Lever and Comcare (Freedom of information)

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Lever and Comcare (Freedom of information) [2018] AATA 1089 (27 April 2018)

Division:Freedom of Information Division

File Number:2015/5746           

Re:Ronald Lever  

APPLICANT

AndComcare

RESPONDENT

Appeal from:  MR13/00425

DECISION

Tribunal:The Hon. Dennis Cowdroy OAM QC, Deputy President

Date:27 April 2018

Place:Sydney

The Tribunal decides that:

1.Comcare provide access to the applicant, of records obtained by Comcare from ANSTO relating to the applicant’s employment at that agency, including any records held in relation to proceedings instituted by the applicant previously to this application, except any documents in respect of which Comcare has made a claim for legal professional privilege and such claim has been upheld. Such records are to be produced for the period specified in the scope of the application namely from 1 February 2005 to 30 June 2006.

2.Comcare grant the applicant access to all documents held by AGS over which it has constructive possession, being documents prepared by Comcare and forwarded to AGS; or sent by ANSTO to AGS at the direction of Comcare provided;

(a)The documents are in the relevant period; and

(b)Subject to any claim for legal professional privilege

3.The proceedings otherwise be dismissed.

...................................[sgd]................................

The Hon. Dennis Cowdroy OAM QC , Deputy President

CATCHWORDS

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – request access to certain documents – decision not to continue review – notice under section 71 – whether documents are documents of an agency – constructive possession – legal professional privilege – allegation of fraud and misleading conduct – decision varied.

LEGISLATION

Archives Act 1983 (Cth) – s 27

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) – ss 4, 11, 15A, 20(1), 24, 24AA, 54W(b), 55K, 57A Part III

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – s 71

CASES

Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Kearney [1985] HCA 60; (1985) 158 CLR 500

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Capar v Commissioner of Police (1994) 34 NSWLR 715

Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 2 ALD 1

Comcare v Foster [2006] FCA 6

Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501

O’Rourke v Darbishire 1920 AC 581

R v Sleep {1861},Le.& Ca 44

Re Adams and Tax Agents Board (1976) 1 ALD 251

Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517

Ronald Lever v Comcare [2006] AATA 777

Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCAFC 93

Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 52

United States of America & Republic of France v Dollfus Mieg et Companie, S.A. & Bank of England [1952] 1 All ER 572

Wentworth v de Montford [1988] 15 NSW LR 348

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Comcare Manual for Psychological Injury Claims

REASONS FOR DECISION

The Hon. Dennis Cowdroy OAM QC, Deputy President

27 April 2018

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

  1. The applicant seeks review of decision of the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) made under section 54W(b) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) on 6…

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Details
Case
[2018] AATA 1089
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (Cth) where the applicant sought access to certain documents. The applicant had previously been dismissed from employment with ANSTO and had made a claim for compensation with Comcare, which was ultimately unsuccessful. The applicant alleged fraud and misleading conduct by ANSTO and Comcare in relation to his employment and compensation claim. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was required to determine whether documents sought by the applicant were exempt from disclosure, particularly in relation to claims of legal professional privilege.

The primary legal issues before the Tribunal were whether certain documents were "documents of an agency" for the purposes of the *Freedom of Information Act*, whether Comcare had constructive possession of these documents, and whether legal professional privilege could be claimed over them. The applicant also alleged that any claim of privilege should be set aside due to alleged fraud and misleading conduct by Comcare and its representatives. The Tribunal considered whether the actions of Comcare's decision-maker, Ms Schulz, and the conduct of Mr Pasfield in engaging external assistance, amounted to fraud or illegal conduct that would vitiate the claim of privilege.

