FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Lord Energy SA v The Ship “MV Dangjin” [2018] FCA 1717
File number: NSD 1982 of 2018 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 7 November 2018 Catchwords: ADMIRALTY – where debtor as settlor transferred to trustee legal title to ship under trust for benefit of security holder – where ship registered in name of trustee hold as security for debtor’s performance of obligation to repay bank the value of bonds issued by debtor – where term of bonds fixed but agreement referred to earlier possible repayment in full when trust would come to an end – whether debtor legally unable to regain legal title to ship by repaying bonds early in full – where trust established under Korean Trust Act for specific purpose of trustee holding debtor’s ship as security for sum needed to redeem bonds – whether debtor was beneficial owner of ship while it was held in trust for purposes of s 19(b) of Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) – whether debtor’s interest in ship analogous to mortgagor’s equity of redemption Legislation: Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 17, 18, 19
Trust Act (Act No. 12592, May 20, 2014) (Republic of Korea)
Cases cited: Casborne v Scarfe (1735) 1 Atk 603
Ciaglia v Ciaglia (2010) 269 ALR 175
City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v FCT (1948) 77 CLR 363
G and CKreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Company Limited [1914] AC 25
In re Sir Thomas Spencer Wells: Swinburne Hanham v Howard [1933] Ch 29
Kent v SS “Maria Luisa” (No 2) (2003) 130 FCR 12
Noakes & Co Limited v Rice [1902] AC 24
Pugh v Heath (1882) 7 App Cas 235
Schmeling v Stankovic (1984) 1 BPR 1
Shagang Shipping Co Ltd v Ship “Bulk Peace” (as surrogate for Ship “Dong-A Astrea”) (2014) 314 ALR 230
The Owners of the Ship “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404
Tisand Pty Ltd v The Owners of the Ship MV Cape Moreton (Ex Freya) (2005) 143 FCR 43
Date of hearing: 6 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Admiralty and Maritime Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 78 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A M Stewart SC and Mr J S Emmett Solicitor for the Applicant: HFW Australia Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr E G H Cox SC and Ms C O Gleeson Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Holding Redlich ORDERS
NSD 1982 of 2018 BETWEEN: LORD ENERGY SA (and another named in the schedule)
Plaintiff
AND: THE SHIP “MV DANGJIN” AS SURROGATE FOR THE SHIP “DS VALENTINA”
Defendant
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 NOVEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application filed on 30 October 2018 be dismissed.
2.The applicant on the interlocutory application, Korea Shipping Corporation, pay the plaintiff’s costs of the interlocutory application.
3.The proceeding be stood over for case management to 9 November 2018 at 9.30am.
Note: Entry of…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1717
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of the trust established under the Korean Trust Act, which held the ship as security for the repayment of bonds. The court found that KSC had real and complete control over the ship and its operations, with its sole obligation being to repay the bank. The court concluded that KSC's inability to repay the debt early and its lack of right to dispose of the ship did not preclude it from being considered the owner of the ship. The court reasoned that the concept of ownership in Australian admiralty law requires a demonstration of ultimate control and title, not merely influence or control over commercial disposition.
The court found that KSC was the owner of the ship for the purposes of s 19(b) of the Admiralty Act, granting the court jurisdiction over the matter. The court dismissed KSC's interlocutory application and ordered KSC to pay Lord Energy's costs. The proceeding was stood over for case management.
This case highlights the importance of understanding the nuances of ownership and control in admiralty law, particularly in the context of international transactions and trust agreements. The court's decision underscores that ultimate control and title are key factors in determining ownership, even in the presence of complex security arrangements.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application filed on 30 October 2018 be dismissed.
2. The applicant on the interlocutory application, Korea Shipping Corporation, pay the plaintiff’s costs of the interlocutory application.
