Lombardo, Dante v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia

Case [1979] FCA 15


W

7-\

G .

IN THE FEDERAL COURT

v.>--

-

--

)

WESTERN

AIJSTR.4LIA

L ) I S T R I C T REGIST!?Y)

W. A . G .

No. G 2 6 oc

1';

->

GENERAL

D I V I S I O N

)

RETdEEN:

DANTE LOXDARDO

AND :

m-

5 March 1979.

REASONS FOR JL'DGI.IE:XT

The

taxpayer

s eeks

i cave

t c appea l

i ~ g a i n s t 3

d e c i s i o n of

t h e Supreme Court

of

Western A u s t r ~ l i a

d i s m i s s i n g h i s appea l

fro,^

a

( l e c i s i o ~ ~

of a B3zi-Ci ~f

XeirLcw

conf imi ing

assessnlcl:t:,

of

j~:c.on~c? t a x r u a a t

?

.

-

r e s p e c t of

t h e ycars cr~dcd 30 june

1966, 1969 &c3

19;:

SJickhm J. he ld thdt i ~ e

h:lci

r ~ i , jur isdic ' ; ;cn

1.1

e n t e r t a i n t he

tippeal,

addin&:

I I

. . .

t h a t slloulcl L

l>:.

ifrsilS L I I t h a t

conc lus ion ,

I

ha: L

bea rd

thz

~ . ~ l ' c i e ~ ; c e

of

ti l t .

p.irLics

2nd

t h e i r

\ J I : I ! ~ L ~ L ~ , - , L . ~ d

I BIJ

i n u

p c s ~ t i o n

i.o

.i,nkc a

d e c i ~ i i ) ~ ;

. ..

<hc)IrlC:

thc c a s e go any Curcl-,rr ~ ~ - 1 1 rcrurl-:eti i;o

I

I

me

f c r t h a t pl?r:-o.. -

.

Section 25(2 ) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 enables an application for leavc to appeal to be heard and determined by a single Judge or by a Full Court. The application came before me as a single Judge. This hss

some implications that I shall mention in thesc rc,,

A - r a n ~ .

The merits of the application were canvassed at some length by counsel for the taxpayer and the Commissioner and in view of the relative novelty of the application

I reserved my decision.

Section 196 (5 ) of the Income Tax Assessment ~ c t

1936, that makes Leave to appeal necessary, docs not

define the circumstances in whlch leave may be given nor

does it prescribc any criteria to be applied. Neverthclrss

there are provisions in the Act which throw sornt light

upon the exercise of this discretionary power.

Section 196 (5 ) itself contrasts the "lcave"

required to appeal to the Fcderal Court with the "spccial

leave" required to appeal to the High Court. Similar

expressions appeared in S. 35 of the Judiciary Act 100 3 ,

as it stood until 1976, although the rcfercnce to lc.1~~.

to appeal was in relation to interlocutory jud~ll~c~~~e

wherc otherwise an appeal would lie as of right. ~ o z

that reason the judgment ic Ex ?arte Buckncll (1335)

56 C.L.R. 2 2 1 is not entirely in point. But in thc collrse

of a joint judgment the Court emphasised thet in t h c c ~ s c

of an application for special leave,

"there rrlust be spccial circumstances in the

case in order to justify the granting of thc

application. ... But, in Lhe case of orders

from which an a p ~ c n l

dot? not Lie without- 1c:~vc

! 8 . 1 .

, ,

. .

..

i

%I-.,,:

J r j s . # L

- y ,

i :

- I S:

Lrcjr~ t,-.c- :.z

. . (::

L':L: sec t ~ . o n th~L

Lhc: c~I:-Lc:,.-,

of speclcil cl rcu ir.jt-.!nccr;

is not nndc necess:iry

in order to justify the grant of leave tu

appeal" (at p. 224).

Likewise , alt110~l;h Ft may be a t tcbL :i negati.ve

c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,

t he

e x i s l c n c c

of

s p e c i a l

circum:;t,~nccs

i s n o t neces sa ry be fo rc

l eave

t o appezl

Lo

the Federa l

Court may

be g ran ted .

S e c t i o n 196(1) of

t h e Income

rcix

Assessmc,nL- AcL

prov ides

f o r an

appea l

t o

a

Suprcn~e Ccur t

f r o l , ~

a11y

d e c i s i o n of

a Board

" t h a t

i nvo lves

qucsLion of

!nw"

The meaning of

t h a t e x p r r s s i o n has been cclnvns',cti

i n a

number

of

d e c i s i o n s .

