Lexcray P/L v NT of Australia

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Lexcray P/L v NT of Australia [2000] NTSC 63

PARTIES:LEXCRAY PTY LTD

v

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY exercising Territory jurisdiction

FILE NO:AP22 of 1999 (9303728)

DELIVERED:  4 August 2000

HEARING DATES:  12 May 2000

JUDGMENT OF:  THOMAS J

CATCHWORDS:

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:A. Lindsay

Respondent:  S. Southwood

Solicitors:

Appellant:Cridlands

Respondent:  Solicitor for the Northern Territory

Judgment category classification:        C

Judgment ID Number:  tho20019

Number of pages:  7

IN SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Lexcray P/L v NT of Australia [2000] NTSC 63
No. AP22 of 1999 (9303728)

BETWEEN:

LEXCRAY PTY LTD

Appellant

AND:

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

CORAM:    THOMAS J

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 4 August 2000)

  1. I refer to my reasons for judgment in this matter dated 19 April 2000.  I dismissed an application made by the respondent that the appellant provide a security for costs of the appeal.  I made no orders as to costs of the application that the appellant provide the sum of $224,000 security for the costs of the respondent.

  2. At the request of the parties this matter was listed again before me on 12 May 2000.  By agreement between the parties they sought to put forward arguments in respect of the issue of costs on the application for security for costs of the respondent on the appeal.  The question of costs on the application for security for costs had not been previously argued.

  3. I have now had the opportunity to consider the merits of the application for costs made by the appellant.

  4. The application for security for costs was an interlocutory application pending the hearing of the appeal.

  5. The question of costs on an interlocutory application is provided by Supreme Court Rules 1978 (NT) Rule 63.18:

    “Each party shall bear his own costs of an interlocutory or other application in a proceeding, whether made on or without notice, unless the Court otherwise orders.”

  6. The principles in respect of costs on interlocutory application have been established in TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd (1992) 2 NTLR 143 at 145:

    “Mention has already been made of the radical departure from past practice introduced by these particular rules.  Such a departure implies a distinct reversal of thinking about costs in interlocutory matters and that leads to the view that there must be something exceptional about the circumstances of the interlocutory application under consideration to lead the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to make an order as to costs, taxation and payment.

    Given the tenor of the rules, it would not be just to make interlocutory orders for costs, or if made to order that they may be taxed earlier than completion of the proceedings, with a view to punishing the unsuccessful party.  To do so may engender a reluctance in parties to properly ventilate their problems during the pre-trial process.  What is required is an approach which seeks to have a successful…

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Details
Case
[2000] NTSC 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lexcray Pty Ltd brought an appeal against the Northern Territory of Australia, focusing on the issue of whether the respondent should provide security for costs associated with the appeal. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The primary legal issue was whether the respondent, the Northern Territory, should bear the costs of the appellant's application for security of costs. The court considered the principles surrounding costs in interlocutory applications, as outlined in Supreme Court Rules 1978 (NT) Rule 63.18 and the case of TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd.

The court noted that costs on interlocutory applications generally follow the principle that each party bears their own costs unless the court orders otherwise. However, the court may exercise discretion to order costs if the application or resistance lacks merit. The appellant argued that the respondent had ignored information about the appellant's assets, leading to an unnecessary application for security of costs. The respondent contended that the information provided by the appellant was ambiguous and did not clearly specify their asset position. After reviewing the affidavits and correspondence between the parties, the court determined that the respondent had sufficient information to avoid the application and the resulting costs. Consequently, the court ruled that the respondent should bear the costs of the appellant's application for security of costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Lexcray Pty Ltd (Lexcray) filed a Notice of Appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory on 24 September 1999. The appeal was listed for hearing on 5 June 2000. On 11 February 2000, the Northern Territory of Australia (the Territory) requested Lexcray to provide security for the costs of the appeal in the sum of $218,450. This request was made via a letter to Lexcray, almost five months after the Notice of Appeal had been filed and approximately four months before the appeal was to be heard. There followed a series of letters between solicitors for Lexcray and the Territory in which Lexcray's solicitors provided considerable details of Lexcray's financial position, including details of assets and liabilities. On 28 March 2000, the Territory filed a summons seeking an order for security for costs pursuant to the relevant rules of court. An affidavit in support of the summons was also filed. The summons was heard on 3 April 2000 and on 19 April 2000, the application was dismissed and written reasons for decision were delivered. Lexcray's solicitors then sought an order that the Territory pay the costs of the application for security for costs on an indemnity basis.

