Lord Energy SA v The Ship “MV Dangjin”

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lord Energy SA v The Ship “MV Dangjin” [2018] FCA 1717

File number: NSD 1982 of 2018
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 7 November 2018
Catchwords: ADMIRALTY – where debtor as settlor transferred to trustee legal title to ship under trust for benefit of security holder – where ship registered in name of trustee hold as security for debtor’s performance of obligation to repay bank the value of bonds issued by debtor – where term of bonds fixed but agreement referred to earlier possible repayment in full when trust would come to an end – whether debtor legally unable to regain legal title to ship by repaying bonds early in full – where trust established under Korean Trust Act for specific purpose of trustee holding debtor’s ship as security for sum needed to redeem bonds – whether debtor was beneficial owner of ship while it was held in trust for purposes of s 19(b) of Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) – whether debtor’s interest in ship analogous to mortgagor’s equity of redemption
Legislation:

Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 17, 18, 19

Trust Act (Act No. 12592, May 20, 2014) (Republic of Korea)

Cases cited:

Casborne v Scarfe (1735) 1 Atk 603

Ciaglia v Ciaglia (2010) 269 ALR 175

City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v FCT (1948) 77 CLR 363

G and CKreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Company Limited [1914] AC 25

Heath v Pugh (1881) 6 QBD 345

In re Sir Thomas Spencer Wells: Swinburne Hanham v Howard [1933] Ch 29

Kent v SS “Maria Luisa” (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 12

Noakes & Co Limited v Rice [1902] AC 24

Pugh v Heath (1882) 7 App Cas 235

Schmeling v Stankovic (1984) 1 BPR 1

Shagang Shipping Co Ltd v Ship “Bulk Peace” (as surrogate for Ship “Dong-A Astrea”) (2014) 314 ALR 230

The Owners of the Ship “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404

Tisand Pty Ltd v The Owners of the Ship MV Cape Moreton (Ex Freya) (2005) 143 FCR 43

Date of hearing: 6 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Admiralty and Maritime
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 78
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A M Stewart SC and Mr J S Emmett
Solicitor for the Applicant: HFW Australia
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr E G H Cox SC and Ms C O Gleeson
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Holding Redlich

ORDERS

NSD 1982 of 2018
BETWEEN:

LORD ENERGY SA (and another named in the schedule)

Plaintiff

AND:

THE SHIP “MV DANGJIN” AS SURROGATE FOR THE SHIP “DS VALENTINA”

Defendant

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application filed on 30 October 2018 be dismissed.

2.The applicant on the interlocutory application, Korea Shipping Corporation, pay the plaintiff’s costs of the interlocutory application.

3.The proceeding be stood over for case management to 9 November 2018 at 9.30am.

Note:    Entry of…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1717
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved a dispute between Lord Energy SA and the ship MV Dangjin, registered in the name of a trustee under a trust agreement. The dispute centred on whether Korea Shipping Corporation (KSC), the debtor, could be considered the owner of the ship for the purposes of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth). The court had to determine whether KSC could legally regain title to the ship by repaying bonds early in full and if its interest in the ship was analogous to a mortgagor's equity of redemption. The legal issue hinged on interpreting the nature of the trust established under Korean law and its implications on ownership under Australian admiralty law.

The court examined the nature of the trust established under the Korean Trust Act, which held the ship as security for the repayment of bonds. The court found that KSC had real and complete control over the ship and its operations, with its sole obligation being to repay the bank. The court concluded that KSC's inability to repay the debt early and its lack of right to dispose of the ship did not preclude it from being considered the owner of the ship. The court reasoned that the concept of ownership in Australian admiralty law requires a demonstration of ultimate control and title, not merely influence or control over commercial disposition.

The court found that KSC was the owner of the ship for the purposes of s 19(b) of the Admiralty Act, granting the court jurisdiction over the matter. The court dismissed KSC's interlocutory application and ordered KSC to pay Lord Energy's costs. The proceeding was stood over for case management.

