Loi (Administrator) v Veraz Enterprises Pty Ltd
[2016] FCA 1109
•9 September 2016
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Loi (Administrator) v Veraz Enterprises Pty Ltd; In the Matter of Homeland Furniture Wollongong Pty Ltd (Administrator Appointed)
[2016] FCA 1109
File number: NSD 1461 of 2016 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 9 September 2016 Catchwords: COSTS – whether costs should be awarded to the plaintiff on an indemnity basis – whether costs should be paid as a lump sum pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 436A, 436E, 438B, 438C, 439A, 440C and 443B
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), Pt VB
Federal Court Rules 2011, r 40.02(b)
Date of hearing: 9 September 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 44 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr RD Marshall Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Polczynski Lawyers Counsel for the Defendant: Dr B Douglas-Baker Solicitor for the Defendant: Holding Redlich ORDERS
NSD 1461 of 2016 IN THE MATTER OF HOMELAND FURNITURE WOLLONGONG PTY LTD (ACN 166 085 696) (ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTED)
BETWEEN: PATRICK LOI IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF HOMELAND FURNITURE WOLLONGONG PTY LTD (ACN 166 085 696) (ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTED)
Plaintiff
AND: VERAZ ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 068 927 980)
Defendant
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 SEPTEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Subject to the orders made below, the balance of the relief sought in the Originating Process be dismissed.
2.The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding on an indemnity basis.
3.Pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, the costs of the plaintiff payable by the defendant pursuant to Order 2 above be awarded in a lump sum instead of being taxed, the lump sum being $19,775.19 (inclusive of GST).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)FOSTER J:
The plaintiff was appointed administrator of Homeland Furniture Wollongong Pty Ltd (ACN 166 085 696) (Administrator Appointed) (the company) in the early evening of 16 August 2016.
On 1 September 2016, he commenced this proceeding.
The claims for relief made by the plaintiff in this proceeding concern premises known as Shop 1, 139 King Street, Warrawong, New South Wales (the premises).
The defendant is the owner of the premises.
Pursuant to a lease dated 1 November 2013, the defendant leased the premises to the company for a period of three years commencing on 1 November 2013 and ending on 31 October 2016, with an option to renew for a period of five years. The company defaulted in its obligations under the lease. As at the date when the present proceeding was commenced, the defendant was owed a substantial sum of money for unpaid rent.
Just before noon on 17 August 2016, the defendant took steps to exclude the company and the administrator from the premises. Those steps included changing the locks.
In response to the defendant’s retaking of possession of the premises, on 17 August 2016, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant care of its solicitor, Peter Noveski of Wollongong Legal. In that letter, the plaintiff explained the relevant law to the defendant. In particular, the plaintiff drew the defendant’s attention to the fact that, in light of his appointment as administrator, there were certain matters which were subject to what the plaintiff described as a “moratorium”. In particular, the plaintiff emphasised that:
(1)The defendant was no longer able to seize property of the company for non-payment of rent;
(2)The defendant was not able to terminate the lease by forcible re-entry;
(3)The defendant was not able to begin or to continue any Court proceedings against the company (including Court proceedings for forfeiture of the lease); and
(4)The defendant was not able to take any steps to enforce any security (for example, under a charged rent deposit).
The plaintiff went on to explain the effect of s 443B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) insofar as his personal liability for rent in respect of the premises was concerned. He made it clear to the defendant that he was not personally liable for rent up to 23 August 2016.
The plaintiff’s letter was answered on 17 August 2016 by an email from Mr Noveski who confirmed that he acted for the defendant. In that email, Mr Noveski said:
…
1.The director of my client is unfortunately unavailable to meet at 3pm today as originally discussed; and
2.Her position is that she has properly served a notice upon the tenant and taken possession of the premises prior to the ASIC form 505 being filed today. As such, no persons should enter the premises until further notice.
The point being taken on behalf of the defendant at this point in time was that the defendant had retaken possession of the premises prior to being informed of the appointment of the plaintiff as administrator of the company and, for that reason, had validly done so. The email from Mr Noveski was unequivocal in its assertion that the defendant had validly retaken possession of the premises.
