Les Laboratoires Servier v GenRx Pty Ltd
[2007] APO 29
•4 September 2007
ABSTRACTS OF DECISIONS
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
Patent Application : 2001276418 in the name of Les Laboratoires Servier
Title : A crystalline form of perindopril tert-butylamine salt
Action: An application under section 223 for an extension of time to file a notice of opposition by GenRx Pty Ltd
Decision : Issued 4 September 2007.
Abstract
The opponent has not provided enough evidence to establish that there was a real intention to oppose the application at the relevant date. As a consequence, there is no link between the original error in failing to identify the patent application and missing the deadline to file a notice of opposition. Hence there is no causative error which would enliven section 223. There may be other material available which the opponent could provide to establish this link. However, even if there were such material, there are other discretionary considerations which weigh heavily against allowing the extension.
The opposition case likely to be presented by the opponent is based on experimental evidence which a UK decision has indicated is subjective. Such disputes often benefit from cross examination which is better suited to a full scale Court trial rather than opposition.
There are on-going revocation/infringement proceedings in the Federal Court involving a related patent. The applicant confirmed that if the current application were to proceed to sealing, they were intending to amend the pleadings to include the current application. This appears to be a more appropriate environment to consider the invalidity of the patent. In addition, any opposition before the Commissioner is likely to delay the Court proceedings. Given that there has already been a 17 month delay in the filing of the opposition, any further delays in this opposition are not in the public interest.
The public interest is strongly in favour of refusing the extension so that the matter can proceed properly in the court environment where it is best suited. The section 223 application was therefore refused.
PATENTS ACT 1990
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
Re:Patent Application No. 2001276418 in the name of Les Laboratoires Servier and an application under section 223 for an extension of time to file a notice of opposition by GenRx Pty Ltd.
BACKGROUND
Patent Application 2001276418 was filed in the name of Les Laboratoires Servier (Servier) on 6 July 2001 claiming priority from a French basic application (FR 00 08793) filed on 6 July 2000. The application was advertised accepted on 28 July 2005 and thus the prescribed period under regulation 5.3 for filing a notice of opposition to the grant of a patent expired on 28 October 2005. A first notice of opposition was filed by Lupin Limited by the due deadline. However they subsequently withdrew their opposition (on 5 February 2007) after a negotiated settlement with the applicant. Following Lupin’s withdrawal, a second opponent GenRx Pty Ltd (GenRx) filed a notice of opposition on 9 March 2007 (17 months after the original deadline) accompanied by a request under section 223 to extend the time to file a notice of opposition.
The patent applicant objected to the section 223 extension of time under sub-regulation 22.22(1). The extension of time application was then advertised for opposition purposes and the applicant formally opposed the extension. This means that the patent applicant is actually the opponent in the current (section 223) matter. However as this can be confused with the substantive opponent, I’ll refer to the patent applicant as the “applicant” and the opponent in the substantive matter (GenRx) as the “opponent” in this decision. I note this was how the parties referred to themselves at the hearing.
The section 223 opposition was set for hearing in Canberra on 26 July 2007. Ms Sophie Goddard, of counsel instructed by Paul Jones and Karen Bentley patent attorneys from Freehills Melbourne represented GenRx Pty Ltd (the substantive opponent). Mr Adrian Ryan, of counsel instructed by Trevor Davies and Oliver Evans patent attorneys of Allen Arthur Robinson, Melbourne represented Servier (the patent applicant).
EVIDENCE
GenRx filed statutory declarations in support of their section 223 application by:
Jessica Keast (regulatory affairs manager for GenRx) dated 20 March 2007 [with exhibits JMFK-1 to JMFK-3] and 4 May 2007 [with exhibits JMFK-1 to JMFK-3]; and
Paul William Jones dated 26 April 2007 [with exhibits PWJ-1 and PWJ-2], 25 July 2007 [with exhibits PWJ-1 to PWJ-6] and 26 July 2007 [with exhibit PWJ-1].
Servier filed no evidence responding to any of this material. Instead, they relied on submissions at the hearing.
RELEVANT LAW
Section 223(2) reads as follows:
Where, because of:
(a) an error or omission by the person concerned or by his or her agent or attorney; or
(b) circumstances beyond the control of the person concerned;
a relevant act that is required to be done within a certain time is not, or cannot be, done within that time, the Commissioner may, on application made by the person concerned in accordance with the regulations, extend the time for doing the act.
