Levitas and Child Support Registrar (Child support)

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Levitas and Child Support Registrar (Child support) [2019] AATA 4233 (18 September 2019)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:           2019/1843

Re:Perry Levitas

APPLICANT

AndChild Support Registrar

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member

Date of decision:                   18 September 2019

Date of written reasons:        17 October 2019

Place:Melbourne

The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

.....[sgd]...................................................................

Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member

Catchwords

CHILD SUPPORT – departure prohibition order – whether criteria requiring revocation met – whether discretion to revoke should be exercised – decision under review affirmed

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975

Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988

Cases

Feras Naboush and Child Support Registrar [2014] AATA 930
Kenyon and Child Support Registrar [2012] AATA 714
Onder and Child Support Registrar and Sari (No.2) [2011] FMCAfam 430

Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2010] FCA 43

REASONS FOR DECISION

Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member

17 October 2019

BACKGROUND

  1. Mr Levitas applied for a review of a decision of the Child Support Registrar (the Registrar) dated 25 March 2019 to refuse to revoke a Departure Prohibition Order (DPO). This order was put in place on 24 May 2017 at which time Mr Levitas had a child support liability of $148,604.07, and a total outstanding debt, including penalties, in excess of $350,000. At the time of the hearing this figure was in excess of $370,000.

  2. Mr Levitas is currently aged 61 years. His children were born in 1987 and 1990 and his child support liability commenced in 1995.

  3. Material was filed by both parties prior to the hearing, including T documents lodged on behalf of the Registrar. The material addressed Mr Levitas’ financial situation including certain arrangements relating to his assets, income, and his medical condition.

  4. Mr Levitas represented himself at the hearing and at its conclusion I affirmed the decision under review, giving oral reasons. These written reasons are now provided as Mr Levitas sought a statement in writing of the reasons for the decision under s 43(2A) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. 

    LEGISLATION

  5. DPO’s are administered under Part VA of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (the Act). The Registrar may make an order under s 72D of the Act prohibiting a person from travelling overseas from Australia, relevantly, where that person has an outstanding child support liability.

  6. A child support liability is defined under s 72E of the Act and includes a registerable maintenance liability, in turn defined to include child support assessed under the Act. Under s 30 of the Act if a liability is registered, the amounts payable become debts due to the Commonwealth.

  7. Section 72I reads as follows:

    Revocation and variation of departure prohibition orders

    (1)The Registrar must revoke a departure prohibition order in respect of a person if:

    (a)  the person no longer has a child support liability or carer liability; or

    (b)  the person has a child support liability or carer liability, but arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar have been made for the liability to…

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Details
Case
[2019] AATA 4233
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Levitas to revoke a departure prohibition order (DPO) made by the Child Support Registrar. Mr Levitas sought revocation on the grounds that the outstanding child support liability was completely irrecoverable, or alternatively, that the Registrar should exercise a discretion to revoke the order. The Tribunal was required to determine whether the criteria for mandatory revocation were met, or whether the discretion to revoke should be exercised in Mr Levitas' favour.

The Tribunal considered Mr Levitas' submissions regarding his lack of current or future capacity to pay the outstanding child support debt, citing his permanent retirement from work due to ill health and his wife's assets exceeding pension thresholds. He also argued that his past payments, though sometimes small, demonstrated a history of voluntary payments based on his capacity, and that his failure to pay was due to incapacity rather than unwillingness. The Registrar contended that the medical evidence was not robust and that Mr Levitas' personal financial arrangements did not prove the debt was irrecoverable.

The Tribunal found that while Mr Levitas had a history of making payments, his cessation of payments correlated with his claimed retirement due to ill health. It noted that Mr Levitas had recently cashed in a significant superannuation benefit, which he used for personal expenses rather than towards his child support liability. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the liability was completely irrecoverable, nor that the discretion to revoke the DPO should be exercised. It reasoned that the discretion must be exercised consistently with the objects of the Child Support Act, which include the regular and timely payment of financial support, an objective Mr Levitas had failed to meet.

Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review, meaning the departure prohibition order remained in place.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The issues are therefore whether conditions exist such that the DPO must be revoked under s 72I(1), or whether it may otherwise be revoked using the discretion in s 72I(3).SUBMISSIONS AND EVIDENCE Mr Levitas submitted at the hearing that he had no current or future capacity to pay the outstanding amount, and had no assets or income. International travel undertaken prior to the DPO was paid for by his wife. He cashed in a superannuation benefit of $22,130.98 in 2017 in order to fund his wedding and honeymoon, having been married earlier in 2000 with no ceremony. Mr Levitas submitted his name was only associated with the current matrimonial home, which is in his wife’s name, for loan purposes. In addition, his initial interest in the property was only as to a 1/100 share as demonstrated by a title search (Exhibit A1). Mr Levitas submitted that the Registrar had explored all sources of recovery and found none. Regarding future capacity, Mr Levitas submitted that neither he nor his wife would be entitled to the age pension as her assets will exceed the requisite asset test. He has permanently retired from work, and has made a declaration to the Australian Taxation Office to that he effect which, Mr Levitas submitted, he cannot breach. In relation to the exercise of the discretion, Mr Levitas submitted, based on research into DPO’s, that they were pursued on the basis of quantity and not quality in the case of child support. He submitted that he never had capacity to pay the debt, and therefore failure to exercise the discretion was a punishment. His was an incapacity to pay, not an unwillingness. In his written submission, Mr Levitas stated that he had made voluntary payments in the past based on his capacity to pay. He had been diagnosed with Graves’ disease leading to the cessation of a gardening business and any ability to generate income. His wife currently pays for daily living expenses and a statement of her financial support and income and expenses was attached to this submission (Annex F). Mr Levitas’ written submission also included other documents relating to the financial affairs of himself and his current wife:(1)a document dated 1 April 2011 titled ‘Financial Agreement’ (Annex G) in which he purports to acknowledge that he has no present or future claims to her assets; and(2)an unsigned letter dated 26 May 2011 to his wife from solicitors (Annex H) describing instructions said to be made in relation to the structure of her will, providing a life tenancy to Mr Levitas over the matrimonial home, with financial interests passing to their respective children.A further document lodged with the Tribunal by Mr Levitas is a signed statement from his wife dated 24 July 2019 stating that all her assets and accounts are held solely in her name. A report from an endocrinologist dated 4 October 2017 (Annex J(i)) states that Mr Levitas was diagnosed with Graves’ disease ‘around May 2017’. It further states: ‘he had to give up his gardening job at the time due to extreme tiredness, lethargy and palpitations. He He still feels tired and this may persist for a couple of months’.

Decision

Reasons for decision

No persuasive arguments were made by Mr Levitas about his particular circumstances and his need to travel. Indeed, his submissions were aimed primarily at the issue of recoverability. What is more, Mr Levitas’ liability is very large indeed. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to exercise the discretion and provide Mr Levitas the outcome he seeks.DECISION The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The representative of the Registrar distinguished Kenyon on the basis that in that decision, revocation was considered warranted only if it did not adversely impact the Registrar’s ability to receive payments which were being received against the liability (at paragraph 14).CONSIDERATIONS I am satisfied that Mr Levitas has a child support liability, and that it is of a significant size. I am also satisfied that arrangements have not been made for the liability to be wholly discharged. Credits, or payments made by Mr Levitas, total nearly $150,000 and the last payment, of $103.00, made was on 29 May 2017. Payments made by Mr Levitas vary over time in value and frequency. For the period 2009-2015 payments were made approximately monthly and were in the order of $40.00. Between 2002-2009, regular payments were made varying, in the main, between approximately $10.00 and $12.00. Much larger payments were made in the years 1995 to early 2001. The record shows a zero balance in May 2000. Mr Levitas clearly has a history of making payments, albeit in many instances in quite small sums. There is an apparent correlation in time between Mr Levitas ceasing work, based on his claim of retirement due to ill health, and the end of payments towards his child support liability. I accept that his employment history has been variable, due at times, possibly, to no fault on his part. It is also the case that in recent years Mr Levitas chose to draw a relatively sizeable sum from superannuation and, on his evidence, pay this to his wife rather than commit the funds toward the liability. I accept the submission on behalf of the Registrar that the medical evidence provided is not particularly robust. I note that no medical witness was called and Mr Levitas did not call on his wife to give evidence. I also accept the submission on behalf of the Registrar that Mr Levitas’ personal financial arrangements do not, in themselves, demonstrate the debt is irrecoverable. In essence, I consider that accepting Mr Levitas’ submission as to his present and future capacity to gain income of some kind, including in the form of a government-funded entitlement, requires me to speculate. This speculation also needs to be weighed against both the words of s 72I(1)(c) and the context in which it must be interpreted. The phrase ‘completely irrecoverable’ is, in any event, itself clear. I do not accept that the liability can be considered to be completely irrecoverable. Is it desirable to exercise the discretion to revoke the DPO? The above considerations in my view also speak against the exercise of the discretion. While the discretion in s 72I(3) is unconfined, it needs to be exercised in a manner consistent with the scope and purpose of the Act, and the principal objects of the Act include the regular and timely payment of financial support to children, which Mr Levitas has failed to achieve. No persuasive arguments were made by Mr Levitas about his particular circumstances and his need to travel. Indeed, his submissions were aimed primarily at the issue of recoverability. What is more, Mr Levitas’ liability is very large indeed. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to exercise the discretion and provide Mr Levitas the outcome he seeks.DECISION