This email provoked a response from the plaintiff by email sent at 9.42 pm on 17 August 2016. In that email, the plaintiff repeated his previous contentions concerning the legal position as a result of his appointment as administrator of the company. He also drew Mr Noveski’s attention to s 440C of the Act. He then said:
Clearly your client’s actions have hindered my ability to continue to trade the business, sell the business and assets to an interested party as a going concern, restructuring [sic] the Company through a deed of company arrangement, which is against the spirit of Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act. I note that when you [sic] client was in process of taking possession, I immediately called you to inform you of my appointment (at this time, the locks were not changed and the Company’s staff was still on site).
At this stage, I note that your client cannot trade the business from the Premises and the assets within the Premises are the properties [sic] of the Company and in the control of the Administrator. I request that your client gives me access of [sic] the Premises by no later than 18 August 2016 at 11am to allow Pickles Auction to value the assets on the Premises and remove the Company’s books and records (including computers) which I am entitled to under Section 438B of the Act. I require the records to conduct my statutory investigation into the affairs of the company.
At the time when that email was sent by the plaintiff, the defendant was continuing to assert as against the company and the administrator a right to payment of the arrears of rent in full.
After the email to which I have referred at [11] and [12] above was sent, the parties engaged in further correspondence concerning the question of access to the premises. It is not necessary to refer to all of the detail of that correspondence. The plaintiff took further formal steps to secure the books, records and property of the company and the defendant, through one stratagem or another, declined to permit access to the premises. At times the defendant said that it would provide access but, not only did it never do so, but it obfuscated, constantly advancing reasons as to why it was justified in not granting immediate access.
On 19 August 2016, the plaintiff again wrote to Mr Noveski. That letter was in the following terms (omitting formal parts):
RE: HOMELAND FURNITURE WOLLONGONG PTY LTD
(ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTED) ACN 166 085 696 (“the Company”)LEASED PREMISES: SHOP 1 139 KING STREET WARRAWONG NSW 2502
I was appointed Administrator of the above company on 16 August 2016 pursuant to Section 436A of the Corporations Act 2001 (“the Act”).
I have requested that your client, Veraz Enterprises Pty Ltd (“Veraz”), provides access to the premises for me to retrieve the books and records of the Company including the Company’s computer/electronic files on the Premises in my previous correspondence. Your client has not arranged a reasonable time for this to occur. Accordingly, enclosed is a notice under Section 438C of the Corporation Act 2001.
Please note that all the stock and plant and equipment on the Leased Premises remains the property of the Administrator and your client has no entitlement to them. In good faith with a view to resolve the matter, I have offered your client, in my email to you dated 18 August 2016, at 4.37pm, the following:
1.Veraz to allow the Company in administration to continue to trade and wind down the stock until the 6 September 2016 from the Leased Premises;
2.Veraz can take possession of the premises on 7 September 2016 and seek a new tenant;
3.Payment of $10,000 will be made to Veraz for providing access to the premises and sell down of the stock on 7 September 2016; and
4.The Administrator would agree to the immediate release of the security deposit totalling c$53,000.
In the event that I do not receive a satisfactory response to the above offer and requests, I intend to commence proceedings against Veraz in relation to the recovery of the assets from the Leased Premises, together with costs, without further notice. I reserve all rights for damages caused by Veraz’s action.
To the extent this is necessary, this letter and all related correspondence will be relied upon by me as Administrator on the question of costs.
(Emphasis in original)
The s 438C Notice sent under cover of that letter required the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff, at his business address, certain books, records and things as specified in the schedule attached to the Notice.
On 22 August 2016, Orbis Legal, who was then acting for the plaintiff, wrote on a “Without Prejudice Save as to Costs” basis to Mr Noveski demanding access to the premises. In that letter, the author threatened legal action if access was not immediately granted.
On the same day, Mr Noveski responded by letter dated 22 August 2016. Omitting formal parts, he said:
Veraz Enterprises Pty Ltd and Homeland Furniture Wollongong Pty Ltd (administrator appointed)
Premises: Shop 1/139 King Street, Warrawong
We refer to your letter of today.
