LK Law Pty Ltd v Karas (Cross-examination)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

LK Law Pty Ltd v Karas (Cross-examination) [2024] FCA 265

File number(s): SAD 222 of 2021
Judgment of: O'SULLIVAN J
Date of judgment: 14 March 2024
Date of publication of reasons: 20 March 2024
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Whether counsel for the fourth respondent should be permitted to cross-examine the second applicant — common law principles —consideration of ss 26, 27, 28, 190(4) and 192 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) — no unfettered right to cross-examine a witness – whether cross-examination would be oppressive, unwarranted or unfair — cross-examination of second applicant by counsel for the fourth respondent limited to topics not covered by counsel for the first to third respondents and in respect of which the fourth respondent has a different interest to that of the first to third respondents
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 26, 27, 28, 190(4), 192
Cases cited:

Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas [2010] FCAFC 125; (2010) 188 FCR 140

GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15

Lehrmann v Network Ten Pty Ltd (Cross-Examination) [2023] FCA 1477

Division: General Division
Registry: South Australia
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Number of paragraphs: 30
Date of hearing: 13 March 2024
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr B Roberts KC with Mr T Besanko and Ms H Doyle
Solicitor for the Applicants: Kerrs
Counsel for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Ms A Sullivan KC with Dr G O’Mahoney and Mr A Flick
Solicitor for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Piper Alderman
Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: Mr I Robertson SC with Ms A Wells
Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent: Piper Alderman

ORDERS

SAD 222 of 2021
BETWEEN:

LK LAW PTY LTD

First Applicant

SCIPIO JOHN LIPMAN

Second Applicant

LIPMAN FAMILY PTY LTD (ACN 627 125 580)

Third Applicant

AND:

JASON DEMETRIOS KARAS

First Respondent

J&A KARAS PTY LTD

Second Respondent

KARAS LLP (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O'SULLIVAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 MARCH 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to s 26 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the cross-examination of the second applicant, Scipio John Lipman, by senior counsel for the fourth respondent, be limited to factual matters relating to topics:

(a)Not covered during the cross-examination of the second applicant by senior counsel for the first to third respondents; and

(b)In respect of which it is contended by the fourth respondent that it has a different interest in the conduct of the defence of these proceedings to that of the first to third respondents.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’SULLIVAN J:

  1. An issue has arisen in relation to the cross-examination of the second applicant, Scipio John Lipman.

  2. The first to third respondents are represented by Mr Sullivan KC and two juniors.  The fourth respondent, Mishcon De Reya LLP…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 265
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of LK Law Pty Ltd v Karas (Cross-examination) before the Federal Court involves a dispute concerning the scope of cross-examination permissible in a legal proceeding. The second applicant, Mr Scipio John Lipman, is the subject of proposed cross-examination by senior counsel for the fourth respondent, Mr Robertson SC. The applicants object to this cross-examination on the basis that Mr Robertson SC is not entitled to cross-examine Mr Lipman as he represents a party with the same interest as the first to third respondents, and there is no divergence in the interests of the parties. The applicants further contend that the proposed cross-examination would be oppressive, unwarranted, or unfair, and would unduly prolong the hearing.

The court was required to decide whether Mr Robertson SC should be permitted to cross-examine Mr Lipman. The legal issues encompassed the common law principles governing the right to cross-examine a witness, the relevance of sections 26, 27, 28, 190(4), and 192 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and whether such cross-examination would be oppressive, unwarranted, or unfair. The court considered the statutory provisions and the precedent set by GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd, which established the principle that ordinarily a judge should permit cross-examination of all witnesses by all counsel unless certain rules apply.

The court found that ordinarily a judge should permit cross-examination of all witnesses by all counsel unless one or more of the above rules apply. The court noted that the only "right" in this context is a right to have a fair trial, and it is the duty of the trial judge to ensure that all parties have a fair trial. The court concluded that Mr Robertson SC could cross-examine Mr Lipman, but only in respect of factual matters relating to topics not covered during the cross-examination by senior counsel for the first to third respondents and in respect of which it is contended that the fourth respondent has a different interest in the conduct of the defence of these proceedings to that of the first to third respondents. The court also noted that the cross-examination should be limited to avoid unfairness or undue prolongation of the hearing.

Pursuant to section 26 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the cross-examination of the second applicant, Scipio John Lipman, by senior counsel for the fourth respondent, is limited to factual matters relating to topics not covered during the cross-examination by senior counsel for the first to third respondents and in respect of which it is contended by the fourth respondent that it has a different interest in the conduct of the defence of these proceedings to that of the first to third respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 26 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the cross-examination of the second applicant, Scipio John Lipman, by senior counsel for the fourth respondent, be limited to factual matters relating to topics:

(a) Not covered during the cross-examination of the second applicant by senior counsel for the first to third respondents; and