3. The proceeding be stood over for case management to 9 November 2018 at 9.30am.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
KSC contended that the structure of the various agreements and Korean law in evidence was distinguishable from a transaction comparable to the Anglo-Australian concept of a mortgage in which the mortgagor retained an equity of redemption. KSC argued that both the contractual prohibitions on it from effecting early termination of the trust by repaying the debt in full and the fact that IBK held the ship in trust under the Trust Act, deprived KSC of the right to sell the ship and keep the proceeds of sale.Consideration In Bulk Peace 314 ALR at 234-235 [19]-[20], [23], [24], Allsop CJ said:19 It is now necessary to deal with both the test to be applied for that conclusion, as well as the evidence that has been led. The test in Australia is not in doubt. The concept of the owner has been analysed in a number of cases in this court, all consistent with each other. In Kent v SS ‘Maria Luisa’ (No 2) ((2003) 130 FCR 12); [2003] FCAFC 93, the Full Court dismissed an appeal from Beaumont J, reported at [130 FCR 1]. By majority of Tamberlin J and Hely J, the notion of the owner was dealt with in terms that reflected the discussion in the Australian Law Reform Commission Report No 33, Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction, and reflected the proprietary and property based analysis applied in England, and the refusal to follow Brandon J’s practical view of a ship owning person in Medway Drydock and Engineering Co v Owners of the MV Andrea Ursula (The Andrea Ursula) [1973] QB 265; [1971] Lloyd’s Rep 145. 20 I refer to, in particular, at [61] and following in the reasons of the majority in the Maria Luisa. Nothing I now say should be taken as an attempt to rework anything said by Tamberlin J and Hely J, or Ryan J and myself in Tisand Pty Ltd v Owners of the Ship MV “Cape Moreton” (ex “Freya”) (2005) 143 FCR 43; [2005] FCAFC 68 at [100] – [122]. Broadly speaking, and with that caveat, what is required is to show what the evidence says about questions of property, such that it can be concluded that the relevant person has the right both to make physical use of the vessel and to sell and in effect keep the proceeds of a disposition of sale of the vessel. It involves connotations of dominance, ultimate control, and ultimate title. It is not sufficiently reflected in a notion of influence or control. It is the right of dominion and true ownership. …23 … an arresting party needs to be able to demonstrate ownership of a surrogate ship by the relevant person, not merely a degree of control, even a high degree of control, over the commercial disposition of the ship.24 Mr Justice Brandon pungently put it in the Andrea Ursula that shipping was not conducted by equity lawyers, but “shipping men”. He asked where the money went. (emphasis added) In my concurring judgment, with which the Chief Justice also agreed, I said (314 ALR at 239 [47]-[49]):47 … the concepts of owner, and ownership, of property were, as the Chief Justice has discussed, explored in great detail in, among other cases, Tisand Pty Ltd v The Owners of the Ship MV Cape Moreton (Ex Freya) (2005) 143 FCR 43. There, Ryan and Allsop JJ explained that notions of “property” and “ownership” were not amenable to crisp, comprehensive definition in the abstract and that, in the context of s 19(b), they involve the possession and enjoyment of dominion over, and power or right to dispose of, a chattel of a kind that is usually engaged in a commercial enterprise. They said (at 143 FCR at 73 [119]) that in that context, “the word ‘ownership’ or ‘owner’ connotes the right or power to have and dispose of dominion, possession and enjoyment of the ship, subject, of course, to intervening interests”.48 There is a distinction between the notion of the control as an incident of ownership that is, or is able to be, exercised by a person who, in fact, has dominion over property from the control over a company that owns the property that is, or is able to be exercised, by a person who is in the position of an actual or a shadow director or a holding company: see the discussion in Ho v Akai Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2006) 24 ACLC 1526 at [21], [73]-[75] per Finn, Weinberg and Rares JJ. …49 As the Chief Justice has indicated, it is important to ensure that a creditor who seeks to invoke the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction to arrest a vessel and compel a person who is, relevantly, the beneficial owner of the vessel to meet its obligations does not invite the court to do so on insufficient or inexact evidence. Nor is it appropriate for a creditor to use the power to arrest a vessel as a mere opportunity to seek subsequently to engage in a fishing expedition to determine whether, later, enough evidence to justify the arrest will emerge if it can be obtained by the Court’s compulsory processes. (emphasis added)