Loudon v The Valuer-General

[1993] QLC 7

[1993] QLC 7

 

  LAND COURT

BRISBANE

2nd April, 1993.

Re:     Appeal against Categorization for Rating Purposes -
  Johnstone Shire Council.
  VC92-243.

Charles W. Loudon and Roslyn Wendy Loudon
  v.
  The Valuer-General

D E C I S I O N

(Hearing at Innisfail)

This appeal is brought against the decision of the Valuer-General disallowing an objection by the appellants against the inclusion by the Johnstone Shire Council (the Council) of the land which they own in Category AE for the purposes of levying differential rates.  The relevant land comprises 8 surveyed lots with an aggregate area of 338.9 hectares.  For the purpose of levying differential general rates for the Financial Year ending 30th June, 1993, the Council categorized the rateable land in its Area into some 25 categories, two of which are relevant to this appeal, these being Categories AE and AD.  The subject land was included in Category AE which under the criteria adopted by the Council comprises - "All properties which are exclusively used for the business of primary production except those incorporated in Category AD".  Category AD comprises - "All properties with Valuer-General's Land Use Codes 6400, 6500 and 6600".  These codes on the evidence of Mr M.L. Donnelly, registered valuer in the employ of the Department of Lands, apply to land which is "exclusively used for grazing purposes".  The use made of the subject land is for cattle grazing and paw paw production.  Mr Donnelly and Mr Loudon agree that the actual use made of the subject land may be broken up as follows:

1.8% (abt 6 hectares) -                  paw paw production

66.3% (abt 224 hectares) -  cattle grazing
  breeding/fattening
           31.9% (abt 108 hectares) -  virgin rainforest

It is also agreed that the activity in paw paw production is a commercial operation.  It follows that the land is not exclusively used for "grazing purposes" and unless some qualification or relaxation can be found in the legislation or in the criteria applying in the circumstances the land must remain in the category in which it has been placed.
           The case as put by Mr Loudon is that the subject land is primarily used for grazing purposes and that with the inclusion of the fruitgrowing business (and the relevant inclusion of the land in Category AE) rates will be in excess of that which would be paid were a severance of the uses permissible.  He said, and it is evident in correspondence accompanying the appeal (Exhibit 1), that the objective the Council had sought to achieve was "a more equitable sharing of the rural rate amongst primary producers and to this end resolved that ultimately all crop growers, should, on average, pay the same general rate.  This course of action resulted in banana, paw paw and other tropical fruitgrowers experiencing substantial rate increases in 1991/2 as the first of the three year phase-in to bring the average rate for those growers up to that being paid by Canefarmers".  Mr Loudon said that the appellants grazing/fruitgrowing operation has annual gross income roughly the same as that of a 5,000 tonne canefarm for which his enquiries suggest that rates would be between $4,000 and $4,500 per year.  The appellants' present rate assessment is $4,483.10 per annum.  He expected rates payable under Category AE to be of the order of $6,500 per annum - hence the allegation of inequity.  Whether upon an economic analysis this would or would not be the case is immaterial for the purposes of deciding this matter for the reasons following:  Under the relevant sections of the Local Government Act (ss21 and 27), a local authority "may adopt criteria for the purpose of categorizing the rateable land in its Area".  Having adopted criteria, land is then "included" in a category.  "The dictionary definition of 'include' does not allow for partial inclusion - Houghton and Others v. Brisbane City Council (VC92-230) 27th November, 1992 (unreported) Mr Trickett.  The definition of the relevant categories is clear and unambiguous.  There is therein no room for considerations such as "predominant use" or "partial use".  It is inescapable in the circumstances of the subject case to hold against the inclusion of the subject land in Category AE.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the decision of the Valuer-General is affirmed.

Member of the Land Court