Levi Strauss and Co. and Anor. v Ming on Trading Co. P/L and Ors.

Case

[1993] FCA 181

9 Mar 1993

No judgment structure available for this case.

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I JLIZGMENT NO.
I IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) No. NG 571 of 1992
i NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY ) \

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GENERAT, DIVISION ;

BETWEEN: LEVI STRAUSS & CO.

First applicant

LEVI STRAUSS (AUSTRALIA)

PTY. LIMITED

Second applicant

AND:  MING ON TRADING CO. PTY.
LIMITED
First respondent
STAR ENGRAVING CO. PTY.
LIMITED
Second respondent
VLAD VORONOV
Third respondent
COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF
CUSTOMS
Fourth respondent
PETER HISLOP
Fifth respondent
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FEDEaAL COURT

CORAM:  BEAUMONT J. OF AUSTPDLIA
2 APR 1993
PLACE :  SYDNEY

LlGMARY

DATE :  9 MARCH 1993

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

These proceedings are brought by Levi Strauss and CO L
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as first applicant and Levi Strauss (Australia) Pty. Limited i
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against the respondents alleging the infringement of several 1
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registered trademarks. Anton Pillar orders were made last :
year by Burchett J. There have been a number of directions I
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hearings and the matter was set down today for final hearing, notwithstanding that the third respondent Vlad Voronov has not

been served. I have evidence which satisfies me that every , . . ,

reasonable effort has been made to attempt service.

The Controller General of Customs, the fourth respondent, has entered a submitfing appearance, except on the impression of costs, and I will return to the claim for relief made against the fourth respondent later. So far as concerns the first and second respondents the matter has been resolved and the Court congratulates the parties and their representatives in that behalf. However, so far as the fifth respondent is concerned the proceedings commenced this morning. I have read the affidavit evidence filed on behalf of those parties. There are no pleadings in the matter but the applicants' further amended application seeks orders restraining all respondents, including the fifth respondent, from infringing four of the first applicant's registered

trademarks.

In opening the applicant's case, counsel for the applicants said that the evidence would disclose that the third respondent had placed orders with the first respondent for the design of certain labels, that the first respondent had, in turn, placed orders with the second respondent for the manufacture of certain plates, and that the second respondent had, in turn, retained the fifth respondent to produce the artwork necessary for the plates.

The evidence read on behalf of the applicants in the proceedings, so far as they are brought against the fifth respondent, has in fact established that case. In particular, the applicants read an affidavit sworn on 8 September 1992 by

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Mr G.T. Perry, the Managing Director of the second respondent,

which affidavit was filed on behalf of the second respondent at a time when the proceedings were still a live issue between the applicants and the second respondent.

M r perry corroborated the case outlined to me by

counsel and, in particular, indicated that the fifth respondent had been engaged by the second respondent as a commercial artist to prepare the artwork in relation to the supply of photo engraving to the first respondent. For this purpose the fifth respondent was supplied with the label in question on 7 July 1992 to enable him to do the artwork for

the project.

On 10 December 1992, the fifth respondent swore an affidavit which was filed in these proceedings. In that affidavit the fifth respondent said that since June 1990 he had carried on business as a graphic artist and had been engaged in that capacity by the second respondent as a subcontractor on numerous occasions.

He confirmed that in July 1992 he had been engaged by the second respondent to prepare artwork in relation to a three-colour woven tag which was supplied to him by the second respondent at that time. The tag was illustrated with a drawing of a man carrying what appeared to be a saddle and a branding iron next to the word, "Levi's", with the letter "E" drawn at an angle. Underneath this appeared the words "Authentic Western wear, Levi Strauss & CO, San Francisco".

According to the fifth respondent's affidavit, the tag and the artwork were collected by the second respondent in

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July 1992. At this time, the fifth respondent rendered an account to the second respondent for the artwork in the sum of

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$22.50. The fifth respondent went on to say that he had not supplied any artwork, the subject of these proceedings, to any

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person or company other than the second respondent. He :

asserted in his affidavit that when retained by the second respondent, it was his belief that the second respondent was

employed as a subcontractor of the first respondent and that
the first respondent was a client of the applicants. He said
that he believed that the artwork which he prepared was
something that was authorised by the applicants.

