LM Investment Management Ltd (in liquidation) v Whyte

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

LM Investment Management Ltd (in liquidation) & Ors v Whyte [2023] QSC 132

PARTIES:

LM INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 077 208 461

(first applicant)

LM INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 077 208 461 AS RESPONSIBLE ENTITY OF THE LM FIRST MORTGAGE INCOME FUND ARSN 089 343 288

(second applicant)

LM INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 077 208 461 AS RESPONSIBLE ENTITY OF THE LM INSTITUTIONAL CURRENCY PROTECTED AUSTRALIAN INCOME FUND

(third applicant)

LM INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 077 208 461 AS RESPONSIBLE ENTITY OF THE LM CURRENCY PROTECTED AUSTRALIAN INCOME FUND

(fourth applicant)

v

DAVID WHYTE AS RECEIVER OF LM INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LIMITED (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 077 208 461 AS RESPONSIBLE ENTITY OF THE LM FIRST MORTGAGE INCOME FUND ARSN 089 343 288

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 14389 of 2022

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Hearing

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

16 June 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

27 April 2023

JUDGE:

Kelly J

ORDERS:

1.   The respondent’s application filed 13 April 2023 is dismissed.

2.   I will hear the parties as to costs and further directions for the conduct of the proceeding.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – DISCLOSING NO REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION OR DEFENCE – where the second applicant is the responsible entity of a registered managed investment scheme (‘the Fund’) – where the first applicant is liquidator of the second applicant – where the respondent was appointed to ensure the Fund was wound up in accordance with its constitution – where the first applicant commenced proceedings together with the second applicant, as well as the third and fourth applicants as unit holders in the Fund, against the respondent – where the applicants contend that the respondent lacks power to charge the Fund with payment of an adverse costs liability arising out of proceedings commenced by the respondent in the name of the second applicant and cause the second applicant to be indemnified out of the Fund in respect of that liability – where the respondent applied to strike out the applicants’ amended statement of claim with no leave to replead on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action – whether the applicants’ amended statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and should be struck out

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Trusts Act 1973 (Qld), s 8
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)

Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552; [2000] HCA 41, cited
Bruce v LM Investment Management Ltd (in liq)[2019] QSC 126, cited
Bruce & Anor v LM Investment Management Ltd & Ors (2013) 94 ACSR 684; [2013] QSC 192, related
Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62; [1949] HCA 1, cited
Dixon v Dixon (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 944
Free Serbian Orthodox Church Diocese for Australia and New Zealand Property Trust…

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Details
Case
[2023] QSC 132
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of LM Investment Management Ltd (in liquidation) v Whyte, the applicant was the liquidator of LM Investment Management Ltd, a responsible entity of a registered managed investment scheme known as the LM First Mortgage Income Fund. The respondent, Mr Whyte, was appointed to ensure the winding up of the Fund in accordance with its constitution. The applicants, including the liquidator, unit holders, and the Fund itself, brought proceedings against Mr Whyte, asserting that he lacked the authority to charge the Fund with an adverse costs liability from proceedings he initiated in the name of the Fund. The respondents sought to strike out the applicants’ amended statement of claim, arguing that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and should be dismissed without leave to amend.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicants’ amended statement of claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action, warranting its continuation or whether it should be struck out. The court noted that this was not an application for summary judgment but rather a motion to summarily terminate the proceeding. The court considered the well-established principle that such jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases where there is a high degree of certainty about the outcome. The court examined the powers conferred upon Mr Whyte by the Dalton J orders and whether there was a real question of fact or law regarding his purported exercise of power to charge the adverse costs liability to the Fund.

The court found that there was indeed a real question of fact or law concerning Mr Whyte's powers and whether he had overstepped his authority in charging the adverse costs liability to the Fund. Given that the proceeding involved complex issues about the interpretation of the Dalton J orders and the scope of Mr Whyte's powers, the court concluded that it was not appropriate to summarily terminate the proceeding. The application to strike out the pleading was dismissed, allowing the matter to proceed to trial.

Finally, the court directed that the parties would be heard regarding costs and further directions for the conduct of the proceeding. The dismissal of the application meant that the applicants could continue to pursue their claims, and the matter would be resolved through the ordinary course of litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s application filed 13 April 2023 is dismissed.