This case highlights the importance of understanding the nuances of ownership and control in admiralty law, particularly in the context of international transactions and trust agreements. The court's decision underscores that ultimate control and title are key factors in determining ownership, even in the presence of complex security arrangements.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed on 30 October 2018 be dismissed.

2. The applicant on the interlocutory application, Korea Shipping Corporation, pay the plaintiff’s costs of the interlocutory application.

3. The proceeding be stood over for case management to 9 November 2018 at 9.30am.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I infer that “the last payment date” in Art 29(1) is the date when payment in full has occurred so that nothing is then outstanding. That would be consistent with Art 2 of the Trust Act and Art 3 of the special agreement. To date, KSC has complied with its obligations under the special receivables contract by paying into the trust account the two instalments of KRW780 million that have fallen due thus far.The expert evidence Both parties relied on written reports by Korean lawyers, but it was common ground that they did not give any admissible evidence as to whether KSC had retained any beneficial interest in Dangjin after transferring to IBK the legal title in her and the right to be registered as owner as occurred on 15 March 2018. Lord Energy’s expert, K M Moon, said that KSC did not retain the right to dispose of the vessel but could only do so with the consent of IBK and the Bank. He said that the proceeds of any sale had to be applied to discharge KSC’s debt to the Bank before KSC could receive any balance in the trust account. KSC’s expert, Sung-Won Kwon, said that the provisions of Arts 98-101 of the Trust Act meant that even if the trust terminated, the trust property remained the beneficiary’s (scil: the Bank’s) property and it could retain it until it had recovered what was due in full. He said that the trustor had no right “on the property” until the debt had been paid in full. He also said that the effect of Art 22 of the Trust Act was to protect the ship from arrest because it was held in trust and that KSC “may not” have the right to terminate the trust at its “pleasure”.KSC’s submissions KSC contended that it had no right to repay the debt to the Bank early or to dispose of the ship because of the existence of the trust over Dangjin and the restrictions on bringing about any early termination contained in the various transaction documents. It contended that these considerations demonstrated that it was not capable of being characterised as the owner, in particular as the beneficial owner, of Dangjin, for the purposes of s 19(b) of the Admiralty Act having regard to the principles in Kent v SS “Maria Luisa” (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 12 at 36 [73]-[74] per Tamberlin and Hely JJ; Tisand Pty Ltd v The Owners of the Ship MV Cape Moreton (Ex Freya) (2005) 143 FCR 43 esp at 73-74 [118]-[122] per Ryan and Allsop JJ and Shagang Shipping Co Ltd v Ship “Bulk Peace” (as surrogate for Ship “Dong-A Astrea”) (2014) 314 ALR 230 at 234-235 [18]-[24] per Allsop CJ with whom McKerracher J concurred, 239 [47]-[49] per Rares J. KSC contended that the structure of the various agreements and Korean law in evidence was distinguishable from a transaction comparable to the Anglo-Australian concept of a mortgage in which the mortgagor retained an equity of redemption. KSC argued that both the contractual prohibitions on it from effecting early termination of the trust by repaying the debt in full and the fact that IBK held the ship in trust under the Trust Act, deprived KSC of the right to sell the ship and keep the proceeds of sale.Consideration

Decision

Reasons for decision

KSC had real and complete control of the ship, how she operated and where she sailed. It only owed money to the Bank whose sole interest, in combination with that of IBK, was having security over the ship and the marine freight receivables until KSC repaid its secured debt in full.Conclusion For these reasons, I find that KSC was the owner of Dangjin on 26 October 2018 for the purposes of s 19(b) of the Admiralty Act and the Court therefore has jurisdiction. KSC must pay Lord Energy’s costs of this jurisdictional issue.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

