Lorenzo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lorenzo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs and Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCA 435

MIGRATION – cancellation of visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 – bad character due to serious offence - denial procedural fairness – submission to the Minister contained information that created a false impression – applicant not informed of false impression – failure to inform applicant that mother of his son had not provided a letter – interests of children to be a primary consideration

MIGRATION – failure to provide reasons in reasonable time – breach of s 501G of the Migration Act 1958 – written reasons given more than 12 months after decision made – Minister’s reasons not admitted into evidence

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Deportation under the Migration Act 1958 is not akin to Executive imposition of a punishment upon a person already punished for an offence – deportation is not an  exercise of Chapter III Judicial power by the Executive

Migration Act 1958 (Cth); s 501(2), 501(6), 501(7), 501G
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth); s 39B
Constitution; s 75(v)

Preston v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCA 107 cited
Dagli v Minister [2003] FCA 298 cited
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 cited
Re Minister for Immigration & multicultural & Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 77 ALJR 1829 cited
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 cited
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 referred to
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 cited
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 cited
Beldjoudi v France (1992) 14 EHRR 801 referred to
Nasri v France (1995) 21 EHRR 458 referred to
Menhemi v France (1997) 30 EHRR 739 referred to
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1 cited

JULIO LORENZO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
N 290 of 2003

HILL J
16 APRIL 2004
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N290 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

JULIO LORENZO
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 APRIL 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The Minister be prohibited from taking any further steps to give affect to his purported decision under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 made on 25 May 2002.
  2. The decision of the Minister purporting to have been made under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 on 25 May 2002 be set aside.
  3. The matter be remitted to the Minister for reconsideration in accordance with law.
  4. The Minister pay the Applicant’s costs of the application.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 435
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Lorenzo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the applicant, a non-citizen who had been residing in Australia since the age of 14, challenged the Minister's decision to cancel his visa under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958. The applicant, who had been convicted of multiple offences, argued that the Minister failed to provide adequate reasons for his decision, mischaracterised the seriousness of his offences, and did not properly consider the impact of his deportation on his son. The central legal issues revolved around the adequacy of the reasons provided for the Minister's decision, the relevance of the seriousness of the applicant's criminal record, and whether the Minister adequately considered the interests of the applicant's child.

The court examined the constitutionality of section 501, finding that it did not infringe upon the judicial power of the Commonwealth as it merely permitted the executive to determine the appropriateness of a non-citizen's continued presence in Australia. The court rejected the argument that failure to provide timely reasons rendered the Minister's decision invalid, aligning with the High Court's stance that such failure does not constitute a jurisdictional error. Regarding the characterisation of the applicant's offences, the court held that while the Minister did not need to seek specific comment on the seriousness of the offences, the consideration of their severity was not irrelevant. Finally, the court concluded that the Minister failed to properly consider the interests of the applicant's son, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

As a result, the court ordered that the Minister be prohibited from enforcing his decision, set aside the decision, and remitted the matter to the Minister for reconsideration in accordance with the law. The Minister was also ordered to pay the applicant's costs. This decision underscores the importance of providing adequate reasons for administrative decisions and ensuring that relevant factors, including the interests of dependent children, are properly considered in the decision-making process.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Minister be prohibited from taking any further steps to give affect to his purported decision under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 made on 25 May 2002.

2. The decision of the Minister purporting to have been made under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 on 25 May 2002 be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the Minister for reconsideration in accordance with law.

