Leos and Leos - [2019] FamCA 339

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

LEOS & LEOS

[2019] FamCA 339

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Contravention Application – Where the father asserts that the mother has contravened certain parenting orders – Where the mother asserts that the father’s application should be summarily dismissed as defective for having failed to identify the orders he says she has contravened – Where the mother asserts that, in the alternative, the father’s application should be dismissed on the basis that it is unintelligible, ambiguous or imprecise – Application dismissed.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss. 38(2), 45A
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr. 10.12, 21.08
High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r. 27.09.5

B & B [2007] FMCAfam 5
Davis & Davis (1976) FLC 90-050
Hale & Hale [2011] FMCAfam 1107
Iberian Trust Ltd. v. Founders Trust and Investment Co. (1932) 2 KB 87
Northam v Favelle Favco Holdings Pty Ltd (Supreme Court (NSW), 7 March 1995, unreported)
Sedley & Sedley [2018] FamCA 315

APPLICANT:

Mr Leos

RESPONDENT:

Ms Leos

FILE NUMBER:

SYC

6210

2010

DATE DELIVERED:

28 May 2019

PLACE DELIVERED:

Sydney

PLACE HEARD:

Sydney

JUDGMENT OF:

McClelland DCJ

HEARING DATE:

22 May 2019

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Camden Solicitors and Conveyancers

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Burke & Mangan Lawyers

Orders

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Items 6 and 7 of the Contravention Application filed by the father on 14 September 2018 be struck out.
The Court decrees, pursuant to s 45A of the Family Law Act 1975(Cth), that items 8 and 9 of the Contravention Application filed by the father on 14 September 2018 have no reasonable prospects of success.
The Contravention Application filed by the father on 14 September 2018 be dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Leos & Leos has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER: SYC 6210 of 2010

Mr Leos

Applicant

And

Ms Leos

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

This matter concerns a Contravention Application filed by Mr Leos (“the father”) on 14 September 2018. In that application, the father alleges that, between 2 February 2018 and 15 August 2018, Ms Leos (“the mother”) “breached” certain parenting orders in respect to the parties’ children X, born in 2008, Y, born in 2008 and Z, born in 2010, referred to collectively herein as “the children”.
At the hearing on 22 May 2019, the mother’s solicitor made an oral application on behalf of her client for the proceedings to be dismissed, pursuant to r 10.12 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (“the Rules”), on the basis that the father’s Contravention Application had no reasonable prospects of success.
During the course of the proceedings, the mother further expanded her argument to argue that, in the alternative, the father’s application should be struck out as being unintelligible, ambiguous or imprecise. The mother also applied for a decree pursuant to s 45A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) that the proceedings, commenced by the father, have no reasonable prospects of success.
To assist those reading this judgment to understand the issues of form in the father’s Contravention Application which are referred to herein, a copy of that application forms Annexure “A” to these Reasons for Judgment.