Section 223(11) defines a "relevant act" for the purposes of section 223 as:
an action (other than a prescribed action) in relation to a patent, a patent application, or any proceedings under this Act (other than court proceedings), and includes the making of a Convention application within the time allowed for making such applications.
Subegulation 22.22(1) reads:
The Commissioner must, before exercising a discretionary power under the Act or these Regulations adversely to a person give the person at least 10 days notice of the time when, and the place where, that person may be heard in relation to the exercise of the power.
Section 223 is a discretionary provision and both parties could be adversely affected by the decision to grant an extension of time to file a notice of opposition. Therefore sub-regulation 22.22(1) gives both parties the opportunity to be heard in respect of the grant of a section 223 extension of time.
10. The definition of an error or omission was expressed by Jenkinson J in Kimberly-Clark Ltd v Commissioner of Patents(No 3) 13 IPR 569-584 where the Federal Court upheld a decision by the Commissioner's Delegate to refuse an extension of time to lodge a notice of opposition. Jenkinson J defined an error or omission in the following terms in the context of section 160 of the Patents Act 1952. Section 223 is the equivalent of the previous section 160.
"It is in my opinion difficult to suppose that only the inadvertence and accidental steps, and not errors resulting from faulty reflection, of the former class of persons were intended by the draftsman to be within s 160(1). Further, the word 'error' is not easily assigned a clear meaning restricted by reference to one or several particular categories of flawed mental function. The attempt is likely to lead to the drawing of fine and often unrealistic distinctions. And some errors of judgement by agents and attorneys may be as bizarre and as little to be anticipated as lapses of memory and accidental slips."
11. Jenkinson J rejected the argument that section 160(2)(a) excluded errors or omissions that were the products of deliberation. Consequently, the concept of what constitutes an error should be interpreted broadly and includes an error of judgement. But Jenkinson J also made the following comments at page 580:
"By no means every judgement by the "person concerned" or by "his agent or attorney" which can be shown to have been mistaken will answer the description "error or omission" in the ordinary meaning of those words, which in their context carry, in my opinion, a connotation of obviousness in error."
12. In addition it was found that the applicant for the extension of time had not provided a prompt, frank, comprehensive and clear disclosure of all the circumstances relevant to the weighing of the discretionary consideration upon which grant or refusal of an extension of time will depend.
13. At page 583 Jenkinson J found that, in order to make out a proper case justifying an extension:
"………an applicant would in my opinion have to go beyond a disclosure of the processes by which an agent's errors came to be committed, and would have to expose frankly, inter alia, all the conduct, knowledge, beliefs and mental processes (or, in the case of corporation aggregate, of the relevant officers and other agents) relevant to an understanding of the way the failure to do the act or take the step occurred, or relevant to an evaluation of the reasonableness of that conduct."
14. There are a number of relevant decisions dealing with applications for extension of time to file a notice of opposition.
15. In Re Weir Pumps Ltd v Commissioner of Patents and Stork Pompen BV (1988) 13 IPR 163, the AAT upheld a decision of the Commissioner to refuse an extension of time to lodge a notice of opposition. This was dealt with under the relevant provisions in the 1952 Patents Act, section 160(2). It was found that the opponent was completely unaware of the patent application in question as it had a "deliberate policy not to maintain a watch for pending patent applications or their acceptance".
16. In Danby Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents and Another (1988) 12 IPR 151, the Federal Court upheld the Delegate's decision to allow an extension of time for lodging a notice of opposition. Despite rather "thin" evidence, the Court was satisfied that instructions to oppose when acceptance took place were firmly given but that they were not carried out due to an error, rather than the opponent having lost interest in opposing.
17. In Henkel Kommanditgesellschaft Auf Aktien v Fina Research SA (1993) 27 IPR 289 the Commissioner's Delegate refused an extension of time to file a notice of opposition. The applicant for the extension of time was aware of the patent application in question but was not aware that the application had proceeded to acceptance, due to their watch being conducted in an inappropriate database. The Delegate was satisfied that this prima facie constituted an error or omission. However, he found that the evidence provided was inadequate as to the chain of causation and refused an extension of time for filing a notice of opposition.
18. All of these cases focus on the need for the opponent to establish that they intended to file a notice of opposition and that they failed to do so in time because of an error or omission on their part, or on the part of their agents. They also place the onus on the opponent to provide a prompt, frank, comprehensive and clear disclosure of all of the facts relevant to the case in order to establish their clear intention to oppose the application and to understand why they failed to do so.
