Lighthouse Corporation Ltd v Timor Leste
[2019] VSC 278
•02/05/2019
(1) The act of state doctrine was not engaged. (a) The subject matter of the proceeding was a commercial transaction. A transaction did not become an act of state merely because a state was party to it or a member of the executive executed the transaction. Nor did it become an act of state merely because a public benefit was intended or received from it . [48]– [52].Moti v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 456 , 475, 476[50]–[52]applied. Underhill v Hernandez (1897) 168 US 250 , 252; Habib v Commonwealth (2010) 183 FCR 62, 66, 77, 86referred to. (b) Even if the inquiry might incidentally expose that there had been an unlawful or inappropriate act by Timor Leste, that would only be incidental or preliminary to the determination of the question in this case. It would not offend the act of state doctrine . [53].Attorney General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 30 , 34; Moti v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 456applied. Belhaj v Straw [2017] AC 964 , 1111–12, 1116, 1154followed. (c) The act of state doctrine could not operate in a way which negated the exception for commercial transactions in s 11 of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth). [56]– [57].
(2) Victoria was not a clearly inappropriate forum for determination of the dispute. There were significant connecting factors to Victoria. Disputed questions as to whether the contract was made, and whether it included the term that the contract was to be governed by the law of Victoria, were matters for the law of the forum . [87].
(a) has no jurisdiction as the claims concern acts of State; alternatively (b) is a clearly inappropriate forum for the resolution of the dispute between the parties.
(a) the government unlawfully repudiated the alleged fuel supply agreement; (b) additionally or alternatively, the government breached obligations owed to Lighthouse under Timor Leste’s foreign investment law ( FIL ); and(c) the government’s breach has caused Lighthouse to suffer loss.
(a) declare that it had jurisdiction to determine Lighthouse’s claims; (b) declare that the government had unlawfully repudiated the fuel supply agreement and order that the government pay to Lighthouse damages including loss of profit and revenue resulting from the wrongful repudiation of the fuel supply agreement; (c) order that the government pay Lighthouse the expenses incurred with respect to the performance of their obligations under the fuel supply agreement; (d) declare that the government was obliged to compensate Lighthouse with respect to the consequential loss, including further sales of high speed diesel fuel to the Timor Leste government departments, which would have ensued had the government not wrongfully repudiated the fuel supply agreement; and (e) order that the government pay the costs of the arbitration and pre- and post-award interest.
(a) the government unlawfully terminated (repudiated) the fuel supply agreement; and (b) Lighthouse lost the benefit of the fuel supply agreement and the revenue which would otherwise have been received, and thereby suffered loss and damage. 2
(a) the supply of barges by Lighthouse to store the supplied fuel pending the construction of the storage facility in Port Caravela being a document entitled ‘Floating Storage Addendum and Nomination’; and (b) the construction of a fuel storage facility at Port Caravela by Zebra Fuels being documents entitled ‘Addendum, Nomination and Variation’ and ‘Special Conditions of Contract’.
(a) there was never any binding contract between it and Lighthouse and Zebra Fuels; (b) it was induced to enter into a negotiation process with Lighthouse and Zebra Fuels and sign documents on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentations of Lighthouse; (c) in order for the government to enter into any contract with Lighthouse and Zebra Fuels the Prime Minister was required to follow certain processes mandated by the constitution of Timor Leste, and more generally under Timorese law; none of these processes were undertaken because the government considered that the arrangements with Lighthouse and Zebra Fuels were preliminary and provisional; (d) at no stage did Lighthouse follow the government’s guidelines on the procurement in relation to any of the proposals or make any approach to the government’s agencies and departments as advised; (e) although Lighthouse claimed to be a majority shareholder in Zebra Fuels it did not carry out any of the necessary steps under Timorese law to become a shareholder in Zebra Fuels, thereby making it unable to perform a significant aspect of the final proposal concerning the development at Port Caravela;
(f) representations made by Lighthouse to the government (in relation to its experience, its financial standing, and an exclusive agency with Cummins) were false and misleading and were known by Lighthouse to be false and misleading; (g) in reliance on the representations made by Lighthouse the government received and considered the Lighthouse and Zebra Fuels proposal and entered into the arrangements on the basis that they were provisional in nature and subject to a tendering process to be conducted in the first half of 2011; and (h) had the government known that the representations were false and misleading and that Lighthouse, among other things, did not have the necessary experience, financial standing, size or an exclusive agency with Cummins then the government would not have had any dealings with Lighthouse and would not have entered into any provisional arrangements for the proposed supply of fuel or generators or the arrangements reflected in the documents signed at about the end of November 2010.