See f u r insLancc IZrcw v .

I ~ L

d t r , l l

Commissioner of

Tnxntlon (1971) 45

A.L . J .R .

325,

(1971) 7 1 A.T.C.

4212.

I t 1 s n o t neces sa rv to r e f e r t o

them;

t h e p o i n t

i s t h a t t he

involvcmint of

a q u i s t ~ o n

of

law

i s a l l t h a t i s neces sa ry

t o ground

an ~ 1 ~ , 2 i z !

from a

Board

t o n

Supren~e Co:lrt.

2'0

appea l

f r o r i ~ a

Supreme

Court

t o t h e Fede ra l Court

l ezvc i s reqc~lrc:d.

The conc lus ion i s i n e v i t a b l e Lhnt

Lhe

existel:cc

of

a

q u e s t i o n of

l a w i s n o t of

i t s c l f cnough

t o ws~-r,lnt ~ l > . ~ t

l eave .

Something

e l s e i s r equ i r ed .

A

q u e s t i r > n of

lai:

t 'l.it

1s

impor tan t

o r of

g e n e r a l

application

i s ,

no

t i r r ~ r ' ~ t . ,

sufficient

bu t

t h c r e may

be

o t h c r

c o n s i d e r a t ~ o n s

t h : ~ t

j u s t i f y

l eave .

Thc

n o t i c e of

appea l

t o t h c Supreme

do~.~r :

i d e n t i f i e d Lhe

quesl . ior~s of

l a w involvcd

i n LIIC

(ILL

I $L01

of

t h e Bo3rd

i n t h i 5 way:

"l.

The

proper c o n s t r u c : ~ o n of

sec tic;^

2G(n!

of

t h e Inconk TAX Assess~ninL Act 1S)?6.

2 .

Whrthcr

t he

kpp t . l l :~n t acqui red

l i d s I ; ' ! i r e

,;l.

i n

Lhe

p r o p i , r - ~ i e s

r c f c r ~ e d

t o ~ I I

thi. rlcci ~ L ~ I I

I

I

of the Board of Review as

H c l m Strerl-" anci

I I Clay Land:,"

f o r Lhc purposi:

of p r o f ~ L

I ~ I : I ~ ~ : I ,

1 ,

t.7;

- . l ! ?

.

Before

t h e

Supreu~e C.ourt

t h e Co~iullj.ssioner submitted

t h a t no q u e s t i o n of

liiw was

involved.

Wickham J .

r e s e r v c d

d e c i s i o n

on

t h a t

q u e s t i o n u n t i l

hc

hLld heard

t h e ev idence ;

i n t h e end he accep ted

t h c

subnii.ssi on.

~ l t h o u g h

s e v e r a l questions of

law were claimer!

by

t h e

taxpayer

t o be

a t

l e a s t p o t e n t i a l l y

i n v o l v ~ d

I n

I I

t h e d e c i s i o n of

t h e Board,

Lhe

important

c l~ lcs t ic~n"

s a i d

t o war ran t

l eave w a s whether

a

t axpaye r ,

a s s e s s e d

under

t h e p r o v i s i o n s

of

s .26(a )

of

t h e

l n c o ~ ~ ~ c

Tax

Assessrne?it A c t , can appcnl t o n S~~prcn le

Court

a g a i n s t

. .

-

iii "... ." '.. 'l.,.

... . 0 ,~.-

a d e c i s i a n G:

a Eoard ;f

Rc-;i;v.

" L J

v L L W

C L L C

\ , 11C i C L<,,

cannot

be

p r o f f e r e d

i n t h a t wlde

form.

Thcrc

~zay be

d e c i s i o n s of

a Board concerning an a:,scssment

under

S . 26(a)

t h a t

i n c o n t e s t a b l y

involve

a

qut+st ion ~ f

l&\/,

hence

a r e appea l ab l e .