Paragraph 14 of his affidavit is as follows:

"The o n l y record I have o f the sub jec t artwork i s
contained on part o f a computer f i l e on which I s t o r e

artwork prepared by me. I t i s poss ib le t o d e l e t e the part o f the computer f i l e which contains the record of

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t h e subject artwork."

Objection having been taken on behalf of the applicants to the form of some of .' the material in the affidavit of the fifth respondent to which I have referred, I granted leave to the fifth respondent to call oral evidence on the point and this was done. Counsel for the applicants, then proceeded to cross-examine the fifth respondent.

During the course of this cross-examination, I inquired of counsel for the parties what the real matter in contest between them was and made the obvious point that it was hardly likely that the fifth respondent, knowing what he now knows, would wish to agitate in any Court the question whether the applicants' trademarks had been infringed. I also inquired of counsel for the applicants whether any claim for damages was to be made as against the fifth respondent and if so, what the amount of that claim would be.

I expressed at the time, the difficulties I then felt, as to how any substantial claim for damages could be advanced with any real prospect of success. I suggested that the matter be adjourned so that the parties and their representatives could consider their respective positions. This afternoon I was informed, on the resumption of the hearing that, save with respect to the question of costs, the position as between the applicants and the fifth respondent had been resolved.

I was informed by counsel for the fifth respondent, that her client was prepared to offer certain undertakings to the Court, without admissions and without prejudice. Those undertakings were as follows: 1) that the fifth respondent would delete any record of the art work referred to in para.14 of his affidavit; and 2) that he would not, hereafter, supply art work bearing any of the applicants' trademarks, without the prior consent of the second applicant.

The Court congratulates the parties and their representatives on resolving the matter, to that extent at least. However one matter remains outstanding and that is the question of costs. The position is that the applicants seek an order that the fifth respondent pay the applicants' costs of the proceedings. On behalf of the fifth respondent, it is submitted that the proper order is that there be no order as to costs save for the costs of today. In order to understand the context in which the application for costs arises, it is

necessary to refer to some of the history of the matter.

Proceedings were first before the Court on 12 August 1992 in an ex parte application made in the chambers of Burchett J. On that occasion, his Honour made orders in the nature of an Anton Pillar order but further ordered that each of the respondents be restrained from infringing the applicants' registered trademarks by making, advertising, offering for sale, selling or distributing clothing or labels for clothing which bear markings which are the same as or which are substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the registered trademarks in question.

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I note that,,,pn the face of it, the order appears to

be in permanent form but I take this to be a slip and I would interpret the order to. be intended to be made on an interim basis only and certainly, as a matter of usual practice, to be made up to and including further order. Nothing, I think, turns on the form of that order, for present purposes. Burchett J made the application returnable at 2.15 pm on

14 August. On that occasion the matter was heard by Foster J

who stood the matter over to 4 September but made orders in accordance with the short minutes which had the effect of making the existing injunctions remain in force until further order and directed that the first respondents file and serve an affidavit in effect by way of discovery of relevant material. At that stage, the fifth respondent had not been

joined in the proceedings.

The matter was before the Court again on 4 September and dealt with by Foster J. The existing injunctions were continued until further order and the matter was stood over until 25 September. Again, the fifth respondent had not been joined at that stage. On 25 September, Burchett J dealt with the matter and made orders as asked in a notice of motion as follows :

"1 . That th is No t i ce o f Motion be r e t u r n a b l e

i n s t a n t e r .

2 . Grant l e a v e t o the App l i can t s t o f i l e and serve
a Fur ther Amended Appl ica t ion j o i n i n g the
Comptroller-General o f Customs and P e t e r - H i s l o p

a s Respondents t o the proceedings.

3 .          D i r e c t t h a t the App l i can t s f i l e and serve the Fur ther Amended Statement o f Claim on or before

October 16 , 1992.