(b) In respect of which it is contended by the fourth respondent that it has a different interest in the conduct of the defence of these proceedings to that of the first to third respondents.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) are part of Division 3 which deals with general rules about giving evidence. They provide:26 Court’s control over questioning of witnessesThe court may make such orders as it considers just in relation to:(a)the way in which witnesses are to be questioned; and(b)the production and use of documents and things in connection with the questioning of witnesses; and(c)the order in which parties may question a witness; and(d)the presence and behaviour of any person in connection with the questioning of witnesses.27 Parties may question witnessesA party may question any witness, except as provided by this Act.28 Order of examination in chief, cross‑examination and re‑examinationUnless the court otherwise directs:(a)cross‑examination of a witness is not to take place before the examination in chief of the witness; and(b)re‑examination of a witness is not to take place before all other parties who wish to do so have cross‑examined the witness. Section 192 of the Evidence Act provides:192 Leave, permission or direction may be given on terms(1)If, because of this Act, a court may give any leave, permission or direction, the leave, permission or direction may be given on such terms as the court thinks fit.(2)Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give the leave, permission or direction, it is to take into account:(a)the extent to which to do so would be likely to add unduly to, or to shorten, the length of the hearing; and(b)the extent to which to do so would be unfair to a party or to a witness; and(c)the importance of the evidence in relation to which the leave, permission or direction is sought; and(d)the nature of the proceeding; and(e)the power (if any) of the court to adjourn the hearing or to make another order or to give a direction in relation to the evidence. It seems the only Full Court authority governing this area is Canberra Residential Developments Pty Ltd v Brendas [2010] FCAFC 125; (2010) 188 FCR 140, (Finkelstein, Siopis and Katzmann JJ). In that matter, although the Full Court dismissed the appeal from a decision of the trial judge who refused leave for junior counsel to continue cross-examination of a witness after senior counsel withdrew, the Full Court considered the primary judge had erred in refusing leave to junior counsel to continue cross-examination. At [44]-[45] the Court said:44 To understand how we have arrived at the view that the judge erred it is necessary to examine the rationale for the rule of practice preventing two counsel from cross-examining one witness. It can be traced back to the decision of Doe v Roe (1809) 2 Camp 280; 170 ER 1155. As Lord Ellenborough made clear, the rule is for the protection of the witness. He said (at 1156): “If this rule were not adhered to, a witness might be subject to the examination or cross-examination of as many barristers as were retained for the plaintiff or defendant, much time would be wasted, and great confusion would be introduced into proceedings at Nisi Prius”. Put another way, the common law frowns upon cross-examination by multiple counsel because of the possibility of oppression: JD Heydon, Cross on Evidence, 8th ed at p 627. 45 Naturally the common law rule is subject to reasonable exceptions. One exception arises from the changing nature of litigation. A common feature of modern commercial litigation is for counsel on one side of the record to split their trial preparation on a topic by topic basis. The conduct of the trial often follows this split with the judge permitting both cross-examination and submissions to be divided so that counsel can deal with his/her assigned topic: see for eg Eva Pty Ltd v Charles Davis Ltd [1982] VR 515. This can be an extremely efficient way in which to conduct complex litigation. All the judge need do in such circumstances is ensure there is no unfairness to the witness: GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15, 22-23.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the circumstances of this matter, the relevant principles taken from GPI Leisure at pp 22F-23F are that:(1)The only actual “right” is a right to have a fair trial.(2)It is a duty of the trial judge to ensure that all parties have a fair trial.(3)In carrying out their duties, the trial judge must so exercise the discretion in and about the examination and cross-examination of witnesses that a fair trial is assured.(4)…(5)Where there is more than one counsel for the same party, then ordinarily the judge will not permit any more than one counsel to cross-examine the same witness.(6)Where there are parties in the same interest, the judge will apply the same rule as stated in (5).…(13)Ordinarily a judge should permit cross-examination of all witnesses by all counsel unless one or more of the above rules apply.Consideration The applicants object to Mr Robertson SC cross-examining Mr Lipman on three bases:(a)MDR has the same interest as the first to third respondents;(b)There is nothing in the counterfactual that would suggest any divergence between the first to third respondents, and the fourth respondent’s interests; and(c)The matters raised in s 192(2)(a)-(d) inclusive. As to the first basis, the applicants submit there is no divergent interest because it is common ground that the first respondent, Mr Jason Demetrios Karas, kept from Mr Lipman at all times, prior to an agreement known as the “Framework Agreement” between Mr Karas and MDR that became unconditional in April 2021, any notion of MDR’s existence and that remained the position until what is known as the “Separation Agreement” between, amongst others, Mr Lipman and Mr Karas was reached on 25 May 2021. As to the second basis, the applicants submit there is no divergence between the respondents on the counterfactual. Senior counsel for MDR refers to the pleading in the applicants’ fourth statement of claim at [79] which alleges, in part:By its knowledge of the matters referred to in paragraph 78, MDR had knowledge that by Mr Karas’ entry into the Framework Agreement, Mr Karas was acting in breach of his fiduciary duties to LKPL in furtherance of a dishonest and fraudulent design … Paragraph 78 of the fourth statement of claim is an extensive paragraph in which the applicants plead that before entering into the Framework Agreement and prior to the satisfaction of the conditions precedent to the Framework Agreement, MDR had actual knowledge of a number of matters. The pleading continues at [79A] that: “In the premises, MDR knowingly participated in Mr Karas’ breach of his fiduciary duties to LKPL by entering into the Framework Agreement and formally approving it on or before 27 April 2021”. None of those matters have been the subject of cross-examination, at least in the context of knowing participation. In reply to that submission, the applicants submit that whether it be the law of Australia or the law of England, there is no requirement for knowing assistance for there to be fraud or conscious dishonesty.