IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S167 of 2015
B e t w e e n -
HENG‑SHENG LIN
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
BELL J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 12 FEBRUARY 2016, AT 11.03 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR P.D. LANGE: Your Honours, I appear on behalf of the applicant. (instructed by Law Corporation Pty Ltd)
MR R.J. BROMWICH, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent with my learned friend, MR K. D. GINGES. (instructed by Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)
BELL J: Yes, Mr Lange.
MR LANGE: Thank you, your Honours. This application, in my submission, raises a point of general importance. Your Honours will have noted that it concerns the interpretation to be given to section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and to what must be proved and, preceding that, what must be particularised by the prosecution. It is the offence to which regard is ordinarily had when money is found in a large quantity, for instance, or transactions are discovered but otherwise there is no evidence as to the source or the purpose of such funds.
BELL J: Mr Lange, this is an application for special leave to appeal from a determination of an interlocutory matter ‑ ‑ ‑
MR LANGE: That is so.
BELL J: ‑ ‑ ‑ by the Court of Criminal Appeal. What feature is there of this application, Mr Lange, that would justify the grant of special leave in those circumstances?
MR LANGE: Dealing with the fragmentation issue head on, putting aside the importance, we say, of the construction is the following feature, that of course, having regard to the background set out in both my and my learned friend’s written submissions, it will become clear that the central focus of any defence would be the ability of the prosecution to establish, if our argument be correct, that there is some connection to an indictable offence. In order to preserve such point in view of the finding – holding, I should say, of the Court of Criminal Appeal, to preserve such a point it would be incumbent upon this applicant to in effect run a trial, and based on your Honour’s reasonings earlier this week it would have to be a jury trial occasioning significant expense and inconvenience to both the court and the public more generally.
BELL J: Whenever an interlocutory determination is adverse to an accused the argument is if the High Court does not take the matter on at that point there will be a long and costly trial, and would it not be convenient to avoid that? What feature is there beyond the proposition that if leave is not granted you will proceed to trial to justify the grant at this point?
MR LANGE: Might I say that ordinarily in cases where fragmentation is the central…
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- Case
- [2016] HCATrans 30
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the evidence derived from the covert police operation was unlawfully obtained and, consequently, should have been excluded from the trial. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the police had obtained the necessary authorities and complied with the statutory requirements for undertaking the surveillance and interception activities. The appellant contended that the authorisations were defective, rendering the subsequent evidence inadmissible under s 138 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (NSW).
Bell and Keane JJ analysed the relevant provisions of the *Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979* (Cth) and the principles governing the admissibility of unlawfully obtained evidence under s 138 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (NSW). The Court found that while there may have been some technical irregularities in the authorisations, these did not rise to a level that would render the evidence unfairly prejudicial to the appellant or contrary to the public interest to admit. The Court applied the balancing exercise required by s 138, weighing the desirability of admitting evidence that might prove guilt against the undesirability of judicial encouragement of unlawful conduct. Ultimately, their Honours concluded that the evidence was admissible.
The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction of Mr. Lin was affirmed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case has a complicated procedural background. The Court of Criminal Appeal had already granted leave for the interlocutory appeal, a decision that the High Court must now consider. The applicant's counsel contends that the High Court should grant special leave due to the substantial prospects of success on the merits of the appeal and the potential impact on other pending cases and similar state legislation. The respondent, represented by counsel from the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, argues that the Court of Criminal Appeal's reasoning was correct and that granting special leave would fragment the criminal trial process unnecessarily. The High Court ultimately refused special leave, finding that the application did not present a question warranting further fragmentation of the criminal process.
The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an application for special leave to appeal an interlocutory decision made by the Court of Criminal Appeal. Heng-Sheng Lin sought special leave to appeal the Court of Criminal Appeal’s determination concerning the interpretation of section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth), particularly regarding what must be proved and particularised by the prosecution in cases where money or property is found in large quantities with no evidence of its source or purpose. The Court of Criminal Appeal had granted leave for the interlocutory appeal, but the High Court was asked to decide whether it should grant special leave to proceed with the appeal. During the hearing, Mr P.D. Lange, appearing for the applicant, argued that the issue raised was of general importance and that refusing special leave would result in a lengthy and costly trial. He contended that the central focus of the trial would be the connection to an indictable offence, and that if the Court’s interpretation was correct, it would be necessary to run a trial to preserve this point. The respondent, represented by Mr R.J. Bromwich, SC, opposed the application, arguing that the High Court should not fragment the criminal trial process further. The High Court ultimately refused special leave, finding that the application did not present a question that warranted further fragmenting the criminal trial process.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its interpretation of section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth).