4. The Minister pay the Applicant’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Commonwealth appeared and submitted to any order which the Court might make other than as to costs. It was unclear whether any order was really sought against the Commonwealth and thus whether it was a necessary party. However, I refrained from dismissing the Commonwealth as a party upon the request of Senior Counsel for the Applicant not to so do.Background The Applicant came to Australia with his parents at age 14 on 14 October 1980. At that time he held a K 11 class visa and resided with his family in Sydney. In 1986, the Applicant’s parents became Australian citizens by naturalisation, but he did not become a citizen because, he said, he was not “ready” at the time to do so. The Applicant attended Ashcroft High School until year 10. He completed his School Certificate. Since leaving school, he has worked as a station assistant for CityRail, engaged in labouring and welding work, studied languages at TAFE in 1989 and 1990, and has worked in Spanish restaurants. The Applicant also commenced degrees in Arts, and Languages and Teaching, at the University of Western Sydney in 1994. The Applicant has resided in Australia for more than 23 years. The Applicant has had two long-term relationships in Australia. He has two sons from those relationships, Yves Lorenzo (currently aged 10) and Aiden Lorenzo (currently aged 15). Both of his children are Australian citizens by birth. Aiden lives with his mother in Brisbane. He has “very limited contact” with his father. Yves lives with his mother, Laura Sosa in Sydney. Both the Applicant and Yves’ mother, Laura Sosa, gave uncontested evidence in affidavits filed in the present proceedings that the relationship between Yves and his father was very close. Although the Applicant and Ms Sosa terminated their sexual relationship and ceased living together in May 1998, the Applicant has had daily contact with Yves, either by telephone or in person, and even during the periods of his incarceration. The Applicant, when at liberty, played soccer with his son, had meals with him, has taught him Spanish and took him on regular visits to his grandparents’ place. Both the Applicant and Ms Sosa say that deportation of the Applicant would have a devastating effect on Yves. I have no reason to doubt that this is the case. Ms Sosa also said that if the Applicant is deported, she would not have the financial means to take Yves to visit him. Her only source of income is a sole parent pension. During the period between 1993 and 2001, the Applicant was convicted of offences of larceny, possession of a prohibited drug, possession of equipment for administering a prohibited drug, self-administering a prohibited drug, entering inclosed land not prescribed without lawful excuse, goods in personal custody reasonably suspected of being stolen, shoplifting, goods in personal custody, common assault, contravening apprehended domestic violence order, smoking Indian Hemp, offensive behaviour, resisting arrest, refusal to leave premises, failure to leave licensed premises, cancelled driver, MID PCA and drive whilst cancelled, and supplying a prohibited drug. The sentences imposed as a result of these convictions were cumulatively in excess of 2 years.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the letter which was not sent, Ms Sosa had written that her son adored this father. She said that her son did not deserve to grow up without a father and that she did not dare to think “of the grief and desperation Julio’s mother will have to endure or the effect that it will have on my son if Julio was to be deported.”The evidence of the Applicant’s mother An affidavit of Paulina Lorenzo, the Applicant’s mother, was also read in the proceedings. In that affidavit she deposed that at no time had anyone from the Department ever contacted her about her son and the effect deportation of the Applicant would have upon the family including herself. She said that if contacted she would have said that Yves loved and worshiped his father, the Applicant, and that he loved and adored Yves. The two were, she said, very close. She said that they would come to see her every Sunday and spend the whole day with her and that the family days were very special. She said that Yves spent a lot of time with her son and that if he were to be deported to Spain it would have a terrible effect on her and her husband. They were a very close family. She said also that she and her husband had sold their previous house to purchase a house which had an extension where the Applicant could live with them and where they could look after him. She said that she would find it financially very difficult to travel to Spain to see the Applicant if he were deported.The Ministerial Submission As already noted there was prepared for the Minister a document entitled Issues for Consideration of Possible Cancellation of Mr Lorenzo’s Visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 . That document is hereafter referred to as “the submission”. There is a question which arises as to the significance the submission played in the decision made by the Minister. The Minister did not comply with the obligations imposed upon him by s 501G of the Act to provide timely reasons for his decision. In fact a document said to be the Minister’s reasons prepared after the present proceedings had been commenced and some twelve months after the making of the decision was sought to be adduced in evidence. In my view the document was not admissible in the form it was sought to be tendered : Preston v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCA 107 per French J. It was not the subject of an affidavit swearing to its correctness. It was prepared after litigation commenced and, while no time is set out in s 501G for the preparation and service of reasons, it is clear that the legislative intention was that reasons would be given within a reasonable time. On no view can provision of reasons more than 12 months after the making of the decision be seen to be compliance with the Act so that the document containing the reasons might be admissible as a business record. However, even if it were admissible as a business record, it would be impossible to give any weight to what is said in it: Dagli v Minister [2003] FCA 298; Preston v Minister for Immigration & Multicultuiral & Indigenous Afffairs (no 2). Counsel for the Minister conceded that on the present state of the authorities the tender of the document should be rejected. Accordingly I rejected it. However, that leaves the question of the status of the submission.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HILL J
As to the Constitutional issue, it too is hopeless. The submission is that s 501 in some way infringes Chapter 3 of the Constitution in that it involves the Minister exercising judicial power. In my view, s 501 does not operate to permit the executive to impose a penalty for the commission of an offence. Rather it permits the executive to determine whether it is or is not appropriate for a person who has committed an offence of a prescribed kind to remain in Australia. The question what non-citizens may remain in the country is a question conferred upon the executive by legislation validly enacted under s 51(xix) of the Constitution: Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 30-31. It does not involve the exercise of judicial power.Conclusion Accordingly, I order that the Minister be prohibited from taking any further steps to give affect to his purported decision under s 501(2) of the Act, made on 25 May 2002. I also order that that decision be set aside and that the application be remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law. The Minister is ordered to pay the Applicant’s costs of the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HILL J

