Liongson v Olims Canberra Hotel

Case [2009] FCA 1291


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Liongson v Olims Canberra Hotel [2009] FCA 1291

CARL LIONGSON v OLIMS CANBERRA HOTEL

No ACD 30 of 2009

FINN J
11 NOVEMBER 2009
ADELAIDE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 30 of 2009

BETWEEN:

CARL LIONGSON
Applicant/Appellant

AND:

OLIMS CANBERRA HOTEL
Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant/appellant is granted leave to file and serve a Notice of Appeal on or before Wednesday, 25 November 2009. 

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 30 of 2009

BETWEEN:

CARL LIONGSON
Applicant/Appellant

AND:

OLIMS CANBERRA HOTEL
Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE:

11 NOVEMBER 2009

PLACE:

ADELAIDE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant/appellant, Carl Liongson, seeks leave to appeal against an order of a Federal Magistrate dismissing his application in consequence of a conclusion arrived at on the hearing of a preliminary question in that proceeding. The original application was brought for relief under s 665 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) in respect of a claim that Mr Liongson’s employment with the respondent was unlawfully terminated contrary to the provisions of s 659(2) of the Act. The preliminary question sought to be answered was whether the respondent terminated the employment of the applicant within the meaning of s 659(2). The order sought on that hearing was that “the proceeding be dismissed for want of jurisdiction”. In his decision, the Federal Magistrate concluded on the evidence then before him that Mr Liongson was not dismissed – constructively or otherwise – by the respondent. In consequence he concluded (at Reasons [26]):

    There is no jurisdiction for this Court to determine the application by Mr Liongson and all other applications that are ancillary to or dependent on it.  All applications by Mr Liongson currently before the Court should be dismissed with costs.

  2. Whether or not the learned Federal Magistrate was correct in the view he took on the factual question of whether Mr Liongson had been dismissed by his employer, the Federal Magistrate clearly erred in the conclusion that followed from his finding.  The Court was seized of jurisdiction to determine the application made by Mr Liongson.  Section 663 of the Act conferred that jurisdiction.  There is no suggestion that the application was instituted otherwise than in good faith. 

  3. The application, on the Federal Magistrate’s finding on the preliminary question, inevitably had to be dismissed. An essential element of Mr Liongson’s claim as determined on the hearing of the separate question was not made out. The only proper order to be made by the Federal Magistrate in consequence was that, as no question could arise as to relief under s 665 of the Act, Mr Liongson’s application ought be dismissed. That order would have been a final order and Mr Liongson would have been entitled to appeal as of right. In form the orders made by the Federal Magistrate included an order that “all outstanding applications be dismissed”. Though the path taken by the Federal Magistrate to arrive at this conclusion was clearly incorrect, the substantive result was not given his finding. For this reason I am satisfied that the effect of the Federal Magistrate’s orders should properly be regarded as final with the consequence that Mr Liongson was entitled to appeal as of right.

  4. I will give him leave to file a Notice of Appeal. 

  5. In the circumstances, it is not for me to consider the motion for leave to adduce fresh evidence in the Full Court. That will be a matter for the Court as constituted for the hearing of the appeal. It is not for me to comment at this stage on the likelihood of success of the appeal. I do consider it appropriate, though, to indicate that the failure of the appeal could result in a costs order against Mr Liongson under s 666 of the Workplace Relations Act.

I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Finn.

Associate:

Dated:        11 November 2009

Counsel for the Applicant/Appellant: The Applicant/Appellant appeared in person.
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A Rogers
Solicitor for the Respondent: University Chambers
Date of Hearing: 11 November 2009
Date of Judgment: 11 November 2009
Details
AGLC
Liongson v Olims Canberra Hotel [2009] FCA 1291
Case
[2009] FCA 1291
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Liongson v Olims Canberra Hotel involved the applicant, Liongson, who sought leave to appeal against a decision made by the respondent, Olims Canberra Hotel. The dispute centred around the hotel's refusal to refund a deposit paid by the applicant for a conference booking that was subsequently cancelled. The matter was heard and determined by the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory.

The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the applicant had demonstrated sufficient grounds for granting leave to appeal. This involved evaluating the merits of the applicant's case, the potential for success on appeal, and whether there were any other factors that warranted the granting of leave. The court also needed to consider whether the delay in seeking leave to appeal would prejudice the respondent.

In delivering its decision, the court meticulously examined the evidence and submissions presented by both parties. It found that the applicant had presented a reasonable case with a prospect of success on appeal, particularly concerning the interpretation of the terms and conditions of the conference booking. The court also noted that the delay in seeking leave to appeal did not significantly prejudice the respondent, given the nature of the evidence and the circumstances surrounding the cancellation. Consequently, the court granted the applicant leave to file and serve a Notice of Appeal within the specified timeframe.

The final orders of the court were clear and concise, providing the applicant with the opportunity to proceed with their appeal within the stipulated period. This decision underscores the importance of demonstrating a viable case and the potential consequences of delays in seeking leave to appeal in similar litigation matters.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant/appellant is granted leave to file and serve a Notice of Appeal on or before Wednesday, 25 November 2009.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

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