Lightburn Pty Ltd v Kama Power Products Pty Ltd

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LIGHTBURN PTY LTD v KAMA POWER PRODUCTS PTY LTD

[2003] SASC 43

Civil

  1. BESANKO J: This is an oral application by the director of a company for the approval of the Court pursuant to s 471A of the Corporations Act 2001 (“the Act”) for the exercise of a power by the director to cause the company to appeal from an order winding up the company. The order was made on 20 December 2002.

  2. Before turning to the merits of the application, it is necessary to set out a summary of the relevant facts.

    The Facts

  3. Lightburn Pty Ltd (“Lightburn”) claims to be a creditor of Kama Power Products Pty Ltd (“the company”). It served a statutory demand on the company seeking payment of the sum said to be owing to it ie., $60,235.36. The statutory demand was served under the power contained in s 459E of the Act. The company did not pay the alleged debt or any part of it. It issued an application to set aside the statutory demand pursuant to s 459G of the Act (Action Number 1189 of 2002). The company was required by s 459G(3)(b) to serve the application and accompanying affidavit within 21 days. Unfortunately, due to an error by the company in the specification of the address of the creditor, the application and accompanying affidavit were not served until a day or two after the 21 day period had expired. The time limit prescribed by s 459G is a strict one and cannot be extended by the Court (David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265). The Master who heard the company’s application under s 459G delivered no reasons for his decision to dismiss the company’s application, but it seems clear from the transcript (in particular the passages showing the Master’s exchanges with Mr Tudor) that he did so on this ground. In any event, there is no appeal from the order dismissing the company’s application to set aside the statutory demand.

  4. On 17 September 2002, Lightburn Pty Ltd applied to wind up the company (s 459P) relying on the presumption of insolvency raised as a result of the company’s failure to comply with the statutory demand (ss 459Q and 459C) (Action Number 1316 of 2002). Section 459C(3) of the Act provides:

    “A presumption for which this section provides operates except insofar as the contrary is proved for the purposes of the application.”

  5. Both the company’s application to set aside the statutory demand and Lightburn’s application to wind up the company came before a Master of this Court on 22 October 2002. Mr Lucian Tudor, a director of the company purported to appear for the company, although no leave had been obtained under Rule 36.11 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 for the company to act in person and to appear by Mr Tudor. Lightburn’s application to wind up the company was adjourned to 6 November 2002. The company’s application to set aside the…

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Details
Case
[2003] SASC 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lightburn Pty Ltd claimed to be a creditor of Kama Power Products Pty Ltd and served a statutory demand for $60,235.36, which was not paid. The company applied to set aside the statutory demand under s 459G of the Corporations Act, but the application was late, and the Master dismissed it. Lightburn then applied to wind up the company based on the presumption of insolvency from the failure to comply with the statutory demand. The company's application to set aside the statutory demand and Lightburn's application to wind up the company were both adjourned for the company to seek legal advice. The company did not provide clear evidence of its financial position, and the appeal against the Master's decision was dismissed for lack of intelligible evidence.

The court had to decide whether the company could appeal the Master's decision to dismiss its application to set aside the statutory demand and whether the company's representative, Mr Lucian Tudor, had the authority to act on behalf of the company. The court had to consider whether the appeal was competent under s 471A(1)(d) of the Corporations Act and whether Mr Tudor had the authority to represent the company. The court also had to consider whether the company's financial position was adequately demonstrated to support the appeal.

The court found that the appeal was incompetent because the company did not provide clear or intelligible evidence of its financial position, and any appeal against the Master's decision must inevitably fail. The court also found that Mr Tudor did not have the authority to act on behalf of the company as required under Rule 36.11 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987. The court dismissed the appeal and noted that it would hear the parties as to what other orders were appropriate.

No further orders were made beyond the dismissal of the appeal and the direction for the parties to discuss further orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Before turning to the merits of the application, it is necessary to set out a summary of the relevant facts.The Facts Lightburn Pty Ltd (“Lightburn”) claims to be a creditor of Kama Power Products Pty Ltd (“the company”). It served a statutory demand on the company seeking payment of the sum said to be owing to it ie., $60,235.36. The statutory demand was served under the power contained in s 459E of the Act. The company did not pay the alleged debt or any part of it. It issued an application to set aside the statutory demand pursuant to s 459G of the Act (Action Number 1189 of 2002). The company was required by s 459G(3)(b) to serve the application and accompanying affidavit within 21 days. Unfortunately, due to an error by the company in the specification of the address of the creditor, the application and accompanying affidavit were not served until a day or two after the 21 day period had expired. The time limit prescribed by s 459G is a strict one and cannot be extended by the Court (David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265). The Master who heard the company’s application under s 459G delivered no reasons for his decision to dismiss the company’s application, but it seems clear from the transcript (in particular the passages showing the Master’s exchanges with Mr Tudor) that he did so on this ground. In any event, there is no appeal from the order dismissing the company’s application to set aside the statutory demand. On 17 September 2002, Lightburn Pty Ltd applied to wind up the company (s 459P) relying on the presumption of insolvency raised as a result of the company’s failure to comply with the statutory demand (ss 459Q and 459C) (Action Number 1316 of 2002). Section 459C(3) of the Act provides:“A presumption for which this section provides operates except insofar as the contrary is proved for the purposes of the application.” Both the company’s application to set aside the statutory demand and Lightburn’s application to wind up the company came before a Master of this Court on 22 October 2002. Mr Lucian Tudor, a director of the company purported to appear for the company, although no leave had been obtained under Rule 36.11 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 for the company to act in person and to appear by Mr Tudor. Lightburn’s application to wind up the company was adjourned to 6 November 2002. The company’s application to set aside the statutory demand was also adjourned to that date, and an order was made as to the filing of affidavits by the parties. Both applications came before a Master on 6 November 2002. The Master adjourned both matters for mention only to 21 November 2002 in order to “enable Mr Tudor and his company to seek legal advice in relation to their position in respect of both actions”. The Master also noted the following:“It is clear that Mr Tudor representing the company does not fully comprehend the various matters involved in this application or in Action Number 1316/02, in which an application is made to wind up Kama Power Products Pty Ltd.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

To my mind, the failure to put any clear or intelligible evidence before the Master of the company’s financial position means that any appeal against his decision must inevitably fail.Conclusions I would refuse approval under s 471A(1)(d) of the Act for Mr Tudor to perform or exercise a function or power to cause the company to appeal. It follows that the appeal is incompetent and I dismiss it under Rule 95.08. I will hear the parties as to what other orders are appropriate in light of these conclusions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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