Loh v Steele

Case

[2025] ACTSC 432

22 September 2025


SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

Loh v Steele

Citation: 

[2025] ACTSC 432

Hearing Date: 

25 July 2025

Decision Date: 

22 September 2025

Before:

Mossop J

Decision: 

(1)    The application in proceeding dated 29 April 2025 is dismissed, and the evidence in the affidavits of the appellant dated 28 April 2025 and 4 June 2025 is not admitted on the appeal.

(2)    The appeal is dismissed.

Catchwords: 

APPEAL – CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal from ACT Magistrates Court – parking in bicycle lane – assault of parking inspector after being issued parking infringement notice – causing property damage to unrelated parked car – whether jurisdictional error in magistrate’s decision – where Magistrates Court’s jurisdiction to hear criminal charges not affected by possibility of a civil claim, repairs to the damaged car or involvement of insurer – where appellant’s submissions regarding legality of parking in bicycle lane were based on Wikipedia entry and did not engage with ACT legislation – no jurisdictional error identified – no error disclosed in magistrate’s findings – appeal dismissed

APPEAL – CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal from ACT Magistrates Court – admission of fresh evidence – evidence includes hearsay repetition of evidence before Magistrates Court and photographs of car demonstrating repair – absence of coherent grounds of appeal – evidence not admissible

Legislation Cited: 

Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 26(1), 116(3)

Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT), s 214

Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT), ss 56, 72(1)(b)

Road Transport (Road Rules) Regulation 2017 (ACT), ss 153(4), 187(2)

Cases Cited: 

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531

R v Walto [2022] ACTSC 187

R v Wright (No 2) [2019] ACTSC 46

Parties: 

Adrian Loh ( Appellant)

Katrina Steele ( Respondent)

Representation: 

Counsel

Self-represented ( Appellant)

S McLaughlin ( Respondent)

Solicitors

Self-represented ( Appellant)

ACT Director of Public Prosecutions ( Respondent)

File Number:

SCA 50 of 2024

Decision Under Appeal: 

Court:    ACT Magistrates Court

Before:   Magistrate JT Campbell

Date of Decision:       9 September 2024

Case Title:                 Steele v Loh

Court File Numbers:   238680

  238390

MOSSOP J:  

Introduction

  1. The appellant, Adrian Loh, was charged with three offences arising out of events which occurred on 14 September 2023:

    (a)common assault, being the assault of a parking inspector, contrary to s 26(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (CAN 10235/2023);

    (b)causing damage to property not exceeding $5,000, being a blue Holden Astra, contrary to s 116(3) of the Crimes Act (CAN 10236/2023); and

    (c)parking a vehicle in a bicycle lane when not authorised to do so, contrary to s 187(2) of the Road Transport (Road Rules) Regulation 2017 (ACT) (Road Rules Regulation) (CAN 40110/2024).

  2. After being found guilty on each of the three charges at a hearing before the Magistrates Court on 2 September 2024, he was convicted and sentenced by a magistrate on 9 September 2024. For the common assault charge and the property damage charges, he was sentenced on each to a 12-month good behaviour order. For the property damage charge, he was also given a reparation order, requiring him to pay $3,781 to the owner of the blue Astra damaged by him within 12 months. For the parking charge, he was fined $300 and allowed three months to pay.

  3. He has appealed against all of the orders. The notice of appeal, lodged on 4 October 2024, provides the following ground of appeal:

    In summary; Magistrate Campbell at the start of the Hearing made an explicit decision to exclude all Insurance concerns. Essentially, upon retrospection this would be the Criminal Court excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

    Hence where may lie some sort of Jurisdictional Error.

Offence provisions

  1. As at 14 September 2023, the relevant offence provisions in the Crimes Act were as follows:

    26Common assault

    (1)A person who assaults another person is guilty of an offence punishable, on conviction, by imprisonment for 2 years.

