Louw (Migration)

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Louw (Migration) [2019] AATA 899 (6 February 2019)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

APPLICANTS:  Mr Jason Gareth Louw
Mrs Kirsty Louise Louw
Master Ethan James Dawe
Master Cuan Cole Duncan

CASE NUMBER:  1719288

HOME AFFAIRS REFERENCE(S):           BCC2017/1167189

MEMBER:Antonio Dronjic

DATE:6 February 2019

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa.

The Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the other applicants.

Statement made on 06 February 2019 at 5:11pm

CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – cancellation – Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visa – Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) – ground for cancellation – work only in occupation listed in most recently approved nomination – ICT Customer Support Officer – carried out work as a Branch Manager – consideration of discretion – purpose of a Subclass 457 visa – ceased employment with sponsor – extent of non-compliance – degree of hardship – decision under review affirmed

LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116, 140, 348
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 8, Condition 8107

CASES
Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379
Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

  1. This is an application for review of a decision dated 17 August 2017 made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to cancel the first named applicant’s (the applicant) Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa under s.116 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

  2. The delegate cancelled the visa under s.116 (1)(b) of the Act. The delegate found that the applicant had not worked only in the occupation listed in the applicant’s most recently approved nomination, namely as an ICT Customer Support Officer, but has carried out work as a Branch Manager. The delegate found that the applicant had breached condition 8107 which is attached to the applicant’s visa by specifically breaching condition 8107(3)(a)(i).

  3. For the purposes of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.348 of the Act, the only decision that is before the Tribunal is the decision with respect to the first named applicant. The other applicants’ visas were automatically cancelled as a consequence of that cancellation, not by a decision but by force of the operation of s.140(1) of the Act which made the cancellation of those other visas self-executing on the cancellation of the first named applicant’s visa: see Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379 at 385, 393, 400; Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80 at 96. As no decision was involved in the visa cancellation under s.140(1), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to them.

    Background to the cancellation of the applicant’s visa

  4. The primary decision record of 17 August 2017, provided by the applicant to the Tribunal with the review application sets out the reasons for the delegates’ decision to cancel the applicant’s visa. The Tribunal summarises those reasons and findings as follows:

    ·On 30 October 2013, the applicant was…

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Details
Case
[2019] AATA 899
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) considered the cancellation of a Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa held by the first applicant, Mr. Louw. The dispute arose when the Department of Home Affairs cancelled Mr. Louw's visa on the grounds that he had not complied with a condition of his visa. The cancellation of Mr. Louw's visa automatically led to the cancellation of other applicants' visas, but the Tribunal's jurisdiction was limited to the decision concerning Mr. Louw.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the ground for cancellation existed, specifically whether Mr. Louw had breached condition 8107 of his visa, which required him to work only in the occupation listed in his most recently approved nomination. If the ground for cancellation was established, the Tribunal then had to consider whether to exercise its discretion to cancel the visa, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

The Tribunal found that Mr. Louw's visa was granted based on a nomination for an ICT Customer Support Officer position with Iris Contractors Pty Ltd. However, evidence indicated that Mr. Louw worked as a Branch Manager at a different location of the same company from December 2015 to October 2016. The Tribunal was satisfied that this constituted a breach of condition 8107(3)(a)(i) of his visa, thus establishing the ground for cancellation under s.116(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958. Although this ground did not mandate cancellation, the Tribunal considered its discretion. It noted that while policy guidelines, such as those in the Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3), could be a useful starting point, they were not legally binding. The Tribunal gave significant weight to the fact that the purpose of the Subclass 457 visa, which was to enable a business to sponsor a skilled worker temporarily, no longer existed as Mr. Louw had ceased employment with his sponsor and was not currently sponsored.

