Lilly v West Australian Trustee Executor and Agency Co Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 22 min read
13 CLR 416

MARY HANNAH LILLY

THE WEST AUSTRALIAN TRUSTEE

EXECUTOR AND AGENCY CO. LTD.

RESPONDENTS.

AND OTHERS

DAME CATHERINE ANNE LEE STEERE

THE WEST AUSTRALIAN TRUSTEE

RESPONDENTS.

EXECUTOR AND AGENCY CO. LTD. Probate duty-Apportionment of liability to duty as between beneficiaries-Life

tenants-Remaindermen-Annuitants-Testamentary Expenses - Administra- tion Act 1903 (W.A.) (No. 13), secs. 86, 87, 111, 112-Duties on Deceased PERTH,

Persons' Estates Act 1895 (W.A.) (59 Vict. No. 18), secs. 10, 13. Oct. 27.

Under the Administration Act 1903, where a testator devises property to trustees in trust for A. for life and for B. in remainder, the amount of the estate is reduced by the whole duty paid in respect of it, and A. is entitled to the income of the estate as so reduced.

The testator gave the residue of his estate, "after payment my debts funeral and testamentary expenses and legacies," upon certain

Held, that the duty payable under the Act was not a testamentary expense and that this was therefore not a "special provision" or a specific direc- tion " within the meaning of secs. 111 and 112.

In re Clemow; Yeo v. Clemow, (1900) 2 Ch., 182, distinguished.

13 CLR 417

An annuity is a legacy and for the purpose of ascertaining the duty payable in respect of it the value of the annuity must be calculated as at the date of the death of the testator. The duty so ascertained is to be deducted from the value, and the amount of the annuity itself must be reduced pro- portionately.

In re Ogilvie, 13 W.A.L.R., 97, discussed.

APPEALS from orders of Rooth J. made on originating summonses in Chambers.

The facts in Mrs. Lilly's case were as follow :- 1. The testator James Lilly died at Claremont in the State of Western Australia on 18th April 1905.

2. Probate of his will with one codicil thereto was granted on 6th June 1905 to the West Australian Trustee Executor and Agency Company Limited the executors in the codicil to the said will.

3. By the said will and codicil the deceased

(a) Appointed the West Australian Trustee Executor and

Agency Company Limited to be executors and trustees of his will. (b) Bequeathed all the effects in and about his house to his

trustees upon trust to his wife to permit his wife to enjoy the same during her life or widowhood and after her death or re-marriage either

(I.) To divide the said effects as his trustees should

think proper amongst living children or (II.) to sell same and divide the proceeds among the

same persons. (c) Gave the residue of his estate to his trustees upon trust

to permit his wife to reside in his house at Fremantle during her widowhood and subject thereto upon trust to convert same into money and invest the proceeds (after payment thereout of his funeral and testamentary expenses and legacies) and to pay the income to his wife during widowhood and on her re-marriage to pay her an annuity…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Lilly v West Australian Trustee Executor and Agency Co Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1911] HCA 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Lilly v West Australian Trustee Executor and Agency Co Ltd concerned appeals from orders made by Rooth J. in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The primary dispute revolved around the apportionment of probate duty payable under the *Administration Act 1903* (W.A.) and the *Duties on Deceased Persons' Estates Act 1895* (W.A.) as between beneficiaries with successive interests in deceased estates. In Mrs. Lilly's case, the testator had established trusts for his wife for life, with remainders to his children, and also provided for an annuity. In Lady Steere's case, the testator had devised property to his wife for life, with remainders to his daughters, and also created life interests for his sons and daughters, with further provisions for their issue and the residue of the estate.

The legal issues before the court were whether the duty payable under the relevant Acts constituted a testamentary expense, and if not, how such duty was to be apportioned amongst the various beneficiaries, particularly those with life interests, remainders, and annuities. Specifically, the court had to determine if beneficiaries were required to reimburse the estate for the duty paid on their respective interests, or if their interests were to be considered as already diminished by the duty at the time of distribution. The court also considered the effect of any "special provision" made by a testator for the payment of duty.

The court reasoned that the duty imposed by the Acts was not a testamentary expense, and therefore, a general direction in a will to pay testamentary expenses did not encompass the probate duty. The court distinguished *In re Clemow* and noted that section 87 of the *Administration Act 1903* clearly distinguished duty from testamentary expenses. The court further held that section 111 of the *Administration Act 1903* required executors and administrators to deduct from each devise, bequest, or legacy an amount equal to the duty payable on that specific interest. However, the court clarified that beneficiaries did not have to refund duty already paid by the executor; rather, their interests were to be considered as already reduced by the duty. The court also indicated that section 112 of the Act provided express directions for the apportionment of duty in cases of successive interests.

The court found that the orders made by Rooth J., which declared that each interest should be charged with a portion of the duty and that the trustee should deduct an amount equal to the duty from each interest, were potentially misleading. The court clarified that beneficiaries took their interests already diminished by the duty and could not be called upon to refund amounts they had not received. The appeals were allowed to the extent that the orders were interpreted to mean that the beneficiaries' interests were to be treated as already reduced by the duty, rather than requiring them to make a cash payment to recoup the estate.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.