Longman v The King

Case [2025] SASCA 100

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Criminal)

LONGMAN v THE KING

[2025] SASCA 100

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Justice Bleby, the Honourable Justice Stanley and the Honourable Justice McDonald)

12 September 2025

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION - JOINT TRIAL OF SEVERAL COUNTS

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - ERROR OF LAW - PARTICULAR CASES INVOLVING ERROR OF LAW - FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS FOR DECISION - ADEQUACY OF REASONS

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - SEXUAL OFFENCES - JOINDER - JOINT TRIAL

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - CREDIBILITY - GENERALLY

This is an appeal against conviction.

The appellant was tried before a judge alone on multiple charges involving two child complainants who were unknown to each other, in that they had never spoken.

In relation to the first complainant, the charges were attempted rape (count 1), aggravated indecent assault in the alternative (count 2), rape (count 4), and aggravated indecent assault (count 5). In relation to the second complainant, the charge was sexual abuse of a child (count 3).

The offences were tried jointly as the trial judge found the evidence was cross-admissible for the purpose of similarity of account or improbability reasoning.

The appellant was convicted of counts 1 and 3 and acquitted on counts 4 and 5. As count 2 was an alternative to count 1, it was not further considered following the conviction on that count.

The grounds of appeal were that:

1.The trial judge erred in finding that the evidence was cross-admissible for similarity of account or improbability reasoning; and further, erred in not ordering a separate trial in respect of the complainants, resulting in a miscarriage of justice (ground 1);

2.The trial judge erred in his treatment of discreditable conduct evidence admitted under s 34P(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), or in the alternative, that his reasons were inadequate in explaining how the acquittals on counts 4 and 5 bore on his findings in relation to the other counts (ground 2); and

3.The trial judge’s reasons were inadequate in explaining the conviction on count 1, given the appellant was acquitted of counts 4 and 5, noting that the acquittal arose from a doubt held by the trial judge, who was troubled by the child’s failure to report the alleged offending in Count 4 at an earlier stage, ultimately challenging whether the trial judge properly applied his doubts regarding that child’s evidence in reaching the verdict on count 1 (ground 5).

Permission to appeal was granted on Grounds 2 and 5. Ground 1 was referred to the Court of Appeal for argument as on appeal and was therefore an application for permission to appeal.

The respondent contended that the evidence was properly cross-admissible and properly admitted, that the trial judge adequately addressed his reasons for using the discreditable conduct evidence,…

Continue reading Longman v The King

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Longman v The King [2025] SASCA 100
Case
[2025] SASCA 100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Longman, appealed against his convictions for attempted rape of a child and sexual abuse of a child, following a trial by judge alone. The charges related to two complainants, IRD and SRC. The appellant was convicted of attempted rape of IRD in 2013 and sexual abuse of SRC in 2016. He was acquitted of other charges relating to IRD concerning alleged offences in 2018.

The appeal raised several legal issues. Firstly, whether a miscarriage of justice occurred due to the joint trial of the counts relating to IRD and SRC. Secondly, whether the judge erred in his use of discreditable conduct evidence admitted under s 34P(2)(a) of the *Evidence Act 1929* (SA), or alternatively, whether the judge's reasons were inadequate in explaining how the verdict on the 2018 counts bore on his findings in relation to the other counts. Thirdly, whether the judge's reasons for verdict were inadequate in failing to properly explain the finding of guilt on the 2013 attempted rape charge when the appellant was found not guilty of the 2018 charges concerning IRD.

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia granted an extension of time for the appeal and permission to appeal on the first ground concerning the joint trial. However, it dismissed the appeal on this ground. The Court also dismissed the appeal on the second and third grounds, finding no error in the judge's reasoning or the adequacy of his reasons. The Court noted that the judge's finding of guilt on the attempted rape charge (count 1) was independently supported by the evidence of SL, who heard a noise and saw the appellant with IRD in her son's bedroom, and that the judge found IRD's evidence credible and the appellant's unsatisfactory. The judge's acquittal on the 2018 charges was based on a reasonable doubt arising from IRD's delayed complaint, which was not inconsistent with the conviction on count 1.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal against conviction. The appellant was convicted after a trial by judge alone of one count of attempted rape of the first complainant (IRD) contrary to s 48(1) and s 270A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (the CLCA), and one count of sexual abuse of a child, namely, of the second complainant (SRC), contrary to s 50 of the CLCA. In relation to IRD, the appellant was acquitted of one count of rape and one count of aggravated indecent assault. Factual background In 2013 IRD lived next door to the appellant. She turned nine on 13 October 2013. During this year, IRD and her brothers stayed overnight with the appellant and the appellant’s partner, SL, on two occasions while their mother (RD) was in hospital. On one of those occasions the appellant came into the bedroom where IRD was sleeping and tried to digitally penetrate her vagina. He placed his hand over her mouth. The appellant was convicted of this count (count 1). As an alternative to the charge of attempted rape, count 1, the appellant was charged with one count of aggravated indecent assault of IRD. In the circumstances of conviction on count 1 it was not necessary to decide this count (count 2). The appellant was also alleged to have committed offences of rape and aggravated indecent assault against IRD in 2018. The appellant and SL had separated by this time. The appellant lived on the Eyre Peninsula but returned to Adelaide occasionally to visit his son. On at least one occasion in 2018 the appellant stayed with IRD’s family. IRD alleged she awoke to the appellant digitally penetrating her. She went into RD’s room. While RD was in the bathroom the appellant came into the bedroom and rubbed IRD’s leg. The appellant was acquitted of the charges of rape and aggravated indecent assault in relation to these counts (counts 4 and 5). SRC is the daughter of LL, who is the sister of SL. SRC turned eight in January 2016. By 2016 the appellant and SL were living on the Eyre Peninsula. SRC and her brother were occasionally left overnight in the care of the appellant and SL. On multiple occasions when SRC was eight years of age the appellant came into the bedroom in which she was sleeping and carried her into another room where he digitally penetrated her vagina (count 3). The judge ruled that the evidence of IRD and SRC was cross-admissible for the purposes of similarity of account, or improbability reasoning. Grounds of appeal The appellant appeals from his convictions on three grounds.[1] ·first, a miscarriage of justice occurred by reason of the joint trial of the counts relating to IRD and SRC (ground 1); ·second, the judge erred, resulting in a miscarriage of justice, in the manner he used discreditable conduct evidence admitted pursuant to s 34P(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (Evidence Act), or in the alternative, the judge’s reasons were inadequate to explain how the verdict on counts 4 and 5 bore on the judge’s findings in relation to the other counts (ground 2); and·third, that the judge’s reasons for verdict were inadequate in that they did not properly explain the finding of guilt in relation to count 1 when he found the appellant not guilty in relation to counts 4 and 5 (ground 5). [1] Grounds 3 and 4 have been abandoned.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

