Lonie v Gryph Investments Pty Ltd
[2015] VMC 26
•15 June 2015
| IN THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF VICTORIA |
AT MELBOURNE
E13197486
| JANIS ELIZABETH LONIE | Plaintiff |
| V | |
| GRYPH INVESTMENTS PTY LTD | Defendant |
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MAGISTRATE: | Magistrate B.R. Wright |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 26, 27 May & 9 June 2015 |
DATE OF DECISION: | 15 June 2015 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Lonie v Gryph Investments Pty Ltd |
REASONS FOR DECISION
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Catchwords:
Workers Compensation – Denial of Liability – Injury After Leaving Place of Employment – Whether Arose Out Of or In Course of Employment – Whether “Incidental to Employment” –
Accident Compensation Act s 82, 83
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr S Loftus | Nowicki Carbone |
| For the Defendant | Mr B McKenzie | Minter Ellison |
HIS HONOUR:
1 Mrs Lonie is a 52 year old former bar manager who tripped and fell at the end of a working day very early in the morning of 7 October 2010 while walking between her workplace and her car.
2 She sustained major injuries to her left lower leg and ankle (“the incident”). There is no dispute about the medical issues and her continuing incapacity for work. The only issue for me to decide is the question of liability pursuant to the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (“the Act”).
3 Liability was initially admitted, but later reopened pursuant to a Notice of Termination dated 16 April 2014. It was alleged that the injury, and thus any resulting incapacity, occurred in circumstances which did not entitle her to benefits under the Act.
4 Mrs Lonie was the bar manager at the Gryph Bar (“the Bar”), which was located within the Caulfield Campus of Monash University. The defendant company, which was effectively owned by her nephew Mr Glen Carter, had recently taken over the lease of the Bar.
5 On 5 July 2010, there was a letter of offer for Mrs Lonie to be the manager. She started on 7 August 2010 doing preliminary work setting up paperwork, and administration systems and getting the Bar ready to open. She said the Bar had been in a rundown and unclean state prior to the defendant taking over.
6 The Bar actually opened for business in early September 2010. It had three aspects. Firstly, it was to be a functioning bar and bistro. Secondly, it was to provide catering services for various functions inside and outside the Bar premises. Thirdly, it was to provide practical training for hospitality students.
7 Her nephew ran courses for responsible service of alcohol and food and needed a functioning venue for these purposes. A separate company provided the trainer and trainees. Mrs Lonie merely had to supervise the operation of that aspect.
8 Mr Carter said that he wanted to build up the catering aspects of the Bar to provide such services to different parts of the campus. However, the main aspect was the Bar itself. This was open, on weekdays only, to students and members of the public. However, it occasionally ran functions there, which was the case on the night prior to the incident.
9 Mrs Lonie had extensive experience in running pubs and other licensed premises over many years. Mr Carter said that he had confidence she was able to run the Bar without any supervision by him. In the months prior to the Bar opening she worked at Mr Carter's main office at Seaford helping set up the Bar by way of computer accounting programs, induction manuals and recruiting staff. She set up a business plan with a view to simply walking in and starting the business straight away after settlement in early September 2010. She even cleaned the Bar area one weekend herself.
10 As the Bar had only been open one month before the incident it was still in the setting up stage. She needed to run around and get things and set up catering aspects more than she would normally be required to do if the business had been running much longer.
11 She undertook the usual duties a bar manager, namely, supervising and rostering staff and organising stock apart from the kitchen main orders. She was often first into the Bar at 7 am to open and may have stayed until 7 pm or earlier. Some nights she would stay later if there was a function there. She had no fixed hours and was very much “hands on” working at the Bar.
12 She would use her own car to purchase small items of alcohol and grocery items from a nearby liquor outlet, Dan Murphy's in Caulfield, and also a supermarket in Caulfield. She would get stationery needs from Officeworks and obtain cleaning products as well at times.
13 Before she started, she said she insisted to Mr Carter that she wanted a nearby car parking space for safety and security reasons. She was a female working early in the morning and late at times in areas where there were few people. Any people in the vicinity may have been drinking alcohol at the Bar. Mr Carter agreed to such a car park.