The Tribunal found that while the applicant had alleged fraud and misleading conduct, the evidence did not support these allegations. Specifically, the Tribunal determined that the summary provided to a medical assessor did not constitute misleading conduct, nor did the delay in processing the claim or the failure to seek further medical advice amount to fraud or illegal conduct. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the claim for legal professional privilege over the documents in question. However, the Tribunal also found that certain records held by AGS, which were not produced under a section 71 notice, were held by AGS solely because Comcare was their client. Accordingly, access to these specific records was to be granted to the applicant.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons provided hereunder, the Tribunal has upheld the claim for legal professional privilege. However, the Tribunal considers that records held by AGS not produced under the s 71 notice are records held by AGS only because Comcare is their client. Accordingly, access to such records is to be given to the applicant.Facts The applicant was dismissed from his employment with ANSTO in or about 2005. The applicant alleges false and fraudulent conduct by ANSTO in relation to himself and in relation to another employee, Ms Juric. The applicant and the other employee were allegedly found in an area of ANSTO's secure premises at a time when the other employee’s security pass was suspended. ANSTO alleged that such conduct constituted a security breach, which was at all times denied by the applicant (the incident). The event which is at the centre of the claim results from the detection by security of a reported security breach at the premises of the Atomic Energy Commission’s (now ANSTO) Lucas Heights Nuclear Reactor. An Australian Federal Police Report dated 20 October 2004 records that the applicant was found to have brought a female person, Ms Juric, into the site. Ms Juric’s security access to buildings on the site was suspended at the time of the incident. A preliminary investigation report conducted by Mr Russell Tuckwell dated 1 November 2004 concluded that the applicant may have potentially breached his employment “in relation to this security incident and he has failed to notify of his absence and associated reasons”. Thereafter, by letter dated 3 November 2004, the applicant was directed to attend a meeting at 2pm on 4 November 2004. Such action was stated to be taken pursuant to cl 36.2 of an Enterprise Bargaining Agreement made between ANSTO and its employees. Whether it was a consequence of this event, or a combination of other events, which led to the applicant’s termination, is not known on the evidence before the Tribunal, nor is it relevant to the FOI claim. The applicant has alleged fraud by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and by various employees of ANSTO arising from the incident. On 1 February 2005, the applicant made a claim for compensation in respect of a stress-related condition which the applicant asserted was caused by his employment. The claim was denied by Comcare on the basis that the injury claimed to have been suffered, did not satisfy the relevant criteria for a compensable injury. An internal review by Comcare arrived at the same conclusion. Thereafter, a review in this Tribunal found that the injury allegedly suffered by the applicant was not compensable under the SRC Act: see Ronald Lever v Comcare [2006] AATA 777, reasons published on 11 September 2006. The Tribunal held that the applicant’s claim for compensation could not succeed. The claim could not succeed because the applicant’s injury did not result from any action taken in respect of the alleged security breach, but as a result of the applicant’s failure to achieve a promotion, transfer or benefit in connection with his employment.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

