Li v Edith Cowan University

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Li v Edith Cowan University [2016] FCA 380

File number: WAD 147 of 2014
Judge: GILMOUR J
Date of judgment: 19 April 2016
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 390, 394, 400, 54(1)

Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.01(1)(a), 26.01(1)(c)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Cases cited:

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194

Li v Edith Cowan University [2012] FWA 1887

Li v Edith Cowan University [2014] FWCFB 2857

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Date of hearing: 4 December 2015
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 46
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Musikanth
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Office of Legal Services, Edith Cowan University
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

ORDERS

WAD 147 of 2014
BETWEEN:

DONGGUANG LI

Applicant

AND:

EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY

First Respondent

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 aPRIL 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The further amended originating application be dismissed.

2.The parties have liberty, within 14 days of this order, to apply to the Court on the question of costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GILMOUR J:

  1. The first respondent (University) applies for summary judgment on the grounds that:

    (a)the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding: r 26.01(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“Rules”); and

    (b)no reasonable cause of action is disclosed: r 26.01(1)(c) of the Rules.

  2. The first respondent’s written submissions set out the relevant statutory provisions and the relevant rule of this Court.  These are well established and are not contentious.

  3. Section 31A(2) of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) empowers the Court to give judgment for a respondent in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if the Court is satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding.

  4. Section 31A authorises summary disposition of proceedings on various bases, including cases "in which the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action and their deficiency is incurable": Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia, (2010) 241 CLR 118, at [22] (per Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

  5. Rule 26.01 of the Rules, in turn, lists the circumstances in which one party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another. The circumstances include those the subject of the grounds relied upon by the respondent.

  6. For the purposes of s 31A(2) a proceeding, or part of a proceeding, need not be hopeless or bound to fail: s 31A(3).

  7. Nevertheless, the "exercise of powers to summarily terminate…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 380
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Li, a former Associate Professor, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Fair Work Commission in relation to his dismissal from Edith Cowan University. The applicant pursued relief in the nature of certiorari, damages for alleged breaches of contract, damages for the publication of an image of him on a website, and declaratory relief. The University applied for summary judgment on the basis that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of success. The court considered the legal issues regarding the applicant's entitlement to relief in the nature of certiorari, damages for alleged breaches of contract, damages for the publication of an image of him on a website, and declaratory relief. The court concluded that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting these claims, given the binding nature of the Deed of Settlement and Release, which included a release from any claims arising from events up to the time of the execution of the Deed, and the fact that the applicant had already been compensated for the unfair dismissal. The court found that the applicant's claims were res judicata, and therefore, dismissed the further amended originating application. The parties have liberty, within 14 days of this order, to apply to the Court on the question of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The further amended originating application be dismissed.

2. The parties have liberty, within 14 days of this order, to apply to the Court on the question of costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant’s tendered his own affidavit sworn on 6 November 2015.Background The background is not contentious and is drawn from the University’s written submissions. The applicant was previously employed by the University as an Associate Professor and was dismissed from that employment on 11 January 2011. The applicant subsequently applied to Fair Work Australia (FWA) for an unfair dismissal remedy under s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). On 9 March 2012 a deputy president of FWA published a decision (Li v Edith Cowan University [2012] FWA 1887) in which he found, among other things, that: (a)there was a valid reason for the dismissal;(b)the dismissal was nonetheless unfair;(c)reinstatement was not an appropriate remedy; and(d)the applicant should receive an amount of compensation equal to two months' pay. The applicant appealed against the FW decision. On 19 May 2014, a Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission dismissed the applicant's appeal: Li v Edith Cowan University [2014] FWCFB 2857. On 24 July 2014, the applicant filed an originating application for judicial review in this Court seeking to challenge the decision of the Full Bench. On about 5 December 2014, the applicant filed an amended originating application along with a document entitled "Summary of Argument". The latter document set out the grounds relied upon by the applicant in support of the relief sought in the amended originating application. On 16 March 2015, the applicant and the University entered into a Deed of Settlement and Release (Deed). The Deed relevantly included provisions to the effect that:(a)the respondent be released from "any claims, liabilities or otherwise from events up to and including the time of the execution of this Deed";(b)the Deed could be pleaded as a bar to any claim or cause commenced by the applicant arising out of the entire period of the applicant's employment with the University, and events up to and including the time of execution of the Deed; and(c)the respondent's right to plead that bar did not apply to the applicant's "appeal (sic) to the Federal Court (WAD No. 147/2014) as at the date of execution of this Deed save to the extent that the Deed may be relied upon to prevent any double recovery of compensation, loss or damage already provided for by [the] Deed". On 1 April 2015, the applicant filed a further amended originating application and a statement of claim in this proceeding.The applicant's claims The relief sought by the applicant against the University is as follows:(1)relief pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in the nature of certiorari (s 39B relief): (2)damages for loss of salary and associated benefits said to be due to him as a result of an alleged failure by the University to comply with terms of an instrument which, according to the applicant, had formed part of the contract of employment between the parties (Contractual entitlements claim):(3)various other forms of damages allegedly suffered by him as a result of the University’s alleged failure to comply with terms of that instrument (Miscellaneous contractual claims):(4)damages allegedly suffered by him in connection with the alleged publication of an image of the applicant on a website (CrimeNet publication claims): and(5)declaratory relief. Declaratory relief would follow only, if at all, should the applicant’s various claims be established.(6)an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders made by the Full Bench on 19 May 2014.Section 39B relief

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting these claims.Conclusion There will be summary judgment of dismissal for the University. I will give the parties liberty to apply, within 14 days, on the question of costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court assessed the applicant’s reasonable prospect of success in prosecuting his claims against the University. Given that the applicant's appeal against the Full Bench's decision was dismissed, the court found no reasonable prospect of success for the applicant's claims. Regarding the Deed of Settlement and Release, the court determined that the Deed precluded the applicant from pursuing certain claims against the University. The Deed explicitly included a release from claims arising out of the entire period of the applicant's employment with the University, and events up to and including the time of execution of the Deed. The court held that the Deed could be pleaded as a bar to any claim or cause of action, except to the extent that it prevents double recovery of compensation already provided for by the Deed. Finally, the court dismissed the applicant's further amended originating application and statement of claim, holding that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought. The court concluded that the applicant’s claims were precluded by the terms of the Deed of Settlement and Release, which the applicant had agreed to, and therefore, the claims were barred. The binding legal principle, or ratio decidendi, of this decision is that a Deed of Settlement and Release, which is entered into by parties, can effectively bar claims that fall within its scope, unless there is an express provision to the contrary. The court did not depart from prior authority in reaching this conclusion, as it followed established principles of contract law and the effect of releases in settlement agreements.