Longworth v Allen

Case [2005] SASC 469


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

LONGWORTH v ALLEN

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Anderson

14 December 2005

SUCCESSION - EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

Plaintiff and defendant are sisters and beneficiaries under the will of their deceased brother – defendant is the executor and trustee of the will – the plaintiff’s son and two children of the defendant are also beneficiaries – long-running dispute between the plaintiff and defendant unrelated to the will – plaintiff made repeated requests for information about the administration of the estate – defendant’s solicitors asserted that a trustee was not obliged to report to beneficiaries during the administration of the estate – defendant followed this advice and failed to provide any information - distributed the estate but not the plaintiff’s share –distribution included the plaintiff’s infant son with the defendant acting as his trustee – defendant required the plaintiff to sign a release as a condition of her share of the estate – plaintiff alleged breaches of trustee’s duties by the defendant – whether proper to request a release from plaintiff – whether defendant required to distribute plaintiff’s share of estate – whether defendant entitled to be indemnified for her costs from the estate in defending the action – Held: defendant breached her duties as trustee in failing to respond to reasonable requests from the plaintiff as to progress reports on the administration of the estate – defendant required to distribute plaintiff’s share of the estate – defendant removed as trustee of the plaintiff’s son’s portion of the estate – defendant not entitled to be indemnified for costs out of the estate – defendant to pay her own costs – defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs to be taxed – plaintiff's costs to be paid on a solicitor/client basis from 2 November 2005 - plaintiff's claim upheld.

Trustee Act 1936 s36, s84B; Trustee Regulations 1996, referred to.
Plimsoll v Drake (No 2) (Unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, Zeeman J, 1 August 1995), discussed.
Skaftouros v Dimos [2002] VSC 198; Re Beddoe; Downes v Cottam [1893] 1 Ch 547; National Trustees Executors and Agency Company of Australasia Ltd v Barnes [1941] 64 CLR 268; Re Jones; Christmas v Jones [1897] 2 Ch 190; Rouse v IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd (No 3) [1999] SASC 208; Morris v McEwin & Anor [2005] SASC 284, considered.

LONGWORTH v ALLEN
[2005] SASC 469

Civil

ANDERSON J

INTRODUCTION

  1. The plaintiff and defendant are sisters.  This matter involves a long and bitter dispute between them.  Prior to the death of their brother they had not been on speaking terms for many years.  The dispute involves the administration of the estate of their late brother, Robert Anthony Quinn.

  2. By his last will and testament, Mr Quinn appointed the defendant to be the sole executrix and trustee of his estate.  The beneficiaries under the will were the defendant and her two children, Rachel and Simon, together with the plaintiff and her child, Sebastian.  The whole…

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Longworth v Allen [2005] SASC 469
Case
[2005] SASC 469
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Longworth v Allen, the plaintiff, Longworth, and the defendant, Allen, were sisters and beneficiaries under the will of their deceased brother, Quinn. Allen served as the executor and trustee of the will, while Longworth's son and Allen's two children were also beneficiaries. Longworth brought a claim against Allen, alleging breaches of trustee duties, including failure to provide information about the estate's administration and requiring Longworth to sign a release as a condition of her share of the estate. Allen had distributed the estate but withheld Longworth's share, and acted as trustee for Longworth's son's portion of the estate. The dispute also involved the deceased's dogs, with Allen giving them to Mrs Zimmerman without Longworth's consent.

The court was required to determine whether Allen breached her duties as trustee by failing to respond to Longworth's reasonable requests for information on the estate's administration, whether Allen was required to distribute Longworth's share of the estate, and whether Allen was entitled to be indemnified for her costs from the estate in defending the action. The court found that Allen breached her duties as trustee by failing to respond to Longworth's reasonable requests for information on the estate's administration. Allen was required to distribute Longworth's share of the estate, and Allen was removed as trustee of Longworth's son's portion of the estate. Allen was not entitled to be indemnified for costs out of the estate, and Allen was to pay her own costs. Allen was also to pay Longworth's costs to be taxed, with Longworth's costs to be paid on a solicitor/client basis from 2 November 2005. Longworth's claim was upheld.