Ultimately, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel Mr. Louw's visa, concluding that the reasons for cancellation outweighed the reasons for not cancelling it. The Tribunal also noted that it had no jurisdiction with respect to the other applicants whose visas were cancelled as a consequence of Mr. Louw's visa cancellation.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the purposes of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.348 of the Act, the only decision that is before the Tribunal is the decision with respect to the first named applicant. The other applicants’ visas were automatically cancelled as a consequence of that cancellation, not by a decision but by force of the operation of s.140(1) of the Act which made the cancellation of those other visas self-executing on the cancellation of the first named applicant’s visa: see Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379 at 385, 393, 400; Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80 at 96. As no decision was involved in the visa cancellation under s.140(1), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to them.Background to the cancellation of the applicant’s visa The primary decision record of 17 August 2017, provided by the applicant to the Tribunal with the review application sets out the reasons for the delegates’ decision to cancel the applicant’s visa. The Tribunal summarises those reasons and findings as follows:·On 30 October 2013, the applicant was granted a Subclass 457 Business (Long Stay) visa for the period of four years;·The standard business sponsor who nominated the applicant in the most recently approved nomination for the visa (15 October 2013) was Iris Contractors Pty Ltd T/AS Tyreright Wangara Refit Tyers (the sponsor). The occupation listed for the applicant in the most recently approved nomination was ICT Customer Support Officer;·On 4 April 2017, a check of the applicant’s LinkedIn profile revealed a list of his work experiences which included a position of a Branch Manager at Tyreright Port Hedland from December 2015 to October 2016;·A notice of intention to consider cancellation (NOICC) was issued on 13 April 2017;·On 28 April 2017, the applicant responded in writing to the NOICC stating inter alia that the majority of his duties have not been consistent with his nominated occupation; that this was done under the direct order from the business owner; that he raised his concerns with the business owner that he is not working only in the occupation listed in his most recently approved nomination, namely as an ICT Customer Support Officer, and was told by the business owner that he knows what he could and could not do for the business; that he offered to fill in the position of a manager at the Port Hedland store until his employer could find a permanent replacement; that his employer threatened to have his visa cancelled and that he put up with this as he could not change his sponsor;·It is further recorded in the primary decision that a new nomination has been lodged for the nominee for the same occupation with a different employer some 107 days after the nominee ceased employment at Iris Contractors Pty Ltd and that the decision on this nomination was still pending with the Department at the time of the delegate’s decision; that the nominee conceded that he worked as a Branch Manager at Tyreright Port Hedland from December 2015 to October 2016 as well as temporarily at other times when the appointed manager was absent.·On 17 August 2017, the delegate proceeded to cancel the applicant’s visa.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa should be affirmed.CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE Under s.116 of the Act, the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that certain grounds specified in that provision are made out. Relevantly, to this case, these include the ground set out in s.116(1)(b). If satisfied that the ground for cancellation is made out, the decision maker must proceed to consider whether the visa should be cancelled, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, which may include matters of government policy.Does the ground for cancellation exist? A visa may be cancelled under s.116(1)(b) if the Minister is satisfied that the holder did not comply with a condition of their visa. In this instance condition 8107 was attached to the applicant’s visa. This condition, inter alia, requires that the applicant must work only in the occupation listed in the most recently approved nomination for the holder. In this matter, the applicant was nominated to work as an ICT Customer Support Officer and the associated business nomination was approved by the Department on 15 October 2013. Based on the evidence before me, including the oral evidence from the applicant, his written submissions and the investigation conducted by the Department as recorded in the primary decision record, I am satisfied that the applicant worked as a Branch Manager at Tyreright Port Hedland from December 2015 to October 2016. Based on this finding, I am satisfied that the applicant was in breach of condition 8107, specifically condition 8107(3)(a)(i), of his visa. I am therefore satisfied that the ground for cancellation exists under s.116(1)(b). As this ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s.116(3) of the Act, the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the power to cancel the visa should be exercised.Consideration of discretion There are no matters specified in the Act or Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations) that must be considered in the exercise of this discretion. The Tribunal has had regard to the circumstances of this case, including matters raised by the applicant, and matters in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) ‘General visa cancellation powers’. The Tribunal acknowledges that, whilst it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it.[1] Specifically, the Courts have held that the PAM3 guidelines constitute no more than an administrative advisory guide to decision makers in relation to the application of the Act and Regulations and that they are incapable of being elevated into legally necessary or relevant considerations. Indeed, there is judicial authority to the effect that the policy guidelines in PAM3 cannot go beyond the wording of the legislation, even where they are favourable to an applicant.[2] [1] See Brennan, J. in Re Drake (No. 2) (1978-1980) 2 ALD 634[2] See Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1429, Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168; Visnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209; Alimi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1520; Durzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1767 at [49]; Moller v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 168 at [14]; and Sakhno v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[2007] FMCA 1492 at [55]

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having regard to the findings above and the circumstances of the case as a whole, the Tribunal is satisfied that the reasons for cancelling the visa outweigh the reasons for not cancelling the visa. The Tribunal finds that cancelling the applicant’s visa is the correct and preferable decision.DECISION The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the other applicants.Antonio DronjicMember

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As this ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s.116(3) of the Act, the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the power to cancel the visa should be exercised.Consideration of discretion There are no matters specified in the Act or Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations) that must be considered in the exercise of this discretion. The Tribunal has had regard to the circumstances of this case, including matters raised by the applicant, and matters in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) ‘General visa cancellation powers’. The Tribunal acknowledges that, whilst it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it.[1] Specifically, the Courts have held that the PAM3 guidelines constitute no more than an administrative advisory guide to decision makers in relation to the application of the Act and Regulations and that they are incapable of being elevated into legally necessary or relevant considerations. Indeed, there is judicial authority to the effect that the policy guidelines in PAM3 cannot go beyond the wording of the legislation, even where they are favourable to an applicant.[2] [1] See Brennan, J. in Re Drake (No. 2) (1978-1980) 2 ALD 634[2] See Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1429, Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168; Visnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209; Alimi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1520; Durzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1767 at [49]; Moller v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 168 at [14]; and Sakhno v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[2007] FMCA 1492 at [55] Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers that the policy guidelines in PAM3 provide a useful starting point in respect of the exercise of its discretion. In considering this matter, the Tribunal has also taken into account the submissions and evidence it received from the applicant.The purpose of the visa holder’s travel to and stay in Australia The Subclass 457 visa is for skilled workers from outside Australia who have been sponsored and nominated by a business to work in Australia on a temporary basis. The Tribunal finds that the purpose of the applicant’s stay in Australia was to work for Iris Contractors Pty Ltd as ICT Customer Support Officer. The applicant ceased employment at the sponsoring business in October 2016. His Subclass 457 visa, but for the cancellation, would have ceased on 30 October 2017. He is currently not sponsored or nominated by any Australian business. As explained at the hearing, the purpose of granting a temporary work visa is to enable an Australian business to sponsor a skilled worker if it cannot find an appropriately skilled Australian citizen or permanent resident to fill a skilled position listed in the relevant list of occupations. The Subclass 457 visa was a temporary visa of limited duration related to working for a particular sponsor in a skilled occupation. The Tribunal finds that this purpose no longer exists. I give significant weight to this consideration.The reason for and extent of the breach