(a) at the time when the document entitled the ‘Supply for Allocation and Contract’ was signed, the government had a procurement office or an office of finance which would supervise the terms of contracts for procurement; (b) in signing the document entitled the ‘Supply for Allocation and Contract’, the Prime Minister’s powers were referable to, amongst others, the following: (i) the requirements of the Timor Leste procurement law; (ii) sections 115, 116 and 117 of the Timor Leste Constitution;
(iii) section 6 of the Government Organic Law, being Decree-Law No 7/2007; (iv) the powers of the Council of Ministers; and (v) the powers of the relevant government departments responsible for the infrastructure and electricity supply;
(c) the contours and constraints of the Prime Minister’s contracting powers and the valid exercise of those powers involve issues regarding the legitimacy of executive and legislative actions of the Timorese state and in order to assess the questions that arise for determination in respect of the alleged Fuel Supply Agreement, it would be necessary for the Court to determine or adjudicate upon the executive actions of the Prime Minister and the legislative and other acts of the Council of Ministers; and (d) those actions, taking place in Timor Leste, are referable to the operation of domestic law in Timor Leste on the actions of the state and its government and are quintessentially foreign acts of state that should not be determined by this Court.
(a) there is a difference between challenging the validity of a foreign state’s law in a domestic court and applying that law; the former being impermissible whereas the latter is routine; (b) the factual issues to be addressed in this proceeding will not involve assessing the character or significance of sovereign acts; (c) specifically, in this case, there is a challenge to capacity to contract which is a question which may arise regardless of the standing or office of the person who manifests contractual intent by executing a document; (d) the fact that the integers of capacity vary depending upon the standing or office held by the person is beside the point and does not change the character of the act of execution; (e) the highest any inquiry into the exercise of sovereign power arises is preliminary to the decision of the ultimate question of the effect of any such exercise (citing Moti );(f) the act of state doctrine could not operate in a way which negates ss 10 and 11 of the Foreign States Immunities Act ;(g) an issue estoppel arises from the finding made by the ICSID Tribunal that there was an agreement between parties; and20
(h) the defendants have not proven the scope and effect of a foreign law, with the consequence that the Court cannot know or be satisfied that the transactions at issue in this case fall within those laws, let alone have act of state level concerns.
(a) the references in the Fuel Supply Agreement reinforce the conclusion that the generators were supplied as commercial goods for purchase ;23 (b) the Floating Storage Agreement (described) is entirely consistent with the Fuel Supply Agreement being a commercial supply transaction; 24 (c) the nature of the transaction on its face involved merely an exchange of goods and services for payment ;25 (d) the essential characteristic of the contractual arrangements in this case, properly analysed ,is as an ordinary commercial transaction: the Claimants offered to sell goods (fuel and generators) and services (storage on barges) in return for payment; 26 (e) the transactions had no notable feature that took them beyond the
(e) ordinary commercial sphere of a sale of goods;27 (f) the Claimants promised to supply goods sold for profit in an ordinary commercial cross-border transaction . It just so happens that the buyer was a sovereign nation ...28
9 General immunity from jurisdiction
... 11 Commercial transactions
(1) A foreign State is not immune in a proceeding in so far as the proceeding concerns a commercial transaction. ... (3) In this section, commercial transaction means a commercial, trading, business, professional or industrial or like transaction into which the foreign State has entered or a like activity in which the State has engaged and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes:(a) a contract for the supply of goods or services; ...
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