4 .
Order t h a t u n t i l f u r t h e r order the Fourth
Respondent be r e s t r a i n e d from r e l e a s i n g the
shipment o f goods i d e n t i f i e d i n the
N o t i f i c a t i o n o f S e i z u r e t o Objector dated
September 9 , 1992 which i s annexure 'A' t o th i s
No t i ce o f Motion o r o therwise dea l ing i n a n y
way w i t h the goods comprising the s a i d

shipment.

5.
Stand the m a t t e r over f o r f u r t h e r d i r e c t i o n s t o

9.30 am on October 30, 1992."

The orders sought in the notice of motion included orders that the application be amended by joining the fourth respondent, the Controller-General of Customs, and by joining the fifth respondent.

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I note that in the notion of motion filed in Court on 25 September 1992, there was a direction that the applicants file and serve a further amended statement of claim, but it is common ground that what was intended by this order was that the applicants file a further amended application. A further amended application was filed on 30 September 1992. On 30 October 1992, the matter was again listed for directions before Burchett J. On this occasion, Mr Small, solicitor, appeared for the first time for the fifth respondent. On that day, certain orders were made by consent

as between the applicants and the second respondent, which had

the effect of dismissing the second respondent from the

proceedings. As I have already said, this matter has been

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settled between those parties.

However, so far as the fifth respondent was concerned, directions were given that the applicants file and serve affidavit material upon which they sought to rely as against the first, third, and fifth respondents. The first and fifth respondents were directed to file affidavits in reply. The proceedings were stood over until 11 December

1992. Shortly thereafter, it appears that the fifth

respondent turned his mind, in consultation with his legal advisers, to the prospect that the litigation in which he had been joined needed to be approached in a practical fashion. The attitude of the fifth respondent in this respect, and in this connection the attitude of the applicants, is reflected in correspondence which has been exchanged between the

solicitors in the latter part of 1992 and more recently.

The correspondence is in each case entitled "without prejudice, l' but I have been referred to the correspondence on the issue of costs, and I think it is appropriate that regard be had to the correspondence on that issue, notwithstanding that the privilege thus arising is a joint privilege and notwithstanding that if the matter had proceeded to a substantive hearing, it would not have been open to the Court to have regard to the correspondence for the purpose of perhaps drawing an inference of weakness, at least in terms of belief, of the case of either of these parties.

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The first letter is dated 23 November 1992. It is a

letter apparently written by the solicitors for the fifth respondent to the solicitors for the applicants, although I am informed that the applicants' solicitors have no present record of its receipt. The document that I have been shown is a copy and the document is in the following terms:

" W e conf inn t h a t we a c t for I&. Peter Hislop, the
f i f t h respondent i n t h e s e proceedings.
Our client i s a self employed graphic a r t i s t . On 7

May, 1992 our c l i e n t was engaged by the second respondent t o prepare ar twork i n r e l a t i o n t o a 3 colour woven t a g which was supp l i ed t o him by the second respondent. I t appears t h a t the i l l u s t r a t i o n

on the t a g may have been a trademark r e g i s t e r e d by
t h e first appl icant .
Our c l i e n t prepared the ar twork on 7 May, 1992 and
subsequent ly rendered an account t o t h e second
respondent, i n t h e sum o f $22.50. Our client's o n l y
record o f the artwork i s conta ined on par t o f a
computer f i l e and the r e l e v a n t p a r t o f the f i l e can
be de le ted .
W e a r e in s t ruc ted t h a t o u r c l i e n t had no knowledge
t h a t the second respondent was a c t i n g wi thout t h e
consent o f the a p p l i c a n t s . W e would submit t h a t o u r
c l i e n t had the r o l e of a f a c i l i t a t o r , b u t n o t the
role o f a p a r t i c i p a n t , i n a n y breach o f your
c l i e n t ' s trademark.
Our c l i e n t i s prepared t o set t le t h e proceedings a s
aga ins t him by d e l e t i n g the p a r t o f t h e computer
f i l e which conta ins the record o f the s u b j e c t
artwork. Please o b t a i n , and i n f o r m u s o f , your
c l i e n t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s i n r e s p e c t o f t h i s proposal."