14 She made enquiries at the campus office and was given a contractors permit. This allowed her to park in one of two or three spots about 50 to 100 metres from the Bar. She said there may have been other contractor spaces on the campus, but these nearby areas were the only ones that she used. If she went out during the day and those spaces were occupied, she would park in other spots reserved for university staff or even the Bar/library loading bay at times. However, she and the staff would keep a lookout for when the contractor spaces were vacant. She or a member of her staff would shift her car then.
15 Evidence was given that the permit cost about $900 per annum. Mr Carter agreed that he paid for the permit through the defendant's business.
16 She said her car was always in the close contractor car spots when she left for the night. Most nights she would take work home as Mr Carter wanted details such as takings by the next day. She said that she did this about 30 % at the bar and 70 % of the time at home. She had a business laptop at the Bar and her own smaller laptop. This had a computer accounts program which was linked by the Internet to Mr Carter's office.
17 Otherwise, she might be out of the Bar during the day in relation to catering. She may go to customers, or potential customers, on the campus and check their needs, deliver food and later check on cleaning. She had been called in twice after hours because of an alarm on one occasion and an equipment failure on another.
18 On the night of the incident the Student Union had organised an Oktoberfest function for the students at the Bar. Special T-shirts were arranged for staff. The function ran late. It was the latest night she had been there. She had gone home earlier in the day, changed her clothes and later parked her car in the closest of the contractor car spots, about 50 to 100 metres from the Bar.
19
She left the Bar about 12.50 am in the morning of 7 October. She had a tote bag over her shoulder, which was about a half metre square. She only ever used this for work purposes. In the bag was her small laptop, a few of the
T-shirts she was going to launder at home and some daily till records, the rosters and order sheets.
20 As it was late at night she was going to compile the till sheets into a document for Mr Carter when she was working at home the next day. The bag only weighed a couple of kilos. She had arranged for Mr Carter to open the Bar the next day.
21 She left the Bar and walked down a ramp to Queens Avenue, which was where she had parked her car. The ramp had two sections with the lower half coming back on itself. At the halfway point of the ramp was a short cut worn track through a garden bed to the footpath. She used that track one to three times per day and said she saw many other people use that short cut. She stepped onto the track and shortly after, about halfway, she tripped on something and fell with her left leg under her buttocks. She was in severe pain. She has had a number of surgical interventions since.
22 In cross-examination she said that she did not know of any other “orange” contractor spots apart from those in Queens Avenue. She had only ever parked in Queens Avenue or in the loading bay. As stated, she seldom parked other than in the orange spots closest to the bar. Mr Carter would come to the business two to three times per week. He did arrange a couple of meetings at the Bar for his other businesses.
23 She agreed that she could have carried the tote bag on public transport if needed. However, she lived a considerable distance from the nearest railway station. It was doubtful that there was any train at that time of the incident anyway.
24 She always had the tote bag with her going to and from the Bar. She was adamant that she required the car park permit to be close to the Bar for safety and security purposes. The purchase of the orange contractors permit was the only option available on campus to ensure a close, regular and reserved spot. However, there was no specific individual car park space allocated to the Bar.
25 She took the documents and the laptop home as she was going to do the accounts at home the next day in view of the late finish that night. She agreed there was no mention of the bag in her Serious Injury Affidavit or Answers to Interrogatories in her common law proceedings in respect of the incident. She said that this did not seem important as she took the tote bag to and from work every day, even in her previous three to four pub jobs.
26 A work mate, Koulia Wells, was called first and largely corroborated the later evidence of Mrs Lonie. She initially worked at the Bar on bar work as a waitress and on catering before Mrs Lonie's injury. She took over the role as the manager after the incident.
27 After Mrs Lonie's injury, she took over the car park permit and used it. She said the orange car park spaces in Queens Avenue were about 50 to 100 metres away. She agreed there were orange car parks near the Student Union and in the multi level car park. These areas were further away from the Bar and in a different direction to the spots in Queens Avenue. She said she used those other spots occasionally.
28 She agreed with the general description of the car park area and the short cut track through the garden bed. She actually obtained two permits, for which the defendant paid $900 each. These were contractor permits which allowed visiting tradesmen and others to use the orange parking spots.
29
The night of the incident was a very late night for the Oktoberfest Student Union function, which finished about midnight to 12.30. She remembered saying goodnight to Mrs Lonie when Mrs Lonie left. She did not remember whether
Mrs Lonie was carrying anything. The next thing she remembered was the security staff telling her that someone had been injured.
