FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Li v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1206
File number(s): BRG 638 of 2023 Judgment of: JUDGE EGAN Date of judgment: 14 November 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION LAW – Where the first applicant was required to satisfy criteria for the grant to him of a Business Innovation and Investment (Provisional) (Subclass 188) Visa – where the evidence before the delegate failed to satisfy the delegate that the first applicant made decisions affecting the overall direction and performance of the business – criteria not satisfied – application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss. 54 and 55
Migration Regulations 1994, Reg 1.11, Reg 1.11(1)(b)
Migration Regulations 1994 – Schedule 2, Clause 188.225
Cases cited: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3FCR 344
Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA28
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 26 Date of last submission/s: 12 November 2024 Date of hearing: 12 November 2024 Place: Brisbane Counsel for the Applicants: Mr L. Boccabella Solicitor for the Applicants: Hartnett Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D. Freeburn Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz ORDERS
BRG 638 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ZHEN LI
First Applicant
ZHONGGUI WANG
Second ApplicantYUNZHU LI
Third ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE EGAN
DATE OF ORDER:
14 NOVEMBER 2024
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1.The name of the respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.
2.The application for extension of time for the filing of the Originating Application for Review filed on 12 December 2023 be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE EGAN
INTRODUCTION
The first applicant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China who applied for a Business Innovation and Investment (Provisional) (Subclass 188) Visa on or about 24 November 2020. The second and third applicants were members of the first applicant’s family unit. The success of their visa applications depended upon the success of the first applicant’s visa application.
Clause 188 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (“the Regulations”) set out the criteria for the grant of a Subclass 188 visa. Clause 188.225 relevantly provided as follows:
MIGRATION REGULATIONS 1994 - SCHEDULE 2
Provisions with…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1206
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case were whether the applicants had provided sufficient justification for the delay in lodging their applications for judicial review, and whether the substantive applications for judicial review had any merit. The principles governing applications for extension of time were considered, including the extent of the delay, the explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent, the impact on the applicant, the interests of the public at large, and the merits of the substantive application. The Court also considered whether the applicants' cases were strong or exceptional, given the length and unexplained nature of the delay.
Mortimer J found that the applicants had not provided a sufficient justification for the delay in lodging their applications for judicial review. The delay was lengthy and unexplained, and the applicants had not shown that their cases were strong or exceptional. The Court also found that the applicants' substantive applications for judicial review had no merit, as the evidence before the delegate did not satisfy the delegate that the applicants made decisions affecting the overall direction and performance of the business. As such, the applications for an extension of time were dismissed, and the applications for judicial review were also dismissed.
No further orders were made by the Court. The applicants' applications for an extension of time and for judicial review were dismissed, and the original decisions of the Minister were upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant relied upon each of the grounds of review at the time of the hearing before the Court. RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS The principles governing applications for extension of time were considered by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3FCR 344 at [18] – [23], the non-exhaustive list of matters for consideration being as follows:•The extent of the delay;•The explanation for the delay;•Any prejudice to the respondent;•The impact on the applicant;•The interests of the public at large; and •The merits of the substantive application. In Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA28 at [13] and [17] – [18], it was held by Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ as follows:13.“In the absence of mandatory considerations for determining whether his Honour had the state of satisfaction required by s 477A(2)(b), the primary judge properly referred to the well established principles guiding decisions whether to extend time under s 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) that were stated by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen. Those principles, which are non-exhaustive of the factors that may be relevant to an extension of time under s 477A(2), include that "[t]he merits of the substantial application are properly to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted"…17.French J's observation in Seiler cannot be applied to the operation of s 477A(2) without regard to the important fact that the power considered by his Honour did not require the state of satisfaction set out in s 477A(2)(b). Even so, it may be accepted that, in determining what is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the purposes of s 477A(2) (or s 477(2)), it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a "reasonably impressionistic level". That is because the interests of justice are likely to be advanced by granting an extension of time to an application with some merit, depending, of course, on other relevant factors. In this regard, it may be relevant, as Mortimer J observed, that an extension of time will confer upon the applicant not only the right to a determination of their substantive application on the merits but also a right of appeal from that judgment, if adverse to the applicant.18.However, and as the plaintiff accepted, there will be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits. For example, if the delay is lengthy and unexplained, the applicant may be required to show that their case is strong or even "exceptional". In such a case, a proper exercise of the power conferred by s 477A(2) will not require the judge to confine their consideration of the merits to an assessment of what is "reasonably arguable" or some similar standard. In other cases, the proposed ground of review may be hopeless but it may be necessary to examine the proposed application in some detail to reach that conclusion. The broad power in s 477A(2) does not prevent a judge from undertaking such an examination and from relying upon that determination to refuse an extension of time.”