This submission may be easily rejected. First, s 501G itself provides that failure to provide reasons does not affect the validity of the decision, whereas the submission if accepted would have the consequence that every decision unsupported by a timely provision of reasons would be taken to be made without reason and thus invalid. Second, and more importantly, the High Court has rejected a submission that failure to provide reasons constitutes jurisdictional error: Re Minister for Immigration & multicultural & Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 77 ALJR 1829 at [46] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon J, and at [55] per McHugh J and at [109] per Kirby J.Grounds 2 and 3 – Procedural fairness – the very serious offence – an irrelevant consideration? I have already indicated my view that the reference to “very serious offence” was a reference to the offence of supply. As I understand the submission it is said that the Minister characterised the offences for which the Applicant was convicted as being either serious, or in the one case, “very serious”, and that the Applicant was not given the opportunity of responding to this characterisation of the offences. There is the problem that in the absence of reasons it can not be said to be clear that the Minister adopted the characterisation appearing in the submissions. But even if he did it is difficult to say that there is any procedural unfairness to the Applicant here. The Applicant knew, or ought to have known, that the Minister was to engage in a process which involved considering the Applicant’s criminal record. There is no suggestion that the record as enumerated in the submission was wrong. It was correct. Further it could hardly be said that all of the convictions were trivial. Importantly, here, however, the seriousness of the offences is capable of being judged by reference to the sentences imposed on conviction. In the circumstances it is difficult to see that there was any obligation upon the Minister to seek specific comment from the Applicant about the classification of the offences as serious. Further, it can hardly be said that the characterisation of offences as serious or very serious involves an irrelevant consideration, if indeed, the characterisation was one adopted by the Minister. What s 501 relevantly is concerned with is the conviction of a visa holder of offences which, cumulatively, involve custodial sentences of two years or more. That is the necessary precondition to the exercise of the power to cancel under the section. The discretion conferred upon the Minister enables the Minister to weigh any relevant matter against the criminal record of the visa holder. In the exercise of the discretion the Minister will be entitled to consider the seriousness of the offences against such other matters as may be favourable to the visa holder. The characterisation of the seriousness of the relevant offence is thus not irrelevant.Grounds 4, 5 and 6 The principal argument on behalf of the Applicant was that the decision of the Minister miscarried in his consideration of the interests of the child. It is submitted that the Applicant was denied natural justice or alternatively that the Minister gave no real consideration to the rights of the child or for that matter, the family of the Applicant.