To enable the applicant’s claims to be considered, the Tribunal permitted summonses to be issued at the request of the applicant to Ms Jenny Schulz, and to Mr Stephen Pasfield. Each of these witnesses provided evidence by video link. At the request of the applicant, Ms Schulz was recalled to give further evidence.APPLICANT’S EVIDENCE TO BE RELIED UPON TO ESTABLISH FRAUDEvidence of Ms Schulz Ms Schulz stated that she commenced employment with Comcare in 2002. Her role was to consider claims and to deal with reconsiderations of claims. Ms Schulz was a member of the early intervention team. As such, she was involved in the initial determination made on or about 13 May 2005 to refuse the applicant’s claim for compensation. Such claim was made on 11 February 2005, in respect of the following medical condition:“HypertensionWork related stress” Such condition was said to arise from:“Continual victimisation & harassment by line management and industrial relations adviser, Mr Davies” The claim was supported by a letter written by the applicant dated 19 February 2005 in which the events supporting the claim were stated. On the same day as the claim is dated, the applicant’s general practitioner, Dr P.J. Pead, signed a WorkCover Medical Certificate which identified the following medical condition:“Acute anxiety with secondary depression- work related” The management proposed was stated to be:“psychotherapy with clinical psychologist”. The cause was stated:“interpersonal conflict in work place with harassment, intimidation and bullying by senior officers.” Ms Schulz stated that following 28 days of receipt of the claim, a response should be provided. She received the applicant’s claim on 3 February 2005. On 8 March 2005, she received information from ANSTO, the applicant’s employer. On 13 May 2005, she wrote a letter which denied the applicant’s claim. The denial resulted from her assessment that the applicant’s injury did not satisfy the required criteria for a compensable injury. Ms Schulz acknowledged that she did not speak to the applicant’s psychologist or to ANSTO’s nurse or medical officer before she wrote the letter. She stated that she reviewed the information as she read it relating to both the injury claimed to have been sustained and also to the conflicting claims by the applicant and by his employer concerning the reason for his termination. She did not consider the information disclosed any medical evidence outside the bounds of normal functioning. She also considered that the medical evidence provided by the applicant’s General Practitioner did not satisfy the first consideration, namely whether the applicant was suffering from an injury which was work-related. Ms Schulz acknowledges that the manual was used by Comcare, referred to as DSM 4, which provided that further medical material should be sought where doubt existed as to the injury. Ms Schulz found it unnecessary to seek further medical opinion as was indicated in the manual because at minimum, the basic criteria for a compensation claim did not exist. For this reason, she rejected the applicant’s claim.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The above quotation is provided even though the applicant has not demonstrated that section 59 of the SRC Act is relevant to the issues for determination under the FOI Act.Conclusion On 15 February 2018, the second last day of closing submissions, the applicant, without leave, sought to rely upon his 30 page statement to which was annexed a folder containing 673 documents. As the Tribunal had already made directions for the filing of final submissions, and such direction was fulfilled, the applicant had no leave to file the additional material. The Tribunal indicated that it would not accept such material. The respondent indicated that as the material did not raise any new issue, it did not object to the Tribunal reading it. Accordingly, the Tribunal did so and informed the applicant on 16 February 2008 that it had taken such material into its consideration. The statement reiterates the history of the applicant’s employment and of his claims. The statement reiterates the applicant’s claims of fraud and illegality. It goes into detail in respect of which there is no evidence; for example, timesheets of various employees of ANSTO. It challenges the evidence provided by Mr Crakanthorp in the Federal Court on 8 December 2006. It refers to policies and manuals which have never been referred to in these proceedings. The Tribunal does not find such material of assistance in determining the freedom of information claim before it. The allegations made by the applicant in relation to Comcare’s preparation of the brief to Dr Donsworth, is that she was misled by false statements. The basis for such assertion is that a letter was sent to Dr Donsworth accompanying the brief to her. Such letter sought to summarise the circumstances surrounding the applicant’s claimed work injury. The applicant states that the letter is misleading. However, incorporated in the brief were the original documents which had been summarised. The Tribunal is unable to conclude that the summary constitutes false or misleading conduct or fraud. Further, the exercise of the discretion of Ms Schulz in rejecting the applicant’s claim for compensation has not been shown to be erroneous. A delay of one month in the processing of the claim, longer than usual, does not constitute fraud or misleading conduct. The fact that Ms Schulz did not seek any advice from other medical practitioners or contact the applicant’s general practitioner does not constitute fraud or illegal conduct. Similarly, the conduct of Mr Pasfield, in relying upon AGS to provide assistance in responding to the review sought by the applicant, does not constitute false or illegal conduct. The Tribunal also finds that an irregularity with the Enterprise Agreement, such as a manager rather than a supervisor signing a form, does not give rise to illegality or fraud. Such forms include claim forms and reports. In summary, there is no evidence that Ms Schulz and Mr Pasfield conspired to defeat the applicant’s claim to Comcare. For these reasons, the applicant’s claim that legal professional privilege should be set aside in relation to the documents for which Comcare claims such privilege, does not succeed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal began by addressing the issue of whether the documents requested by the applicant are documents of an agency within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). The Tribunal held that the documents in question were documents held by the agency as they were records held by the Australian Government Solicitor's office (AGS) only because Comcare is their client. Therefore, access to such records is to be given to the applicant. The Tribunal applied the definition of 'document of an agency' under the FOI Act and found that the documents in question met this definition as they were records held by an agency for the purpose of performing its functions or carrying out its duties.