There was subsequent correspondence to which I will refer shortly, but I should interpose here a reference to a directions hearing taken by Wilcox J. on 30 November 1992. Again, Mr Small appeared for the fifth respondent and an extension of time was granted, in which affidavit material sought by the respondents, was to be filed and served. However, the transcript of the proceedings on that occasion shows that Wilcox J. then questioned the amount of any damages which might be properly sought against the fifth respondent, assuming, of course, liability to have first been established.

Reverting to the correspondence, on 23 December 1992 the solicitors for the fifth respondent wrote again to the solicitors for the applicants a letter, which again was entitled "without prejudice", and the letter was in the

following terms :
"We r e f e r t o previous communications i n respect o f
t h i s matter and t o the attendances i n the Federal
Court on 11 December, 1992 for further directions. We regret that Mr. Hall was not present i n Court
the conduct o f the proceedings against our c l i en t . We trus t that Hr. Webb, o f Counsel has informed you o f these comments.
Whilst we are hopeful that the proceedings against our c l i en t can be resolved our cl ient i s not prepared t o agree t o your proposal that he pay the
sum o f $3,000.00 a s damages and costs.
We confirm that our c l i en t i s prepared t o s e t t l e the proceedings on the basis that he delete the part o f h i s computer f i l e which contains the record o f the subject artwork.
Please inform u s o f any further instructions you
receive from your c l i e n t regarding the proposed
s e t t l e m e n t . ' l

when Justice Wilcox made certain comments regarding

It appears that no reply was made to that letter

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until 2 March. On that date the solicitors for the applicants wrote a "without prejudice" letter to the solicitors for the fifth respondent in the following terms:

"We refer t o your wi thout pre judice le t ter o f
December 23, 1992, and t o our open le t ter o f today ' s
da te .
Our client r e j e c t s the s e t t l e m e n t proposal p u t i n
your let ter o f December 23, 1992. Our client i s
prepared t o sett le these proceedings on the
fo l lowing terms:
1 . Your c l i e n t consen t s t o an i n j u n c t i o n
r e s t r a i n i n g him from i n f r i n g i n g o r f o r g i n g a n y
o f the t r a d e marks o f Lev i S t r a u s s & CO
r e f e r r e d t o i n the Appl ica t ion;
2. Your c l i e n t d e l i v e r s up t o us or prov ides
ev idence t h a t he has i r r e t r i e v a b l y d e l e t e d the
computer f i l e which c o n t a i n s the record o f the
s u b j e c t artwork;
3 . Your client pays t o our c l i e n t the sum o f
$3,000 a s damages and c o s t s .
client would be prepared t o accept payment i n three On th is f i n a l i s s u e , we are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t o u r
equal m o n t h l y i n s t a l m e n t s o f $1,000, the f i r s t
i n s ta lmen t t o be made before March 9 , 1993.
C lear l y , a l l p a r t i e s t o these proceedings now face
l e g a l c o s t s which w i l l g r e a t l y exceed the amount i n
d i spu te . mile the m a t t e r has considerable v a l u e t o
our client i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the l i a b i l i t y o f p a r t i e s
who are i n v o l v e d i n and f a c i l i t a t e others i n s a l e s
o f c o u n t e r f e i t products they are n o n e t h e l e s s
commercial i n their a t t i t u d e t o such m a t t e r s . The
proposal i n this le t ter i s put on t h a t b a s i s , and
r e f l e c t s the sugges t ion made by J u s t i c e Wilcox i n a
d i r e c t i o n s h e a r i n g l a s t year t h a t i t 'may be
appropr ia te i f M i H i s l o p pays some amount f o r
damages, b u t I t h i n k a r e l a t i v e l y token amount would
do j u s t i c e ' .
Please l e t u s know your c l i e n t ' s p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g
t h i s o f f e r which w i l l remain open u n t i l Midday on
March 5 , 1993. ''

There was a reply to that letter written by the solicitors for the fifth respondent, dated 8 March, but given the lateness of the reply, which I may say should be understood in the light of the circumstance that the solicitors for the applicants had themselves written only on 2 March, I do not find it necessary to refer to the letter of 8 March, nor to a reply sent on the same date by facsimile transmission by the solicitors for the applicants.

