in that Bankruptcy Notice as the debt owed to Ms Low was $288,086.46. That amount was the Australian dollar equivalent of GBP118,317.11 as at 3 July 2003. The bankrupt spent most of the second half of 2003 overseas. On 6 December 2003, the Bankruptcy Notice was validly served on the bankrupt in Australia. The bankrupt did not comply with the Bankruptcy Notice. On 2 January 2004, Ms Low filed a Creditor’s Petition in this Court seeking a sequestration order against the estate of the bankrupt. On 18 May 2004, a Registrar made a sequestration order against the estate of the bankrupt. The Registrar also ordered that the bankrupt pay Ms Low’s taxed costs of and incidental to the Creditor’s Petition filed by her. On 19 April 2005, the bankrupt applied for an annulment of his bankruptcy pursuant to s 153B of the Act. The bankrupt subsequently also sought review of the Registrar’s decision to make a sequestration order.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In those circumstances, if Ms Low fails in her s 109(10) proceeding to secure any risk premium, it will be necessary for the Court to determine which of Ms Low’s specific claims which remain in contest should be met by the Trustee. The Evidence Ms Low read and relied upon the following affidavits:(a)The affidavit of Phillip Leong sworn on 26 February 2014 and filed in proceeding NSD 310 of 2014 and the bundle of documents exhibited to that affidavit as Exhibit “PL‑1”; (b)The affidavit of Mr Leong sworn on 3 October 2014 and filed in proceeding NSD 310 of 2014 and the bundle of documents exhibited to that affidavit as Exhibit “PL‑1”; (c)The affidavit of Stephen Keith Mullette sworn on 25 July 2014 and filed in proceeding NSD 769 of 2014;(d)The affidavit of Ms Low sworn on 22 August 2014 and filed in proceeding NSD 310 of 2014 and the bundle of documents exhibited to that affidavit as Exhibit “LMK‑1”; and(e)The affidavit of Desmond Anthony Ryan sworn on 24 August 2014 and filed in proceeding NSD 310 of 2014 (Mr Ryan’s affidavit) and the bundle of documents exhibited to that affidavit as Exhibit “DAR‑1”. Mr Leong is also known as “Philip Kong”. He is Ms Low’s husband. Ms Low and Mr Leong live in Vancouver, Canada. Because of Ms Low’s poor health, Mr Leong has acted as her representative in dealing with the Trustee and in pursuing the judgment debt. He holds a formal power of attorney from Ms Low. The Trustee relied upon her affidavit sworn on 23 September 2014. No witness was cross-examined. Some objections were taken by Counsel for the Trustee to parts of the affidavits read on behalf of Ms Low. My rulings in respect of those objections are set out in a document which I marked as MFI‑3. I made those rulings in advance of the hearing. At par 169 of her Written Submissions, Ms Low applied to re-tender certain paragraphs of Mr Leong’s first affidavit. I decline to accede to that request. My rulings will stand. The hearing of both proceedings took place at the same time. Evidence in each proceeding was evidence in the other proceeding. THE RELEVANT FACTS In this section of these Reasons, I shall set out a brief summary of the relevant facts. That summary will not include much detail of the steps taken by Ms Low and her husband over many years to recover the amount of the judgment debt which she obtained against the bankrupt. I will provide more detail of those steps when I come to address those specific claims for reimbursement made by Ms Low which the Trustee continues to reject. In 1993, Ms Low commenced proceedings against the bankrupt in the English High Court, Chancery Division (Ch 1997 K 3097) in which she claimed from the bankrupt three holdings of United Kingdom Treasury stocks which she contended belonged to her. In those proceedings, Ms Low claimed that the bankrupt had fraudulently obtained control of those stocks by forging a document which purported to transfer the stocks to him. On 12 October 1998, the English High Court gave judgment in favour of Ms Low against the bankrupt. The trial judge found that the bankrupt had forged the signatures of Ms Low and another person on the document by which the stocks were purportedly transferred. The Court made an appropriate declaration and ordered the bankrupt to pay to Ms Low GBP179,575.24 plus interest and costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was also submitted on behalf of the bankrupt that s 109 is not punitive and should not be used by the Court to punish the bankrupt for his conduct over the years in resisting paying Ms Low the amounts which the English High Court and courts in this country have held she was owed. The subsection is not directed to punishing the bankrupt for alleged misconduct.Decision Part VI of the Act deals with administration of the bankrupt’s property comprising his bankrupt estate. In s 5(1) of the Act, “property” is defined in wide terms as follows: property means real or personal property of every description, whether situate in Australia or elsewhere, and includes any estate, interest or profit, whether present or future, vested or contingent, arising out of or incident to any such real or personal property. Part VI commences with Div 1 which addresses the concept of provable debts and then outlines the procedures and principles governing the lodgement and assessment of proofs of debt. Division 2 of Pt VI is concerned with the order in which proven debts are to be paid. The general rule is that all debts proved in a bankruptcy are to rank equally and, if the proceeds of the property of the bankrupt are