LM - [2023] WASAT 15 | CaseChat AU

JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION:   LM [2023] WASAT 15
MEMBER:   PRESIDENT PRITCHARD
MS F CHILD, MEMBER
MS R BUNNEY, MEMBER

HEARD:   28 FEBRUARY 2023
DELIVERED          :   8 MARCH 2023
PUBLISHED           :   9 MARCH 2023
FILE NO/S:   GAA 68 of 2023

LM
Represented Person
MH
First Applicant
AH
Second Applicant
JW
Third Applicant

Catchwords:

Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 17A - Review of decision by single member of Tribunal - Capacity to make decisions - Appointment of a guardian and administrator - When joint guardians and administrators should be appointed - Plenary or limited guardian and administrator - Suitability of proposed guardian and administrator

Legislation:

Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth)
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)

Result:

Public Advocate appointed limited guardian
Public Trustee appointed plenary administrator

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Represented Person	:	Not applicable
First Applicant	:	Not applicable
Second Applicant	:	Not applicable
Third Applicant	:	Not applicable

Solicitors:

Represented Person	:	In Person
First Applicant	:	In Person
Second Applicant	:	In Person
Third Applicant	:	In Person

Cases referred to in decision:

Nil

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Introduction

MH and AH, and JW, have applied, pursuant to s 17A(1) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act), for the review of a decision made by a single member of the Tribunal on 13 December 2022 (Original Decision).
In the Original Decision, the learned Member found that the requirements of the GA Act for the appointment of a guardian and administrator were met and appointed the Public Advocate as LM's limited guardian, with a variety of functions, and the Public Trustee as LM's plenary administrator, with the power to make gifts. The Member also set aside an order made under s 65 of the GA Act and revoked an enduring power of attorney made by LM on 20 November 2020 (EPA) appointing MH as her sole attorney.
In essence, the only live issues on the review were who should be appointed the guardian and administrator for LM.
For the reasons which follow, we have concluded that LM meets the requirements of s 43 and s 64 of the GA Act for the appointment of a guardian and administrator respectively.
Various family members indicated that they were willing to be appointed, either individually, or jointly with others, to be LM's guardian and administrator. For the reasons outlined below, we are not satisfied that the joint appointments of guardian and administrator for LM would be in her best interests. We are of the opinion that MH, who was the only person who was willing to consent to a sole appointment as guardian and administrator, is not suitable to act as the guardian or administrator for LM. His unsuitability for appointment means that the proposed joint appointments of guardian and administrator, each of which involved him, should not be made. We are also of the view that MH's brother, SC, is unsuitable for appointment as an administrator, with the result that the proposed joint appointments of administrators, each of which involved him, should not be made.
There being no other person who is suitable and who is willing to act, we have concluded that the Public Advocate should be appointed the limited guardian for LM. We have concluded that the Public Trustee should be appointed LM's plenary administrator. We will discuss the functions to be conferred on the guardian, and the term of these appointments, later in these reasons.

Factual background

LM is a 76‑year‑old woman. She is not married. She has three brothers, NM, KM and CLM. She has three sons, SC, MH and MM. SC lives interstate, MH lives in the south west of Western Australia and MM lives on a station in the north of the State (Station).
LM has been in a relationship with JW for a number of years but they do not live together. She has also had the benefit of considerable support, for many years, from a long‑standing friend, EW.
LM has a not insignificant estate, which involves some complexity. Two aspects of that complexity should be mentioned. For many years LM owned the Station. In about August 2021, she entered into a contract by which she agreed to transfer her interest in the Station to MM (Contract). She transferred $200,000 of the proceeds of that transfer to SC's daughters (Alleged Gift) in circumstances where she later said she did not intend to do so. Some, but not all, of that money was repaid.
As we have already mentioned, in November 2020 LM executed the EPA and appointed MH as her sole attorney.
LM has always been a strongly independent woman. However, over at least the past 18 months her family has noticed a significant decline in her cognitive capacity. That resulted in a number of problems including an emerging need for assistance in securing accommodation and care suitable for her needs.
Her partner, her brothers and her sons all care for LM very much. All of them, on occasion, sought to assist with providing or finding accommodation and care but no one appears to have been capable of securing necessary arrangements for her. That culminated in an application by MM, in October 2022, for the appointment of a guardian and administrator for LM. That application was the subject of the Original Decision.