On behalf of the applicants, it is contended that the fifth respondent had infringed the trade marks of the first applicant within the meaning of s.62(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955 ("the Act") in that the fifth respondent had "used" a mark which was substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the trade mark in the course of trade. Alternatively, it is said on behalf of the applicants that

even if it had not been demonstrated that the fifth respondent

had himself "used" a mark which was substantially identical

with or deceptively similar to the trade mark of the first applicant, nonetheless, the fifth respondent had been a party to an infringement of the marks in question which had been committed by the first and second respondents in the course of their trade.

Adjectivally, at least, it is said the fifth respondent was a party who ought to have been joined in these proceedings, and if an injunction were to go to the first and second respondents, by reason of their conduct, then it was appropriate that by reason of the participation and involvement of the fifth respondent in the process of production of the labels now complained of, that the fifth respondent himself should also be enjoined. The present application is, of course, only one for costs, and it would not be appropriate, let alone necessary, for me to form any view on the substantive legal questions that might have arisen in the proceedings if they had gone to a final conclusion.

The fact is, as has been noted, that the fifth respondent has given undertakings to the Court which, for all practical purposes, deal with the applicant's claim as against the fifth respondent. I should note in this connection that as a matter of formality only, I have dismissed the

undertaking proffered to the Court on behalf of the fifth application as against the fifth respondent upon noting the

respondent. The effect of that dismissal is, of course, that the claim not only for injunctive relief but also for damages, previously made by the applicants as against the fifth respondent is no longer pursued.

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But as I have said, in practical terms the undertakings given to the Court by the fifth respondent, which I have noted, achieve all that the applicants could reasonably expect to achieve out of this litigation so far as concerns the fifth respondent. In these circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that it is not appropriate that I make any order for costs. I do, of course, have a discretion. As has been put on behalf of the applicants, today, for the first time, formal undertakings to the Court have been proffered on behalf of the fifth respondent. In particular, reliance is placed, on behalf of the applicants, upon the circumstance that up to this point of time the fifth respondent had not proffered any undertaking, or even foreshadowed one, at least in tens, to the solicitors for the applicants along the lines of the second undertaking now given.

It will be recalled that, under that undertaking, the fifth respondent has agreed not to supply artwork bearing any of the applicant's registered trade marks hereafter, without the prior consent of the second applicant. On the

reflection I think there is not much force in it at all. It face of it there is some force in this submission, but on

will be recalled that in the correspondence in November and December last year, and in the affidavit sworn by the fifth respondent on 10 December 1992, it was made clear to the applicants that the fifth respondent was willing to delete any record of the artwork from his computer. Implicit in this offer, on any reasonable reading, in my view, is an indication that the fifth respondent did not propose hereafter to embark upon any infringement of the applicant's registered trade mark.

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I do not think that the correspondence and the affidavit, particularly para. 14 of the fifth respondent,

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could reasonably be read in any other way. The applicants : . , .

were proceeding further in the litigation as against the fifth

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respondent at their own risk as to costs. In the special

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circumstances, I am of the view that there should be no order I
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for costs as between the applicants and the fifth respondent. I
The formal orders will be that I note the undertakings to the i
Court proffered on behalf of the fifth respondent which I have '
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initialled, dated today and placed with the papers. The

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application as against the fifth respondent is otherwise i
dismissed. I make no order for costs as between the ,.

applicants and the fifth respondent.

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I make order (1) in the terms of the notice of . .
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motion dated 11 December 1992 and I order that within 14 days

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of this order the fourth respondent release the said goods to . ..
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the applicants, and I will add: to be applied by the I ,
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applicants for their own purposes.
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I make, as against the third respondent, an order in the terms of paragraph 1 of the further amended application

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filed in Court on 30 September 1992 and I make that order !
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until further order. I reserve liberty to any party to apply

on such notice, i f any, as a judge may allow t o vary o r discharge t h a t order. But, otherwise, f o r t h e purposes of the

Court's records, I w i l l note t h a t t h e matter is completed.
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t t h i s and
t h e preceding s ix teen ( 1 6 ) pages
a r e a t r u e copy of t h e Reasons
f o r Judgment of h i s Honour M r .
J u s t i ce Beaumont.
W: 

Associate:

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