Loga v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Loga v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1518

File number(s): SYG 1586 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE GIVEN
Date of judgment: 12 August 2025 
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Whether Tribunal erred by misconstruing the term “reasonably practicable” for the purposes of reg 1.04(2)(c)(i)(B) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5CA, 198

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) rr 1.03, 1.04

Cases cited:

M38/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 146

Marshall v Gotham Co Ltd [1954] AC 360

Slivak v Lurgi (Aust) Pty Ltd (2001) 177 ALR 585

Division: General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 50
Date of hearing: 12 August 2025
Place: Sydney
Solicitor for the Applicant: In person
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr Fyfe, MinterEllison

ORDERS

SYG 1586 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

MERE SENIGIGIA LOGA

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GIVEN

DATE OF ORDER:

12 AUGUST 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application filed 20 August 2021 is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application fixed in the amount of $5,900.

3.Pursuant to r 17.02 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)(General Federal Law) Rules 2021(Cth), orders 1 and 2 above not be entered until the date of the publication of written reasons for judgment (revised from transcript) which for the avoidance of doubt, and for the purposes of r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011(Cth), will also be taken to be the date upon which the judgment was pronounced.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographic, clerical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 of the Rules.

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)

JUDGE GIVEN:

  1. By an application to show cause filed with this Court on 20 August 2021 the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal), affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to not grant the applicant an Other Family (Residence) (Class BU) (subclass 835) visa (visa). 

    BACKGROUND

  2. The applicant is a female citizen of Fiji, who was born on 2 February 1994. On 5 December 2017, the applicant filed an application for the visa on the basis that she was the remaining relative of her uncle and aunt because she claims to be their adopted child (Court Book (CB) 18 to 39).  In support of the visa application, the applicant provided a judgment of the Family Court of…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1518
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia considered an appeal by Loga against the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, focusing on the interpretation of the term "reasonably practicable" in the context of a visa application. The applicant argued that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of this term as it applied to regulation 1.04(2)(c)(i)(B) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). Specifically, Loga contended that it was not reasonably practicable for her uncle and aunt to adopt her while they were living in Fiji due to various obstacles, including their lack of access to a lawyer and the court system. The court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied the term "reasonably practicable" in its decision-making process.

The court examined the Tribunal's reasoning and noted that the Tribunal had found that there were multiple opportunities for the applicant's uncle and aunt to adopt her during their visits to Suva. The Tribunal concluded that it was reasonably practicable for the adoption to occur while the applicant's relatives were living in Fiji, rejecting Loga's argument. The court found that the Tribunal's interpretation of "reasonably practicable" was consistent with the authorities and that the Tribunal had properly understood and discharged its statutory task. Consequently, the court was not satisfied that the Tribunal's decision was affected by any jurisdictional error.