The court's decision highlighted the importance of a trustee fulfilling their duties, including providing information to beneficiaries about the estate's administration. The court also emphasised the need for a trustee to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries, and not to use their position for personal gain. The decision serves as a reminder to executors and trustees to act with transparency and fairness when administering an estate.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Quinn, at the time of his death, had two dogs which, following his death, proved to be a major area of disagreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. It probably was the catalyst for what was to follow.BACKGROUND Both the plaintiff and defendant were half sisters of the deceased. The plaintiff and her son, Sebastian, were concerned with the welfare of the dogs following the death of the deceased. The defendant sought to dispose of the dogs by giving them to a Mrs Zimmerman who, after Mr Quinn’s death, produced a note signed by Mr Quinn but not witnessed, which authorised Mrs Zimmerman to “do what I have instructed her to do in regards to my three dogs”. I understand from discussions with counsel that one of those dogs had died by the time the dispute arose, and it was suggested that another, Vicki, was to be put down following Mr Quinn’s death. Immediately following the death of Mr Quinn, the dogs were cared for by a family, the Bakers, but Mrs Zimmerman, with the approval of the defendant, took the matter into her own hands, called the police, and attempted to register the dogs in her name with the local council. The Bakers, however, handed the dogs to the plaintiff who then took them to New South Wales. The dogs remained with the plaintiff, and one of them, Vicki – an Australian Sheepdog – is still in their possession. The other dog went missing some time after it went to New South Wales and has never been found. On 22 November, 11 days after Mr Quinn’s death, and after the plaintiff returned to New South Wales, solicitors engaged by the plaintiff wrote to the defendant in relation to the dogs. They alleged that the note produced by Mrs Zimmerman was of no legal effect. It was suggested that the dogs formed part of the assets of the deceased’s estate. A suggestion was made as to how the dogs should be valued and how the matter should be resolved. It was pointed out that the plaintiff had expended some $678 in getting the dogs from Whyalla to New South Wales. The plaintiff pointed out that she was happy to have both dogs and that she would pay a proportion of their value. Following that letter, the plaintiff wrote herself to solicitors, Hume Taylor & Co, who were acting in connection with the estate on the instructions of the defendant. Again, the letter related to the dogs. The plaintiff wrote again to Hume Taylor & Co in January 2002 when she had received no reply. This letter reiterated the plaintiff’s belief that the dogs should be regarded as assets of the estate. Hume Taylor & Co responded to the plaintiff by letter dated 23 January 2002. They advised that they were no longer acting and that new solicitors had been engaged, but that those solicitors in turn were no longer acting and that further solicitors, Hills Solicitors, had been engaged by the defendant and that the correspondence had been forwarded to them. The plaintiff wrote to Hills Solicitors on 24 October 2002. This was the first correspondence which related to any aspects other than the question of whether the dogs should be part of the estate. She asked whether probate had been applied for, and if so, when, and if not, why not. She also requested information about the assets and liabilities of the estate and whether any distributions had taken place.THE DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS AS EXECUTOR AND TRUSTEE

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

That then is the unfortunate history by which the matter came on for trial. It is necessary to refer to some parts of the evidence given in this court. Both the affidavit of the plaintiff and the affidavit of the defendant were tendered by consent as part of their evidence-in-chief and they were both cross-examined on their affidavits and testimony in court.EVIDENCE GIVEN In her affidavit, the plaintiff highlights the matters in respect of which she was seeking information as including real estate, monies in deposit in financial institutions, shares in listed companies, furniture, a motor vehicle, and an entitlement to an income tax refund, the two dogs, and photographs. She also deposes to the fact that on 9 December 2002 she instructed Hallam & Littlewood Solicitors to act on her behalf, and the following day she was present in their office when a telephone call was made to the defendant’s solicitors to obtain information on the progress of the estate. That was followed up on 18 December 2002 by a further telephone conversation to check on progress. On neither occasion did the solicitors for the defendant provide the solicitors for the plaintiff with any information. In relation to the release, the plaintiff says in her affidavit that at the time she was asked to sign that release, to the best of her knowledge there were still assets in the estate to be realised. These included the Telstra and OneSteel shares, and the taxation liability or refund for the 2002 tax year. None of those assets were referred to in the release. She indicates that she was not provided with the inventory of assets and liabilities as submitted for probate, nor details of Sebastian’s trust money and investment, nor details of the costs alleged to have been realised from her entitlement in the estate, nor photographs or copies thereof, and the issue of the dog remain unresolved. It was in those circumstances and for those reasons that the plaintiff sought to replace the defendant as trustee of her son’s entitlement. In the affidavit filed by the defendant, she confirms that having sighted the note made by her brother to Mrs Zimmerman, and after she obtained legal advice, she gave the dogs to Mrs Zimmerman. She also says that she asked others in the family including the plaintiff whether they wished to take and care for the dogs. She said that no-one expressed any interest. That seems quite surprising in view of the actions taken by the plaintiff immediately following the death of her brother, but no questions were directed to either the plaintiff or the defendant in cross-examination on that topic. In her affidavit, the defendant refers to some correspondence and then says:At the time of each of the letters there was no meaningful information which could genuinely be provided to any beneficiary regarding administration except that we had applied for, obtained a Grant of Probate and arranged for collection of the assets. In my view, that is quite an extraordinary statement because that is exactly the information that the plaintiff was seeking. She confirmed that it was her view, following receipt of the letter from the plaintiff’s solicitors, that it was, “both proper and prudent to complete administration of the estate and then report”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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