We note the notice provided in your letter is unreasonable. The correspondence and demands for access to the premises received from you and the administrator are often made with less than 24 hours notice. This is unacceptable and unreasonable. We require further time to advise our client and obtain instructions.
We have made the administrator aware that the director of our client has been severely affected by this situation. She has been receiving medical assistance for stress and anxiety.
At no stage has our client objected to allowing access to the premises for the purposes of the administrator undertaking a review or valuation of the stock as requested. We simply need to arrange a time, as early as possible, which is suitable to both parties. We will advise you further in this regard before close of business tomorrow.
We note that we have been provided with inconsistent and unsubstantiated reports regarding the position of the company.
On 12 August 2016, Homeland Furniture Wollongong Pty Ltd (“HFW”) was in a position to pay our client a large sum of money and enter into a fresh lease. We now understand that there a [sic] nominal funds in the company’s account. We are unsure how this has occurred. The series of events and correspondence that we have received indicates that the company has been trading whilst insolvent for some time.
We understand that our client is the major creditor in the matter. We can indicate that it will be taking steps to ensure that the financials of HFW are properly audited and inspected.
We are instructed to request the following with respect to HFW:
1. A list of creditors to date;
2. A statement of the position of the company at the time that an administrator was appointed.
3. The 2015-2016 financials;
4. A current profit and loss statement and balance sheet.
Please advise when the administrator proposes to convene a meeting pursuant to section 439A of the Corporation Act 2001 [sic].
We await your reply.
Mr Noveski’s response provoked a further letter dated 22 August 2016 from Orbis Legal. That letter was marked “Without Prejudice Save as to Costs” and was in the following terms (omitting formal parts):
Homeland Furnitures Wollongong Pty Ltd (Administrator Appointed)
Premises: Shop 1/139 King Street, WarrawongAdministrator: Greengate Advisory (NSW) Pty Ltd
We refer to your letter of even date.
We are instructed that the Administrator has made multiple requests for access to the Premise [sic] since 17 August 2016. However, the Landlord has failed and continues to deny the Administrator access to the Premises.
Accordingly, the notice in our earlier letter today is measured and appropriate. Please be advised that we require a written confirmation on when the Administrator will be given access to the Premises by no later than 12:00pm tomorrow 23 August 2016.
If we do not receive any response from your client, the Administrator may be forced to immediate action to avoid further delays and hence achieve the best possible outcome for all creditors.
Please be advised that the Administrator requires access to the Premises to carry out valuation of the floor stock, and to retrieve stock and equipment belonging to Homeland Furnitures Wollongong Pty Ltd (“the Company”).
In respect of the financial position of the Company and the requested documents, please be advised that the Administrator is currently investigating the financials of the Company and the requested documents will be tabled at the second creditor’s meeting when it is convened pursuant to section 439A of the Corporation Act 2001 [sic].
We look forward to receiving your prompt response.
(Emphasis in original)
Mr Noveski responded by letter dated 23 August 2016 in which he said (omitting formal parts):
Veraz Enterprises Pty Ltd & Homeland Furniture Wollongong Pty Ltd (administrator appointed)
Premises: Shop 1/139 King Street, Warrawong
We refer to the above matter and to recent correspondence.
Access to Premises
In relation to the letter by Orbis Legal dated 22 August 2016 our client’s position is that it has at no time denied the administrator access to the premises. As stated in our previous letter of 22 August 2016, the director of our client company, Ms Voskra Mateska, has become unwell which has made it difficult for us to obtain instructions and assist with suitable arrangements for access.
We anticipate that access can be granted early next week however we await further instructions in this regard.
Medical condition of director of Veraz Enterprises Pty Ltd
The writer received a text message from Ms Mateska’s daughter earlier today stating that she visted Ms Mateska this morning and found her slurring and disorientated. We are instructed that Ms Mateska is taking a course of medication to deal with the stress of the present circumstances and an injury to her head. She has been advised by her doctor not to drive whilst under medication.