The mother’s contentions

The mother’s primary contention is that the father’s Contravention Application discloses no cause of action against her. There are two aspects to that contention.
The first is that, where provision is made at item 6 of Part D of the relevant Court form to initiate a Contravention Application, the father has failed to identify the order/s made by the Court which he alleges have been contravened by the mother. At item 7 of Part D, the father sets out a series of dates, times and locations where he alleges contraventions have occurred. Immediately following those particulars, the father provides summaries of events which he contends occurred on each of those dates and, in respect to each summary, concludes with a sentence to the effect that the mother’s conduct was in breach of a particular order, for instance, “order 6a”, “order 6b”, “order 6c(ii)”, and “order 3e”.
Despite those references to particular subparagraphs of orders, the mother asserts that the father has not identified the date on which those orders were made and, as a result, he has failed to identify the orders he contends were contravened. The mother argues that that should have been done at item 6 of Part D of the Contravention Application. In the absence of the orders being identified, the mother contends that items 6 and 7 of the Application fail to disclose a cause of action against her.
Next, the mother contends that, while the father alleges a series of contraventions at items 8 and 9 of Part D of the Contravention Application, at item 9, where he is required to set out the date, time and place of the alleged contraventions, he has listed those particulars for only one incident. In that respect, item 8 of the Contravention Application alleges that the orders which have been contravened are the “Order of 8 December 2017 Orders breached are 6a, 6b, 6c and 3e”. In providing particulars of the date, time and place of the alleged contravention at item 9 of the Application, the father specifies just one event as giving rise to the contravention. That event is identified as occurring on 2 February 2018 at 4.00 pm at Suburb T McDonald’s. As such, while, directly below those particulars, the father has set out a number of instances on dates subsequent to 2 February 2019 which, he says, constitute contraventions, the mother contends that the details of events occurring after 2 February 2018 are irrelevant to the contravention identified above.
The father, in response, contends that, having regard to the totality of the Contravention Application and his Affidavits in support, it can reasonably be inferred that, in respect to item 6 of the Contravention Application, which has been left blank, it is intended to refer to the same orders as set out at item 8, to which I have referred, that is, the orders made on 8 December 2017. In that respect, the father contends that the inclusion of the reference to a particular paragraph of the orders in the concluding sentence of each of the summaries of the relevant events, set out at items 7 and 9 of Part D of the Contravention Application, leaves the mother in no doubt as to the case she is required to meet.

