Lo v Minister for Immigration
[2019] FCCA 2642
•25 October 2019
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| LO & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 2642 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – application for Other Family (Residence) (Class BU) visa – whether the Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied the provisions under cl 836.213 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal denied the first applicant a meaningful and fair opportunity to present arguments and give evidence – whether the Tribunal failed to comply with the requirements under s 360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error due to an invalid notification purportedly made under s 376 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and/or denial of procedural fairness – no jurisdictional error made out – the application is dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss, 360, 376 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r 1.20, cl 836.321 of Schedule 2, cl 836.213 of Schedule 2 |
| Cases cited: Berenguel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 264 ALR 417 Commissioner for the Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 363 ALR 599 Parvin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 86 SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 |
| First Applicant: | HSIANG-LING LO |
| Second Applicant: | YI-SHAN HOU |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2044 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Humphreys |
| Hearing date: | 18 September 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 18 September 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Parramatta |
| Delivered on: | 25 October 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | Mr Chia |
| Solicitors for the Applicants: | MurdockCheng Legal Practice |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Knowles |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore Lawyers |
ORDERS
The name of the first respondent be changed to the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.
The application is dismissed.
The first applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $5500.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
SYG 2044 of 2018
| HSIANG-LING LO |
First Applicant
| YI-SHAN HOU |
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The first applicant is a Taiwanese national. In January 2010, the applicant arrived in Australia with her daughter. The first applicant was on a Student Guardian visa and her daughter was on a Student Visa.
On 21 November 2012, the first applicant submitted an application for an Other Family (Residence) (Class BU) visa in relation to caring for her father Yung-Tsao Lo (sponsor). On 29 August 2013, a Power of Attorney signed by the first applicant’s father was submitted to the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection (“the Department”). On 8 June 2017, a delegate of the Minister advised that the Power of Attorney, signed by Mr Lo, did not meet the Minister’s requirement and the visa was denied. The first applicant’s daughter, as a secondary visa applicant, was also denied a visa.
The first applicant sought merits review in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). On the 2 July 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant’s Other Family (Residence) (Class BU) visa. The first applicant now seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s Decision
The essential question for the Tribunal to decide was whether or not the relevant sponsorship requirements underpinning the migration application were met. The Tribunal noted at paragraph 11 of its decision, that r 1.20 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”), defines sponsorship obligations. Under r 1.20(2) of the Regulations the obligations of a sponsor, in relation to an applicant, is to assist the applicant to the extent necessary, financially and in relation to accommodation, for two years following the grant of a visa.
At paragraph 12 of the decision, the Tribunal noted that an aged care assessment report from 2 September 2008 in relation to the first applicant’s father, Mr Lo, reported that Mr Lo had regular short and long term memory issues, needed assistance with communication and was unable to sign the report.
Several medical reports were available in relation to the father from Dr Cesar Uy, a specialist in aged care. Dr Uy stated that in April 2010, he reviewed Mr Lo and formed the view he was unable to make complex decisions. It was stated that Ms Lo, the first applicant’s mother, does not appear to have a full understanding of her husband’s conditions. The first applicant’s sister was managing Mr Lo’s money.
A Medibank carer’s assessment dated 28 May 2012, also noted that Mr Lo was then 89 years of age. Mr Lo was not orientated as to place or time and needed constant supervision.
On 25 August 2012, Mr Lo signed the sponsorship undertaking. On 7 August 2013, the migration agent acting for the first applicant, advised that Mr Lo had advanced Alzheimer’s/dementia but still had periods of normalcy.
A General Power of Attorney dated 29 August 2013, appointed the first applicant’s sister as attorney in relation to matters dealing with the carer’s application to the Department.
On 1 November 2016, a sponsorship undertaking was claimed to have been signed by Mr Lo in which he agreed to be a sponsor. On 8 November 2016, Dr Uy stated that Mr Lo has been his patient at the Memory Clinic since 2008 and that he has declined significantly in terms of cognition.
At paragraph 13 of the decision, the Tribunal noted the evidence submitted by the first applicant, that Mr Lo wanted the first applicant to be his carer and that the Power of Attorney was to ensure that his wishes were implemented. The first applicant stated that her father still needed a carer and she was willing to undertake that role.
At paragraph 14, the Tribunal notes other statements provided from the first applicant’s sister, indicating her father understood what he was doing and wanted the first applicant to be his carer. At paragraph 16 of the decision, the Tribunal notes other statements received by the Department record the inability of other family members to care for Mr Lo.