DISCUSSION
19. The parties agreed to the basic chronology of events leading up to the filing of the notice of opposition by GenRx as set out in the table below:
Date Event Prior to October 2003 Mayne Group Ltd (Mayne) (at that time the parent company of GenRx) commissioned Phillips Ormonde & Fitzpatrick (POF) to conduct a patent search for all active patents and patent applications relating to the pharmaceutical Perindopril. 3 October 2003 Carmela Sergi of Mayne provided the results of that search to Joe Amon of GenRx. The POF search identified a large number of applications. The current application was mentioned at page 16 of the POF patent search report but was classified as a process patent and not ranked as relevant. July-Dec 2004 The ownership of GenRx was transferred from Mayne to Apotex Inc of Canada with the latter company now providing GenRx patent advice. 17 January 2005 Ms Keast started work at GenRx 28 July 2005 Current application advertised accepted 28 October 2005 Notice of opposition due with Lupin filing a notice of opposition March 2006 GenRx requested a further patent search from La Fontaine Intellectual Property Services (LFIPS) which failed to identify the application. 1 August 2006 GenRx requested a further patent search from LFIPS which again failed to identify the application. 10 August 2006 GenRx requested a further patent search from LFIPS which this time identified the application September 2006 Gen Rx receives letter of demand from applicant 5 February 2007 Lupin withdraws its opposition 9 March 2007 Servier filed its own opposition and applied for a section 223 extension of time
20. Both parties also acknowledged that there were two distinct issues in the current section 223(2)(a) dispute:
a) Whether there was an error on the part of the agent to enliven section 223; and
b) If there were an error, whether the Commissioner should still exercise her discretion not to grant an extension.
Was there an error to enliven section 223?
21. The opponent (GenRx) argued that the primary error to enliven section 223 occurred in September 2003 when Phillips Ormonde & Fitzpatrick (POF) searched for patents that related to the pharmaceutical perindopril erbumine but failed to identify the current application as a “relevant key patent” (see Ms Keast’s declaration dated 20 March 2007 at paragraphs 12 and 14).
22. The applicant (Servier) argued that POF had explained that the formulation and process patents were not ranked and were grouped together at the end of the report for separate review. Ms Sergi’s letter of 3 October 2003 (exhibit JMK-2 to Ms Keast’s declaration of 20 March 2007) noted that she was “not in a position to review process or formulation patents and that she would co-ordinate a process and formulation review once they had identified an API supplier and formulator”. According to the applicant, the opponent’s failure to identify the current application was not due to an error by POF’s but rather a deliberate decision not to rank or review the process and formulation patents as suggested in Ms Sergi’s letter.
23. I do not agree with the applicant’s argument. The opponent was not primarily interested in process patents and the current application was clearly identified as such on page 16 of the POF report. There was no reason for the opponent to question this classification. While the report also has a “comment” that the application related to an alpha-crystalline form of the tert-butylamine salt of perindopril, the abstract relates to a particular method and the implication is that the claimed salt is a product of a particular method rather than the product per se.
24. I accept that if the opponent had done a further search on the process and formulation patents, as suggested by Ms Sergi in her letter of 3 October 2003, they may have been able to rectify POF’s original error. However, the opponent’s decision not to do any further searching does not mean that the original error did not occur or that the opponent made a deliberate decision not to locate the current patent application.
25. Given this, I accept that POF made an error in failing to identify the current application in their search so that the opponent was not aware of the relevance of the patent application until August 2006.
Was this a causative error?
26. To enliven section 223, there has to be a causative link between the error and the relevant act and hence an intention to do a relevant act within the prescribed time (as per GS Technologies v Commissioner of Patents (2004) 63 IPR 9 at 10). The opponent argued that had they been aware of the patent application in 2003, they would have placed it on a “watch” with the other key patents identified in Ms Sergi’s letter of 3 October 2003.
27. However, while Ms Sergi’s letter suggests that applications were placed on “regular watch to monitor status”, it was not clear from Ms Sergi’s letter whether this “watch” was for the purpose of filing an opposition. Ms Keast in her 20 March 2007 declaration noted (at paragraph 17) that she understood and “verily believed that, had GenRx been made aware of the application in September 2003, or at any time prior to or during the opposition period, we would have instructed either Mayne or our attorneys, Freehills Patent & Trade Mark Attorneys to place the Application on watch with the purpose of opposing its grant.”