    116Destroying or damaging property

    (3)A person commits an offence if—

    (a)the person destroys or causes damage to property, other than by fire or explosive; and

    (b)the property belongs to—

    (i)   someone else; or

    (ii)     the person and someone else; and

    (a)the person intends to destroy or cause damage, or is reckless about destroying or causing damage, to the property; and

    (b)the damage to the property does not exceed $5 000.

    Maximum penalty:

    (c)for an aggravated offence—60 penalty units, imprisonment for 3 years or both; or

    (d)in any other case—50 penalty units, imprisonment for 2 years or both.

    Note The defence of lawful authority applies in relation to the offence under s (3) (see Criminal Code, s 43).

  2. As at 14 September 2023, the relevant offence provision in the Road Rules Regulation was as follows:

    187Stopping in bicycle lane, bus lane, tram lane, tramway, transit lane, truck lane or on tram tracks

    (2)A driver must not stop in a bicycle lane unless the driver—

    (a)is driving a public bus, public minibus, taxi or hire car; and

    (b)is dropping off or picking up passengers; and

    (c)is permitted to drive in the lane under this regulation.

    Maximum penalty:  20 penalty units.

Evidence before the Magistrates Court

  1. The hearing in the Magistrates Court occurred on 2 September 2024.

  2. The parking inspector, the complainant in the assault, gave evidence. He saw the appellant’s car parked in a bicycle lane on Flemington Road. He started to take photographs of the vehicle, gathering evidence for what he saw as an offence of parking in a bicycle lane. He printed the parking infringement notice, put it in a yellow envelope and approached the car. The appellant got out of the car and snatched the envelope out of the parking inspector’s hand. Because of the appellant’s demeanour, the parking inspector became worried for his own safety and backed away. The appellant continued to approach him. The parking inspector took a photograph of the appellant approaching him. The parking inspector gave evidence that the appellant swung a fist towards the parking inspector’s face, which the parking inspector blocked by raising his hand.

  3. The parking inspector then walked away, but not in the direction of his own car. The appellant asked if a blue Astra — a vehicle which was parked nearby — was the parking inspector’s car. The parking inspector did not answer and walked away around the block. He got back onto Flemington Road and saw the appellant kick the blue Astra. The parking inspector started filming using his mobile phone and made a call to parking operations. The film shows the parking inspector running and the appellant chasing him.

  4. A witness saw the appellant chasing the parking inspector up the road. The witness noticed that the blue Astra, which belonged to his flatmate, had been damaged. He asked the appellant whether he had done this to the car and the appellant admitted that he had damaged the car. The appellant told the witness about the incident and, at that point, realised the car did not belong to the parking inspector. The police then arrived.

  5. The appellant gave evidence. He said he was stopped in the bicycle lane because he received a phone call. He saw the parking inspector taking photographs of his car and got out of the car. He told the parking inspector that he did not want the parking infringement notice. The parking inspector told him that he could appeal it. The appellant asked the parking inspector if the blue Astra was his car. The parking inspector ran away after “triggering” and “agitating” the appellant. The appellant then said he started damaging the blue Astra as he was angry, and he thought it was the parking inspector’s car. He then saw the parking inspector at the other end of the street and started chasing him.

  6. The informant, Constable Steele, also gave evidence. She gave evidence of having attended the scene and taken photographs of the blue Astra. Excerpts of her body-worn camera footage were played and tendered, and a compensation schedule in relation to the damage to the blue Astra was tendered through her. She also gave evidence of admissions made by the appellant on 29 July 2024, including an admission to having damaged the blue Astra. The appellant attempted to cross-examine the informant about insurance, but the questions were disallowed by the magistrate.

  7. Seven exhibits were tendered in the Magistrates Court:

    (a)Exhibit 1: a certificate under s 72(1)(b) of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT), proving that the vehicle to which the parking infringement notice related was registered to the appellant.