The nature of the review

MH, AH and JW now seek a review of the Original Decision.
Section 17A(1) of the GA Act permits any party who is aggrieved by a determination made by the Tribunal consisting of one member to request the President of the Tribunal to arrange for a full Tribunal to review the determination.
An express right of review is granted to any party who is aggrieved by a decision of a single member. Reviews under s 17A thus come within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction. In contrast, reviews under Part 7 are within the Tribunal's original jurisdiction.
As the Tribunal is exercising its review jurisdiction, the hearing of the review application was conducted as a hearing de novo. Consequently, the hearing was not confined to the matters that were before the Tribunal at first instance but involved the consideration of new material including evidence the Tribunal received in the hearing of the review.[1]
[1] State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), s 27(1).
The purpose of a review is to produce the correct and preferable decision at the time of the decision on the review.[2]
[2] SAT Act, s 27(2).
The central issue for the Tribunal on the review was who should be appointed LM's guardian and administrator. However, it remains necessary for us to be satisfied that a guardian and administrator should in fact be appointed, having regard to the requirements of the GA Act.

Principles governing proceedings under the GA Act

Before turning to consider those issues in more detail, it is appropriate to recall that in dealing with proceedings under the GA Act, the Tribunal is required to observe the principles set out in s 4 of that Act.
The primary concern of the Tribunal is the best interests of any represented person.[3] In addition, every person is presumed to be capable of, amongst other things, managing their own affairs and making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to their estate, until the contrary is proved to the satisfaction of the Tribunal.[4] That important presumption applies in respect of every application under the GA Act, including the present review application. In considering any matter relating to a represented person, the Tribunal is required, as far as possible, to seek to ascertain the views and wishes of the person concerned.[5]
[3] GA Act, s 4(2).
[4] GA Act, s 4(3).
[5] GA Act, s 4(7).
Furthermore, an administration order should not be made if the needs of the proposed represented person could, in the opinion of the Tribunal, be met by other means less restrictive of the person's freedom of decision and action.[6]
[6] GA Act, s 4(4).
A plenary guardian shall not be appointed if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the appointment of a limited guardian would be sufficient to meet the needs of the proposed represented person.[7] In addition, any order appointing a limited guardian or an administrator should be in terms that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, impose the least restrictions possible, in the circumstances, on the represented person's freedom of decision and action.[8]
[7] GA Act, s 4(5).
[8] GA Act, s 4(6).

The evidence before the Tribunal on the review application

LM attended and gave evidence at the hearing. We took her views into account.
It is fair to say that LM did not manifest a great deal of insight into her cognitive limitations. She acknowledged that she needed practical assistance in relation to her care and that she needed support in relation to complex financial decisions. She denied requiring a guardian and administrator but said that if they had to be appointed she wanted MH and AH to act as her guardian and administrator.
A number of interested persons attended and gave evidence. They were JW, MH, AH, MM, SC, NM, KM, CLM, EW, JG (LM's accountant), a representative of the Public Advocate and an officer from the Public Trustee's Office.
In evidence before the Tribunal were a number of documents setting out witness statements or submissions made by various members of LM's family, both for the hearing before the learned Member on 13 December 2022, and for this review. It is unnecessary to refer to those individual statements or submissions. It suffices to say we have read and taken them all into account.
In addition, there were various documents prepared by medical practitioners and service providers who have assessed LM. Key among those were the report of Dr C dated 9 December 2022, and the report of Prof F dated 4 February 2022. There was also a report from LM's general practitioner, Dr Q, dated 1 December 2022.
Also in evidence were reports provided by the Public Trustee and the Office of the Public Advocate for the purposes of the Tribunal hearing on 13 December 2022, and for the review hearing.
Finally, the documentary evidence also included a copy of the EPA.