Ms Mateska attended the Emergency Department in Wollongong Hospital today. We attach a copy of a letter from Warrawong accident and Medical Centre to Wollongong Hospital dated 23 August 2016 for your information.
Our client considers that the repeated unreasonable demands by you with respect to access amounts to bullying and harassment. Numerous emails and letters are being sent to our client, often after hours, which do not provide our client sufficient time to obtain proper legal advice. This needs to stop.
Should proceedings be commenced by you prematurely, we put you on notice that your conduct will be a point of issue.
First Meeting of Creditors
We understand that the first creditors meeting will be held this Friday 26 August 2016.
For avoidance of doubt, we advise that:
1. Our client is a creditor; and
2. Our client or its representative will attend the first creditor [sic] meeting.
Neither we nor our client have received a formal notice of the meeting.
Please provide us with a copy of the Notice of the First Meeting of Creditors as required by section 436E of the Corporation Act 2001 [sic].
Statement of Company’s Business and affair [sic] by director
Section 438B of the Corporation Act 2001 [sic] requires the director to provide the administrator a statement of the company’s business, property, affairs and financial circumstances within 5 business days.
We request that a copy of the information provided by the director to be forwarded to us upon receipt of same by you.
We await receipt of the Notice of First Meeting of Creditor [sic] together with the other documents requested above.
(Emphasis in original)
On 25 August 2016, Mr Noveski informed the plaintiff by letter dated that day that the defendant was willing to make arrangements for access to the premises, but only after the plaintiff had provided to the defendant or its lawyer a list of the specific documents and items which he wished to remove. Under cover of the same letter, Mr Noveski lodged an informal proof of debt on behalf of the defendant in respect of unpaid rent for the premises. The amount claimed in that Proof of Debt was $255,132.14 (inclusive of GST).
This state of affairs produced further exchanges of correspondence and emails, during the course of which Mr Noveski repeated his previous assertion that the defendant had never denied access to the premises. One reason advanced by him in support of that assertion was that the director of the defendant, Ms Mateska, had been unwell and had not been able to facilitate access.
In the period between 25 and 29 August 2016, formal access was demanded by the solicitors for the plaintiff on 25 August 2016, on 26 August 2016 and on 29 August 2016.
On 30 August 2016, the solicitors for the plaintiff responded to two letters dated 30 August 2016 sent by the defendant to the plaintiff. In that letter, the plaintiff again made formal demand for access. That letter was in the following terms (omitting formal parts):
Homeland Furniture Wollongong Pty Limited (Administrator Appointed) (the Company)
Veraz Enterprises Pty LimitedShop 1/139 King Street, Warrawong
We refer to the two letters received today from your client directly and addressed to the Administrator.
On the basis that you were copied to the correspondence we have responded to you rather than your client.
Response to correspondence
At the outset your client should understand that the Administrator is in full control of the Company, that the director’s powers have been suspended and that he is acting independently. Any assertion otherwise from your client is defamatory and will be responded to accordingly.
Your client makes a number of assertions and allegations that are incorrect, inaccurate or misleading, and which requires a response as follows:
1.1 The Administrator was initially intending to trade the business on, but was prevented by your client changing the locks and refusing access to the premises. This remains the position;
1.2 Your client has [sic] and continues to refuse access. It is not open to your client to dictate the terms and conditions upon which access is to be granted;
1.3 The Administrator is investigating issues pertaining to the Company and its property and will report to creditors within his second report. If your client has any information or detail relevant to the trading of the Company or any other matter relating to the Company or its directors then she should provide it to the Administrator as soon as possible.
To date your client has provided the Administrator with a list of companies associated with the director and has referred to a “purchase order” which she has in her possession but has refused to provide a copy.
We note that this is now the second request to your client to provide such information that [sic] she has;
1.4 The Administrator has provided your client with a complete listing of creditors as previously requested. We attach the list of creditors with the associate [sic] value of their debt as now requested;
1.5 The actions of your client to date is [sic] serving only to increase the costs of the administration and reduce the return to creditors;
1.6 If your client has a proposal to make in relation to the future of the Company or its property then she should put it in writing and provide it to the Administrator as quickly as possible.