insufficient to meet those debts in full, they are to be paid proportionately (s 108). The general rule embodied in s 108 is subject to the terms of s 109 which require the trustee to apply the proceeds of the property of the bankrupt in the specific order set out in subs (1) as explained and qualified by subs (1B) to subs (9). Subsection (11) invokes the general rule captured in s 108 in order to rank the debts in each of the classes specified in subs (1) as between themselves. It must not be forgotten that s 109(10) appears in a section which is headed “Priority payments” and which, for the most part, addresses the question of the order of the payment of those debts which are proven in the bankruptcy. At 262–263 [20]–[21] in Pastro (which I have extracted at [80] above), Mansfield J identified and explained the policy behind s 109(10). I respectfully agree with his Honour’s observations. Here, Ms Low is the only creditor of the bankrupt. There are no other persons who have made any claims upon the estate. She is a judgment creditor of the bankrupt and a claimant for reimbursement of additional outlays said to be recoverable from the estate. The only property of the bankrupt in the estate are the two Wellington Street properties and rent derived from one of those properties. 68A Wellington Street has been sold. The net proceeds of sale have fallen into the estate. Ms Low provided funds and gave indemnities to Mr Ryan and to Mr Nelson in respect of the s 121 proceedings and the appeals which followed. In the circumstances, it follows (and I find) that property (the two Wellington Street properties) were recovered under an indemnity for costs of litigation (the s 121 proceedings and the subsequent appeals) given by a creditor (Ms Low) to the trustee. Thus, s 109(10) is prima facie engaged in the present case because the threshold requirements specified in s 109(10)(a) have been satisfied.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 564 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) derives from the original form of s 109(10). It is in the following terms:564 Power of Court to make orders in favour of certain creditorsWhere in any winding up:(a)property has been recovered under an indemnity for costs of litigation given by certain creditors, or has been protected or preserved by the payment of money or the giving of indemnity by creditors; or(b)expenses in relation to which a creditor has indemnified a liquidator have been recovered;the Court may make such orders, as it deems just with respect to the distribution of that property and the amount of those expenses so recovered with a view to giving those creditors an advantage over others in consideration of the risk assumed by them. It can readily be seen that the effect of s 564 is substantially the same as s 109(10) of the Act. Ms Low’s Arguments Senior Counsel who appeared for Ms Low at the hearing before me correctly submitted that, in circumstances where property has been realised after recovery under an indemnity for costs of litigation given by a creditor or creditors, the proceeds of the property recovered in respect of which an order may be made under s 109(10) are the net proceeds after deduction of relevant remuneration, legal costs and expenses (Re Ehrat and Danglmaier (1976) 12 ALR 566 at 567–568 per White J). These deductions will not include the cost of work done prior to the receipt of the relevant indemnity (Re Ehrat and Danglmaier at 568). It was also submitted on behalf of Ms Low that the principles relating to the application of s 109(10) were considered in Grandsky Pty Ltd v Horne [2014] FCA 119 (Grandsky) at [6]–[20] per Jagot J. In those paragraphs of her Honour’s judgment, her Honour extracted various observations of general application from a number of cases. Counsel also referred to Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Pastro [2004] FCA 713 (Pastro) at [20]–[21]; (2004) 2 ABC(NS) 257 at 262–263 where Mansfield J said: 20In my view, in the circumstances the Court has power to order that the whole amount recovered by the litigation be distributed amongst the creditors who had indemnified the trustee against the costs of the litigation. The discretion under s 109(10) is unqualified. In Re the Estate of Lawrence Robert Connell (Deceased) [2001] FCA 51, Carr J at [24] described the policy behind s 109(10) as being at least twofold: to encourage creditors to indemnify trustees in bankruptcy who wish to pursue claims in the administration of bankrupt estates, and to reward creditors who bear the burden and take the risks of litigation. See e.g. Re Glenisia Investments Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (1996) 14 ACLC 237. It is in the public interest that the property of a bankrupt should be available to the creditors of the bankrupt, including where the property of the bankrupt may be secured only through litigation. There is no presumption that the indemnity creditors should not receive the full benefit of the net proceeds of the property or expenses recovered under an indemnity for costs of litigation: see the remarks of Barrett J in Re Home Corp Projects [2002] NSWSC 879 (Re Home Corp Projects) at [12]. That case concerned the provisions analogous to s 109(10) of the Act in s 564 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 21The way in which the discretion should be exercised is of course dependent upon the facts of the particular case, and is often ultimately a matter of impression: see per Paine J in Re Bavistock (1946) 14 ABC 30 at 32.