Appointment of guardian and administrator - statutory criteria

The appointment of a guardian requires that the Tribunal be satisfied as to the matters set out in s 43 of the GA Act.
If the Tribunal is satisfied that the proposed represented person is over 18 years of age, is either incapable of looking after their own health and safety, unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to their person, or in need of oversight, care or control in the interests of their own health and safety or for the protection of other persons, and is in need of a guardian, then the requirements for the appointment of a guardian will be met. The Tribunal is then required to consider subsidiary questions such as whether a plenary or limited guardian should be appointed, what functions should be given to a limited guardian, and who should be appointed the guardian.
The appointment of an administrator requires that the Tribunal be satisfied as to the matters set out in s 64(1) of the GA Act.
The three questions for the Tribunal under s 64 are whether the proposed represented person suffers from a mental disability; whether, by reason of that mental disability, the proposed represented person is unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all or any part of their estate; and whether the proposed represented person is in need of an administrator of their estate.
If those three questions are answered 'yes', then the Tribunal is required to consider subsidiary questions such as who should be appointed the administrator, whether a plenary or limited administration order should be made and the duration of that appointment.

Capacity

Underlying each of s 43 and s 64 of the GA Act is, therefore, a question of the proposed represented person's decision‑making capacity. The tests are similar, but not the same, under each section.
Turning first to s 43 in relation to guardianship, the evidence relevant to LM's capacity is, first, set out in the reports of Dr C dated 9 December 2022 and Prof F dated 4 February 2022. We note that LM's general practitioner, Dr Q, was unsure about her decision‑making capacity in all spheres. Given the greater expertise of Dr C and Prof F in relation to cognitive capacity, we prefer their opinions to that of the general practitioner.
Prof F noted that LM presented as a person who was able to follow simple conversations and seemed logical in her speech. However, when topics of conversation became more complex or when the quantity of information increased, she appeared to be unable to process information as logically. Prof F undertook comprehensive cognitive assessments and concluded that while she had some well‑preserved cognitive functioning in some areas, other cognitive domains revealed significant weaknesses concerning her ability to retain and recall or recognise contextual verbal information, her ability to retain and recall complex visual information and aspects of her executive functioning. Prof F considered LM's ability to make decisions in relation to personal decision making, in the context of her medical status, and his opinion was that LM does not possess an adequate level of insight about her current medical status and risk factors.
Dr C expressed the unambiguous view that LM did not have the capacity to make reasonable decisions in relation to medical treatment and procedures but was less sure about her ability to make decisions about her accommodation and the services she requires.
Also relevant to the question of LM's capacity were reports of her family members, summarised in the Public Advocate's reports of 9 December 2022, and 20 February 2023. That evidence included reports of LM's discharge from hospital in December 2022, her trip north and her eventually being located in Carnarvon before those close to her made temporary arrangements for her accommodation pending this hearing. That evidence amply demonstrated that LM has no insight into her accommodation and care needs and lacks the ability to make reasonable decisions about those matters. We do not doubt that the same conclusion applies to the services she may require. By way of example, LM's evidence at the review hearing was that during her recent hospital stay she happened to meet a person who assured her that that person would be willing to work as a carer for her in the future. LM assumed that that care arrangement could then readily be made despite all other evidence which suggested that attempts to arrange full time care for her in the past had not been successful.
At the review hearing, none of those in attendance sought to contest the finding made by the Member on 13 December 2022 as to LM's lack of capacity in personal and financial decision making.
Having regard to the evidence to which we have referred, we are satisfied that the presumption of capacity has been displaced. We are satisfied, and we find, that LM is incapable of looking after her own health and safety, unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to her person, and is in need of oversight, care or control in the interest of her own health and safety.
In relation to financial decision making, having regard to the evidence of Prof F and Dr C, we are satisfied, and we find, that LM has a mental disability namely a 'major neurocognitive disorder' and 'neurodegenerative disease e.g. Alzheimer's Disease', and that by reason of that disability she is unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all or any part of her estate. Prof F was of the opinion that LM would require assistance to manage her finances, especially with respect to financial tasks involving a moderate to high level of complexity. Dr C was of the same view. The evidence of LM's family members, outlined in the Public Advocate's report, especially the report of December 2022, is entirely consistent with those views.
We are also satisfied, and we find, that LM needs to have a guardian and an administrator appointed. There is no doubt, having regard to the evidence, that decisions need to be made in relation to LM's personal affairs, such as her accommodation and services, and in relation to her finances, that will undoubtedly require the legal authority of a guardian and administrator respectively. Informal decision making is not an adequate alternative.
As we have noted, LM had made an EPA dated 20 November 2020 appointing MH to be her sole attorney. The EPA was revoked by the Member on 13 December 2022. For the reasons we will shortly set out in relation to MH's suitability to manage LM's financial affairs, we do not consider that reinstatement of the EPA is an option in this case.