28. She stated that this was “GenRx’s standard practice at the time and had remained so for many years”. However apart from Ms Sergi’s letter (which merely refers to maintaining a “watch”), there was no documentary evidence to support Ms Keast’s statement nor was there any evidence that GenRx regularly filed other oppositions in line with this “standard practice”. In addition, while Ms Keast worked at GenRx at the time the notice of opposition was due, she did not work there when the POF search was commissioned. I am therefore not convinced that she has sufficient direct knowledge of the background to Ms Sergi’s letter to properly comment on the actual purpose of the “watch” referred to by Ms Sergi.
29. There may be other material around which might support the opponent’s intention to oppose such as (for example):
· a statement by Ms Sergi explaining her letter;
· a pattern of opposing other patent applications of interest;
· file notes or emails from cases on “watch” indicating that the opponent was preparing to oppose;
· some documentary evidence about the company’s policy in opposing applications;
· a statutory declaration explaining the importance of the patent application and why the opponent would have been particularly interested in opposing this application; or
· a statutory declaration from a patent attorney attesting to what the phrase “watch to monitor status” clearly indicated to a skilled reader.
30. However, without such additional material, the opponent has not established that the “watch” referred to in Ms Sergi’s letter was for the purpose of filing an opposition. It seems to me that the “watch” referred to by Ms Sergi could equally refer to a watch which monitored the scope of a patent (and whether it was in force) to determine the level of risk of infringement rather than to mount an opposition. The final paragraph of the letter appears consistent with this second interpretation:
“In summary, it is difficult to predict the final scope of the two Aventis patent applications and as a result, we are unable to advise on the level of risk in proceeding. We recommend watching the two applications and re-visiting the search results as October 2006 approaches” (my emphasis)
31. Even if the “watch” were for the purposes of monitoring the status of the application for opposition purposes, this is not the same as having a clear intention to oppose at the relevant time. I have no doubt that many more cases are “watched for opposition purposes” than are actually opposed. The opponent failed to explain why they would have been particularly interested in the application at the relevant date and why they would have been motivated to oppose it.
32. Most section 223 cases involving a notice of opposition (including Geron Corporation v ES Cell International PTE [2005] APO 11 referred to by the opponent), the period of time between the prescribed deadline and filing of notice of opposition is measured in days. Because of the close timing in these cases, there is a reasonable presumption that the opponent had a real interest in opposing the case at the due deadline. This is not true in the current case where the period of extension requested is lengthy (17 months). In such cases, there is a greater need for clear documentary evidence to establish a clear intention to oppose at the relevant date.
33. The applicant argued that the evidence strongly indicates an intention by GenRx and Mr Jones not to implement opposition proceedings whilst the other opposition was on foot because the opponent did not file a notice of opposition until six months after they became aware of the application and only after the first opponent withdrew their opposition. The opponent argued that the timing of the opposition was simply because the withdrawal of the other opposition triggered their realisation that section 223 could be a possible remedy.
34. I agree with the applicant that the timing was unfortunate but the opponent’s explanation is plausible. I therefore accept that there is no evidence of the opponent making a deliberate decision not to oppose the application. However this does not mean that the evidence is sufficient to establish a clear intention to oppose at the relevant date. In my view, Ms Sergi’s letter merely establishes that a “watch” would be maintained - not necessarily that this would have led to an opposition being filed by the relevant date.
35. As a consequence, the evidence does not establish a link between the original error (failing to identify the patent application) and missing the deadline to file a notice of opposition. Hence I am not satisfied from the material before me that there is a causative error which would enliven section 223.
Other discretionary factors to consider
36. The considerations involved with the exercise of the discretion to extend time were discussed by Bowen CJ in Vangedal-Nielsen v Smith (Commissioner of Patents) (1980) ALR 144 at 150 as follows:
"Clearly, the Commissioner will have to consider the interests of the prospective opponent who, for some good reason, has not been able to mount his opposition within the initial period of three months. The Commissioner will further have to have in mind, where a serious opposition is foreshadowed, the public interest [in ensuring worthless patents are not granted], but he will have to require to be satisfied by an applicant for an extension that a proper case has been made out justifying an extension. It would be wrong if he granted an extension simply because no one had raised rather exceptional circumstances why it should not be granted. Reasons why this is so include the desirability of operating the system efficiently and without unreasonable delays and also the interests of the applicant for a patent which are also clearly involved."