For the avoidance of doubt the conditions that your client seeks to impose on access to the premises to recover Company property are unacceptable.
Application to the Federal Court.
We are now preparing an application to obtain access.
We anticipate that we will be appearing before the Duty Judge in the Federal Court on Thursday. We will show the Court a copy of this letter. We invite you (again) to obtain instructions to accept service from your client.
If you wish to be appear at the hearing please advise us and we will attempt to agree a time with you and the Court.
We again invite your client to reassess its position as a matter of urgency.
There was no response to that letter prior to the commencement of this proceeding.
Contrary to the assertions made in the correspondence on behalf of the defendant that the defendant had never denied access to the premises during the period 17 August 2016 to 30 August 2016, it is plain beyond argument that access was, in fact, denied on a number of occasions in that period. It appears to me that the defendant was upset that the company had failed to pay rent over a significant period of time and was not prepared to accept the legal consequences of the appointment of the administrator to the company. Notwithstanding that those consequences had been pointed out accurately and comprehensively in correspondence from the plaintiff and probably (although, I do not know this) by the defendant’s own solicitors, the defendant continued to refuse access.
The matter came before me on an ex parte basis on 1 September 2016. On that occasion, I made orders in Chambers requiring the defendant to afford appropriate access to the premises.
The matter was returned before me on 5 September 2016. After the commencement of the proceeding (1 September 2016) but before the return of the proceeding on 5 September 2016, Mr Noveski wrote to the solicitors for the plaintiff offering to grant access on terms. (See his letter of 2 September 2016 which was tendered as part of Exhibit A). Those terms included that each party pay his or its own costs of this proceeding.
The defendant read and relied upon an affidavit affirmed on 8 September 2016 by Mr Nathan Cecil, who was by then the solicitor on the record for the defendant. There was annexed to that affidavit a document signed by the defendant’s accountant, Gladys Alarcon. That document is in the following terms:
06/09/2016
To Whom this May concern
I certify that:
1.I am a practicing [sic] accountant and act as the accountant for Veraz Enterprises Pty Ltd.
2.Mrs. Mateska contacted my office on Friday 2nd of September 2016 to request our presence at the location of one of her properties 1-139 King Street Warrawong at 3.10pm.
3.Both Alan and myself went to the premises immediately as Mrs. Mateska was advised by her lawyer that she needed to be at the store to open the doors for the administrators for Homeland Furniture to come in to collect Books, records and computers and organize a stock take if time allowed.
4.Mrs. Mateska was concerned about the Books and computers and stock take, so she wanted us keep an eye on things and act as her witnesses.
5.Mrs. Mateska received a call from her lawyer to say that the Administrators were not coming and we left the premises, this was approximately 1 hour after we arrived.
Yours faithfully
I do not derive any assistance from this document. The purpose of the tender of this document appears to have been to establish that the administrator had decided not to attend at the premises on 2 September 2016 and that that was the reason why no access was granted on that day. I do not think that the document relied upon establishes that fact. All that it proves (perhaps) is that the director of the defendant told Ms Alarcon, the defendant’s accountant, that the plaintiff “was not coming” to the premises on 2 September 2016. The conversation noted in the document says nothing about why the plaintiff was not coming on that day. The document is confusing and, in effect, is a hearsay upon hearsay account of whatever it is that is attempted to be conveyed by the document.
By the time the matter came before me on Monday, 5 September 2016, Mr Noveski had ceased to act for the defendant. The defendant had, by then, retained her current solicitors. When the matter was called on at 10.15 am on 5 September 2016, I was informed that, in breach of the orders which I had made on 1 September 2016, the defendant was still refusing to allow the plaintiff access to the premises. In light of that communication, I stood the matter down in order to afford an opportunity to the current legal representatives of the defendant to proffer advice to the director of the defendant and to give her a further opportunity to cause the defendant to comply both with the orders which I had made on 1 September 2016 and with the law.