Following the dismissal of Loga's appeal, the Minister sought an order for costs, proposing an amount of $5,900. The court acknowledged Loga's financial difficulties and her family's inability to meet legal costs but determined that the impecuniosity of a party was not a factor that would typically influence the court's decision on whether to order costs. The court found that costs should follow the event and that the amount sought by the Minister was reasonable. Therefore, the court ordered Loga to pay the Minister's costs in the sum of $5,900.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 22 July 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review (CB 193 to 202).Tribunal Decision The Tribunal noted that visa application was made on the basis that the applicant was the remaining relative of her uncle, whom the applicant claimed to be her Australian relative for the purposes of the visa criteria and confirmed that the applicant's uncle did have the right to permanently reside in Australia (CB 197 at [20] to [21]). The Tribunal identified the relevant legislation (CB 198 to 199 at [22] to [27]) and noted that it was not in dispute that the applicant's uncle and aunt did not apply to adopt the applicant in Fiji until 3 February 2015 (CB 199 at [28]). The Tribunal further noted the adoption order was not made until 14 October 2016, at which time the applicant was 22 years old. It further observed that there was no assertion advanced that the adoption order had been made in accordance with any law of the State or Territory of Australia (CB 199 at [28]). The Tribunal did not accept the applicant's argument that, because the uncle and aunt had assumed a parental role since her birth, the adoption order was simply a recognition of that assumption and it should therefore be accepted the applicant had been in fact adopted immediately after her birth (CB 199 at [29]). The Tribunal found there was nothing to indicate that the applicant's biological parents did not continue to be recognised as her parents under Fijian law until the time the adoption order was made. The Tribunal observed that the applicant travelled with her biological mother to the United States in 2010, and remained there with her when the biological mother applied for a further visa. The Tribunal further noted the applicant's Fijian birth certificate was amended only after the adoption order was made in 2015 (CB 199 at [31]). The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was adopted by her uncle and aunt in accordance with the requirements of sub-reg 1.04(1)(b) of the Regulations, because she had attained the age of 18 years prior to any application being made for her adoption (CB 199 at [32]). The applicant alternatively argued (for the purpose of sub-reg 1.04(1)(c) of the Regulations) that the Tribunal should find that she was customarily adopted in accordance with the usual practice, recognised custom or culture of Fiji. The Tribunal noted that there was nothing to demonstrate that the adoption procedures accessed by the applicant's uncle and aunt to adopt the applicant had not been available in Fiji since the birth of the applicant (CB 200 at [35]). Nor had the applicant previously made a claim to this affect. The Tribunal had regard to a claim by the applicant that it had not been reasonably practicable in the circumstances for the applicant's uncle and aunt to adopt her while they were living in Fiji. This was said to be because the applicant's aunt was working as a teacher in the Lau Islands and they did not have access to a lawyer or to the court system of Fiji (CB 200 at [36]). The Tribunal rejected this, noting that the applicant's aunt only worked in the Lau Islands, until 2003, and there was evidence of that they would return to Suva three times a year, during school holidays. The Tribunal found there was nothing to indicate that during those visits they could not have made appropriate arrangements to formally adopt the applicant if they chose to do so (CB 200 at [37]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first respondent submitted there is nothing within the Act or Regulations that requires the Tribunal to expressly consider the applicant's uncle and aunt's "knowledge". Further, any such an argument is contrary to the facts (which were not contentious), where the applicant's uncle and aunt ultimately did formally adopt the applicant, albeit after she had turned 18.Consideration The context in this case, namely whether it was reasonably practicable to adopt the applicant in Fiji, in my view this was properly addressed by the Tribunal. I am satisfied that the Tribunal did not construe the terms "reasonably practicable" too narrowly in the present case for the reasons which it gave. That included that there was no identified need to adopt the applicant until such time as the applicant wished to regularise her migration status in Australia, the fact that there were, in fact many opportunities to do so during trips to Suva. To the extent that submissions were made to the Court today about it not being reasonably practicable to take time on holidays to undertake legal paperwork, those are matters which go to the merits of that issue. However, I accept that the findings of the Tribunal in that context were open to it, based on the evidence before it. I agree with the submissions of the first respondent that the reasons do not reveal an interpretation by the Tribunal more narrow than the authorities allow in this context. I also accept the first respondent's submissions about the reasons being more nuanced than contended for by the applicant at hearing. It is tolerably clear that the Tribunal understood (and discharged) its statutory task and, as such, that the ground is not made out. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is affected jurisdictional error. In the absence of a jurisdictional error, the decision is a privative clause decision and must be dismissed, and I will so order.Costs Consequent on the dismissal of the application, the solicitor for the Minister seeks an order that the applicant pay some part of the Minister's costs, in this case fixed in the sum of $5,900. When asked to address whether or not costs should follow the event and/or the quantum of the amount sought, the applicant made submissions that she did not believe that she would be able to meet such a costs order because it would be financially hard for her given her current status, namely that she does not have work rights. The applicant also made submissions that the family's inability to meet legal costs was part of the reason that she is self-represented today and that the sponsor is currently unemployed after two years of not working in order to take care of his wife. While I understand those submissions, and I have sympathy for the position of the applicant and her family, the impecuniosity of a party is not ordinarily a matter which would factor into whether or not an amount which otherwise represented a proper indemnity of a successful party's cost ought to be ordered in the circumstances. In this case I am satisfied that costs should follow the event. I am also satisfied that the amount sought is reasonable.