37. In this current case, the opponent argued that the Commissioner had a public interest in ensuring that invalid patents should not proceed to grant. According to the opponent, there was a strong presumption of invalidity because a recently issued UK decision found the identical claims (on a family equivalent – see annex A) to lack novelty (Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2007] EWHC 1538).
38. However, the UK case is not as clear-cut as the opponent has claimed. The key issue in dispute in the UK proceedings was an alleged anticipation by EP 0 308 341 (hereafter 341). The defendents (Apotex Inc, the parent company of the current opponent) claimed that the crystalline form of perindopril is obtained in stage 3D of the process described in the earlier document. The UK decision (at paragraph 7) outlined the alleged anticipatory process as follows:
“Place in a reactor approximately 140 litres of ethyl acetate and 10 kg of [material obtained previously]. Add gradually approximately 2.20kg- of tert-butylamine, heat to reflux until all has dissolved; filter. Cool, filter off and dry. Yield: 95%.”
39. Detailed conditions for the crystallisation of the salt were not provided in the citation nor are the properties of the salt obtained outlined. The latter means that the X-ray diffraction data specified in claim 1 of the current specification is not explicitly disclosed in the citation. However, the defendants argued that a skilled person carrying out 341 process would inevitably produce a product which fell within the claim contending that the PXRD diagram obtained for the product of 341 was the same as the claimed pattern (see paragraph 24 of the UK court decision).
40. The claimants in the UK court argued that while the pilot-plant version of 341 is capable of producing the α-crystalline form, it will not inevitably do so (see paragraph 33 of the UK court decision). While the matter was finally resolved in the defendant’s favour, the Court relied heavily on cross examination evidence to come to its decision as there is a large degree of subjective assessment in PXRD diagram analysis (paragraph 13) and the witnesses differed widely in their view of the proper interpretation of the experimental data (paragraph 20).
41. Given the issues in dispute and the importance of cross examination to the court’s determination, it is not clear that the case would meet the “clearly invalid” test outlined in [Hoffman-la Roche AG v New England Biolabs (2000) 99 FCR 56 (at 48-67)]. In that case, the Emmett J. found that only “clearly invalid” patents should be refused in an opposition because the opponent has a further chance to challenge a patent at revocation.
42. The Hoffman-la Roche AG approach mirrors the points made by a UK court in Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd (Haggis’s) application [1975] RPC 403 concerning a broadly corresponding provision in the Patents Act 1949 (UK):
“…the pre-grant opposition procedure under s14 is designed to prevent registration of patents which would be certain to be revoked, if granted. It is a procedure designed to act as a sieve at comparatively little expense to the parties. It is not intended to provide a method of finally determining rights the determination of which merits a full-scale trial with oral evidence. Accordingly, it is a jurisdiction which should be exercised in only clear cases. If any bona fide conflict of fact or expert opinion is involved, a grant should not be refused unless and until that conflict has been resolved in the opponent’s favour”…..
43. In my view, given the clear benefit that cross examination would provide, the dispute is much better suited to a full scale Court trial rather than opposition. The opponent argued that the Court should have the benefit of the Commissioner’s views but given the experimental issues in dispute, it is not clear what the Commissioner could add above the views of the expert witnesses.
44. I note that there are on-going revocation/infringement proceedings in the Federal Court (NSD 208/2007) involving a related patent 740748 (see annex B). The applicant confirmed that if the current application were to proceed to sealing, they were intending to amend the pleadings to include the current application. It seems to me that this is a better environment to consider the invalidity of the patent given the clear benefit of cross examination to resolve the key issues in dispute. Such detailed consideration would provide a more balanced and correct determination of the issues which is clearly in the public interest.
45. Combining the actions into one forum would also appear to lower the complexity and costs of the overall litigation in line with the general principle of avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings (see for example, University of Georgia Research Foundation Inc v BioChem Pharma [2001] FCA 688). This will also likely led to the most expeditious resolution of the dispute between the parties.
46. The applicant noted that there had already been an unreasonable delay with filing the notice of opposition. The applicant referred to Genetics Institute v Kirin-Amgen (1997) 92 FCR 106) in support of the proposition that pre-grant opposition is intended to be “a swift and economical means of settling disputes that would otherwise need to be dealt with in the courts in more expensive and time consuming post-grant litigation”. I agree that 17 months is an excessive delay and is a discretionary factor against granting of the extension.