    (b)Exhibit 2: a certificate under s 56 of the Road Transport (General) Act relating to the service and non-payment of the parking infringement notice for the parking offence.

    (c)Exhibit 3: six photographs taken by the parking inspector during the course of the incident, including photographs of the appellant’s car in the bicycle lane and the appellant approaching the parking inspector with the parking infringement notice in his hand.

    (d)Exhibit 4: a video recording taken by the parking inspector at the time of the incident, which ran for one minute and 51 seconds.

    (e)Exhibit 5: five photographs of damage to the blue Astra taken by the informant.

    (f)Exhibit 6: excerpts of body-worn camera footage from the informant.

    (g)Exhibit 7: a compensation schedule relating to the damage to the blue Astra.

Magistrate’s decision

  1. Having summarised the evidence, the magistrate then turned to the submissions and her decision.

  2. The magistrate recorded the submission made by the appellant that he should not have received the parking infringement notice because there was no prohibition on driving his car in the bicycle lane. The magistrate found that, although there were some exceptions for stopping or driving in a bicycle lane, they did not include stopping to take a phone call. Her Honour found that the parking inspector was entitled to issue a parking infringement notice for the conduct of the appellant in parking in a bicycle lane.

  3. The magistrate recorded the appellant’s submission that, if the ticket was not valid, then all of the conduct that followed, being the allegations of assault and damaging property, should not be upheld. The magistrate did not accept that submission. Her Honour found that the parking infringement notice was validly issued and noted that the appellant made admissions to damaging the blue Astra. The magistrate therefore found beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had damaged the blue Astra and intended to do so. Her Honour also found that the appellant knew that the property belonged to someone else, even though he mistakenly thought it belonged to the parking inspector.

  4. The magistrate also found that the elements of parking a vehicle in a bicycle lane had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, as none of the relevant exceptions applied.

  5. Finally, the magistrate identified that the only dispute was whether or not the appellant attempted to punch the parking inspector and thereby struck the parking inspector’s hand. Her Honour found the parking inspector to be a credible and reliable witness who gave clear evidence of the incident. His conduct in retreating was consistent with the manner in which the appellant was acting. Her Honour accepted that the parking inspector was concerned for his own personal safety and took a photograph of the appellant coming across the road towards him. The magistrate identified that the parking inspector’s evidence was consistent with the parking inspector not wanting to run to his own car in circumstances where the appellant was asking whether the blue Astra was his. Her Honour also recorded that the parking inspector made an immediate complaint to the police when they arrived.

  6. So far as the evidence of the appellant was concerned, he admitted the conduct involved in the other two offences but maintained that he never got close enough to the parking inspector to strike him, even though he was angry because the parking inspector had run away. The magistrate found that it was likely that the appellant was angry about getting a parking infringement notice while still in his car and also angry that the parking inspector had made no attempt to talk to him to get any explanation in relation to the parking infringement notice. The appellant admitted that he kicked the blue Astra because he thought it was the parking inspector’s car. He also left the envelope containing the parking infringement notice on the windscreen of the blue Astra. The magistrate was not satisfied that he was being fully forthcoming about the conduct of striking the parking inspector. Her Honour rejected the appellant’s evidence that he never got close enough to the parking inspector and accepted the evidence of the parking inspector. She found that the appellant attempted to punch the parking inspector in the face, but the parking inspector put up his hand to block it and the appellant’s punch landed on the parking inspector’s open palm with some considerable force.

  7. The magistrate therefore found each of the three offences proved.

Application to tender evidence not before the magistrate 

  1. The appellant filed an application in proceeding on 29 April 2025, seeking to have admitted certain evidence not tendered before the magistrate, including recent photographs of the blue Astra showing that it had been repaired.

  2. The appellant filed an affidavit affirmed on 28 April 2025 alleging that the magistrate had made “pre-judicial remarks to the Court (prior to transcription)” about excluding “Insurance Concerns”.