30 As stated, she later took over the managerial role when Mrs Lonie was injured. She herself did not run any errands in her car in that role. If she worked late at night, which was not the usual situation, she wanted to park near the Bar as well. She left the employment of the defendant in 2013.
31 The final witness was Mr Glen Carter, Mrs Lonie's nephew and the effective owner of the defendant. He said he had difficulty remembering some matters as they happened five years ago. He had recently sold the Bar as the university had increased the rent markedly.
32 He had a number of other businesses, including in the hospitality training field. He had been looking for a suitable food/liquor venue for the practical training aspects of his other businesses, as well as having a bar venue involving catering as well.
33 He bought the business, obtaining a lease from the Student Union in 2010. He said it was rundown and dirty. He approached his aunt, Mrs Lonie, to run the business as he knew of her extensive experience in the food and liquor business and that she was well regarded. She had not worked for him before. He said he “sold her the job” on the basis of a lifestyle change. Unlike most other such businesses, it did not involve weekend work or much night work. There were very few students around at those times.
34 He would pay her well but wanted her to have overall responsibility, as he was not able to spend much time in the business. He was planning to visit there regularly and hold meetings for his other businesses as well. He wanted her to keep an eye on and supervise the training businesses at the Bar. He was “hands” off in relation to the Bar business. She had clear responsibilities and a job description. He only expected her to contact him with any problems if she was not able to handle them herself.
35 His main office would process wages and payments for goods and services as submitted by her. She had a software program on her till register and a computer to provide information on sales. As opposed to Mrs Lonie who said that he wanted the information within a day, he said that he expected the details on a weekly basis. She was provided with a laptop on which she kept rosters and marketing information as well as for sending emails to the central office. This would allow her to work from home and at weekends, which he expected her to do, as this could be disruptive time-wise at work.
36 He said that she would go at times to pick up supplies when needed and when prices were cheaper. She needed to drive herself for that purpose. She would also need to pick up marketing materials from the Seaford office. Obviously, most things would be delivered by suppliers. He said he did not remember any dedicated work vehicle for the Bar.
37 He remembered a specific discussion about a car park permit for her to be paid for by the defendant. It was difficult to park nearby without a permit. He did not arrange it personally, but authorised it and actually saw the permit later. He saw her car in those restricted parking places. He did not use the permit himself but parked in other areas. He paid for the permit through the business.
38 He encouraged her to go out and build up the catering business, as he wanted her to build up relationships with the university staff. In cross-examination he was taken through a signed statement he had made for the purposes of her claim in December 2012. He said he thought that she had dirty tea towels with her when she was going home on the night of the incident. He said that she was trying to save money by taking home some laundry to wash at home from time to time.
39 He agreed with his statement that her work at the venue had ceased that night prior to her being injured, but that her accounts work had not finished. She needed to go to different areas of the campus for catering deliveries from time to time. They had wanted to build up that aspect of the business of the Bar. He said the Bar was a tough business to get going, as it was rundown. In addition, there would be little business when there were university holidays.
40 He remembered they used university approved cleaners and security as it was difficult to get other contractors onsite because of the university's requirement for prior induction. The cleaners would come in each morning before the Bar opened. He remembered Mrs Lonie complaining of the quality of the cleaning. He remembered she cleaned the Bar one weekend including the bar area, public toilets, beer lines and temprites. She was responsible for any after hours issues such as alarms. He had observed her parking in the loading bay and delivering items. He had in fact parked in the loading bay himself.
41 He was not at the Bar on the night of the incident but went to see her in hospital the next day. He believed that she had “bits and pieces” of work business with her at the time of the incident.
42 Apart from some agreed facts, which I will detail later, that completes the evidence called before me.
43 It is common between the parties that Mrs Lonie had ceased work for the night and had left the Bar premises. She was on the campus grounds when she fell and was injured prior to getting to her car to drive home.
44 Prior to the 1992 amendments to the Act she would have been on a “protected journey” and thus be entitled to workers compensation benefits as a matter of course.