Deci , ; ions tur1,in;

on

t he m e n n i p r

I t

of "acquired" ,

"purpose" and

p r u f ~ t

~n:ikiilg by sdlr"

f a l l i n t o

t h l s

ca t ego ry .

was

r e a l l y say ing was

Lhat

t h e a p p l i c a t ~ o n

of a hLatuf-r,ry

p r o v i s i o n sus11 as s.?f>(:t)

Lo

the f a c t s ,IS

fo,lnd

("1 1 1

always involve a qucsLio11 of

l a w , c\,en whc>n t l > t 7 c.o.

-,

, , l

.

f a l l s

s h o r t

of

s ~ l y l n g

t h a t

t h c r e w:is

r!o

c v i d c n ~ c

or: ; - l

.:

t h e Board might reasonably have

reached i t s c ~ ~ n c l u s i

- ,

Wickh'ml

J .

d l d n o t a c c e p t Lhjs.

F1c

took a s h i s s::~r:

I I . :

polnt.

a

[ I ~ S L ~ S C .

from

thc

] L I O j r ~ ~ c n t

of F ~ ~ l l a ~ ~ ~ i -

.I.

I 11

tlavcs v . F~,d::l-al Corlu111

sL.-~,rlcr-

of

T,ix:it-]on

( 1 9 5 t ) !

' c

. l . I :

-

47 'it p .51:

"Where

t he

fnc t : l - l ,

p~-,,I,anduri

J i ~ v n l v e s

,l tc7rn

115(:d

I n a s l a t u i - ,

L h c <jU.!>!:Jill~

whcthcl- Llie

,, .

I 1

,

.

, 1-1 ,

*'!L. .

! c .

1

can

CC,, . i l ~ : . : - < ~ .

:,I-

<.I

(~: IC: .LLOII

oi

l:;\:''.

Wjckl~am J . was

cf

Lhe

view

t h a t

F u l l a k a r . I .

w a s s imply r e s t a t i n g what had

bcen

s a i d by

L,itl::~rn

C..J.

i n C o m i s s i o n e r of

Taxa t ion v.

M l l l e r

(1946)

73

C.I..R.

93

a t 97 a n d what

had been s a i d e a r l i e r by Lord ?,lrker

117

Farmer v.

c o t t o n ' s

T r u s t e e s (1915) A.C.

922 a t p.933.

There

i s a

d l f f e r e n c c of

language

Involved;

t he e a r l i e r

c a s e s

cxprc!ssly

inLroduccd

the

e l e ~ r ~ e n t

of

constructi .vn

by

speaking of

" the

provisions

p r o p e r l y cons t rued of

sornc

s t a t u t o r y enactment".

\.?lcth,?r

i n t he

cnJ

L l i c

t h r e c

Judges were clppljrin,

t he 5amc t e s t may bc a rguab lc .

S i t t i n g as

s

s i n g l e Judge,

h e a r ~ n g

an

a p p l l c a t l o n

f o r

leave

t o a p p e a l ,

I

do n o t

t h i n k i t i s f o r m e

t o

t r y ~o

r e s o l v e

t h a t

a:i;llmcnt.

My

i n q u i r y

shc~ulcl be

di r i cL id

;o

t he

e x i s t e n c e of

ac

a rguab lc q l lcs t lon ,

t he

i n p l i ~ a t ~ o ; ~ :

of

t h a t q u e s t i o n f o r t h c c a s e i n hand

and,

i f urgcd

s s a

reason f o r l e a v e ,

I L S

wiclcr

joll~1icatlon.s.

The

c o r r e c t n e s s

o r

ot t lerwise

of

t h e

dcc i r i c~ r l

cha l lenged nay

be

a

r e l e v a n t cons ideraLion when

Lhc

a p l , l i c ~ t i o n

i s be fo re

a

F u l l Cour t .

Frcder ic l -S v .

!lnv

--

(1973)

47

A . L . J . R .

362.

.C:j.tLing as

a

s l n g l e Jc.d;e,

l r a ~ - t i c u l a r l y

whcn

Lhc

c o r r c c t n r . . ; ~ of

Lhe

d e c i s i o n

11ot f : ; l ly

al-,:uc.d,

~ : - I L ) s j t ~ : . ~ t

ii:n I.= (11 f f c r e n t .

1;

~ L ~ I ,

C

i s gr ' lntcd,

Lhe I k l l Court 1:; n o t bound by any v ~ i v

r C

t h c l a w 1 t dke ,

ba t

~ t

silenis

Lo rnc

u n d c s ~ r a h l c

t ' :~ : l t

:.

s l n g l e Judgc should srnnl: l eave on

the ba:,is

tli;ar

I 11 ,

d e c i s i o n af

t h e Suprc11.e Court xris !:ron&.

