[2013] HCATrans 188
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S47 of 2013
B e t w e e n -
TING LI
Applicant
and
CHIEF OF ARMY
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 16 AUGUST 2013, AT 11.04 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR A.W. STREET, SC: If it please the Court, I appear in this matter with my learned friends, MR P.W. KERR and MR A.K. FLECKNOE‑BROWN for the applicant. (instructed by Wyatt Attorneys)
MR S.B. LLOYD, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS S.G. CALLAN, for the Chief of Army. (instructed by Clayton Utz)
HAYNE J: Yes, Mr Street.
MR STREET: Your Honours, in this application the important questions of principle that arise concern the fault element and the physical element under Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code in respect of section 33(b) of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 - if I can go first to identify the errors and then the question of importance, your Honours.
If your Honours would turn to the application book at page 73 in the judgment of the Full Court, paragraph 57, dealing first with the erroneous approach in respect of the fault element, what the majority, in essence, determined was in relation to the offence that an intention to engage in the conduct, not the creating of a disturbance, was sufficient. Your Honours, that appears in paragraph 57 where one goes to the reasoning of the Court in the third‑last line where the Court says:
The relevant physical element of the offence is conduct which “creates a disturbance”. For conduct, the fault element is intention.
We say that is clearly excising the creating of the disturbance and then to make it clear, the majority continue:
As the Tribunal explained, the relevant intention is the intention to engage in the conduct alleged in the particulars –
Your Honours, in our respectful submission, it could not be clearer that the Full Court is embracing what was said by the Tribunal, excising a fault element from the requirements of section 33(b).
HAYNE J: Well, can I understand better, what do you say are the physical elements and fault elements of the relevant offence?
MR STREET: Your Honours, we put it in two ways in our submissions. We put it first on the proposition that when one goes to section 5.6 - can I take your Honours to it on page 71 - it identifies:
a physical element that consists only of conduct, intention is the fault element for that physical element.
Effectively, if the physical element is correctly characterised as only conduct, it is the creating of a disturbance in respect of which intention was necessary, or if one looks at subsection (2), and we put both, your Honours, if it is a circumstance or result, recklessness was required.
HAYNE J: What I…
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- Case
- [2013] HCATrans 188
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Chief of Army, in making the decision to discharge Mr Li, was under a duty to afford him procedural fairness. This involved considering whether the decision was of a kind that attracted the requirements of procedural fairness, and if so, what those requirements entailed in the specific context of a military discharge. The court also had to determine whether any such duty had been breached.
In their joint judgment, Hayne and Crennan JJ held that the Chief of Army's decision to discharge Mr Li was not one that attracted the requirements of procedural fairness. Their Honours reasoned that the power to discharge a soldier under section 110(1)(b) of the *Defence Act* was an administrative power exercised in the context of the command and discipline of the armed forces. They distinguished this power from those that affect individual rights or interests in a manner that would ordinarily attract procedural fairness. The court found that the statutory scheme and the nature of the power were such that it was not impliedly required to afford procedural fairness, and therefore, no breach of such a duty could have occurred.
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