Lloyd v Ryan Borg by his Tutor NSW Trustee and Guardian

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Court of Appeal

New South Wales

Case Title: Lloyd v Ryan Borg by his Tutor NSW Trustee and Guardian
Medium Neutral Citation: [2013] NSWCA 245
Hearing Date(s): 5 July 2013
Decision Date: 01 August 2013
Before: Barrett JA at [1];
Gleeson JA at [9];
Leeming JA at [77]
Decision:

(1) Grant leave to appeal.

(2) Direct the applicant to file a notice of appeal in the form of the draft notice of appeal within 14 days.

(3) Appeal allowed.

(4) Set aside the orders of Judge McLoughlin made on 26 July 2012.

(5) In lieu thereof, order:

(a) judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff;

(b) the plaintiff pay the costs of the defendant.

(6) The respondent pay the applicant's costs on appeal.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords: TORTS - negligence - liability for others' negligence - other persons - Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 216 - Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333 - social occasion - where owner of vehicle not present - where owner of vehicle not aware of its use - whether applicant vicariously liable for the acts of his de facto wife
Legislation Cited: Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 Motor Accidents Compensation Amendment Act 2006
Motor Vehicles Insurance Act 1936 (Qld)
Cases Cited: Behrendorff v Soblusky (1957) 98 CLR 619
Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 29; 206 CLR 512
Brown v Holloway (1909) 10 CLR 89
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers and Citizens Co-operative Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41
Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee [1999] HCA 59; 200 CLR 1
Gutman v McFall [2004] NSWCA 378; 61 NSWLR 599
Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44; 207 CLR 21
International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Ltd v Carrigan's Hazeldene Pastoral Co [1958] HCA 16; 100 CLR 644
Maric v Nominal Defendant [2013] NSWCA 190
Morgans v Launchbury [1973] AC 127
Moynihan v Moynihan [1975] IR 192
O'Keeffe v Hickey [2008] IESC 72; [2009] 2 IR 302
Ormrod v Crosville Motor Services Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 1120
PGA v R [2012] HCA 21; (2012) 245 CLR 355
Scott v Davis [2000] HCA 52; 204 CLR 333
Soblusky v Egan [1960] HCA 9; 103 CLR 215
State of New South Wales v Paige [2002] NSWCA 235; 60 NSWLR 371
Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 19; 226 CLR 161
Texts Cited: B M E McMahon and W Binchy Law of Torts, 3rd ed (2000)
Bowstead and Reynolds On Agency, 19th ed (2010) Sweet & Maxwell
Clerk & Lindsell on…
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Details
Case
[2013] NSWCA 245
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the liability of the applicant, Mr Lloyd, for the negligence of his de facto wife, who was driving his vehicle at the time of an accident. The respondent, Mr Ryan Borg, was a passenger in the vehicle and sustained injuries. The primary judge had found Mr Lloyd vicariously liable for the negligent driving of his de facto wife. The appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal of New South Wales by Barrett, Gleeson and Leeming JJA.

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether Mr Lloyd, as the owner of the vehicle, was vicariously liable for the negligent driving of his de facto wife, notwithstanding that he was not present at the time of the accident and was unaware of her use of the vehicle. This required the court to consider the principles of vicarious liability in the context of a vehicle owner who has permitted another person to drive their vehicle, and whether such permission, in the absence of the owner's presence or knowledge of the specific use, was sufficient to establish vicarious liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the primary judge's orders. The court reasoned that the principles established in cases such as *Soblusky v Egan* and *Scott v Davis* did not support the imposition of vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle in circumstances where the driver was not acting as the owner's agent or servant, and the owner had no knowledge of or control over the use of the vehicle at the time of the negligent act. The court found that Mr Lloyd had not authorised or permitted the use of his vehicle by his de facto wife in a manner that would render him vicariously liable for her negligence.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal entered judgment for the defendant (Mr Lloyd) against the plaintiff (Mr Borg) in the proceedings below, and ordered that Mr Borg pay Mr Lloyd's costs of those proceedings. The court also ordered that Mr Borg pay Mr Lloyd's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Grant leave to appeal.

(2) Direct the applicant to file a notice of appeal in the form of the draft notice of appeal within 14 days.

(3) Appeal allowed.

(4) Set aside the orders of Judge McLoughlin made on 26 July 2012.

(5) In lieu thereof, order:

(a) judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff;

(b) the plaintiff pay the costs of the defendant.

(6) The respondent pay the applicant's costs on appeal.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Lloyd v Ryan Borg by his Tutor NSW Trustee and Guardian involves a claim for damages arising from an incident at a social occasion where the plaintiff was injured by the defendant's de facto wife, who was driving the defendant's vehicle. The plaintiff, Lloyd, attended a social gathering at the defendant's residence where alcohol was served. The defendant, Ryan Borg, was not present at the gathering, but his vehicle was there, parked in the driveway. During the evening, the defendant's de facto wife, who had been drinking, decided to drive the vehicle. She lost control of the car and collided with the plaintiff, causing him injuries. Lloyd subsequently brought an action against Borg, seeking compensation for the injuries sustained.