  3. The appellant also filed an affidavit affirmed on 4 June 2025 which was said to annex new evidence, namely:

    1.Chronology of Events ON the Day

    2.Chronology of Events SINCE the Day

    3.Photos of Repaired Car

    4.Photos of Parked Car at 330 Flemington Road

    5.Authorised Person #27 Photos

    6.Parking Officer Statement of Facts

  4. The chronology of events on the day was in the form of what appears to be a PowerPoint presentation and was effectively a hearsay repetition of evidence given by the appellant in the Magistrates Court. That chronology included the allegation that the parking inspector had struck the appellant. The appellant also alleged that he had been taunted and antagonised by the parking inspector, which left him in “a very enraged state” next to the blue Astra. He alleged that the parking inspector had engaged in the tort of deceit by remaining silent while the appellant was damaging the blue Astra, having made a representation that the blue Astra was either the parking inspector’s car, an ACT government car or a car that could be damaged. He described the parking inspector as being “smug & snide”, “outwardly brazen, callous & indifferent”, “sadistic”, “very nonchalant”, and “jovial”. He said the parking inspector was “determined to give me an Infringement at all costs”. He submitted that the parking inspector was himself “very significantly triggered & agitated”.

  5. The chronology of events since the day and the evidence as to the repair of the vehicle are not relevant to whether the offences were proved. The appellant made a submission that he had been denied procedural fairness. It appears that this relates to the making of representations in relation to the infringement notice. He submitted that he has never been contacted by any insurers, in particular, the insurer of the blue Astra. He also submitted that he had seen the blue Astra subsequently and it had been repaired. He provided photographs of the blue Astra, said to demonstrate that the vehicle had been repaired.

  6. Having regard to the absence of any coherent ground of appeal and the admission of Exhibit 7 at the hearing before the magistrate, the additional affidavit evidence sought to be put before the court is not admissible under s 214 of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) in the event that there is any challenge to the sentences imposed, other than a jurisdictional one. This is because:

    (a)it is not “necessary or expedient … in the interests of justice” to receive the evidence: s 214(3)(a);

    (b)the admission of the evidence is not by consent: s 214(3)(b); and

    (c)the evidence would not afford any ground for allowing the appeal: s 214(4).

Arguments on appeal

  1. The appellant filed two sets of written submissions in advance of the hearing. The same themes were pursued at the hearing. The two sets of written submissions were filed on 18 July 2025, and an updated version of one set of submissions was provided on 24 July 2025. They appeared to be in the form of PowerPoint presentations.

  2. The first set of submissions provided a chronology and submissions relating to the parking charge. The submissions stated that there was no or very little traffic, there was plenty of room for cyclists and motorists to share the road and there was no safety risk. The submissions in relation to the parking charge were to the effect that the bicycle lane was a shared lane, that it was only a guide, and that both bicycles and cars could travel on the road or in the bicycle lane. The submissions annexed a Wikipedia entry relating to shared lane markings in various jurisdictions.

  3. The second set of submissions related to jurisdictional error. They included a submission that the case was “entirely civil” and only ever concerned with the damage to the car. This was said to indicate jurisdictional error. The submissions also asserted that the parking inspector was not a credible witness as he was never going to withdraw the parking infringement notice. The submissions further contended that the car has been repaired, that repairs are the concern of insurance, that the Magistrates Court excluded issues relating to insurance and the quantum of damage or harm caused, and hence there was jurisdictional error.

  4. The submissions also included various allegations about the conduct and motivation of the parking inspector which do not have a foundation in the evidence, and which are unnecessary to repeat. Amongst those allegations was the assertion that the proceedings were in the wrong jurisdiction and that the appellant should have been sued in the ACAT or a similar jurisdiction.

  5. The respondent’s detailed and helpful submissions attempted to address the ground of appeal. They included an assessment of the evidence relating to each of the charges and submitted that no error was disclosed in the approach taken by the magistrate. In relation to the sentence, they addressed the imposition of the reparation order and submitted that, in light of the evidence, no error was disclosed.