At paragraphs 17 to 21 of the decision, the Tribunal deals with two items of confidential information provided to the Department. The material was the subject of s 376 certificates of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), which the Tribunal considered to be valid. At paragraph 18 of the decision, the Tribunal told the first applicant that it was satisfied that some of the information that is the subject of the certificates was not relevant to the review because it did not address any aspect of the sponsorship. The Tribunal accordingly placed no weight on this information. The Tribunal however then went on to provide the core of the other information to the applicant.
At paragraph 19 of the decision, the Tribunal records that the following information was put to the first applicant:
In June 2013, the applicant provided statutory declarations providing false and misleading information about members of Mr Lo’s family being unable to provide assistance to Mr Lo, when they were providing Mr Lo with assistance. Other information is that at the same time you claimed to be caring for Mr Lo, you have been working.
At paragraph 20 of the decision, the Tribunal notes the first applicant’s response which stated that at the time, other family members were unable to care for Mr Lo and that she was not working as her English was not very good.
At paragraphs 21 to 22 of the decision, the Tribunal deals with the issue of who signed the sponsorship applications of August 2012, November 2016 and April 2017. The first applicant has reported to have said that her father signed them. At paragraphs 25 to 26 of the decision, the Tribunal concludes that the Power of Attorney was not effective with respect to the health and lifestyle decisions on behalf of Mr Lo. At paragraph 30 of the decision, the Tribunal concludes that a sponsor, who undertakes an obligation in terms of r 1.20(2) of the Regulations, must have the requisite mental capacity to make such a commitment or guarantee.
At paragraph 32 of the decision, the Tribunal concluded that at the time of the application, Mr Lo did not understand the sponsorship undertakings and the Power of Attorney did not entitle the first applicant’s sister to commit to those on behalf of her father.
At paragraphs 33 and 34 of the decision, the Tribunal found that at the time of the application, the first applicant was not relevantly sponsored and did not satisfy cl 836.213 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. Accordingly, the first applicant’s daughter, as the secondary visa applicant, could not satisfy cl 836.321 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. The Tribunal accordingly affirmed the decision of the Minister.
Grounds of Appeal
There are four grounds of appeal that are set out in a further amended application filed 15 August 2019. Counsel for the Applicant did not press Ground 3. The grounds of appeal as they appeared in the application are as follows:
1. The second respondent (Tribunal) misconstrued and misapplied the provisions of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Regulations).
Particulars
The Tribunal did not consider whether the first applicant satisfied the requirements of clause 836.213 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations by reason of a sponsorship undertaking given by her mother.
The Tribunal told the first applicant at the hearing that if her mother intends to sponsor her she “needed to make a new application”.
Clause 836.213 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations was not a “time of application” criterion which could not only be satisfied by evidence provided at the time of submitting the application.
2. In the alternative, the Tribunal denied the first applicant a meaningful and fair opportunity to present arguments and give evidence and thereby failed to comply with the requirement to “invite” under section 360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Act).
Particulars
The applicants repeat the particulars to ground 1 above.
Further, the first applicant was not notified that, by signing the sponsorship undertaking, her mother was to be taken as only consenting to and agreeing to support her husband as sponsor.
Ground 3 was not pressed.
4. Further or in the alternative to 1 and 2, the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error due to:
a. An invalid notification, purportedly made under section 376 of the Act; and/or
b. Denial of procedural fairness
The Applicant’s Submissions
It was noted, in terms of the legislation, that cl 836.213 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations, provides that:
The applicant is sponsored
a. By the Australian relative….
b. By the spouse or de facto partner of the Australian relative…
Grounds 1 and 2
Counsel on behalf of the applicant submitted that the Tribunal either misconstrued or misapplied the Regulations in respect of the mother’s sponsorship of the first applicant which was produced to the Tribunal or failed to comply with s 360 of the Act.
During the course of the review, a further form 40 was produced to the Tribunal. The following exchange took place between the Tribunal member and the first applicant with the aid of an interpreter (see Annexure LS-1 at page 10 paragraph 20):
Tribunal member: So why is your mother signing the sponsorship undertaking?
Interpreter: My mother also need, need to look after her. She is not in good health.
Tribunal member: No, no, no, no, no, stop. Why is your mother signing this sponsorship form in relation to the application?
Interpreter: My mother has agreed to me coming over to look after my father.
Tribunal member: No. The application was made ah on the basis of your father acting as your sponsor.
Interpreter: My mother, as my father’s wife, also has the right to, to sign documents on his behalf. My father has signed it as well.
Tribunal member: Where has your father signed it?