What decision-making functions does the guardian need to perform?

As noted, s 4(5) of the GA Act provides that a plenary guardian shall not be appointed if a limited guardian would be sufficient to meet the needs of the proposed represented person. We are satisfied that appointment of a limited guardian would suffice in this case.
Having regard to LM's decision‑making needs, as disclosed by the evidence, we are satisfied that the limited guardian should be given the same functions as were given by the Member on 13 December 2022. No one who attended the review hearing suggested otherwise.

Plenary or limited administration?

We are satisfied that a plenary administrator should be appointed, in all of the circumstances. As we have observed, LM's estate is not insignificant and involves some complexity. The administrator should be given plenary powers in order to be able to deal with all issues that may arise.

Who should be appointed guardian and administrator?

Section 44 of the GA Act sets out the criteria for who may be appointed a guardian. Section 68 of the GA Act deals with the criteria for the appointment of an administrator.
LM's view was that she wanted MH and AH to be appointed her guardians and administrators. We have taken her view into account. However, it is not determinative of our decision, which must be reached on the basis of our conclusion as to what is in her best interests.
Each of the following members of LM's family were over 18 years of age, and indicated - either at the review hearing, or by email after that hearing - that they would consent to appointment, in the terms set out below (that is, as to sole or joint appointment).
·MH - is willing to be appointed both the guardian and administrator. MH recognised that AH would assist him, but did not propose, expressly, her joint appointment as guardian and administrator, and neither did AH propose her own appointment.
·SC - proposed that he be jointly appointed as guardian and administrator together with NM and MH. SC was not willing to be appointed solely as guardian and administrator because he does not reside in WA and that would cause practical difficulties.
·NM - proposed that he, SC and MH be jointly appointed as guardian and administrator. NM was not willing to be appointed as sole guardian and administrator.
·KM - initially indicated, with some reluctance, that he would be willing to be appointed, but expressly withdrew that consent after the hearing. He preferred that NM, SC and MH be appointed as guardian and administrator, if they could work together.
·CLM - also supported the appointment of NM, SC and MH jointly as guardian and administrator.
·MM - did not propose himself for appointment. He did not support MH's sole appointment because of his dissatisfaction with the conduct of MH (and AH) under the EPA. However, he thought that it could be a possibility for NM, SC and MH to be jointly appointed guardian and administrator.
·JW - did not propose his own appointment. He supported MH's appointment.
·JG, LM's accountant, opposed SC's appointment because of the potential conflict of interest arising from LM's transfer of funds to SC's daughters, which had not been fully refunded. JG supported the appointment of MH and AH, as she felt that LM was comfortable with them in that role, that they were committed to what was best for LM, and that they had been able to work effectively with JG.
·EW - preferred not to express a view about preferencing one or more family members above others as guardian and administrator but felt that things had not changed a lot in several years.

