Lin v One Funds Management Limited (Leave to Appeal)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lin v One Funds Management Limited (Leave to Appeal) [2025] FCA 1140   

File number(s): NSD 1148 of 2025
Judgment of: CHEESEMAN J
Date of judgment: 17 September 2025
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – application by a non-party for extension of time to appeal and if granted leave to appeal from Court approval of creditors scheme of arrangement – where non-party applicant sought and obtained leave to appear at the first and second court hearings and appeared by her solicitor at each court hearing – where non-party did not seek to enjoin the lodgement of the approval orders with the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) as required by s 411(10) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – where scheme approved and lodged with ASIC and became effective pursuant to s 411(10) of the Corporations Act – where the scheme has irrevocably affected third parties’ rights – where scheme provides for release of claims in relation to the respondent and third parties – where in consequence of the scheme becoming effective proceedings in this Court have been dismissed by consent – where applicant held intention to appeal at all material times – where application for leave to appeal made 19 days after the elapse of the 14 day period proscribed for applications for leave to appeal by rule 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where no adequate explanation for the delay – whether in the exercise of discretion an extension of time should be granted – whether in the exercise of discretion leave to appeal should be granted – Held: application dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 411

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 4, 24, 37M

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.51, 2.25, 35.11, 35.12, 35.13, 35.14, 36.03

Cases cited:

Bacnet Pty Ltd v Lift Capital Partners Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2010] FCAFC 36; 183 FCR 384

Chief Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax v Group Four Industries Pty Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 680

City of Swan v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd [2009] FCAFC 130

Commonwealth v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2000] FCA 453

Cuthbertson v Hobart Corporation [1921] HCA 51; (1921) 30 CLR 16

First Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116; 320 FCR 78

Fortress Credit Corporation (Australia) II Pty Ltd v Fletcher [2011] FCAFC 89; 281 ALR 38

Fowler v Lindholm; Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2009] FCAFC 125; 178 FCR 563

Fowler, in the matter of Opes Prime Stockbroking Limited [2009] FCA 989

In the matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2009] EWCA Civ 1161

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc v City of Swan [2010] HCA 11; 240 CLR 509

Link Fund Solutions Ltd, Re (Re Companies Act 2006) [2024] EWHC 250 (Ch)

Re Centro Properties Ltd (in its capacity as responsible entity of Centro Property Trust) [2011] NSWSC 1481

Snowside Pty Ltd as trustee for Snowside Trust v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 1140
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Lin v One Funds Management Limited, the applicant, Ms Lin, sought an extension of time to appeal and leave to appeal the Court's approval of a creditors' scheme of arrangement. The application was brought against One Funds Management Limited (OFML), the respondent. The primary issue before the Court was whether the applicant should be granted an extension of time and leave to appeal the approval of the scheme, which had already become effective and was implemented, affecting third parties and scheme creditors.

The Court examined the statutory and rule framework governing leave to appeal, noting that Ms Lin was a relevant party for the purposes of Rule 35.11 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. The Court considered the statutory requirement for a written application for leave to appeal within 14 days of the judgment or order, and the absence of any adequate explanation for Ms Lin's delay in filing her application for leave to appeal. The Court also noted the irreversible effects of the scheme on third parties and the financial benefits to scheme creditors if the scheme were to be implemented.

The Court concluded that the factors against granting leave to appeal were compelling, particularly the irrevocable changes to third parties' rights and the financial benefits to scheme creditors. Additionally, the Court noted the potential prejudice to scheme creditors and third parties if leave were granted, as they were not notified of the application and may not have had the opportunity to be heard. The Court found that the overarching purpose of proceedings in the Court, as embodied in Section 37M of the Federal Court Act 1976, weighed heavily against granting leave to appeal.