45 However, there is still an argument for her to obtain workers compensation benefits. There is what is known as the “Henderson principle” after Dixon J's judgment in Henderson v Commissioner for Railways (WA) (1937) 58 CLR 281. Dixon J stated at p.294:
"Where the accident arises shortly before the beginning of actual work or shortly after its cessation or in an interval when labour is suspended and it occurs at or near the scene of operations, the question whether it arises in the course of employment will depend on the nature and terms of the employment, on the circumstances in which the work is done and on what as a result the workman is reasonably required, expected or authorised to do in order to carry out his actual duties. That the workman is liable to the control of the employer is of some importance that he has not yet assumed the same relation to his employer's premises and work as an ordinary member of the public is another matter of weight." (emphasis added)
46 More recently in the VWA v Michaels [2009] 26 VR 88 the Court of Appeal dealt with a case where a university lecturer was injured in a bookshop while looking for books one week prior to commencing his employment. The court said at paragraphs 15-16:
"We accept that in general the greater the interval between the injury and the commencement of work the greater the employee's difficulty in demonstrating the required relationship. But this is an essentially factual issue which must be considered in all the circumstances. These circumstances will include the nature of the employment and the activity undertaken at the time of the injury and its relationship to the work which the employee was engaged to perform. What must be shown is that the injury was suffered in the course of activities done as part of the work which the employee was engaged to perform." (emphasis added)
47 In that case the Court of Appeal made the point that in the course of the employment was not the same as during the employment and that the former phrase should not be considered in a rigid way limited to temporal proximity to the commencement of duties (at para. 16).
48 In Reid Stockfoods v Lindhe [2008] VSC 304 at para 17, Kyrou J in referring to cases applying the Henderson principle stated:
"they have required that there be a nexus (which has sometimes been very slight indeed) between the relevant activity and the work or service that the employee is employed to perform with most specifically referring to that activity as being incidental to the work or service."
49 He then went on to note that:
"a trend, however, can be discerned towards the adoption of a more liberal approach over the years to whether something is ‘in the course of employment’."
50 Both Counsel before me referred to a number of recent cases, including some decided by me, which considered the “Henderson principle”. Often the principle is referred to as the “incidental to employment” test.
51 In O'Dea v L'Oreal (del. 15 February 2012), a decision of mine, I ruled that a retail assistant was not entitled to benefits for an injury sustained in a shopping centre car park when on her way to work.
52 In Lukey v Mercy Public Hospital (del. 25 May 2012), I ruled that a nurse was entitled to workers compensation benefits after ceasing work and leaving the hospital building. She was injured later when crossing a shared area with another hospital before reaching the closest public street.
53 In Aloi v VWA (del. 31 October 2013), I ruled against a worker who had left a work area at the end of the day, but was injured when returning to the work area to pick up his wallet that he had left behind.
54 Finally, in Fletcher v AMRS (del. 2 May 2012), I upheld a claim for a travelling meter reader who was injured while on his way home in circumstances in which he was required to garage his work vehicle at home and not use it for private purposes. In that case, I also ruled that he was travelling for the purposes of employment.
55 In Shane v Kelly's Bakery (del. 19 September 2011) Magistrate Garnett ruled that a worker was entitled to workers compensation benefits in circumstances in which she was injured in a loading bay after finishing duties and leaving the work premises, but was in the process of returning to the workplace for work related purposes.
56 Of course, there is a danger in closely comparing fact situations in previous decisions to the relevant factual situation being considered in any one case. All of the above cases were decided applying the relative principles. I do not propose to go into some of the older well-known cases in this area such as Park v. Peach [1967] VR 558. These cases have been referred to in some of the Magistrates' Court decisions that I have already discussed.
57 A number of the earlier cases in this area such as Henderson itself arose out of circumstances in which workers were injured at or near railway camps where they had been living while working. More recently, as can be seen from the above cases, a common fact situation these days includes injuries at or near car parks close to a designated workplace. The present case is a good example.
58 More recently the “Henderson principle” was considered by Beach J at first instance in the VWA v Jones Lang Lasalle [2012] VSC 412. That was a case in which a worker slipped and fell on the ground floor of a city building in which she worked on the third floor. His Honour pointed out that the whole building was actually leased by the Victorian Public Service. His Honour held that the injuries occurred arising out of or in the course of her employment. He held that she was using a permitted, if not expected, means of gaining access to her work area. Further, she was in the building not as a member of the public, but only by virtue of her employment. In addition, she was proceeding in the building directly to her work area. She had to use the foyer to get to her place of work.