We start by noting that in so far as administrators are concerned, the Tribunal is ordinarily loath to make a joint appointment given the practical difficulties of joint administration, especially in relation to banking arrangements, and the real practical limitations faced by joint administrators in operating online banking accounts for a represented person.
In relation to guardianship, joint guardians are sometimes appointed but usually only in circumstances where the Tribunal can be confident that the guardians are likely to be able to work together, and to reach unanimous views about the decisions which need to be made for a represented person.
The family dynamics which were apparent from the evidence, and which we discuss in a moment, have led us to the view that joint decision making is unlikely to be successful and that a joint appointment of a guardian and administrator for LM is not in her best interests. We acknowledge that all family members expressed sincere hope that joint decision making would be possible but recognised that this would require a change in the way that their family relationships had historically operated. In their responses to the Public Advocate's inquiries, prior to the earlier hearing, NM and LM told the Public Advocate's representative that they thought the guardian and administrator needed to be outside the family, due to the conflict within it. Nothing in the evidence suggested that anything had occurred since then to change that situation, other than the development of what may, respectfully, be described as misplaced optimism that things could be different in the future.
LM left us in no doubt that she is a strong willed individual. Her relationships with family members have been under strain when disagreements have arisen (e.g. she has not spoken with MM for some time). We have little doubt that if a guardian and administrator makes a decision with which LM does not agree, she will have no hesitation in making her disagreement known. We think it likely that if the guardian and administrator is a family member that that disagreement will undermine LM's relationship with that person. That would not be in LM's best interests.
Furthermore, we have reached the conclusion, and we find, that none of the family members who were willing to be appointed as guardians or administrators is suitable for appointment, and that that precludes their sole or joint appointment.
We turn first to explain why MH is not suitable for appointment. In our view, MH is unsuitable for appointment as LM's guardian for three reasons.
First, the evidence supports the conclusion, and we find, that in the past, MH has not adequately communicated with family members about decisions in relation to LM. There is a history of tension in his relationships with family members. MH acknowledged that history in his evidence. For example, MH acknowledged that in the past it had been AH who had undertaken communications with his family members. MH and MM do not appear to communicate at all. It became apparent during the evidence that NM and MH also have a strained relationship, arising out of an incident where MH said he overheard NM shouting at LM, and which NM refuted.
In his statement to the Public Advocate's investigator, NM advised that MH has a fractured relationship with MM, SC and NM himself, and very limited communication with the family. He told the Public Advocate's representative that family members were concerned that MH did not take the necessary action to arrange for support and care to be provided for LM when he had the authority to do so under the EPA. (MH was appointed by LM as her attorney under an EPA dated 20 November 2020.) Regardless of whether that is an accurate summation of MH's authority under the EPA, or of his conduct, it nevertheless reflects a perception by other family members of his conduct, and of their confidence in him.
SC told the Public Advocate's representative in December 2022 that he had found MH difficult to communicate with and that conversations with him would often end up in an argument and MH would hang up on him.
In our view, a guardian appointed for LM needs to be able to communicate effectively with LM's family members. This is crucial in relation to significant personal decisions which now need to be made in relation to her accommodation and services, but also in relation to her medical treatment and services in the future. If the guardian is not able to communicate effectively they will not be able to elicit all relevant information from family members in relation to those decisions. Such a process of decision making is not in LM's best interests. We are not satisfied that MH will be able to communicate effectively with LM's family and thus to act as a guardian.
Secondly, we are not satisfied that MH will be able to make decisions in LM's best interests, if those decisions are contrary to LM's own views about what should be done. In his evidence at the hearing, MH told us that he would give his mother the 'main rein' to make her decisions. That mirrored MH's comments to the Public Advocate's representative, for the purposes of their report of 9 December 2022, that his mother was capable of 'running her own race'.
Thirdly, those comments by MH, and his evidence at the review hearing, revealed an inadequate appreciation of LM's present level of impairment and a failure to appreciate what decisions may need to be made, from where assistance might be found, and of the fact that it is imperative that difficult decisions in relation to LM's accommodation and services need to be made now.
In relation to MH's suitability for appointment as LM's administrator, there is an additional reason why we do not consider him suitable. That is that it may be necessary for the administrator to explore whether there is any basis for legal action in respect of two matters. The first is a contract that LM entered into with MM for the transfer of LM's share in the Station to MM. (We emphasise that in making that observation we do not express any finding in relation to the Contract but merely note that the circumstances in which it was made, and its terms, may require investigation by the administrator). MH and MM are brothers. Their relationship is already under strain. If MH is administrator and raises questions in relation to the Contract, that is likely to place that sibling relationship under even further strain. MH brushed off these concerns and told us that he was not concerned about the implications of his role for his relationship. Even if he is not concerned, we have no doubt that their relationship is likely to be further strained in those circumstances.
The second matter which may require investigation by the administrator is the Alleged Gift, which has not been fully repaid. (Again, we make no finding about the status of that payment.) It was apparent, from SC's evidence at the hearing, that that is an issue of some sensitivity already. If MH is appointed as administrator any such investigation will undoubtedly give rise to real tension between him and SC. That family relationship would be likely to be undermined, rather than preserved, by MH's appointment as administrator in those circumstances.
The difficult family circumstances to which we have referred confirms for us that joint decision‑making involving MH and the other family members who volunteered to be jointly appointed with him, would not be workable in any practical sense.
We turn next to SC. We note that SC does not seek sole appointment as guardian and administrator. We find that SC is unsuitable for joint appointment as administrator with anyone else because there will be an inevitable conflict of interest between his personal interest in his daughters' financial well-being and the interest he would have as administrator to act in LM's best interests, reflected in the corresponding duty he would have as administrator to investigate the payment of $200,000 by LM to his daughters, and to take such action (if any) as may be necessary to recover those funds.
Neither NM, nor KM nor LM were willing to be appointed individually as guardian and administrator. Their proposals for joint guardian and administrator involved the appointment of MH and SC. The unsuitability of each of MH and SC make those proposals for joint guardian and administrator unworkable.
Section 44(5) of the GA Act provides that the Public Advocate should not be appointed unless there is no other person who is suitable and willing to act.
We are satisfied that there is no person who is suitable and willing to act. The Public Advocate should be appointed as LM's limited guardian.
In relation to the administrator, we are satisfied that it is in the best interests of LM for the Public Trustee to be appointed as her plenary administrator. Quite apart from the unsuitability of family members for that role, we note that LM has a not insignificant estate involving some complexity. It is in her best interests that the administrator appointed have the knowledge and ability to make the necessary financial decisions to manage her estate in the foreseeable future.
In our opinion, the appointment of the Public Advocate and the Public Trustee will result in the appointment of a guardian and administrator with the ability and appropriate level of expertise to make the necessary decisions LM requires in the foreseeable future.