That

15 '

1

n ; n t t c r f a r

t hc

F1111

C d u ; t .

I f

l e avc i s grnntcd and

1-tie a p ; x a l

i s uy,licld,

t he m a t t e r w i l l be

r en j - t t ed 1-0

Wickham J.

I t nqay IJL

t h a t

from

h l s l l o~ iou r ' s d e c i s i o n

l eave

Lo

appea l

w i l l

a g a i n be

sought ,

e i t h e r by

the

taxpayer

o r t h e

Corr~missioner.

That should n o t s t and i n Lhe way of

t h i s a p p l i c a l i o n .

For

Lhj s

tnxp.lyer

buLh t a a t i a l s u : , ~ ~

of

income

t a x are

involved ,

n o t on ly i n r e t p e c t of

t h e y e a r s a s s e s s e d

b u t ,

I

a11 t o l d ,

i

r

~

rcgarcl

t o

l a t e r y e a r s

f o r which

assessments

w l l l be

r a i s t d

a r i s i n g o u t

of

t h e

some

t r s n s d c t i o n s .

Thc

taxpayi r ' s

r e f r ~ r ~ q c e

t o tile 5oar.l ..vzs !?e?rd j p ~ z t !

- 7

: r j

L!?

! : !?PS-

--- - ---

of

h i s f a t h e r

and

b r o t h e r .

T h e ~ r

asscssrncrlts were

con£ irmc-d 311d the

co~~ ipe

L ncy

of

Lllclr

.~lq,e:li 1, ; J ~ I Y I . .I -

i n t he

Suprcrnc

Cour t ,

w i l l b~ a f f c c t c d ,

i f

n:)L

( ! c l 1-r,

. l l 3 . . i ,

by

a d c c l s i o n on ari appea l t ~ y

tl11s

taxpaycr .

I n my

view t h e s e a r e good

reasons

f o r SrL~ntLn,

l eave

t o a p p e a l ,

c s p ~ c i n l l

y as t h e r e

i s a

r1~1c::t

I:);I

l , +

l a w t o be

a rgued ,

t h e

answer

t o ~ i t i l c h

vay throb%,

1 1 <l'-

on t h e scope of

a p p e a l s from Boards of Revie;< t o S:II,L~I:,:

CourLs.

There w i l l be lpavc- Lo

the Laxpayer t o .?- l>~cL~I

!,t

t h s

r e q u e s t

of

t h e p a r t i e s

I

restervc

t h i ( luescit*, c81

c o s t s .

I f

t h e r e

i s any o t h e r

n u t t e r a r l s j r ~ g

frorn :l:&.

r e a sons ,

r e q u i r i n g

di r~ 'cLi011s

o r

any

p r o ~ ~ : c ~ u r a I .

UTL!L :-.

eiLtier parLy nay apply i.:~tt1111 1L( day:.

Details
AGLC
Lombardo, Dante v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [1979] FCA 15
Case
[1979] FCA 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the taxpayer, Dante Lombardo, sought leave to appeal a decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia that dismissed his appeal against a decision of a Board of Review confirming an assessment of income tax for the years ended 30 June 1966, 1969, and 1972. The primary legal issue was whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of a Board of Review concerning an assessment under section 26(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The taxpayer argued that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, while the Commissioner of Taxation contended that no question of law was involved.

The court examined the statutory provisions and case law relevant to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear appeals from decisions of a Board of Review. It noted that while an appeal to a Supreme Court from a decision of a Board of Review is only possible if a question of law is involved, the existence of a question of law is not sufficient to warrant leave to appeal. The court found that the Commissioner's argument that the application of a statutory provision to the facts always involves a question of law was not accepted. The court held that there was an arguable question of law regarding the scope of appeals from Boards of Review to Supreme Courts, which warranted granting leave to appeal. The court also noted the significant tax implications of the case, not only for the years assessed but also for future years, as well as the involvement of the taxpayer's family members.

The court granted leave to the taxpayer to appeal to the Full Court, reserving the question of costs. The decision highlighted the importance of considering the broader implications of a case when deciding whether to grant leave to appeal, particularly when there is an arguable question of law that may significantly impact the parties involved.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.