Consideration of allegations set out at item 7

It is significant that the father’s Contravention Application “alleges that an order … has been contravened and seeks that the respondent be dealt with under Division 13A of Part VII of the Family Law Act”. The Court has power to make a range of orders under that Division, including, in the event of finding that a contravention has occurred, the imposition of a fine, a bond or, in circumstances concerning a serious contravention, imprisonment.
Referring to Davis & Davis (1976) FLC 90-050 and Smit & Pickworth (1981) FLC 91-071, in B & B [2007] FMCAfam 5, Brown FM, as he then was, stated at [100]:
Early authorities of the Family Court emphasise the quasi-criminal nature of contravention proceedings, which, if established, may render the contravenor liable to a penalty. Accordingly, a respondent to such an application is entitled to know precisely how he or she is alleged to have breached any particular order.
However, in Sedley & Sedley [2018] FamCA 315, Cronin J took a different view in respect to whether the proceedings are “quasi-criminal”, stating, at [13]:
Suffice to say, the contravention proceeding is not a quasi-criminal law application but rather, whether there has been a breach of its orders and if so, whether the orders should be altered to ensure the intention of the court is given effect.
Cleary, proceedings involving the consideration of whether an order should be made under those sections referred to in s 70NAF(3) of the Act would fall into the category of quasi-criminal proceedings. However, I agree with Cronin J that, other than proceedings involving potential orders under those sections, an application for orders that a party has contravened an order of the Court should probably not be regarded as being in the nature of quasi-criminal proceedings.
Nevertheless, irrespective of how these proceedings are described or categorised, the fundamental point is that, if a party is found to have contravened parenting orders, there are potentially serious consequences for the contravening party. In those circumstances, it is important that the party who is alleged to have contravened an order is “informed with reasonable particularity of the matters alleged against [them]”: Davis & Davis (1976) FLC 90-050 at 75,207.
In that respect, Part D of the Contravention Application form relevantly states:
You must attach to the affidavit filed in support of this application, a copy of the order, bond, agreement, or undertaking that you allege has been contravened, or a copy of the recovery order if you have it.
At Item 6 and 7, you must set out the details of the act or omission which you allege contravened the order, bond, agreement, registered parenting plan or undertaking, or which prevented or hindered the action under the recovery order. [Emphasis added].
The father did not attach, to either of his Affidavits filed on 14 September 2018 and 5 March 2019, a copy of the orders he alleges were contravened by the mother. That is particularly significant in circumstances where the father has also failed to identify the order it is alleged has been contravened by the mother at item 6 his Contravention Application.
The mother contends that, as a result, the father’s application is defective and should be dismissed in respect to the alleged contraventions set out at item 7 of Part D. Specifically, the mother contends that item 6 of the application fails to disclose a “reasonable cause of action”, thus engaging the power of summary dismissal under r 10.12 of the Rules. That provision relevantly provides:
A party may apply for summary orders after a response has been filed if the party claims, in relation to the application or response, that:
(a) the court has no jurisdiction;
(b) the other party has no legal capacity to apply for the orders sought;
(c) it is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process; or
(d) there is no reasonable likelihood of success.
In the alternative, the mother contends that item 7 of the application should be struck out as being unintelligible, ambiguous or imprecise.
The father, however, contends that there is no such ambiguity because, in the summary of each alleged contravention, set out at item 7, he has identified the paragraph of the order which he contends has been contravened, albeit without including the date on which the relevant order was made. In that way, he asserts that although item 6, which requires him to specify the order, has been left blank, the mother can reasonably infer that those references to particular paragraphs of orders cited in item 7, refer to the orders made on 8 December 2017. Specifically, the father contends that inference can and should be made because of the reference to the orders made on 8 December 2017 at items 8 and 9 of the application.
In considering this matter, s 45A of the Act is relevant. That section provides the following:
Summary decrees
No reasonable prospect of successfully defending proceedings
(1) The court may make a decree for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of proceedings if:
(a) the first party is prosecuting the proceedings or that part of the proceedings; and
(b) the court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceedings or that part of the proceedings.
No reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting proceedings
(2) The court may make a decree for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceedings if:
(a) the first party is defending the proceedings or that part of the proceedings; and
(b) the court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceedings or that part of the proceedings.
When there is no reasonable prospect of success
(3) For the purposes of this section, a defence or proceedings or part of proceedings need not be:
(a) hopeless; or
(b) bound to fail;
to have no reasonable prospect of success.
Proceedings that are frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process
(4) The court may dismiss all or part of proceedings at any stage if it is satisfied that the proceedings or part is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process.
(5) To avoid doubt, proceedings or a part of proceedings are not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse or process merely because an application relating to the proceedings or the part is made and later withdrawn.
Costs
(6) If the court makes a decree, or dismisses all or part of proceedings, under this section, the court may make such order as to costs as the court considers just.
Action by court on its own initiative or on application
(7) The court may take action under this section on its own initiative or on application by a party to the proceedings.
This section does not limit other powers
(8) This section does not limit any powers that the court has apart from this section.
That section was inserted into the Act by the Family Law Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2018 (Cth), which received Royal Assent on 31 August 2018. It is to be noted that the section, in certain circumstances, empowers the Court to “dismiss all or part of proceedings”, rather than to strike out pleadings.
Nevertheless, in the absence of a specific provision in the Act or the Rules to strike out pleadings, the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) apply mutatis mutandis, so far as they are capable of application to proceedings in this Court: s 38(2) of the Act. In that regard, r 27.09.5 of the High Court Rules provides that:
Where a pleading:
(a) does not disclose a cause of action or defence;
(b) is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;
(c) may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the proceedings; or
(d) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court;
the Court or a Justice may order the whole or part of the pleading be struck out or amended.
In Westpac Banking Corporation v Michael Vincent Bourke & Anor [2012] NSWSC 111 at [22] to [24], Einstein J usefully summarised the relevant legal principles in respect to embarrassing pleadings, as follows:
… A pleading is embarrassing if it is unintelligible, ambiguous, or so imprecise in its identification of material factual allegations as to deprive the opposing party of proper notice of the real substance of the claim or defence: Gunns Ltd v Marr [2005] VSC 251 at [14]-15]; or if it pleads confusing or irrelevant allegations: Shelton v National Roads & Motorists Association Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 278 at [18]. No attempt is made in the defendants' draft pleadings to link the vague factual matters asserted to any proper defence, or to respond to the matters alleged by the plaintiff. [Emphasis added].
In Northam v Favelle Favco Holdings Pty Ltd (Supreme Court (NSW), 7 March 1995, unrep), Bryson J said at [2] to [3]:
A pleading may be embarrassing even though it does contain allegations of material facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, if the material facts alleged are couched in expressions which leave difficulties or doubts about recognising or piecing together what is referred to, or if imprecise or slang words are used with unduly broad ranges of possible meanings or without clear meanings. … It is not fair to require a defendant to flesh out general expressions or indirect allusions by piecing together information in other documents such as affidavits or experts' reports. [Emphasis added].
That authority has been applied a number of times: see National Australia Bank v Menere [2010] NSWSC 381 at [64]-[65] per Davies J; Wen Guo Jin v L Bank Limited [2011] NSWSC 183 per McCallum J; McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424 per Johnson J.
In this matter, I am satisfied that elements of the father’s application set out at item 7 of that document are bound to fail, because the father has not identified, at item 6, the order/s he contends have been contravened by the mother, nor has he identified such orders by way of attaching a copy of them to either of the Affidavits that he has filed in these proceedings.
It is not, in my view, appropriate for the Court or the mother to attempt to rectify that defect by inferring that the references to paragraphs of orders as set out at item 7 of the Contravention Application are intended to refer to the set of orders set out at item 8 of that document. In that respect, I note that r 21.08 of the Rules requires the Court, at the hearing of a contravention application, to:
(a) inform the respondent of the allegation;
(b) ask the respondent whether the respondent wishes to admit or deny the allegation; …
The reference to “the allegation” in that rule is a reference to the allegation as set out in the Contravention Application and not an allegation constructed by the Court or the mother by way of inference or otherwise.
If, however, I am wrong in reaching that conclusion, I nonetheless strike out those allegations as being embarrassing, in terms of being unintelligible, ambiguous or imprecise within the principles adumbrated in Westpac Banking Corporation v Michael Vincent Bourke & Anor (supra), to which I have referred. In that context, I do not consider it appropriate to require the mother to attempt to decipher what is alleged against her by cross referencing the details of the incidents set out at item 7 of the application against the information set out at items 8 and 9, which plead separate and distinct contraventions to those set out at item 7.