The central issue in the case revolves around whether Borg, the owner of the vehicle, can be held vicariously liable for the negligent actions of his de facto wife. Lloyd's argument hinges on the proposition that Borg, as the owner of the vehicle, was somehow responsible for the use of the car by his de facto wife even though he was not present at the social occasion and was unaware of her intention to drive. Borg contends that he cannot be held liable for his de facto wife's actions because he was not present and had no knowledge of her driving the vehicle. The case draws on previous legal precedents such as Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 216 and Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333, which discuss the principles of vicarious liability and the liability of vehicle owners for the actions of others using their vehicles.

The court's consideration of these facts is critical in determining the applicability of the legal principles surrounding vicarious liability and the responsibility of vehicle owners for the negligent use of their vehicles by others. The circumstances of the social gathering, the defendant's absence, and the lack of knowledge about the de facto wife's decision to drive form the basis of the factual dispute in this case. The outcome will depend on how these facts are interpreted in light of the relevant legal principles.

The matter came before the court following a decision by Judge McLoughlin in the Local Court of New South Wales on 26 July 2012, which was then subject to an application for leave to appeal to the District Court. The appellant, Lloyd, sought to challenge the liability ruling in respect of negligence claims against the respondent, Ryan Borg, and his tutor, NSW Trustee and Guardian. This appeal centred on the question of whether the appellant could be held vicariously liable for the acts of his de facto wife in a scenario where she was driving a vehicle not owned by the appellant and without his knowledge or consent at a social occasion. The appellant argued that he could not be held vicariously liable under the principles established in Soblusky v Egan and Scott v Davis. The District Court granted leave to appeal, directing the appellant to file a notice of appeal within a specified timeframe, and subsequently allowed the appeal, setting aside the prior orders and substituting them with a judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff, along with an order for costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the applicant is vicariously liable for the acts of his de facto wife in relation to the accident caused by her while driving the applicant's vehicle at a social occasion, where the applicant was not present and not aware of the vehicle's use.
2. Whether the principles set out in Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 216 apply to establish vicarious liability for the acts of a de facto spouse.
3. Whether the principles set out in Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333 apply to determine the liability of an owner for the negligent acts of a driver when the owner was not present and unaware of the vehicle's use.
4. Whether the doctrine of imputed negligence can extend to a de facto relationship in circumstances where the relationship is akin to marriage.

Held
1. Whether the applicant is vicariously liable for the acts of his de facto wife in relation to the accident caused by her while driving the applicant's vehicle at a social occasion, where the applicant was not present and not aware of the vehicle's use: The court concluded that the applicant is not vicariously liable for the acts of his de facto wife in this context.
2. Whether the principles set out in Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 216 apply to establish vicarious liability for the acts of a de facto spouse: The court concluded that the principles in Soblusky v Egan do not apply to establish vicarious liability for the acts of a de facto spouse.
3. Whether the principles set out in Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333 apply to determine the liability of an owner for the negligent acts of a driver when the owner was not present and unaware of the vehicle's use: The court concluded that the principles in Scott v Davis apply in this scenario to determine the liability of the vehicle owner.
4. Whether the doctrine of imputed negligence can extend to a de facto relationship in circumstances where the relationship is akin to marriage: The court concluded that the doctrine of imputed negligence does not extend to a de facto relationship where the relationship is akin to marriage.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court's reasoning in this case primarily revolved around the issue of whether the applicant could be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of his de facto wife, who caused an accident while driving the applicant's vehicle at a social occasion. The court considered several legal principles and precedents to reach its decision. Firstly, the court addressed whether the principles established in Soblusky v Egan (1960) 103 CLR 216 apply to a de facto relationship. In Soblusky v Egan, the High Court held that a husband could be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of his wife. However, the court in Lloyd v Ryan Borg by his Tutor NSW Trustee and Guardian distinguished this case on the basis that it concerned a married couple, whereas the present case involved a de facto relationship. Consequently, the principles in Soblusky v Egan did not directly apply to establish vicarious liability for a de facto spouse.

Secondly, the court examined whether the principles in Scott v Davis (2000) 204 CLR 333 applied to determine the liability of an owner for the negligent acts of a driver when the owner was not present and unaware of the vehicle's use. In Scott v Davis, the High Court held that a car owner could not be held liable for the negligent acts of a driver who used the car without the owner's knowledge or consent. The court found this case relevant and applied its principles to the present case, concluding that the applicant could not be held vicariously liable for his de facto wife's negligent acts since he was neither present nor aware of the vehicle's use at the time of the accident.

Furthermore, the court considered whether the doctrine of imputed negligence could extend to a de facto relationship in circumstances where the relationship is akin to marriage. The court observed that while de facto relationships can be akin to marriage in some respects, they are not legally equivalent. Consequently, the doctrine of imputed negligence, which applies to married couples, did not extend to de facto relationships in this case. This distinction was crucial in determining that the applicant could not be held vicariously liable for his de facto wife's negligent acts.

In summary, the court held that the principles set out in Soblusky v Egan and Scott v Davis applied to the present case but did not establish vicarious liability for the applicant in his de facto relationship. The court distinguished the legal principles applicable to married couples from those applicable to de facto relationships, thereby concluding that the applicant could not be held vicariously liable for his de facto wife's negligent acts. The binding legal principle, or ratio decidendi, established by this decision is that vicarious liability does not extend to de facto relationships in the same way it does to married couples. This decision follows the precedent set by Scott v Davis, which limits the liability of vehicle owners to cases where they are present or aware of the vehicle's use.