The matter came before the Court again on 12 May 2000, at the request of the parties, to argue the issue of costs on the application for security for costs. The question of costs on an interlocutory application is provided by the relevant rule of court, which states that each party shall bear their own costs unless the Court otherwise orders. The principles in respect of costs on interlocutory applications were established in a previous case, which held that costs in interlocutory matters no longer follow success and that no order as to costs should be made against the unsuccessful party if the grounds of the application or resistance are reasonable. However, if the application or resistance is without real merit, the successful party should not have to bear their costs. Lexcray's counsel argued that the Territory had the information prior to making the application for security for costs as to the value of Lexcray's assets, which was the crucial issue on the application. Counsel for the Territory argued that the affidavit material provided by Lexcray did not clearly specify the assets of the company and that if Lexcray had clearly specified their position with respect to their asset holding, the application could have been avoided.

After analysing the history of the application and the affidavit material before the Court, the Court found that the Territory had been provided with or had the opportunity to obtain all the material that would enable them to calculate Lexcray's assets. If the Territory had undertaken this exercise prior to the hearing, the application to the Court could well have been avoided and the resultant costs not incurred. The Court considered that there were reasons to grant the application by Lexcray's solicitors for costs of the Territory's application for security for costs. The Court made an order that the Territory pay Lexcray's costs of the application for security for costs and Lexcray's costs on the application for costs of such application. Such costs were to be either agreed or, in default of agreement, taxed.

The matter of Lexcray P/L v NT of Australia came before the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory as an appeal against an interlocutory decision regarding a security for costs application. Initially, the respondent, Northern Territory of Australia, filed a summons on 28 March 2000 seeking an order for security for costs pursuant to Rules 62.02(1)(b) and (f) and Rule 85.13. The application was heard on 3 April 2000, and the Court dismissed the application on 19 April 2000. Lexcray P/L, the appellant, subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on 24 September 1999 regarding the substantive hearing. On 11 February 2000, the respondent requested security for costs of the appeal in the sum of $218,450, which was almost five months after the Notice of Appeal had been filed. Following correspondence between the parties, the matter was listed again before the Court on 12 May 2000 to argue the issue of costs on the application for security for costs. The Court considered the merits of the application for costs and granted the appellant's application for an order that the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the application for security for costs and the appellant’s costs on the application for costs of such application, to be either agreed or in default of agreement taxed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the court have the discretion to make an order for costs on an interlocutory application for security for costs?
2. What were the principles governing costs in interlocutory matters, and how did they apply to the current case?
3. Did the respondent have real merit in their application for security for costs, or was it without real merit?
4. Was the respondent aware of the appellant's assets and liabilities prior to making the application for security for costs?
5. Did the respondent act unreasonably or in disregard of known facts when they proceeded with the application for security for costs?
6. Did the appellant provide sufficient information about their financial position to the respondent, and was the information ambiguous or unclear?
7. Was the respondent's application for security for costs made in a timely manner, or was it unduly delayed, contributing to the costs incurred?

Held
1. The court concluded that it had the discretion to make an order for costs on an interlocutory application for security for costs. Result: Order made for costs on the application for security for costs.

2. The principles governing costs in interlocutory matters were that costs should not be awarded unless there are exceptional circumstances, and if an application is without real merit, the successful party should not have to bear their costs. Result: Principles applied to the case.

