Lloyd v Ramsey
[2002] VSC 175
•13 May 2002
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
PRACTICE COURT
No. 8735 of 2001
| RICHARD LLOYD | Appellant |
| v | |
| COLIN RAMSEY | Respondent |
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JUDGE: | Ashley J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 13 May 2002 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 13 May 2002 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Lloyd v Ramsey | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2002] VSC 175 | |
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Appeal – appeal from order refusing application under Rule 58.09 of Chapter 1 of the Rules – challenge to validity of Constitution Act 1975 and Road Safety Act 1986 – Freemasonry – no prima facie case for relief demonstrated – appeal dismissed.
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APPEARANCES: | |
| For the Appellant | In person |
| For the Respondent | No appearance |
HIS HONOUR:
This is an appeal from a decision of Master Wheeler made on 14 December last year, by which the Master dismissed an application brought under Rule 58.08 of Chapter I of the Rules seeking an order under Rule 58.09. It was necessary for the prospective appellant to show to the Master a prima facie case for relief. If that was not demonstrated, then Rule 58.09(2) directs the Master to refuse the application. The refusal of an application, subject to appeal, leads to the appeal standing dismissed: see Rule 58.10.
What is before me, as I said a moment ago, is an appeal from the Master's decision by which, in substance, the Master determined that a prima facie case for relief had not been shown. The appeal is by way of re-hearing de novo, that is, I consider the matter afresh.
An issue arose before the Master whether the Master was disqualified from hearing the application because he was a Freemason. That matter is of no relevance to this appeal because, as I have said, I consider the matter afresh. I pause to add that, out of caution, and to allay the appellant's possible concern, I informed him – and it is the case – that I am not a Freemason.
The application for an order under Rule 58.09 was apparently made in reliance upon s.92 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989. The application was supported by an affidavit affirmed by the appellant on 13 December 2001.
It appears that the appellant was charged with a breach of the Road Safety Act 1986 and that the matter was finally disposed of adversely to the appellant on 16 November last year. The hearing followed, it seems, two mentions of the matter, the first being held on 27 April and the second on 8 June 2001. In the course of the first application the appellant apparently indicated that the charge brought against him involved "the legal status of the Victorian Constitution of 1855 and the matter of Freemasonry". On the second occasion that the matter came on for mention, the appellant submitted certain written material to the Magistrates' Court; and he told the magistrate, it seems, that his matter involved or necessitated a "voire dire concerning the 1855 Victorian Constitution and also Freemasonry".
According to paragraph 5 of Mr Lloyd's affidavit, "The reason for this appeal is that Magistrate Cottrill erred when he ignored and refused to answer my question of disclosure relating to Freemasonry", this leading to the situation that (see paragraph 6 of the affidavit) "(w)hen the magistrate ignored and refused to answer the disclosure question, I withdrew from the hearing".
By paragraph 7 of his affidavit Mr Lloyd sets out 10 issues of law which allegedly arise out of the proceeding in the Magistrates' Court. I cannot see that any of them have any prospect of success. I deal with them seriatim.
The first issue is framed this way: "(a) Is it legally possible for a Masonic magistrate, master or judge to hear a matter within the State of Victoria concerning Masonic breaches of State law?" I have not got the slightest idea what is meant by the phrase "Masonic breaches of state law", and it seems to me, with all respect to the appellant, that that is not readily intelligible. Moreover, whatever else might be said, the issue as framed is obviously over-wide.
The second question of law said to arise is this: "Is a law bench bound by law to disclose a Masonic involvement when disclosure is requested?" The question is hopelessly non-specific. If, as might be the case, the question is intendedly linked with the taking of oaths by Freemasons, then the question has in substance been answered by the Court of Appeal in the Application by Shaw and Another[1]
[1][2001] VSCA 175.
The third question: "Does the organisation of Freemasonry within the State of Victoria have some type of separate authority for taking and administering of oaths contrary to the authority and jurisdiction of the law of the State of Victoria?" is also a matter which seems to me to be foreclosed by what the Court of Appeal said in the matter to which I referred a moment ago. Again, also, the question is impossibly wide.
The fourth question: "Does any Act of Victorian Parliament exist that justifies the taking of extrajudicial oaths or Masonic oaths?" is a further matter that I consider is foreclosed by the appeal to which I have referred; likewise, in my opinion, each of the matter raised by the proposed issue of law (f), to the text of which I will not refer. Again, also, the questions framed lack necessary specificity.
Question (e) : "Do Masonic oaths breach section 24 of the Victorian Constitution Act of 16 July 1855?" assumes the relevance of the 1855 Act. The Court of Appeal has said, in substance, that it is not relevant. [2] I note the unsatisfactory form of the question. I need say nothing in that connection.
[2]Joosse v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2002] VSCA 47 at paragraph 12.
The seventh question of law, (g), is framed this way: "When the Masonic matters came before the full court of the Supreme Court of Victoria for Grand Jury application, was the hearing a nullity considering the fact that President Winneke's father is listed in Hansard as a member of the Masonic order of the Knights of St John of Jerusalem?" The proceeding referred to by question (g) is the appeal to which I first referred. I do not think that it is open to me to consider whether what is described as the "full court of the Supreme Court" produced a nullity for the reason advanced by Mr Lloyd.
Question (h), the text of which I shall not set out, is simply a restatement of question (f) in wider terms. It is an invitation to consider, in an unrestrained way, all of the laws of the State of Victoria. I do not consider that the form of the question is satisfactory, and the question when attached to particular statutory provisions has already been resolved.
Question (i) is, I think, entirely misconceived. It raises the issue: "Is Freemasonry a secret religion, thereby in breach of section 116 of the Commonwealth Constitution?" Section 116 is a guarantee of individual rights applying to the Commonwealth, not the States. I think it has nothing to say that could assist the appellant at all.
The last question sought to be raised by Mr Lloyd is whether Freemasonry is a foreign power in breach of section 24 of the 1854 Constitution Act, section 24 of the 1855 Imperial Constitution Act and section 44(i) and (ii) of the Commonwealth Constitution. In light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Joosse, it does not seem to me that the references to the 1854 and 1855 Constitution Acts are evidently relevant. Section 44(i) and (ii) of the Constitution of Australia have to do with disqualification from being chosen or sitting as a Member of the House of Representatives or the Senate. Again, I think they have nothing to do with the appellant's charge and conviction of an offence against the Road Safety Act 1986.
In oral argument today Mr Lloyd submitted that, "Freemasonry issues" apart, two other issues of law arose on his intended appeal. First, was the 1855 Constitution Act of the Imperial Parliament invalid because the Act sent to Westminster by the Victorian Parliament in 1854 was, as a Bill, amended in England? Second, was it open to the Victorian parliament to repeal the 1855 Act in 1975, if it be assumed that the 1855 Act was not invalid?
Each of these two additional matters was agitated in Joosse. In each instance the outcome was unfavourable to the arguments which Mr Lloyd sought to pursue.
In the event, even putting aside what I consider to be substantial technical defects in Mr Lloyd's material, he has not demonstrated a prima facie case for relief. The Master's decision was correct. The appeal must be dismissed.
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