KSC contended that the structure of the various agreements and Korean law in evidence was distinguishable from a transaction comparable to the Anglo-Australian concept of a mortgage in which the mortgagor retained an equity of redemption. KSC argued that both the contractual prohibitions on it from effecting early termination of the trust by repaying the debt in full and the fact that IBK held the ship in trust under the Trust Act, deprived KSC of the right to sell the ship and keep the proceeds of sale.Consideration In Bulk Peace 314 ALR at 234-235 [19]-[20], [23], [24], Allsop CJ said:19 It is now necessary to deal with both the test to be applied for that conclusion, as well as the evidence that has been led. The test in Australia is not in doubt. The concept of the owner has been analysed in a number of cases in this court, all consistent with each other. In Kent v SS ‘Maria Luisa’ (No 2) ((2003) 130 FCR 12); [2003] FCAFC 93, the Full Court dismissed an appeal from Beaumont J, reported at [130 FCR 1]. By majority of Tamberlin J and Hely J, the notion of the owner was dealt with in terms that reflected the discussion in the Australian Law Reform Commission Report No 33, Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction, and reflected the proprietary and property based analysis applied in England, and the refusal to follow Brandon J’s practical view of a ship owning person in Medway Drydock and Engineering Co v Owners of the MV Andrea Ursula (The Andrea Ursula) [1973] QB 265; [1971] Lloyd’s Rep 145. 20 I refer to, in particular, at [61] and following in the reasons of the majority in the Maria Luisa. Nothing I now say should be taken as an attempt to rework anything said by Tamberlin J and Hely J, or Ryan J and myself in Tisand Pty Ltd v Owners of the Ship MV “Cape Moreton” (ex “Freya”) (2005) 143 FCR 43; [2005] FCAFC 68 at [100] – [122]. Broadly speaking, and with that caveat, what is required is to show what the evidence says about questions of property, such that it can be concluded that the relevant person has the right both to make physical use of the vessel and to sell and in effect keep the proceeds of a disposition of sale of the vessel. It involves connotations of dominance, ultimate control, and ultimate title. It is not sufficiently reflected in a notion of influence or control. It is the right of dominion and true ownership. …23 … an arresting party needs to be able to demonstrate ownership of a surrogate ship by the relevant person, not merely a degree of control, even a high degree of control, over the commercial disposition of the ship.24 Mr Justice Brandon pungently put it in the Andrea Ursula that shipping was not conducted by equity lawyers, but “shipping men”. He asked where the money went. (emphasis added) In my concurring judgment, with which the Chief Justice also agreed, I said (314 ALR at 239 [47]-[49]):47 … the concepts of owner, and ownership, of property were, as the Chief Justice has discussed, explored in great detail in, among other cases, Tisand Pty Ltd v The Owners of the Ship MV Cape Moreton (Ex Freya) (2005) 143 FCR 43. There, Ryan and Allsop JJ explained that notions of “property” and “ownership” were not amenable to crisp, comprehensive definition in the abstract and that, in the context of s 19(b), they involve the possession and enjoyment of dominion over, and power or right to dispose of, a chattel of a kind that is usually engaged in a commercial enterprise. They said (at 143 FCR at 73 [119]) that in that context, “the word ‘ownership’ or ‘owner’ connotes the right or power to have and dispose of dominion, possession and enjoyment of the ship, subject, of course, to intervening interests”.48 There is a distinction between the notion of the control as an incident of ownership that is, or is able to be, exercised by a person who, in fact, has dominion over property from the control over a company that owns the property that is, or is able to be exercised, by a person who is in the position of an actual or a shadow director or a holding company: see the discussion in Ho v Akai Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2006) 24 ACLC 1526 at [21], [73]-[75] per Finn, Weinberg and Rares JJ. …49 As the Chief Justice has indicated, it is important to ensure that a creditor who seeks to invoke the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction to arrest a vessel and compel a person who is, relevantly, the beneficial owner of the vessel to meet its obligations does not invite the court to do so on insufficient or inexact evidence. Nor is it appropriate for a creditor to use the power to arrest a vessel as a mere opportunity to seek subsequently to engage in a fishing expedition to determine whether, later, enough evidence to justify the arrest will emerge if it can be obtained by the Court’s compulsory processes. (emphasis added)