3. The court found that the respondent's application for security for costs was without real merit. Result: Application for security for costs deemed without real merit.

4. The court held that the respondent was aware of the appellant's assets and liabilities prior to making the application for security for costs. Result: Respondent had knowledge of appellant’s financial position.

5. The court determined that the respondent acted unreasonably or in disregard of known facts when proceeding with the application for security for costs. Result: Respondent acted unreasonably.

6. The court found that the appellant did not provide sufficient information about their financial position to the respondent, and the information was ambiguous or unclear. Result: Insufficient and ambiguous information provided by appellant.

7. The court concluded that the respondent's application for security for costs was not made in a timely manner and was unduly delayed, contributing to the costs incurred. Result: Application for security for costs was untimely and contributed to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Lexcray P/L v NT of Australia, Thomas J addressed the issue of the court's discretion to make an order for costs on an interlocutory application for security for costs. The Supreme Court Rules 1978 (NT) Rule 63.18 sets out that each party shall bear their own costs of an interlocutory or other application, unless the Court otherwise orders. The court's discretion to make an order as to costs is rooted in the exceptional circumstances surrounding the interlocutory application. The court must consider whether there are exceptional reasons to deviate from the general principle that costs should not follow success in interlocutory matters unless the application or resistance is without real merit.

In applying these principles, Thomas J referred to the case of TTE Pty Ltd v Ken Day Pty Ltd (1992) 2 NTLR 143, which outlines that costs in interlocutory matters should not ordinarily be awarded to the successful party unless the application or resistance was without real merit. The court emphasized that the imposition of costs in interlocutory applications should be avoided to encourage parties to properly ventilate their issues during pre-trial processes. However, in cases where the application or resistance lacks real merit, the successful party should not bear the costs.

Thomas J also considered whether the respondent had real merit in their application for security for costs. The court scrutinized the evidence provided by both parties, including affidavits and correspondence, to determine if the respondent was aware of the appellant's financial position prior to making the application. The appellant argued that the respondent had information indicating the value of the appellant's assets, which were approximately $6 million with liabilities over $3 million, and thus the application was without real merit. The respondent, however, contended that the information provided by the appellant was ambiguous and did not clearly specify the company’s asset position.

The court found that the respondent had access to all necessary information to calculate the appellant’s assets and liabilities. The respondent's failure to undertake this exercise prior to the hearing resulted in the unnecessary application and subsequent costs. Thomas J concluded that the respondent's application for security for costs was without real merit, as they proceeded with the application despite being aware of the appellant's substantial assets.

Furthermore, Thomas J assessed whether the respondent acted unreasonably or in disregard of known facts when proceeding with the application. The court noted that the respondent's application for security for costs was issued almost five months after the Notice of Appeal had been filed and four months before the appeal was to be heard. This delay contributed to the costs incurred, as the respondent did not act promptly upon obtaining the necessary information about the appellant's financial position. The respondent's delay exacerbated the situation, leading Thomas J to find that the respondent acted unreasonably.

Regarding the appellant's provision of information about their financial position, the court acknowledged that the appellant had provided considerable details, including assets and liabilities, through correspondence between solicitors. However, the respondent did not respond to a specific query about the grounds for their belief that the appellant could not satisfy an order for costs. Despite this, the court found that the respondent had sufficient information to avoid the application and the resultant costs.

Lastly, Thomas J examined whether the respondent's application for security for costs was made in a timely manner. The significant delay in making the application, coupled with the respondent's failure to act on the available information, indicated that the application was not made in a timely manner. This delay contributed to the costs incurred by the appellant.

In conclusion, Thomas J ordered that the respondent pay the appellant's costs of the application for security for costs and the appellant's costs on the application for costs, to be either agreed upon or, in default of agreement, taxed. The court found that the respondent acted unreasonably, and the application was without real merit, leading to the imposition of costs on the respondent.