Interpreter: This is my father’s signature…
Tribunal member: Ah [laughs], ah what’s, what’s happened here, ah for the recording, is that umm the ah visa, the applicant’s mother I’m told has si…now signed the sponsorship undertaking and the applicant’s father has signed the section which said I give consent to the above arrangement. Umm I’ll deal with this in my decision record. It’s not possible for the sponsor to change ah during the, the time of the application. If your mother ah intends to sponsor you as a carer, you need to make a new application.
Interpreter: Ah this document is to, just to show you that if this current application umm was not successful I’ll, my, my mum would ah make another application for me so sponsor me to, to look after her.
Counsel for the applicant contended that there was no time requirement under r 1.20 of the Regulations as to when an undertaking needed to be given. Counsel for the applicant referred the Court to Berenguel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 264 ALR 417. This concerned a Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) visa in a joint decision of French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ, where it was noted at paragraphs [22], [24] and [26] that:
[22] The minister submitted in the present case that the criterion which the delegate found was not met was that in cl 885.213, which is a time of application criterion. It was submitted that the test score must therefore have been achieved at the time of application because the minister (and delegate) were bound by s 65 and the Migration Regulations to reach a state of satisfaction as to the position at that time.
…
[24] The evidence purpose of the alternative criteria in cl 885.213 is to ensure that, when the minister or delegate decides upon the application for a visa, the applicant will have demonstrated recent competency in the English language. It does not follow that the criterion can only be satisfied by evidence provided to the minister at the time of submitting the application.
…
[26] There is nothing to prevent relevant information being submitted to the minister after lodgement of the application. Indeed, s 55 of the Act expressly provides for that to be done and requires the minister to have regard to such information. The Act provides that the minister may heave regard to up-to-date information and, where the purpose of the relevant criterion is to endure that the standard of English language competency is recently ascertained, a construction which would deprive him of the most recent information seems to be antithetical to that purpose.
Counsel for the applicant submitted to the Court that the provision of the Form 4 at the Tribunal hearing, allowed for the relevant criteria to be satisfied in that the first applicant’s mother, was now agreeing to be the sponsor for the first applicant as the carer of her father. It was submitted that at paragraph 23 of the decision, the Tribunal found the first applicant’s mother signed not as the sponsor, but as supporting the application and agreeing to support the sponsor in meeting the responsibilities of the sponsorship.
Counsel for the Applicant submitted that the first applicant, as a matter of procedural fairness, should have been put on notice of this finding as it was obviously open on the known material (see Commissioner of the Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 (“Alphaone”) at paragraph [30] and SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152). It was submitted that the first applicant was not put on notice that, in the Tribunal’s view, the mother was only signing as an expression of support or that it was otherwise as her own undertaking.
Ground 4
In relation to the matters that were the subject of s 376 Certificates of the Act, the material was in fact provided to the Court as annexures to the affidavit of Yi-Shan Hou, sworn on the 19 October 2018. The first document contained information that was put to the first applicant during the course of the Tribunal’s hearing. The information was received via a Department of Immigration and Border Protection web form on 27 August 2017, which states as follows:
Do you wish to remain anonymous? Yes
Have you provided information about this offence before? No
The form then went on to set out the information that was put to the first applicant during the course of the Tribunal’s hearing. The second document was a letter which was signed by Da-Wei Lo, who the Court is informed is the first applicant’s younger brother. The letter states:
Please keep this letter in confidential, thanks.
Counsel for the applicant conceded that s 376 Certificate of the Act in respect of the second document was valid. Counsel for the applicant submitted however, that in respect of the first document, that whilst the identity of the informant was and should remain confidential, that the contents of the documents itself were not given “in confidence”. Accordingly, the s 376 Certificate of the Act, in respect of the first document was invalid. It was submitted that subject to materiality, an invalid notification without more will establish jurisdictional error (see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 363 ALR 599 (“SZMTA”).
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the first applicant had been denied the possibility of a different outcome and without more, based on SZMTA, there is jurisdictional error.
The First Respondent’s Submissions
Ground 1
Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the Ground 1 alleges that the Tribunal misconstrued cl 836.213 of the Regulations because it did not consider whether the first applicant’s mother could be her sponsor. Clause 836.213 requires that, at the time of the visa application, the first applicant be “sponsored” by the Australian relative of whom they intend to become the carer. The term “sponsored” is not defined in the Regulations, however, the term “sponsor” is defined in r 1.03 of the Regulations by reference to r 1.20(1) and the undertaking in r 1.20(2) of the Regulations.
