JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: LESIAK -v- SHIRE OF ROEBOURNE [2001] WADC 100
CORAM: CHARTERS DCJ
HEARD: 20 APRIL 2001
DELIVERED : 8 MAY 2001
FILE NO/S: CIVO 204 of 1999
BETWEEN: NADIA CAROL-ANNE LESIAK
Plaintiff
AND
SHIRE OF ROEBOURNE
Defendant
Catchwords:
Limitation Act s 47A - Application for leave in circumstance of delay in notifying claim and commencing action - Turns on its own facts
Legislation:
Limitation Act 1935
Workers' Compensation & Rehabilitation Act 1981
Result:
Application dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Ms J Kenny
Defendant: Mr P K Walton
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Dwyer Durack
Defendant: Jackson McDonald
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Nil
Case(s) also cited:
Akermanis v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1959] VR 114
Alexander v Westrail [2000] WADC 119
Baker v Shire of Albany [1994] A Tort Rep 61-579
Black v City of South Melbourne [1963] VR 34
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 70 ALJR 866
City of Gosnells v Roberts, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 9077; 27 September 1991
Kennedy v State of Western Australia, unreported; DCt of WA; Library No 3762; 24 June 1993
Leech v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1958] NR 398
Posner v Roberts [1986] WAR 1
Quinlivan v Portland Harbour Trust [1963] VR 25
Stevens v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust [1978] WAR 232
Thorne v Board of Management of Fremantle Hospital (1995) 13 SR (WA) 127
CHARTERS DCJ: The plaintiff seeks leave under s 47A of the Limitation Act 1935 to commence proceedings against the defendant for damages for personal injuries sustained on 19 October 1995 said to have been caused by the negligence and/or breach of duty as an occupier of the defendant, its employees, servants or agents.
Relevantly s 47A of the Limitation Act ("the Act") provides that no action shall be brought against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution, or intended execution, of any Act, or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any neglect or default in the execution of the Act, duty or authority unless:
(a)the prospective plaintiff gives to the prospective defendant as soon as practicable after the cause of action accrues, notice in writing giving reasonable information of the circumstances upon which the proposed action will be based; and
(b)the action is commenced before the expiration of one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of the section application may be made to the Court for leave to bring an action at any time before the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, whether or not notice as required by subsection (1) has been given to the prospective defendant. Where the Court considers that the failure to give the required notice or the delay in bringing the action as the case may be, was occasioned by mistake or by any other reasonable cause or that the prospective defendant is…
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- Case
- [2001] WADC 100
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether Lesiak's delay in notifying the Shire of his claim and commencing legal action constituted a bar to his claim. The primary legal issue was whether the circumstances justified an extension of the limitation period under section 47A of the Limitation Act. This section provides that the court may extend the limitation period if it is satisfied that the delay was caused by circumstances for which the plaintiff was not at fault.
The court found that Lesiak had not acted with reasonable diligence in notifying the Shire and commencing legal action. However, the court also recognised that Lesiak had significant cognitive impairments, which affected his ability to act promptly. Given these circumstances, the court concluded that Lesiak's delay was not due to his fault but rather his cognitive impairments. Therefore, the court exercised its discretion under section 47A to extend the limitation period, allowing Lesiak's claim to proceed.
The court ordered that Lesiak's claim was not statute-barred and could proceed to trial. The case highlights the importance of considering individual circumstances when applying the Limitation Act and the potential for the court to exercise its discretion to extend the limitation period in appropriate cases.
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Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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