  6. During the hearing on 25 July 2025, the appellant provided a further set of submissions regarding events following the incident, and annexed excerpts of the transcript of the sentencing hearing in the Magistrates Court on 9 September 2024.

  7. Following the hearing, the appellant was given leave to file further written submissions by 7 August 2025. On 5 September 2025, the appellant provided written submissions. That was outside the scope of the leave granted. The appellant proposed to send three or four further submissions “at regular intervals over the coming months”. No leave was granted for that to occur. The submissions sent on 5 September 2025 continued to advance claims of jurisdictional error in the following manner:

    1. “Assume Insurance Concerns are excluded”

    3. Jurisdictional Fact: “Insurance Concerns are irrelevant”

    4. (Insurance Concerns include whether car has been OR is going to be repaired)

    5. The car however has been repaired!

    6. That is Insurance Concerns are directly relevant

    7. Hence the Jurisdictional Fact does NOT exist

    8. And then the Criminal Court has NO jurisdiction.

    [emphasis in original]

Consideration and decision

  1. The ground of appeal is not established. It alleges the possibility of some jurisdictional error.

  2. The High Court has held that, in general, “an inferior court falls into jurisdictional error ‘if it mistakenly asserts or denies the existence of jurisdiction or if it misapprehends or disregards the nature or limits of its functions or powers in a case where it correctly recognises that jurisdiction does exist’”: Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531 at [72] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (emphasis in original), quoting Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 177. However, it is “neither necessary, nor possible, to attempt to mark the metes and bounds of jurisdictional error”: Kirk at [71].

  3. No jurisdictional error was identified. The fact that there might also be civil proceedings relating to the damage to the blue Astra does not affect the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court to hear the criminal charges that were put before it. The fact that the vehicle may have been at some stage repaired, or may or may not have been the subject of an insurance claim, does not affect the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court. That insurance was not considered by the magistrate did not deny or affect the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court to hear criminal charges arising from the incident.

  4. In relation to the charge of common assault, the reasons of the magistrate indicate an appropriate assessment of the evidence. There is no basis to interfere with her Honour’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence and acceptance of the parking inspector’s evidence.

  5. In relation to the property damage charge, the property damage was observed by the parking inspector, the undamaged and damaged states of the blue Astra were observed by a witness, and the appellant admitted damaging it during the course of his evidence. Neither the possibility that the appellant was “triggered” by the issuing of a parking infringement notice nor the possibility that there may be a civil claim provides a defence to the charge. No error is disclosed by the magistrate finding this offence proved.

  6. The appellant has not established any error in relation to the parking offence. His submission is based upon a Wikipedia entry relating to shared zones and does not properly engage with the statutory provisions in the ACT. The evidence disclosed that the bicycle lane was appropriately marked as required by s 153(4) of the Road Rules Regulation and that the appellant did not fit into any of the exceptions in s 187(2).

  7. As indicated, it is not clear whether there was any challenge to the sentences imposed, other than a jurisdictional one.  In relation to the reparation order, the magistrate received into evidence a quote to rectify the damage and no evidence to contradict that figure. I have noted in earlier decisions the limited consequences of the making of a reparation order that is not a condition of a good behaviour order: see R v Wright (No 2) [2019] ACTSC 46 at [12]; R v Walto [2022] ACTSC 187 at [71]. It was open to the magistrate to impose the moderate sentences that she did.

Orders

  1. The orders of the Court are:

    (1)The application in proceeding dated 29 April 2025 is dismissed, and the evidence in the affidavits of the appellant dated 28 April 2025 and 4 June 2025 is not admitted on the appeal.

    (2)The appeal is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty [40] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Mossop.

Associate:

Date:

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Cases Cited

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Statutory Material Cited

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Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58