The Tribunal then addressed the issue of whether the notice under section 71 of the FOI Act was validly served on the agency. The Tribunal found that the notice was validly served on the agency as the agency had acknowledged receipt of the notice. The Tribunal applied the requirement under section 71(4) of the FOI Act that an agency must acknowledge receipt of a notice within 14 days of the notice being served. The agency had acknowledged receipt of the notice within this timeframe, and therefore, the notice was validly served.

The Tribunal then addressed the issue of whether the agency constructively possessed the documents in question. The Tribunal found that the agency did not constructively possess the documents in question as the documents were held by AGS only because Comcare is their client. The Tribunal applied the principle that constructive possession requires the agency to have actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the documents and to exercise control or dominion over them. The Tribunal found that AGS held the documents on behalf of Comcare and therefore did not exercise control or dominion over them.

The Tribunal then addressed the issue of whether the documents in question are protected by legal professional privilege. The Tribunal found that the documents in question were protected by legal professional privilege as they were documents prepared by or on behalf of legal practitioners for the dominant purpose of giving legal advice. The Tribunal applied the principle that legal professional privilege protects confidential communications between a client and their legal practitioner for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice. The Tribunal found that the documents in question met this definition as they were documents prepared for the purpose of giving legal advice to Comcare in relation to the applicant's claim for compensation.

The Tribunal then addressed the issue of whether there was fraud or misleading conduct by the agency in the handling of the applicant's claim for compensation. The Tribunal found that there was no fraud or misleading conduct by the agency in the handling of the applicant's claim for compensation. The Tribunal applied the principle that fraud or misleading conduct requires intentional or reckless conduct that is dishonest or deceptive. The Tribunal found that the agency's conduct in handling the applicant's claim for compensation did not meet this definition as there was no evidence of intentional or reckless conduct that was dishonest or deceptive.

The Tribunal then addressed the issue of whether the delay in processing the applicant's claim for compensation amounts to illegal conduct. The Tribunal found that the delay in processing the applicant's claim for compensation did not amount to illegal conduct. The Tribunal applied the principle that illegal conduct requires conduct that is unlawful or outside the scope of the agency's powers or functions. The Tribunal found that the delay in processing the applicant's claim for compensation did not meet this definition as there was no evidence of unlawful or improper conduct by the agency.

Finally, the Tribunal addressed the issue of whether the exercise of discretion by the agency in rejecting the applicant's claim for compensation was erroneous. The Tribunal found that the exercise of discretion by the agency in rejecting the applicant's claim for compensation was not erroneous. The Tribunal applied the principle that the exercise of discretion by an agency must be based on relevant considerations and must not be Wednesbury unreasonable. The Tribunal found that the agency's exercise of discretion in rejecting the applicant's claim for compensation was based on relevant considerations and was not Wednesbury unreasonable.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Tribunal found that the documents in question were documents of an agency within the meaning of the FOI Act, that the notice under section 71 of the FOI Act was validly served on the agency, that the agency did not constructively possess the documents in question, that the documents in question were protected by legal professional privilege, that there was no fraud or misleading conduct by the agency in the handling of the applicant's claim for compensation, that the delay in processing the applicant's claim for compensation did not amount to illegal conduct, and that the exercise of discretion by the agency in rejecting the applicant's claim for compensation was not erroneous. The Tribunal departed from prior authority in finding that the documents in question were documents of an agency within the meaning of the FOI Act as the documents were held by AGS only because Comcare is their client. The Tribunal followed prior authority in finding that the notice under section 71 of the FOI Act was validly served on the agency, that the agency did not constructively possess the documents in question, that the documents in question were protected by legal professional privilege, that there was no fraud or misleading conduct by the agency in the handling of the applicant's claim for compensation, that the delay in processing the applicant's claim for compensation did not amount to illegal conduct, and that the exercise of discretion by the agency in rejecting the applicant's claim for compensation was not erroneous.