SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Limpus v State of Qld & Ors [2003] QCA 563
PARTIES:
COLIN LIMPUS
(applicant/first respondent)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first respondent/second respondent)
GRANT DENNIS HOWARD and CHERYL JOY HOWARD
(second respondent)
WHITSUNDAY SHIRE COUNCIL
(third respondent/appellant)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 3906 of 2003
SC No 1761 of 2002DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal from interlocutory decision
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
19 December 2003
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
11 September 2003
JUDGES:
Jerrard JA and Dutney and Philippides JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order madeORDER:
1. Appeal dismissed
2. Appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appealCATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PRACTICE UNDER RULE OF COURT – JOINING PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS – where respondent granted leave pursuant to r 69 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to add the second defendant to a proceeding against the first defendant – where apparent degree of uncertainty exists as to who is the responsible party – whether decision of learned judge to join the party was unreasonable and unjust
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – CONTRACTS, TORTS AND PERSONAL ACTIONS – PERSONAL INJURY CASES – where respondent injured in single vehicle accident on a state controlled road – where limitation period expired over a year before the second defendant was joined to the proceeding – where learned judge held that appellant did not show any specific prejudice in addition to the ordinary disadvantages caused by delay – whether learned judge acted on wrong principle
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 31(2)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 69Bates v Queensland Newspapers [2001] QSC 83; SC No 1324 of 1993, 27 March 2001, discussed
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, considered
Cacchia v Rungert & Ors [2002] QCA 207; Appeal No 1153 or 2001, 21 June 2002, distinguishedCOUNSEL:
R J Douglas SC, with D Scheidewin, for the appellant
D A Reid, with D J Murphy, for the first respondent
S J Hamlyn-Harris for the second respondentSOLICITORS:
Barry & Nilsson for the appellant
Murphy Schmidt for the first respondent
Crown Solicitor, C W Lohe, for the second respondent
JERRARD JA: This matter is an appeal against an order made in this court on 9 April 2003, granting the respondent/plaintiff Colin Limpus leave pursuant to r 69 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) to add Whitsunday Shire Council as a second defendant to a proceeding commenced on 22 February 2002 against the State of Queensland. The relevant limitation period expired on 24 February 2002, and the appellant Council was thus added as a defendant a little more than 13 months later. It contends that the learned judge acted on a wrong principle in granting leave, and that in any event the order was plainly wrong.
Background matters and chronology
Mr Limpus complains…
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- Case
- [2003] QCA 563
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case revolve around the application of Rule 69 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), which governs the addition of parties to proceedings. The court had to determine whether the decision to join the second defendant was unreasonable and unjust, given the uncertainty surrounding the responsible party. Additionally, the court considered whether the delay in joining the second defendant prejudiced the appellant beyond the ordinary disadvantages of delay. The court also had to examine whether the learned judge correctly applied the principles relevant to the addition of parties and the impact of the limitation period on the proceedings.
The court found that the decision to join the second defendant was not unreasonable and unjust, considering the uncertainty regarding the responsible party. The court also held that the appellant did not demonstrate any specific prejudice beyond the ordinary disadvantages caused by the delay. The judge correctly applied the relevant principles in making the decision, and the limitation period did not prevent the court from joining the second defendant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal dismissed
2. Appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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