Regulation 1.20(1) of the Regulations, relevantly provides that:
The sponsor of an applicant for a visa is a person…who undertakes the obligations stated in sub regulation (2) in relation to the applicant.
Clause 1.20(2) of the Regulations, relevantly lists “the obligations of a sponsor in relation to an applicant for a visa´ including the undertaking to provide financial assistance. Counsel for the first respondent submitted that it was tolerably clear that:
a. To be sponsored requires a visa applicant to have a sponsor at the time of the application – see cl 836.213 of the Regulations; and
b. To be a sponsor, a person much give the undertakings in r 1.20(2) – see r 1.20(1) of the Regulations
In this case, as at the time of the visa application, the only person who purported to give the undertakings was the first applicant’s father. The first applicant’s mother signed the Form 40 to give approval to the first applicant becoming the carer of the sponsor but not as the sponsor. The time of application criteria cannot be overcome by subsequent documents seeking to change the sponsor to the mother. Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the undertakings are an essential aspect of the visa criteria.
Ground 2
Ground 2 alleges the Tribunal did not put the applicant on notice that an issue was, in what capacity the first applicant’s mother had signed the subsequent Form 40. Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the first applicant was on notice that a live issue was the capacity of the first applicant’s father to sign the form and give the sponsorship undertaking. It is clear that the Tribunal indicated that if the first applicant’s mother intended to become the sponsor, a new application was required.
Counsel for the first respondent submitted that it was apparent that the first applicant did not put the Form 40 to assert that her mother was now the sponsor, rather she was supporting the original visa application. There is no need to separately put the first applicant on notice of this adverse conclusion (see Alphaone at paragraph [30]).
Counsel for the first respondent submitted that, contrary to the submissions by counsel for the applicant, there was no misrepresentation by the Tribunal. It was clear that the first applicant’s mother had signed the original Form 40, as supporting the visa application for the first applicant to become the carer of her father who was to be the sponsor, not for the mother to be the sponsor. There is therefore no procedural fairness requirement to put the first applicant on notice as to the adverse conclusion.
Ground 4
In relation to Ground 4, counsel for the first respondent submitted that both certificates were valid. Although the document in dispute, being the first document referred to above, does not make it absolutely clear that the information was given in confidence and that only the identity of the informant was in confidence, this is to draw a too finer line. There was no disadvantage to the first applicant as a result of the certificates, as the gist of the material was given to the first applicant and she was invited to comment. It cannot be said in these circumstances that there was the possibility of a different outcome had the entirety of the document been given to the first applicant because the relevant material was put to her and she was asked to comment. The material which was not relevant to the matter in question was specially stated by the Tribunal as irrelevant and would be ignored.
Counsel for the first respondent took the Court to the decision of Perram, Perry and O’Callaghan JJ in Parvin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 86 at paragraphs [59] and [60], where the Court said:
[59] As the Minister submitted, the appellant and her solicitor were thus well aware that the Tribunal had before it relevant confidential information. In those circumstances, it was open to the appellant to have requested further detail of the confidential information, to the extent the Tribunal was permitted to disclose it.
[60] It follows, in my view, that the non-disclosure of the certificate did not deprive the appellant of any opportunity to give evidence or make arguments to the Tribunal and thereby to deprive her of the possibility of a successful outcome. It follows that no jurisdictional error is made out in respect to ground 3.
Counsel for the first respondent submitted that this was precisely the case in the current matter before the Court, where the first applicant could have requested further information but chose not to. The substance of the information was put to the first applicant and she had the opportunity to comment upon it and did so. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that there was any practical injustice to the first applicant.
Considerations
This is a matter, which in my view, has resulted from a lack of understanding by the first applicant from the very beginning as to what the requirements of a sponsorship application were for a carers visa. In my view, access to professional advice at an earlier point in time, would have avoided the need for this litigation that is currently before the Court.
Ground 1
In relation to Ground 1, I am reasonably satisfied that the Tribunal correctly applied cl 836.213 of the Regulations. The sponsorship application relied upon in the proceedings, related to the father as the “sponsor”, not the mother. The Tribunal clearly found the father did not have, as at the time of the application, the capacity to “sponsor” the first applicant and give the necessary undertakings. The initial Form 40 signed by the first applicant’s mother, had no relevance to the application in regards to the father due to the timing issue. In my view, the Tribunal correctly found that the first applicant’s mother had signed the original Form 40 not in the capacity as a “sponsor”, but rather in her capacity as the spouse of the sponsor and indicated her consent to the proposed arrangement by which the first applicant would become the carer of her father.
