Li v Toyota (Costs Ruling) - [2012] VSC 196

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

No. 609 2012

JAMES LI	Plaintiff
v
TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION AUSTRALIA LTD	Defendant

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JUDGE:	J FORREST J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	14 May 2012
DATE OF RULING:	14 May 2012
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Li v Toyota (Costs Ruling)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2012] VSC 196	Amended 15 May 2012.

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COSTS – Costs of and incidental to the discharge of a jury – Referral under Rule 63.51 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) – Costs “of and incidental to the discharge of the jury” – Costs consequential upon the discharge of the jury – Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic).

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	Mr A D B Ingram	Clark Toop & Taylor
For the Defendant	Ms R N Annesley	Minter Ellison

HIS HONOUR:

Introduction

This application raises the question as to what costs are payable by Toyota to Mr Li as a result of my orders discharging the jury on Friday 1 October 2010 and requiring Toyota to pay the “costs of and incidental” to the discharge of the jury.[1]
[1]“the costs order”.

Subsequent to the termination of that trial, the case proceeded before Beach J as a cause. His Honour gave judgment on Thursday 14 October 2010.[2] Mr Li was successful, but by reason of the provisions of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic)[3] obtained no order as to costs.
[2][2010] VSC 458.
[3]“the Act”.

The Judicial Registrar has now referred the question of the appropriate allowance to me pursuant to r 63.51 of the Supreme Court (General Civil procedure) Rules 2005[4] for directions.
[4]“SCR”.

Factual Background
The trial

Mr Li’s claim against Toyota arose out of injuries sustained by him in 2005 as a result of his employment with Toyota. The trial commenced on 23 September and was in its seventh day on 1 October when the jury was discharged.

The evidence concluded on 29 September. Counsel for Toyota addressed the jury on 30 September and after argument on 1 October the jury was discharged.

The reasons for the discharge of the jury are set out in my ruling of 1 October 2010[5] and essentially turned upon irrelevant references in counsel’s address to Mr Li’s entitlement to workers’ compensation payments.
[5][2010] VSC 448.

Having determined to discharge the jury I made the following costs orders:

(2)The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the discharge of the jury.
(3)The matter be referred for mention to Beach J for hearing as a cause on 4 October 2010 at 2.15pm (emphasis added).

It was not argued on that occasion that the provisions of the Act[6] prevented the making of such orders. On this application, it was accepted by Toyota that those provisions only apply when the final outcome of the proceeding is known.[7]
[6]Sections 134AB(27), (28) and (28A).
[7]O’Neill v T D Williamson (No 2) [2008] VSC 430

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Li v Toyota (Costs Ruling)

Details

AGLC: Li v Toyota (Costs Ruling) [2012] VSC 196
Case: [2012] VSC 196
Decision Date: 14 May 2012

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the recent case of Li v Toyota, the parties were engaged in a dispute that ultimately reached the Supreme Court of Victoria. The case revolved around a motor vehicle accident and the subsequent legal proceedings. The court was tasked with making a ruling on costs associated with the discharge of a jury, specifically under Rule 63.51 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic). The respondent sought to recover costs incurred due to the discharge of the jury, which had been discharged following a mistrial.

The primary legal issue before the court was the interpretation and application of the relevant rules and statutes governing costs. The court had to determine whether the costs claimed by the respondent were appropriately categorised as "costs of and incidental to the discharge of the jury" or if they fell under a different category of costs. Additionally, the court needed to consider the implications of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) on the respondent's right to recover these costs.

The court carefully examined the applicable rules and statutes and concluded that the costs claimed by the respondent were indeed "costs of and incidental to the discharge of the jury." The court found that these costs were properly incurred as a consequence of the jury's discharge and that they were not recoverable under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic). As a result, the respondent was entitled to recover these costs from the appellant.

The court's ruling provided clarity on the interpretation and application of the relevant rules and statutes concerning costs associated with the discharge of a jury. The respondent's application for costs was successful, and the court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs as determined.

Orders