47. I accept that granting the extension would be in the opponent’s interest. As they admitted at the hearing, preventing a patent being granted would mean that the patent applicant could not apply to the Federal Court for an injunction preventing the opponent commercialising their product. However, such interests have to be counter-balanced by the applicant’s interests who equally could argue that being prevented from having a granted patent affected their rights to request an injunction. Ultimately, the balance needs to be properly weighed in deciding whether or not an injunction is appropriate. However, this is a matter for the Court to decide not the Commissioner.
DECISION
48. On balance, the opponent has not provided enough evidence to establish that there was a real intention to oppose the application at the relevant date. As a consequence, there is no causative link between the original error (in failing to identify the patent application) and missing the deadline to file a notice of opposition. There may be other material which the opponent could provide to establish a causative error which would enliven section 223. However even if there were such material, there are other discretionary considerations which weigh heavily against allowing the extension.
49. Based on corresponding proceedings in the UK, the key issues in the opposition case would involve experimental evidence which is best tested by cross examination. This kind of dispute would therefore be better suited to a full scale trial which only the Court can provide. There are on-going revocation/infringement proceedings in the Federal Court involving a related patent. The applicant confirmed that if the current application were to proceed to sealing, they were intending to amend the pleadings to include the current application. It seems to me that this is a more appropriate environment to consider the invalidity of the patent.
50. Having the matters heard at the one time in the one forum is likely to decrease the costs and complexity of the overall litigation. It is also likely to resolve the issues in dispute the quickest possible time. There have already been considerable delays to date with the opposition (17 months to file the notice of opposition) and additional delays in the opposition to complete the evidentiary stages and proceed to hearing will only delay the Court proceedings further. This is not in the public interest.
51. I note that the main reason the opponent wants to proceed with opposition rather than court proceedings is to avoid the possibility of an injunction based on the current application (when granted). However their interests are countered by the applicant’s interests whose rights would equally be affected by not having the opportunity to apply for an injunction. Ultimately, the issue of whether or not an injunction is appropriate is a matter for the Court to decide (after balancing the interests of the parties) rather than the Commissioner.
52. My view is that the public interest is strongly in favour of refusing the extension so that the matter can proceed properly in the court environment where it is best suited. I therefore refuse the extension of time under section 223 to file a notice of opposition.
COSTS
53. In matters before the Commissioner, costs generally follow the event. In this case, the patent applicant successfully argued that the section 223 should not be granted. I therefore award
costs against the substantive opponent, GenRx Pty Ltd.
Karen Ayers
Delegate of the Commissioner of Patents
Patent attorneys for the patent applicant : Allen Arthur Robinson
Patent attorneys for the opponent : Freehills Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys, Melbourne
Annex A
Family Tree
Annex B -Servier Perindopril patents
| Patent | Subject matter of patent | Federal Court Proceedings |
| AU542611 | Perindopril active | None – patent has expired |
| AU606992 | Process patent for the preparation of intermediates which can be used in the preparation of perindopril | Infringement proceedings in VIC commenced by Servier Revocation proceedings in NSW commenced by GenRx. There are no infringement/revocation proceedings in the UK on the equivalent patent. |
| AU607260 | Process patent for the preparation of intermediates which can be used in the preparation of perindopril | No proceedings |
| AU608636 | Process patent for the industrial synthesis of Perindopril | No proceedings. This patent is the AU equivalent to EP0308341; ‘341 was the document that was found in the UK proceedings to anticipate the same claim that is claim 1 in AU2001276418 . |
| AU618752 | Process patent for the industrial synthesis of compounds including Perindopril | No proceedings |
| AU740748 | Perindopril in combination with indapamide | Revocation proceedings in NSW by GenRx |
| AU2006404079 | Innovation divisional patent of AU2001276418 – the patent the subject of the patent office hearing. Claim to alpha crystalline form of Perindopril and process. | GenRx filed a s28 notice in relation to this patent; Servier surrendered the patent. |
| AU2001248433 | Process patent for the preparation of intermediates which can be used in the preparation of perindopril | No proceedings There are infringement/revocation proceedings in the UK on the equivalent patent - EP1268398 |
| AU2001248470 | Process patent for the synthesis of Perindopril and its salts | No proceedings |
| AU2001250467 | Process patent for the preparation of intermediates which can be used in the preparation of perindopril | No proceedings |
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