59 His Honour said that the question in such cases is essentially a factual issue, as to which I respectfully agree. He applied the reasoning similar to that applied by the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in Foster v Edwin Penfold (1934) 27 BWCC 240. In that case a commercial travel worker was killed after his car hit a bollard on a wharf. On the wharf was a garage leased by the employer. Its workers were allowed to park their cars on the wharf and used a private passage at the back of the employer's premises to gain access to the wharf. His employer paid him a weekly benefit towards the running costs of his vehicle. He would come to the office in the morning before his rounds and return in the afternoon to the office to enter up the results of his day's work.
60 The court held that the accident arose in the course of the employment. The worker had been using a permitted means of egress from his work and on a spot where he happened to be not as a member of the public, but only by virtue of his employment. It was immaterial who owned or controlled the spot where the accident occurred.
61 More recently in the County Court, His Honour Judge Misso found those two cases were "of considerable assistance" in determining his decision in Nikolaidis v Coles Supermarket & Ors [2013] VCC 1343. That case involved a worker who had finished his duties for the day. He was injured when he fell at a loading bay while on his way to his car which was parked in the shopping centre car park section designated for shopping centre employees only. He had not been directed to use the loading bay and connecting corridor which was at least a permitted way of accessing the car park. His Honour ruled the claim was work-related. He found that he was not using the corridor and loading bay "on a frolic of his own", but rather was using it by virtue of his employment to get to his car in the designated car park.
62 The Jones Lang Lasalle and Foster decisions were also referred to by Magistrate Maclean in Jakeman v Winslow Constructions (del. 10 September 2013). In that case after finishing work for the day a worker slipped and fell on a public road situated between a worksite and where he had parked his car. Her Honour found that there was no requirement or direction for him to park his car where he did. He was not carrying any tools and was not obliged to do so. She regarded him as being equated to a member of the public at the time of the incident and thus his nexus to the employment had ceased. She dismissed his claim.
63 There was some other reference to some other cases such as the Commonwealth of Australia v PYVW (2013) 250 CLR 246 at 61 which did not take the issue any further.
64 As I have stated there were some agreed facts between the parties as follows.
(1) The defendant admits that the plaintiff lodged a claim form under the Act on 11 October 2010 in respect of the incident for weekly payments and reasonable medical and like expenses and that that claim was accepted by CGU on behalf of the defendant.
(2) It is agreed that consequently the defendant paid weekly payments and reasonable medical and like expenses.
(3) A s.98C claim form was lodged on 6 December 2011 and accepted.
(4) The plaintiff was granted a serious injury certificate as to both pecuniary loss and non pecuniary loss on 11 September 2013.
65 Both Counsel then made submissions both as to the liability under the Act and as to the initial admission of liability for the same incident. I will deal with the general issue of liability first.
66 Counsel for the defendant highlighted that there was a fixed place of employment, Mrs Lonie had ceased work for the day and the car park was less than a hundred metres away. The area where she was parked was available to anyone with the appropriate permit. She did occasionally park elsewhere, albeit for short periods. There were other orange contractor parking areas on the campus. The Bar, and not the campus, was her workplace. He submitted that she used the tote bag to carry all the items including personal items and had used the same bag at previous employments. It was light enough to carry if she wanted to walk home or take public transport. Thus, the car was not necessary for work purposes. The tote bag was not implicated in the fall. The fact that she was going to do work at home did not mean that the journey was work related.
67 Counsel for Mrs Lonie submitted that she was carrying the tote bag to the car and was using the car to carry the bag home. In the bag there were work documents such as rosters and till printouts, together with some work T-shirts she was going to launder. It was irrelevant whether she did this daily or weekly. She required her car for work purposes every day especially at the set up stage that she was then conducting. There was no allocated separate work vehicle. She needed, and did use, her car to pick up ancillary items such as small items of alcohol, stationery and occasional food items the kitchen required. She needed the car to be close for safety and security reasons, having regard to the late hours she would work and the fact patrons of the Bar would be consuming alcohol.
68 There was uncontradicted evidence that Mrs Lonie only ever used the orange contractor parking spaces near to the Bar. If they were occupied she would otherwise park in nearby parking spaces in the same avenue or the loading dock. She and other staff would check frequently as to when an orange space became available. Most importantly, the defendant paid a relatively large fee of $900 per annum for her to use the orange contractor parking area. The only reason she was on the campus at the time was for work purposes. The defendant, through Mr Carter, "reasonably required expected or authorised" her to use the orange contractor parking area.
69 Substantially, I agree with the submissions of Counsel for Mrs Lonie that at the time she was injured she was in the course of her employment. I do so applying the principles set out by Dixon J in Henderson (supra) p.294.