The duration of the order

The Tribunal is required to nominate a period of time by which a review of a guardianship and administration order must be undertaken.
The maximum time allowed under the GA Act is five years.
We consider that the guardianship and administration order should be reviewed in five years, namely by 7 March 2028.

Orders

The effect of our decision is, in practical terms, to confirm the decision of the Member on 13 December 2022. However, because the review date for the appointments is to change, and for the sake of clarity, we will set aside relevant paragraphs of the decision of the Member on 13 December 2022 and make a fresh decision.
The orders we make are, therefore, as follows.
1.Orders 1 and 4 of the Orders made by Member Oldfield on 13 December 2022 are confirmed.
2.Orders 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Orders made by Member Oldfield made on 13 December 2022 are set aside and the following orders are substituted for them.

Guardianship

3.The Tribunal declares that the represented person, LM, is:
(a)incapable of looking after her own health and safety;
(b)unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to her person;
(c)in need of oversight, care or control in the interests of her own health and safety; and
(d)in need of a guardian.

4.The Public Advocate of David Malcolm Justice Centre, Level 23, 28 Barrack Street Perth, Western Australia, is appointed limited guardian of the represented person with the following functions:
(a)to decide where the represented person is to live, whether permanently or temporarily;
(b)to decide with whom the represented person is to live;
(c)to make treatment decisions for the represented person, subject to Division 3 of Part 5 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA);
(d)to determine the services to which the represented person should have access;
(e)to decide whether to give or withhold consent to the use of any restrictive practice for the represented person proposed from time to time in compliance with Part 4A of the Quality of Care Principles 2014 made pursuant to the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth); and
(f)to decide whether and on what terms the represented person is to travel.

5.The Tribunal approves delegation by the Public Advocate of her functions as guardian of the represented person to an officer or employee employed in the Office of the Public Advocate.
6.The guardianship order is to be reviewed by 7 March 2028.

Administration

7.The Tribunal declares that the represented person, LM, is:
(a)unable by reason of a mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all of her estate; and
(b)in need of an administrator of her estate.

8.The Public Trustee of 553 Hay Street, Perth, Western Australia is appointed plenary administrator of the represented person's estate with all the powers and duties conferred by the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA).
9.The administrator is authorised to expend up to a total amount of $2,000 on gifts on behalf of the represented person.
10.The administration order is to be reviewed by 7 March 2028.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
PM
Associate to the Honourable Justice Pritchard
9 MARCH 2023