When the matter was called on for a second time on 5 September 2016, the legal representative of the defendant informed me that she had received instructions which were to the effect that the company was not the entity which had been trading from the premises but that related companies, Homeland Furniture Pty Limited and Homeland Furniture Warrawong, were the entities trading from the premises and that therefore the books, records and property of the Homeland companies at the premises were not those of the company. In light of that assertion, the matter was again stood down until later in the day in order to afford to the defendant a further opportunity to reflect on its position.
At 2.18 pm on 5 September 2016, the matter was called on for a third time at which time I was informed that access to the premises had been granted and that the administrator was proceeding to remove the books, records and property of the company from the premises.
I have been informed this morning (9 September 2016) that further access to the premises was granted during this week and that there is no need for additional relief to be granted by the Court in respect of access to the premises.
In light of the above matters, the plaintiff seeks a lump sum costs order on an indemnity basis against the defendant. That order is resisted.
Initially, Counsel now appearing for the defendant submitted that there should be no order as to costs. Ultimately, his submissions were directed to the question of whether there should be an order for costs on an indemnity basis. He submitted that there should not be such an order because the Court should only make such an order if there are special circumstances justifying the order and that there are no such special circumstances in the present case.
On the question of costs, the plaintiff read an affidavit affirmed by Richard Alexander Lyne on 8 September 2016, in which Mr Lyne explained the costs which were incurred by the plaintiff in seeking access to the premises commencing with costs incurred on 26 August 2016. According to Mr Lyne, the actual costs incurred up to the time when he affirmed his affidavit came to a total of $17,205.49.
While I have some sympathy for the position in which the defendant found itself when the plaintiff was appointed administrator of the company, I am firmly of the view that the defendant should have granted access when first requested to do so on 17 August 2016. It seems to me that, throughout the relevant period, the defendant was endeavouring to use its control of the premises to see whether some deal could be struck with the plaintiff with a view to the defendant’s obtaining some payment from the plaintiff which would reduce the substantial amount of unpaid rent due from the company to the defendant under the lease.
This was conduct which was wrong at law and utterly inappropriate. Not only did it begin almost immediately after the appointment of the plaintiff as administrator but it continued right up until 5 September 2016 when finally the defendant did that which it should have done much earlier. The defendant adopted an unreasonable position prior to the commencement of this proceeding throughout the period from 17 August to 1 September 2016 and then compounded the difficulty by not granting access immediately after this proceeding was commenced on 1 September 2016. In truth, there was no answer to the plaintiff’s claim for access and access should never have been denied to the plaintiff.
In that context, on 5 September 2016, the defendant instructed its lawyer to put a submission which was against the evidence already before the Court and which was not supportable by any evidence. It was put forward in order to justify the continuing denial of access even in the face of the orders which I had made on 1 September 2016.
In my view, the defendant has behaved inappropriately at all relevant times towards the plaintiff as administrator of the company, including during the course of this proceeding up to the afternoon of 5 September 2016 and has also failed to discharge its obligations owed to the Court under Pt VB of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and generally.
Whether or not it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that there are special circumstances before making an indemnity costs order, in my view there are such circumstances in this case. The defendant should never have forced the plaintiff to commence this proceeding and, once notice of its commencement was given to the defendant, the defendant should have granted immediate access to the premises.
For these reasons, I propose to award costs on an indemnity basis.
In addition, I think that it would be a further waste of time and money for the plaintiff to have to assess or tax his costs. The amount of costs which have been claimed is reasonable and, in all of the circumstances, I propose to make a lump sum costs order pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011. During the course of today, it became necessary to increase the amount for costs by $2,569.70, being the quantum of a hearing fee which the plaintiff has become liable to pay to the Court. Mr Lyne was not aware of that fee when he affirmed his affidavit.
For all of the above reasons, I intend to make the following orders:
(1)Subject to the orders below, the balance of the relief sought in the Originating Process will be dismissed.
(2)The defendant is to pay the plaintiff’s costs on an indemnity basis.
(3)Pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, the amount payable by the defendant pursuant to subpar 2 above is to be awarded in a lump sum instead of being taxed, that lump sum being $19,775.19 (inclusive of GST).
I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Foster. Associate:
Dated: 13 September 2016
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