70 She had ceased her actual duties a very short time prior to the incident and the incident occurred within a very short distance of the usual workplace. However, those aspects alone do not give an entitlement to workers compensation benefits in my opinion.
71 At the time she was undertaking an activity "reasonably required, expected or authorised" to carry out her duties. She was injured in circumstances incidental to her employment. More particularly, her duties required her to take documents and her laptop containing suitable business software home to complete documentation and records for her employer. This was not disputed. The course of the employment does not automatically cease at the end of a shift (see, Fitzgerald v Ainsby Rubber [1987] VR 437 at 441).
72 More importantly, with her employer's agreement she was using her own car to do so. The employer had paid a relatively large parking fee of $900 per annum for her to park her car in that area accordingly. There was no other specific work vehicle for her to use. The purpose of the permit was to park in a spot reserved for contractors and others within 50 to 100 metres of the Bar. At times she had to leave her car at other spots for a limited time if those other contractors spots were not available. However, she said that by the time she left at night her vehicle would always be in one of those specific contractor spots.
73 Whether or not she could have taken the bag home by public transport or parked in a contractor spot much further away is not to the point. She was using the closer contractor parking spot. Also, she was using the car for work related purposes at the time to take home documents, her laptop and some work laundry for later attention.
74 Further, there was another very good reason for the defendant to agree to pay for the parking permit. There were obvious safety and security concerns. As a female leaving licensed premises late at times and carrying a relatively large bag of documents and a laptop, she was rightly concerned. Further, the campus premises were virtually deserted late at night. She was the manager of bar premises which obviously had a significant cash turnover. She would be walking in an area where people may have been drinking alcohol at the Bar shortly before her leaving.
75 Again in the few weeks prior to the incident there was an increased need for her to use her own car for separate work purposes, namely collecting items such as amounts of alcohol, stationery and food items. Obviously, a close and regular parking area was required for this as well.
76 She would also have to visit Mr Carter in his Seaford office at times to collect items. She was unable to formally use the loading bay for parking as this was used by the campus library as well.
77 To a lesser extent she was still on the campus itself where the Bar stood. She had not ventured out into a public street or area away from the campus at the time. She was using a short direct route to the car. Although she was injured on a short cut through a garden bed, there was evidence from her and Ms Wells that they and many others used the short cut. There is no allegation of misconduct in this regard anyway.
78 On the balance of probabilities, she was injured in circumstances giving rise to an entitlement to benefits pursuant to the Act. Having regard to the cited cases and the overall circumstances of this case, she is entitled to a finding in her favour.
79 Finally, for the purposes of completeness I should refer to the submissions as to the effect of a previous admission of liability. As stated, the claim form lodged on 11 October 2010 and a s.98C claim made in December 2011 were accepted. Further, she was granted a serious injury certificate in September 2013.
80 Despite those previous admissions, the relevant Notice of Termination reopening liability was issued on 17 April 2014. There was only one aspect set out in the reasons for that decision, a medical report from a Dr Baynes which set out the history to him for the purposes of compiling a report on 31 October 2012, which was some 16 months before the Notice was issued. Of course, after that date the serious injury certificate was granted.
81 The defendant called no evidence or made no submission as to any change of circumstances or other reason to alter its previous three decisions to admit liability.
82 At the very least, it has been held that an acceptance of liability pursuant to s.98C amounts to a “very significant admission that a work related injury had been sustained” (see, Ansett v Taylor [2006] VSCA 171 at paras. 40 and 62, per Ashley JA).
83 Neither Counsel addressed me any further as to what extent I should take the previous admissions into account and any appropriate test for same. In Young v BPS Property Group (del. 11 June 2014), Magistrate Ginnane considered the issue and effect of such admissions and the need for a relevant party to call evidence to discharge its onus in displacing the weight that should otherwise be accorded to the admission.
84 In the present case the previous admissions and failure to give any reason for changing its attitude to liability, let alone calling evidence in that regard, certainly does not assist the defendant, to say the least.
85 As I have already determined that the defendant is liable to pay workers compensation benefits anyway in respect of the incident, it is not necessary for me to make any specific ruling on this point.
86 Therefore, I find that Mrs Lonie is entitled to workers compensation benefits. I seek Counsels' assistance as to the appropriate orders to be made in this regard.
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