FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
LK Law Pty Ltd v Karas (Cross-examination) [2024] FCA 265
File number(s): SAD 222 of 2021 Judgment of: O'SULLIVAN J Date of judgment: 14 March 2024 Date of publication of reasons: 20 March 2024 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Whether counsel for the fourth respondent should be permitted to cross-examine the second applicant — common law principles —consideration of ss 26, 27, 28, 190(4) and 192 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) — no unfettered right to cross-examine a witness – whether cross-examination would be oppressive, unwarranted or unfair — cross-examination of second applicant by counsel for the fourth respondent limited to topics not covered by counsel for the first to third respondents and in respect of which the fourth respondent has a different interest to that of the first to third respondents Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 26, 27, 28, 190(4), 192 Cases cited: Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas [2010] FCAFC 125; (2010) 188 FCR 140
GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15
Lehrmann v Network Ten Pty Ltd (Cross-Examination) [2023] FCA 1477
Division: General Division Registry: South Australia National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Number of paragraphs: 30 Date of hearing: 13 March 2024 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr B Roberts KC with Mr T Besanko and Ms H Doyle Solicitor for the Applicants: Kerrs Counsel for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Ms A Sullivan KC with Dr G O’Mahoney and Mr A Flick Solicitor for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Piper Alderman Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: Mr I Robertson SC with Ms A Wells Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent: Piper Alderman ORDERS
SAD 222 of 2021 BETWEEN: LK LAW PTY LTD
First Applicant
SCIPIO JOHN LIPMAN
Second Applicant
LIPMAN FAMILY PTY LTD (ACN 627 125 580)
Third Applicant
AND: JASON DEMETRIOS KARAS
First Respondent
J&A KARAS PTY LTD
Second Respondent
KARAS LLP (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
O'SULLIVAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 MARCH 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to s 26 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the cross-examination of the second applicant, Scipio John Lipman, by senior counsel for the fourth respondent, be limited to factual matters relating to topics:
(a)Not covered during the cross-examination of the second applicant by senior counsel for the first to third respondents; and
(b)In respect of which it is contended by the fourth respondent that it has a different interest in the conduct of the defence of these proceedings to that of the first to third respondents.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’SULLIVAN J:
An issue has arisen in relation to the cross-examination of the second applicant, Scipio John Lipman.
The first to third respondents are represented by Mr Sullivan KC and two juniors. The fourth respondent, Mishcon De Reya LLP…
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 265
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether Mr Robertson SC should be permitted to cross-examine Mr Lipman. The legal issues encompassed the common law principles governing the right to cross-examine a witness, the relevance of sections 26, 27, 28, 190(4), and 192 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and whether such cross-examination would be oppressive, unwarranted, or unfair. The court considered the statutory provisions and the precedent set by GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd, which established the principle that ordinarily a judge should permit cross-examination of all witnesses by all counsel unless certain rules apply.
The court found that ordinarily a judge should permit cross-examination of all witnesses by all counsel unless one or more of the above rules apply. The court noted that the only "right" in this context is a right to have a fair trial, and it is the duty of the trial judge to ensure that all parties have a fair trial. The court concluded that Mr Robertson SC could cross-examine Mr Lipman, but only in respect of factual matters relating to topics not covered during the cross-examination by senior counsel for the first to third respondents and in respect of which it is contended that the fourth respondent has a different interest in the conduct of the defence of these proceedings to that of the first to third respondents. The court also noted that the cross-examination should be limited to avoid unfairness or undue prolongation of the hearing.
Pursuant to section 26 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the cross-examination of the second applicant, Scipio John Lipman, by senior counsel for the fourth respondent, is limited to factual matters relating to topics not covered during the cross-examination by senior counsel for the first to third respondents and in respect of which it is contended by the fourth respondent that it has a different interest in the conduct of the defence of these proceedings to that of the first to third respondents.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to s 26 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the cross-examination of the second applicant, Scipio John Lipman, by senior counsel for the fourth respondent, be limited to factual matters relating to topics:
(a) Not covered during the cross-examination of the second applicant by senior counsel for the first to third respondents; and
(b) In respect of which it is contended by the fourth respondent that it has a different interest in the conduct of the defence of these proceedings to that of the first to third respondents.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the circumstances of this matter, the relevant principles taken from GPI Leisure at pp 22F-23F are that:(1)The only actual “right” is a right to have a fair trial.(2)It is a duty of the trial judge to ensure that all parties have a fair trial.(3)In carrying out their duties, the trial judge must so exercise the discretion in and about the examination and cross-examination of witnesses that a fair trial is assured.(4)…(5)Where there is more than one counsel for the same party, then ordinarily the judge will not permit any more than one counsel to cross-examine the same witness.(6)Where there are parties in the same interest, the judge will apply the same rule as stated in (5).…(13)Ordinarily a judge should permit cross-examination of all witnesses by all counsel unless one or more of the above rules apply.Consideration The applicants object to Mr Robertson SC cross-examining Mr Lipman on three bases:(a)MDR has the same interest as the first to third respondents;(b)There is nothing in the counterfactual that would suggest any divergence between the first to third respondents, and the fourth respondent’s interests; and(c)The matters raised in s 192(2)(a)-(d) inclusive. As to the first basis, the applicants submit there is no divergent interest because it is common ground that the first respondent, Mr Jason Demetrios Karas, kept from Mr Lipman at all times, prior to an agreement known as the “Framework Agreement” between Mr Karas and MDR that became unconditional in April 2021, any notion of MDR’s existence and that remained the position until what is known as the “Separation Agreement” between, amongst others, Mr Lipman and Mr Karas was reached on 25 May 2021. As to the second basis, the applicants submit there is no divergence between the respondents on the counterfactual. Senior counsel for MDR refers to the pleading in the applicants’ fourth statement of claim at [79] which alleges, in part:By its knowledge of the matters referred to in paragraph 78, MDR had knowledge that by Mr Karas’ entry into the Framework Agreement, Mr Karas was acting in breach of his fiduciary duties to LKPL in furtherance of a dishonest and fraudulent design … Paragraph 78 of the fourth statement of claim is an extensive paragraph in which the applicants plead that before entering into the Framework Agreement and prior to the satisfaction of the conditions precedent to the Framework Agreement, MDR had actual knowledge of a number of matters. The pleading continues at [79A] that: “In the premises, MDR knowingly participated in Mr Karas’ breach of his fiduciary duties to LKPL by entering into the Framework Agreement and formally approving it on or before 27 April 2021”. None of those matters have been the subject of cross-examination, at least in the context of knowing participation. In reply to that submission, the applicants submit that whether it be the law of Australia or the law of England, there is no requirement for knowing assistance for there to be fraud or conscious dishonesty.