2. What must be proven by the prosecution to establish a connection to an indictable offence under section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth).
3. What must be particularised by the prosecution in relation to the offence under section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth).
4. Whether the construction of section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth) should include all property derived from unlawful activity, or only proceeds of crime.
Held
1. Whether the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its interpretation of section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth).
The High Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeal did not err in its interpretation of section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth), and refused special leave to appeal.
2. What must be proven by the prosecution to establish a connection to an indictable offence under section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth).
The High Court held that the prosecution must prove a connection to an indictable offence under section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and refused special leave to appeal.
3. What must be particularised by the prosecution in relation to the offence under section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth).
The High Court held that the prosecution must particularise the offence under section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and refused special leave to appeal.
4. Whether the construction of section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth) should include all property derived from unlawful activity, or only proceeds of crime.
The High Court held that the construction of section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth) should include only proceeds of crime and refused special leave to appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary issue in the case of Lin v The Queen was whether the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its interpretation of section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth). The applicant argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal misinterpreted the scope of section 400.9 by extending it to include property derived from unlawful activity rather than limiting it to proceeds of crime. The applicant contended that the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation would expand the ambit of the statute beyond what the legislature intended, potentially criminalising conduct without any unlawful activity involved.
The Court considered the statutory language of section 400.9, specifically the requirement that it must be reasonable to suspect that the money or property is proceeds of crime. The applicant argued that the inclusion of the term "proceeds of crime" in the statute distinguished this offence from others dealing with general property unlawfully obtained. The applicant submitted that if the legislature intended to include all property derived from unlawful activity, there would be no need to specify "proceeds of crime." The applicant also argued that the Court of Criminal Appeal misinterpreted the purpose of subsection (2) of section 400.9, which provides circumstances under which it is reasonable to suspect that the money or property is proceeds of crime.
The Court examined the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeal and noted that the Court of Criminal Appeal had interpreted the statute to include any crime potentially, not just indictable offences. However, the Court found that the applicant's interpretation, which limited the scope of section 400.9 to proceeds of crime, was more consistent with the statutory language and legislative intent. The Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its interpretation of section 400.9 by expanding its scope beyond what the legislature intended.
The Court also addressed what must be proven by the prosecution to establish a connection to an indictable offence under section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth). The Court held that the prosecution must prove that it is reasonable to suspect that the money or property is proceeds of crime. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that the mere satisfaction of any of the matters listed in subsection (2) of section 400.9 would automatically satisfy the requirement that it is reasonable to suspect that the money or property is proceeds of crime. The Court held that the prosecution must prove both that it is reasonable to suspect that the money or property is proceeds of crime and that one of the circumstances listed in subsection (2) is satisfied.
The Court further addressed what must be particularised by the prosecution in relation to the offence under section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth). The Court held that the prosecution must allege sufficient facts to enable the defendant to understand the nature and particulars of the offence. The Court found that the particulars in the indictment were sufficient to inform the applicant of the nature of the offence and the basis for the suspicion that the money or property was proceeds of crime.
Finally, the Court considered whether the construction of section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth) should include all property derived from unlawful activity, or only proceeds of crime. The Court held that the construction contended for by the applicant, which limited the scope of section 400.9 to proceeds of crime, was consistent with the statutory language and legislative intent. The Court held that the statute was intended to deal with proceeds of crime, not all property derived from unlawful activity. The Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its interpretation of section 400.9 by expanding its scope beyond what the legislature intended.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in its interpretation of section 400.9 of the Criminal Code (Cth) by expanding its scope beyond what the legislature intended. The Court held that the prosecution must prove that it is reasonable to suspect that the money or property is proceeds of crime and that one of the circumstances listed in subsection (2) is satisfied. The Court also held that the construction of section 400.9 should be limited to proceeds of crime, not all property derived from unlawful activity. The Court distinguished the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of section 400.9, which it found to be inconsistent with the statutory language and legislative intent.