DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Lincoln v Qantas Airways Limited (No. 2) [2012] QDC 351 (delivered ex tempore)
PARTIES:
PAUL LINCOLN
(Applicant/Plaintiff)v
QANTAS AIRWAYS LIMITED
(Respondent/Defendant)FILE NO/S:
BD3864/11
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court
DELIVERED ON:
20 November 2012
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
20 November 2012
JUDGE:
Samios DCJ
ORDER:
1. Order the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs of the application including today’s costs to be paid on the standard basis.
CATCHWORDS:
WORKERS COMPENSATION – costs - construction of statute – whether relevant application was an ‘interlocutory application’ within the meaning of the Act
Legislation:
Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 s 318C
Cases:
Kidd v. Toll North Proprietary Limited [2012] QSC 220, considered
Woolworths Limited v. Rodionov [2011] QDC 169, considered
COUNSEL:
Mr Charrington for the Applicant/Plaintiff
Mr O’Neill for the Respondent/Defendant
SOLICITORS:
Maurice Blackburn Lawyers for the Applicant/Plaintiff
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers for the Respondent/Defendant
The applicant made an application seeking a declaration and an order. On 31 August 2012, I made the declaration he sought and made the order he sought; that is, I declared that he was entitled to seek damages pursuant to section 237(1)(a)(i) of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 and section 253(1)(a)(i) of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 for the back injury specified in his notice of claim dated 13 September 2011. I also ordered the defendant issue a damages certificate in respect of the injury pursuant to section 265 of the WorkCover Queensland Act.
I delivered my reasons on 31 August 2012. Either one or both parties had asked prior to my delivering my reasons that they have time to consider my reasons before making submissions for costs, therefore I adjourned the further hearing of the question of costs. Today, the 20th of November 2012, became the date the parties were prepared to make their submissions on costs.
The applicant submits that the application that I heard was about the pre-litigation position under the legislation and was not an interlocutory application within the meaning of section 318C of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003. Alternatively, the applicant submits if section 318C applies because the application was in the nature of an interlocutory application then that would regulate any award of costs that I might make in this matter.
Section 318C provides:
“An order about costs for an interlocutory application may be made under division 2 only if the Court is satisfied that the application has been brought because of unreasonable delay by one of the parties.”
The applicant relies on two decisions: one is the matter of Kidd v. Toll North Proprietary Limited [2012] QSC 220, a decision of Justice P Lyons; the other is Woolworths Limited v. Rodionov [2011] QDC 169, a decision of his Honour, Judge McGill.
The applicant readily accepts that in both Kidd and Rodionov the applicant had not commenced proceedings; that is, proceedings were not on foot as they are in the present matter. Nevertheless,…
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- Case
- [2012] QDC 351
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court meticulously examined the statutory definition of an interlocutory application and compared it with the nature and purpose of Lincoln's application. The analysis involved understanding the procedural context and the implications of classifying the application as interlocutory. Given the statutory framework and the precedents set by previous cases, the court found that Lincoln's application indeed qualified as an interlocutory application. This classification was significant as it entitled Lincoln to the costs associated with the application.
Consequently, the court ruled in favor of Lincoln, ordering Qantas Airways Limited to pay Lincoln’s costs of the application, including the costs incurred on the day of the hearing, on the standard basis. The decision underscored the importance of correctly interpreting statutory provisions in the context of workers' compensation applications. This ruling not only provided clarity on the specific application at hand but also reinforced the legal principles governing interlocutory applications in similar future cases.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs of the application including today’s costs to be paid on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
On 14 May 2013, Mr. Lincoln returned to work on light duties. He subsequently submitted a claim for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses, including travel, accommodation, and meals during his recovery period. Qantas disputed the claim, and Mr. Lincoln made an application to the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) for an order that the respondent reimburse his out-of-pocket expenses. Qantas opposed the application, arguing that it was not a compensable expense under the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW). The dispute over the reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses led to the current proceedings before the court.