2. I will hear the parties as to costs and further directions for the conduct of the proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondent (“Mr Whyte”) applies to strike out the applicants’ amended statement of claim filed 28 March 2023 (“the pleading”). The interlocutory application does not specify reliance upon any part of r 171 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”). The order sought is that the pleading be struck out “without leave to replead”. As the arguments developed, the basis for the order was identified as being that the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action.[1] [1]The concession was made in oral argument (T1-9.25). Mr Whyte submitted that the application rose and fell on the pleading “as pleaded” (T1-3.25) and that the pleading should be struck out because it failed “to articulate a cause of action” (T1-4.34-38). The background to this proceeding In 1999, the LM First Mortgage Income Fund (“the Fund”) was established as a managed investment scheme under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Corporations Act”). The Fund invested by lending upon the security of mortgages to borrowers who developed real property. LM Investment Management Ltd (in liquidation) (“LMIM”) is the responsible entity of the Fund. The managed investment scheme was constituted as a trust of which LMIM was trustee both under the constitution of the scheme and under the Corporations Act.[2][2]Park v Whyte [2015] QSC 283 at [2]. On 19 March 2013, voluntary administrators were appointed to LMIM. In July 2013, Dalton J heard applications concerning LMIM and the Fund. Amongst the issues then ventilated were issues concerning whether, and by whom, the Fund should be wound up. On 8 August 2013, her Honour delivered judgment and made relevant orders which can be set out as follows:“1.Pursuant to section 601ND(1)(a) of the Corporations Act … [LMIM] …in its capacity as Responsible Entity of the [Fund] is directed to wind up the [Fund] subject to the orders below.2.Pursuant to section 601NF(1) of the [Corporations Act], [Mr Whyte] … is appointed to take responsibility for ensuring that [the Fund] is wound up in accordance with its constitution (“the Appointment”).3.Pursuant to section 601NF(2), … Mr Whyte;-(a)have access to the books and records of LMIM which concern the [Fund];(b)be indemnified out of the assets of the [Fund] in respect of any proper expenses incurred in carrying out the Appointment;(c)be entitled to claim remuneration in respect of the time spent by him and by employees of BDO who perform work in carrying out the Appointment at rates and in the sums from time to time approved by the Court and indemnified out of the assets of the [Fund] in respect of such remuneration.4.Nothing in this Order prejudices the rights of:(a)Deutsche Bank AG pursuant to any securities it holds over LMIM or the [Fund]; or(b)the receivers and managers appointed by Deutsche Bank AG, Joseph David Hayes and Anthony Norman Connelly.5.Pursuant to sections 601NF (2) of the [Corporations Act], Mr Whyte is appointed as the receiver of the property of the [Fund].6.Pursuant to sections 601 NF (2) of the [Corporations Act], Mr Whyte have, in relation to the property for which he is appointed receiver pursuant to paragraph 5 above, the powers set out in section 420 of the [Corporations Act].7.Without derogating in any way from the Appointment or the Receiver's powers pursuant to these Orders, Mr Whyte is authorised to:(a)take all steps necessary to ensure the realisation of property of [the Fund] held by [LMIM] as Responsible Entity of [the Fund] by exercising any legal right of [LMIM] as Responsible Entity of the [Fund] in relation to the property, including but not limited to:(i) providing instructions to solicitors, valuers, estate agents or other consultants as are necessary to negotiate and/or finalise the sale of the property;(ii) providing a response as appropriate to matters raised by receivers of property of LMIM as Responsible Entity of the [Fund] to which receivers have been appointed;(iii) dealing with any creditors with security over the property of the [Fund] including in order to obtain releases of security as is necessary to ensure the completion of the sale of property;(iv) appointing receivers, entering into possession as mortgagee or exercising any power of sale; and(v) executing contracts, transfers, releases, or any such other documents as are required to carry out any of the above; and(b)bring, defend or maintain any proceedings on behalf of [the Fund] in the name of [LMIM] as is necessary for the winding up of the [Fund] in accordance with clause 16 of its constitution, including the execution of any documents as required and providing instructions to solicitors in respect of all matters in relation to the conduct of such proceedings including, if appropriate, instructions in relation to the settlement of those actions.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Whyte submitted that “the proceeding” should be struck out essentially for five reasons. First, Mr Whyte has power to pay the adverse costs liability by reason of the Dalton J orders. Secondly, what the pleading described as the Beddoe Principles had no application to Mr Whyte, an officer of the court, who was specifically authorised to conduct litigation in the name of LMIM. Thirdly, the pleaded Beddoe Principles did not reflect the state of the law in relation to when an onus was cast upon a trustee. Fourthly, the applicants’ reliance on s 8 of the Trusts Act was “misguided and not correct”. Finally, the liquidator of LMIM had no authority to bring this proceeding in the name of LMIM.Consideration This is not an application for summary judgment. By seeking an order that the pleading be struck out with no leave to replead, Mr Whyte effectively seeks to summarily terminate the proceeding. In General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW),[10] Barwick CJ observed:“… the jurisdiction summarily to terminate an action is to be sparingly employed and is not to be used except in a clear case where the Court is satisfied that it has the requisite material and the necessary assistance from the parties to reach a definite and certain conclusion … [a] plaintiff ought not to be denied access to the customary tribunal which deals with actions of the kind he brings, unless his lack of a cause of action … is clearly demonstrated. The test to be applied has been variously expressed; ‘so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed’; ‘manifestly groundless’; ‘so manifestly faulty that it does not admit of argument’; ‘discloses a case which the Court is satisfied cannot succeed’; ‘under no possibility can there be a good cause of action’; ‘be manifest that to allow them’ (the pleadings) ‘to stand would involve useless expense’.”[11][10](1964) 112 CLR 125.[11]Ibid at 128–129. It is well recognised that there is the need for “exceptional caution” in exercising a power to summarily terminate a proceeding.[12] To summarily terminate a proceeding, there needs to be a “high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way”.[13] In Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners,[14] Dixon J said:“A case must be very clear indeed to justify the summary intervention of the court to prevent a plaintiff submitting his case for determination in the appointed manner by the court … once it appears that there is a real question to be determined whether of fact or law and that the rights of the parties depend upon it, then it is not competent for the court to dismiss the action as frivolous and vexatious …”.[15][12]Ibid at 129.[13]Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 at 576 [57].[14](1949) 78 CLR 62.[15]Ibid at 91. The first issue concerns the powers conferred upon Mr Whyte by the Dalton J orders. For the purposes of this strike out application, the issue may be framed as whether there is a real question of fact or law in relation to Mr Whyte’s purported exercise of power to charge the adverse costs liability to the Fund and pay the adverse costs liability out of the Fund.