The Court dismissed the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal, with costs awarded against Ms Lin. The Court held that the applicant had not provided an adequate explanation for her delay in filing the application for leave to appeal, and that the factors against granting leave were overwhelming. The Court emphasised the importance of adhering to the statutory and rule framework governing leave to appeal, and the need to protect the rights and interests of third parties and scheme creditors.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For this reason, I will address the issue of an extension of time after I consider the issue of leave to appeal. EVIDENCE The parties prepared an indexed electronic court book for the purpose of this application, which was marked as Exhibit 1 on this application. The affidavits read on this application are included in the court book, as are the documents annexed or exhibited to the affidavits, at tabs 7 to 35. Ms Lin relies on: (1)two affidavits of Simran Kaur, law clerk at Hall Partners, sworn on 7 July 2025 and 12 August 2025; and(2)an affidavit of Mr Hall, principal solicitor at Hall Partners, sworn on 22 August 2025. OFML relies on two affidavits of Christopher Michael Prestwich, its solicitor, the first sworn on 23 July 2025 (together with its exhibit CP-1) and the second on 5 August 2025.CONSIDERATIONApplicable legal framework in context Section 24(1) of the FCA Act relevantly provides that the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments of the Court constituted by a single judge exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court. Section 24 of the FCA Act picks up the long established practice that permits non‑parties to appeal by leave: Commonwealth v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2000] FCA 453 at [18] (Black CJ, Tamberlin and Sundberg JJ) (Commonwealth v CFMEU); Fortress Credit Corporation (Australia) II Pty Ltd v Fletcher [2011] FCAFC 89; 281 ALR 38 at [32] (Emmett, Nicholas and Robertson JJ). Rule 35.11, situated in division 35.2 of the Rules ⸻ written applications for leave to appeal ⸻ provides:A party may apply to the Court under this Division for leave to appeal if:(a) an Act gives the party a right of appeal to the Court subject to the party obtaining leave to appeal; and(b) the party has not made an oral application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court. Rule 1.51 provides that a word or expression defined in the Dictionary (being Schedule 1 to, and forming part of, the Rules) has the meaning given in the Dictionary. The Dictionary defines party as “a party to a proceeding”. The word “proceeding” is in turn defined in the Dictionary by reference to s 4 of the FCA Act which provides that “proceeding” means “a proceeding in a court, whether between parties or not, and includes an incidental proceeding in the course of, or in connexion with, a proceeding, and also includes an appeal.” On this application, Ms Lin submitted that she was not a “party” as that word is used in rule 35.11 and therefore division 35.2 of the Rules does not apply to her application. I reject that submission. Ms Lin is relevantly a party within the meaning of rule 35.11 because as the applicant on this application she is a person who is a party to a relevant incidental proceeding in the course of, or in connexion with, a proceeding. Division 35.2 applies to her application, which is not surprising given it is a written application for leave to appeal, the very subject matter to which the division is addressed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Proposed ground 6 was not the subject of any submissions – written or oral.Conclusion on leave to appeal I decline to exercise my discretion in favour of granting leave to appeal. The factors that are relevant to the exercise of the discretion are overwhelming against leave being granted. Principal among my reasons for refusing leave is the fact that Ms Lin took no steps to avail herself of the opportunity to apply to enjoin the lodgement of the office copy of the approval orders so as to enable the issues she now seeks to raise in a way that was timely before third parties’ rights and the rights of other Scheme creditors were irrevocably altered. I will not rehearse the other factors that I have addressed which weigh against the grant of leave, but I will specifically address the issue of the prejudice that a grant of leave to appeal would occasion. In addition to the prejudice occasioned by irrevocable changes to third party rights effected by the Scheme, there is additional prejudice in that there is a financial benefit to Scheme creditors in the implementation of the Scheme. The independent expert concluded that the estimated return to scheme creditors is materially greater than the amount that they could expect to receive in a winding up within six months in the absence of the Scheme (notwithstanding the expected return is still a small amount in terms of cents in the dollar). This is in part because of the substantial contributions by third parties to the Scheme fund. To prolong the payment of distributions to Scheme creditors would be unfair to the Scheme creditors who voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Scheme. If leave is granted, the other Scheme creditors will be faced with potential financial burdens. No other Scheme creditor has sought to propound an objection to the Scheme by way of an appeal of the orders approving the Scheme. As mentioned, there are more than 60 Scheme creditors. They have not been notified of this application. They may have wished to be heard against it. If leave is granted, they may seek to be heard after the event in relation to that leave being granted in circumstances where they were not on notice and the order made arguably affects their interests. Ms Lin’s retort that the Court can simply have a second hearing on the issue of leave if it is necessary to do so flies in the face of the overarching purpose embodied in s 37M of the FCA Act. The fact that I am asked on this application to grant leave to appeal from orders approving a scheme that is already substantially implemented and that notice has not been given to other Scheme creditors and the third parties who are affected is a significant reason why I should not grant leave. If leave is granted, Ms Lin submits that the absence of notice to this application may be cured by joining all of the Scheme creditors to the appeal and they could be heard on the appeal. I reject that submission. The practical and cost consequences attendant on such a course are obvious and in no way conducive to the effectuation of the overarching purpose of proceedings in this Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

OFML relies on two affidavits of Christopher Michael Prestwich, its solicitor, the first sworn on 23 July 2025 (together with its exhibit CP-1) and the second on 5 August 2025.CONSIDERATIONApplicable legal framework in context Section 24(1) of the FCA Act relevantly provides that the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments of the Court constituted by a single judge exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court. Section 24 of the FCA Act picks up the long established practice that permits non‑parties to appeal by leave: Commonwealth v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2000] FCA 453 at [18] (Black CJ, Tamberlin and Sundberg JJ) (Commonwealth v CFMEU); Fortress Credit Corporation (Australia) II Pty Ltd v Fletcher [2011] FCAFC 89; 281 ALR 38 at [32] (Emmett, Nicholas and Robertson JJ). Rule 35.11, situated in division 35.2 of the Rules ⸻ written applications for leave to appeal ⸻ provides:A party may apply to the Court under this Division for leave to appeal if:(a) an Act gives the party a right of appeal to the Court subject to the party obtaining leave to appeal; and(b) the party has not made an oral application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court. Rule 1.51 provides that a word or expression defined in the Dictionary (being Schedule 1 to, and forming part of, the Rules) has the meaning given in the Dictionary. The Dictionary defines party as “a party to a proceeding”. The word “proceeding” is in turn defined in the Dictionary by reference to s 4 of the FCA Act which provides that “proceeding” means “a proceeding in a court, whether between parties or not, and includes an incidental proceeding in the course of, or in connexion with, a proceeding, and also includes an appeal.” On this application, Ms Lin submitted that she was not a “party” as that word is used in rule 35.11 and therefore division 35.2 of the Rules does not apply to her application. I reject that submission. Ms Lin is relevantly a party within the meaning of rule 35.11 because as the applicant on this application she is a person who is a party to a relevant incidental proceeding in the course of, or in connexion with, a proceeding. Division 35.2 applies to her application, which is not surprising given it is a written application for leave to appeal, the very subject matter to which the division is addressed. Rule 35.12(1) provides that a person who wants to apply for leave to appeal must file an application, in accordance with Form 117. Rule 35.13 provides that the application must be filed:(a)within 14 days after the date on which the judgment was pronounced or the order was made; or(b)on or before a date fixed for that purpose by the Court from which leave to appeal is sought. Here the judgment (being the order of the Court) was pronounced on 5 June 2025. Ms Lin’s application for leave to appeal was required to be filed by 19 June 2025. Accordingly, Ms Lin requires an extension of time within which to appeal.