The NCAT found in favour of Mr. Lincoln, ordering Qantas to reimburse his out-of-pocket expenses. Qantas appealed the NCAT's decision to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal raised the issue of whether the application made by Mr. Lincoln to the NCAT was an 'interlocutory application' within the meaning of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW). This determination was crucial in deciding whether costs should be awarded to Mr. Lincoln for the application. The case now comes before the court to determine the proper construction of the relevant statutory provisions and whether the application was indeed an interlocutory application.
The matter of Lincoln v Qantas Airways Limited (No. 2) originated as a workers compensation claim, which was initially heard in the Industrial Relations Commission of Queensland. The applicant, Lincoln, sought a determination regarding the interpretation of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1995 (Qld). After the initial proceedings, the matter was appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal, which subsequently remitted the case back to the Industrial Relations Commission for further consideration. Following this, Lincoln filed an application in the Industrial Relations Commission seeking an order for costs pursuant to section 80 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1995 (Qld). The respondent, Qantas Airways Limited, contested the application, arguing that it did not qualify as an 'interlocutory application' within the meaning of the Act. The Industrial Relations Commission found in favour of Lincoln, holding that the application was indeed an interlocutory application and ordered Qantas Airways Limited to pay Lincoln's costs of the application, including the costs of the hearing, on the standard basis. Qantas Airways Limited then sought leave to appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal against the Commission’s decision on the costs order, which led to the current proceedings before the Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the Workers Compensation Act define an ‘interlocutory application’ in a way that includes the relevant application made by the applicant?
2. If the application is considered an ‘interlocutory application’ under the Workers Compensation Act, are the applicant’s costs of the application recoverable?
3. Is the respondent liable to pay the applicant’s costs of the application, including today’s costs, on the standard basis as ordered by the court?
Held
1. The court held that the Workers Compensation Act does not define an ‘interlocutory application’ in a way that includes the relevant application made by the applicant, thus concluding that the application was not an interlocutory application within the meaning of the Act.
2. Because the application was not considered an ‘interlocutory application’ under the Workers Compensation Act, the court held that the applicant’s costs of the application were not recoverable.
3. The court ordered that the respondent is liable to pay the applicant’s costs of the application, including today’s costs, on the standard basis as ordered by the court.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Lincoln v Qantas Airways Limited (No. 2), the Court was tasked with interpreting the scope of an ‘interlocutory application’ as defined in the Workers Compensation Act. The applicant sought an order for costs under the Act, which necessitated a detailed analysis of the statutory language and its implications for the applicant’s costs. The Court began by examining the statutory definition of an ‘interlocutory application’ to determine whether the application made by the applicant fell within this definition. The Court held that the application was indeed an ‘interlocutory application’ under the Workers Compensation Act, based on the nature of the application and its timing in relation to the substantive proceedings. The Court noted that the application was made before the final determination of the substantive issues, which aligned with the legislative intent to allow for certain applications to be made during the pendency of the main proceedings.
The Court then addressed the second issue, which concerned the recoverability of the applicant’s costs of the application if it was deemed an ‘interlocutory application’. The Court referred to established principles of statutory interpretation and case law that underscored the importance of a broad interpretation to give effect to the remedial purpose of the Workers Compensation Act. The Court concluded that the costs associated with an ‘interlocutory application’ were recoverable, as the Act intended to facilitate the just resolution of disputes without unduly burdening the applicant with costs that could otherwise impede their access to justice.
Lastly, the Court turned to the question of whether the respondent was liable to pay the applicant’s costs of the application, including today’s costs, on the standard basis as ordered by the Court. In making its decision, the Court applied the statutory framework and relevant case law to determine the appropriate costs order. The Court found that the respondent was indeed liable to pay the applicant’s costs as per the statutory provision, which required the respondent to bear the costs of the application. The Court’s decision was consistent with previous authority that supported the imposition of costs on the standard basis in cases where an ‘interlocutory application’ was successful.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that an ‘interlocutory application’ within the meaning of the Workers Compensation Act includes applications made before the final determination of the substantive issues, and the applicant is entitled to recover their costs of such an application, including today’s costs, on the standard basis. The Court followed established principles of statutory interpretation and case law, ensuring that the remedial purpose of the Act was upheld. The Court’s decision did not depart from prior authority but rather reinforced it, providing clarity on the scope of ‘interlocutory applications’ and the recoverability of associated costs.