Lloyd Murray Reed v Francis Rex Ranger No. SCGRG 1921 of 1992 Judgment No. 3620 Number of Pages 2 Evidence Prohibition of Publication of Evidence - [1992] SASC 3620

COURT IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA DUGGAN J

CWDS
Evidence - prohibition of publication of evidence - appellant charged with separate sets of offences - considerable publicity expected - application to suppress name during hearing of evidence at preliminary examination - suppression order justified by reason of risk that publicity could prejudice subsequent trial.

HRNG ADELAIDE, 31 August 1992 #DATE 31:8:1992
Counsel for appellant:     Mr R. Bleechmore
Solicitors for appellant:    R. Bleechmore
Counsel for respondent:     Mr S. Mcewan
Solicitors for respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions

ORDER
Appeal allowed.

JUDGE1 DUGGAN J The appellant in this matter stands charged with certain drug offences which arise out of two separate and distinct sets of circumstances. First, it is alleged that he sold heroin on 10th July, 1992 and 7th August, 1992. Those alleged offences have been charged under s.32 of the ControlledSubstances Act, 1984 (SA). Secondly he is charged under s.233B of the Customs Act, 1901 (Commonwealth) with possessing a prohibited import, namely heroin, on 6th April, 1992. I have been told that all matters will be contested. At present the appellant is awaiting committal proceedings in respect of the State matters. He was committed for trial on the Commonwealth matter on 25th August, 1992. If he is committed for trial on the State offences he will be tried separately on the State and Commonwealth informations. In other words, there will be two trials and Mr McEwen for the respondent has indicated to me that to his knowledge there is no suggestion that evidence relating to the State offences will be admissible in respect of the Commonwealth offence or vice versa. 2. When the appellant appeared before the learned magistrate on the State offences an application for suppression of his name was refused. The application was based upon the risk that publicity in respect of one matter would prejudice the trial of the appellant on the other matter. A similar application has been made to another magistrate with respect to the Commonwealth offence. An interim order for suppression has been made in that matter which has been adjourned to 2nd September, 1992 for a final order to be made. 3. It should not be necessary to stress the fact that where a person is charged with a criminal offence the law is ever vigilant to ensure that allegations of criminal conduct unconnected with that offence or any other suggestion that the accused person is of bad character, should not be made known to jurors or potential jurors who are or may be engaged in the trial of that offence. Indeed publication of such material is often a contempt of court. (Hinch v Attorney-General for Victoria 164 CLR 15 and Attorney-General for New South Wales v Willesee and Others (1980 2 NSWLR p.143.) 4. Of course it will not be a contempt of court if the reports are no more than accurate accounts of committal proceedings or other court proceedings, but it is for this reason that suppression orders are…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

AGLC: Lloyd Murray Reed v Francis Rex Ranger No. SCGRG 1921 of 1992 Judgment No. 3620 Number of Pages 2 Evidence Prohibition of Publication of Evidence [1992] SASC 3620
Case: [1992] SASC 3620
Decision Date: 31 August 1992

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant in this case, Lloyd Murray Reed, is facing charges related to drug offences arising from two separate incidents. The first set of charges pertains to the sale of heroin on 10th July, 1992 and 7th August, 1992, which are alleged to have occurred under section 32 of the Controlled Substances Act, 1984 (SA). The second set of charges involves the possession of a prohibited import, specifically heroin, on 6th April, 1992, under section 233B of the Customs Act, 1901 (Commonwealth). The appellant is currently awaiting committal proceedings for the state offences, while he has already been committed for trial on the Commonwealth offence. The court noted that there is no suggestion that evidence from one trial will be admissible in the other. The central legal issue before the court was whether a suppression order should be granted to prevent the publication of the appellant's name during the preliminary examination, in light of the potential for prejudice to future trials.

The court considered the importance of ensuring that jurors or potential jurors are not exposed to allegations or suggestions of criminal conduct unrelated to the current offence, which could prejudice the trial. The court referenced previous cases that emphasised the need to prevent such publicity, which could be considered a contempt of court. Suppression orders are not automatically granted but are made when there is a clear risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. In this case, the court found that both sets of charges were likely to attract significant publicity, and there was a clear danger that each trial could be prejudiced by the publicity surrounding the other matter. The court was of the view that the potential for prejudice would increase as the trials approached, and it had a duty to minimise the impact of such publicity.

Given the circumstances, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the previous order of the magistrate. The court ordered that the appellant's name in relation to the state offences be suppressed until further order. The court emphasised that the suppression order was justified only by the identified risk of prejudice and should be revoked if this risk no longer existed. The court also noted that while the public's right to be informed is important, suppression orders in such cases are typically temporary, lifting after the trials and any appeals have concluded.

Orders