An extension of time is required. The question of an extension of time was referred to this Court. The evidence at trial IRD, her mother RD and SL, all gave evidence on the prosecution case relevant to the offending against IRD. In relation to counts 1 and 2, in 2013 the appellant and SL lived next door to IRD and her family in Elizabeth Park. RD and SL were friends. In 2013 RD was pregnant with a child that was born on 29 November 2013. RD stayed in hospital overnight due to a complication with her pregnancy. IRD and her younger brothers stayed at the house occupied by the appellant and SL while their mother was in hospital. IRD slept in the appellant’s son’s bedroom which was just off the lounge room, while her brothers slept in the lounge room. IRD gave evidence that she awoke in the night to see the appellant in the doorway. He approached her and unzipped his fly. He placed his hands inside her shorts and underneath her underwear. IRD felt the appellant attempting to insert his penis into her vagina. She moved around and tried to say stop but he placed his hand over her mouth. He attempted to insert himself a number of times, but IRD kept attempting to wriggle away. IRD says that the accused stopped what he was doing to her when SL was heard in the lounge room. In relation to counts 4 and 5 the evidence was that the appellant and SL had moved from the house at Elizabeth Park to the Eyre Peninsula, but during 2018 he occasionally came to stay with IRD’s family. On one occasion IRD woke briefly to see the appellant in her bedroom, place his bedding down on the floor and then walk out again. She went back to sleep. She gave evidence of waking later to feel the appellant digitally penetrating her vagina. When she opened her eyes the appellant removed his fingers. He laid on the floor and she lifted her younger sister who was sleeping next to her and carried her into RD’s bedroom. She laid in RD’s bed and observed the appellant in the doorway of the bedroom. RD woke and went to the bathroom. The appellant came into the bedroom and placed his hand on IRD’s leg over the blanket and began rubbing his hand up and down. He asked whether he had upset her. IRD responded in the negative, thinking that was the quickest way to get rid of the appellant. He responded saying “Good, I’m not doing anything that will upset you”. He left the room. The appellant left IRD’s house the next morning. He returned later. IRD was on RD’s bed with her siblings and the appellant started to move closer to her. She “freaked out” and started kicking out with her legs and screaming at him to “fuck off”. The appellant left the house. In 2020 IRD met SRC at SL’s engagement party but they did not speak. This was the only occasion on which they were together. In cross-examination IRD said that she had overheard a conversation between RD and SL and recalled them saying something about how the appellant had sexually offended against SL, although she did not know any details.[2] IRD denied that either RD or SL had told her what to tell the police about the appellant.[2] R v Longman [2023] SADC 132 at [126]; Trial Transcript 36.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In relation to count 4 the judge was generally satisfied that the evidence of IRD was credible.[54] The judge did not reject her evidence, but felt a reasonable doubt given the failure by IRD to have complained earlier of the alleged rape. That doubt is not necessarily inconsistent with the judge’s verdict that the appellant was guilty of the charge of attempted rape in count 1. That evidence was independently supported by the evidence of SL of hearing a noise and seeing the appellant with IRD in her son’s bedroom.[55] The judge found IRD’s evidence was credible and the accused’s evidence unsatisfactory. The verdict further supported by the evidence of complaint accepted by the judge.[56] [54] R v Longman [2023] SADC 132 at [211].[55] R v Longman [2023] SADC 132 at [106]-[107].[56] R v Longman [2023] SADC 132 at [175].Conclusion We would grant the extension of time. We would grant permission to appeal on ground 1 but dismiss the appeal on this ground. We would dismiss grounds 2 and 5. We would dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.