The acknowledgment signed by the first applicant’s mother stated:
“I give my consent to the above arrangements and agree to support my partner in fulfilling the responsibilities of sponsorship”.
This clearly was not as an assertion by the first applicant’s mother that she in fact was the sponsor.
It was clearly open to the Tribunal to find, at the time of the application, based on the medical evidence that was available to it, that the first applicant’s father was unable to make the relevant undertaking due to his advanced dementia.
In relation to counsel for the applicant’s submission that the defect was capable of being cured by the presentation of a further Form 40 signed by the first applicant’s mother, in which she purported to become the sponsor, cannot be sustained.
It is clear from the transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing, that the Form 40 that was tendered to the Tribunal was put on the basis that the first applicant’s mother proposed that the first applicant become the carer. This is clear from the following exchange:
Tribunal member: So why is your mum signing the sponsorship undertaking…
After an exchange with the Tribunal member, the following was stated:
Interpreter: Ah this document is to, just to show you that if this current application umm was not successful I’ll, my, my mum would ah make another application for me so sponsor me to, to look after her.
I am reasonably satisfied that the second Form 40 that was tendered at the Tribunal hearing can be interpreted in either one of two ways. It was either that the first applicant’s mother was now proposing to become the sponsor of the first applicant with her to be the carer of the father. The alternative is that the form purported to show that the first applicant’s mother would sponsor the first applicant to become her own carer.
I am reasonably satisfied that under the regulations, the first applicant required a sponsor, as at the time of the visa application, that if the sponsor was not found to be capable of giving the undertakings, this could not be later cured by another Form 40, signed by the first applicant’s mother. Based on the exchange above, I am satisfied that the Form 40 that was tendered at the Tribunal hearing, was put forward on the basis of evidence that the first applicant’s mother either supported the application by the first applicant to be the carer of her father, or that the first applicant’s mother would in fact sponsor the first applicant to become the her own carer. In either case, I am not satisfied that the defect which was found by the Tribunal to have occurred, was capable of being cured by the second Form 40.
Ground 2
This alleges that the Tribunal should have put the first applicant on notice as to its view as to the capacity in which the first applicant’s mother signed the Form 40. I am satisfied that the first applicant was clearly on notice by reason of the Minister’s decision as to whether the first applicant’s father had capacity and that by inference, his sponsorship was an issue. There was not any suggestions that it was the first applicant’s mother who was now the sponsor. It is clear from the transcript that the first applicant was on notice as to the capacity of her mother to become a sponsor. I am not satisfied there was a need to put the first applicant on notice as to the adverse conclusion (see Alphaone paragraph [30]).
Ground 4
Counsel for the applicant submitted that the certificate in relation to the first document is in valid in that whilst it is clear that the provider of the information wished to remain confidential, they did not require the information itself be kept in confidence. I am reasonably satisfied that the certificate is valid. Due to the detailed nature of the information contained within the document, which included information as to the name of the first applicant, date of birth, gender, nationality, place of residence, contact details, together with information as to where she had been working, the amount of work she had done and other material were in such detail that there was a reasonable prospect that the disclosure of the document would have by implication, disclosed the identity of the informant. It is clear at the top of the document that the identity of the informant wished to remain in confidence.
Given the detail contained within the document, I am satisfied that there was a considerable danger that had the entire document been made available to the applicant, the identity of the informant, which was given in confidence, would have been apparent to the first applicant. Accordingly, I am of the view that the certificate is valid.
If I am wrong in this, I note that the “gist” or “core” of the material was put to the first applicant and her answers were noted in the Tribunal’s decision. I am not satisfied that the first applicant was denied the opportunity of a different result. As set out in paragraph [44] of SZMTA, the High Court found:
None of these submissions can be accepted. The Secretary’s provision of an incorrect, and therefore invalid, notification that a s 438 applies in relation to a document or information amounts, without more, to an unauthorised act in breach of a limitation within the statutory procedures which condition the performance of the overarching duty of the Tribunal to conduct a review. Applying the principle of construction recently explained in Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, however, the Act is not to be interpreted to deny legal force to a decision made on a review in the conduct of which there has been a breach of that limitation unless that breach is material.
Given that the first applicant was given the “gist” of the information and had an opportunity to respond to it, I am not satisfied, even if there was a breach, that it denied the applicant the possibility of a different outcome. The breach, if there be one, in my view is not material.
Conclusion
I find that there has been no jurisdictional error committed by the Tribunal in relation to this matter and that Grounds 1, 2 and 4 of the application cannot be sustained.
Accordingly, I dismiss the application.
I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Humphreys
Associate:
Date: 25 October 2019
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