FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Li v Edith Cowan University [2016] FCA 380
File number: WAD 147 of 2014 Judge: GILMOUR J Date of judgment: 19 April 2016 Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 390, 394, 400, 54(1)
Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.01(1)(a), 26.01(1)(c)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Cases cited: Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194
Li v Edith Cowan University [2012] FWA 1887
Date of hearing: 4 December 2015 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 46 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Musikanth Solicitor for the First Respondent: Office of Legal Services, Edith Cowan University Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear ORDERS
WAD 147 of 2014 BETWEEN: DONGGUANG LI
Applicant
AND: EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY
First Respondent
FAIR WORK COMMISSION
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GILMOUR J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 aPRIL 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The further amended originating application be dismissed.
2.The parties have liberty, within 14 days of this order, to apply to the Court on the question of costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GILMOUR J:
The first respondent (University) applies for summary judgment on the grounds that:
(a)the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding: r 26.01(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“Rules”); and
(b)no reasonable cause of action is disclosed: r 26.01(1)(c) of the Rules.
The first respondent’s written submissions set out the relevant statutory provisions and the relevant rule of this Court. These are well established and are not contentious.
Section 31A(2) of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) empowers the Court to give judgment for a respondent in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if the Court is satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.
Section 31A authorises summary disposition of proceedings on various bases, including cases "in which the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action and their deficiency is incurable": Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia, (2010) 241 CLR 118, at [22] (per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
Rule 26.01 of the Rules, in turn, lists the circumstances in which one party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another. The circumstances include those the subject of the grounds relied upon by the respondent.
For the purposes of s 31A(2) a proceeding, or part of a proceeding, need not be hopeless or bound to fail: s 31A(3).
Nevertheless, the "exercise of powers to summarily terminate…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 380
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The further amended originating application be dismissed.
2. The parties have liberty, within 14 days of this order, to apply to the Court on the question of costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court assessed the applicant’s reasonable prospect of success in prosecuting his claims against the University. Given that the applicant's appeal against the Full Bench's decision was dismissed, the court found no reasonable prospect of success for the applicant's claims. Regarding the Deed of Settlement and Release, the court determined that the Deed precluded the applicant from pursuing certain claims against the University. The Deed explicitly included a release from claims arising out of the entire period of the applicant's employment with the University, and events up to and including the time of execution of the Deed. The court held that the Deed could be pleaded as a bar to any claim or cause of action, except to the extent that it prevents double recovery of compensation already provided for by the Deed. Finally, the court dismissed the applicant's further amended originating application and statement of claim, holding that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought. The court concluded that the applicant’s claims were precluded by the terms of the Deed of Settlement and Release, which the applicant had agreed to, and therefore, the claims were barred. The binding legal principle, or ratio decidendi, of this decision is that a Deed of Settlement and Release, which is entered into by parties, can effectively bar claims that fall within its scope, unless there is an express provision to the contrary. The court did not depart from prior authority in reaching this conclusion, as it followed established principles of contract law and the effect of releases in settlement agreements.