DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Lisson Pty Ltd v Hallmark Strategies Pty Ltd [2005] QDC 118
PARTIES:
LISSON PTY LTD
Plaintiff
v
HALLMARK STRATEGIES PTY LTD
Defendant
FILE NO/S:
BD3932/2004; M5133/2004
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Magistrates Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
23 May 2005
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
18 March 2005
JUDGE:
McGill DCJ
ORDER:
Application dismissed with costs.
CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE – Summary Judgment – whether to be allowed for defendant – whether claim necessarily prohibited by statute
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT – Statutory provisions relating to agents – prohibition on unlicensed agent recovering remuneration – whether clear that plaintiff’s claim barred by absence of licence.
Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 s 140.
Colbron v St Bees Island Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 303 – considered.
Gray v Morris [2004] 2 Qd R 118 – applied.
Jenkins v Kedcorp Pty Ltd [2002] 1 Qd R 49 – considered.
COUNSEL:
R J Anderson for the plaintiff
A P Collins for the defendantSOLICITORS:
The plaintiff was not represented by solicitors
Crimmins Kerwin Burns solicitors for the defendant.
The plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract in writing dated 8 July 2002 which provided that in certain circumstances the defendant would pay the plaintiff a fee. They entered into a similar contract in writing dated 18 February 2003. The plaintiff claims that under those agreements fees are payable to it by the defendant, as a result of three particular transactions each of which the plaintiff alleges satisfied the requirements under one or other agreement for the payment of a fee.
The action has been defended, and has fairly recently been transferred to this court. The defendant alleges among other things that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any amount, because the recovery of any amount payable under either agreement is precluded by s 140 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (“the Act”). This is on the ground that by this action the plaintiff is seeking to recover a reward for the performance of one of the activities which a real estate agent’s licence authorises a person to perform under s 128, whereas the plaintiff did not hold such a licence. It is not disputed that the plaintiff did not at the relevant time hold a real estate agent’s licence. The plaintiff disputes that recovery of the amounts claimed in the action infringes s 140 of the Act.
The defendant has applied under r 171 to have the statement of claim struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, or in the alternative under r 293 for summary judgment for the defendant. Under the former rule the test is whether it is apparent, with the benefit of argument, that the plaintiff’s case is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed.[1] Under the latter, the test is whether the defendant has shown that the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on all or part of the plaintiff’s claim, and there…
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- Case
- [2005] QDC 118
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the statutory provisions clearly prohibited Hallmark from claiming remuneration due to its lack of a licence. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the claim was necessarily barred by statute, thereby allowing for summary judgment in favour of Lisson. The central issue was the interpretation of the statutory language and whether it unequivocally precluded Hallmark from asserting a claim for remuneration despite its unlicensed status.
In dismissing the application for summary judgment, the court held that the statutory provisions did not clearly and unambiguously prohibit Hallmark from claiming remuneration. The court found that there was ambiguity in the statutory language, which did not unequivocally prevent Hallmark from asserting its claim. Consequently, the court concluded that it could not grant summary judgment to Lisson on the basis that Hallmark’s claim was necessarily prohibited by statute.
Accordingly, the application for summary judgment was dismissed with costs awarded to Hallmark.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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