Consideration of allegations set out at items 8 and 9

As stated, at item 8 of the Contravention Application, the father identifies the orders he alleges have been contravened by the mother as being “Order of 8 December 2017 Orders breached are 6a, 6b, 6c, and 3d”.
At item 9 of the Contravention Application, the father identifies the time, date and place of the alleged contravention as being:
Date – 2/2/2018
Time – 4pm
Place – [Suburb T] McDonalds
Despite referring to just that one incident, immediately below those particulars, the father sets out summaries in respect to certain events he says occurred on 20 different dates. However, only one of those summaries is in respect to events which the father contends occurred on 2 February 2018. Given that the father has not set out, in the first part of item 9, the date, time and place for any other alleged acts of contravention, the mother asserts that the summaries of events pertaining to incidents after 2 February 2018 set out below should be disregarded.
The father sets out the following summary in regards to the events which, he says, occurred on 2 February 2018:
On 02/02/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children – I attended the meeting point ([Suburb T] McDonalds) at 4pm the agreed and usual change over location where the Respondent Mother did not attend and instead called me on the telephone and said that I cannot have the children. That was in breach of order 6a.

Order 6a of the orders made on 8 December 2017 is, as follows:
6. The children are to spend time with the father as follows:
(a) commencing from the making of these orders and during school term time, each alternate weekend from 4pm Friday to 5pm Sunday. The first occasion to commence 8 December 2017 if the children are still in school term time and if that weekend falls as the father’s weekend with the children pursuant to the orders in place immediately before these orders being made. If that weekend does not fall as the father’s pursuant to the previous orders, this order is to commence in term one of 2018.
In that respect, at paragraph 8 of his Affidavit filed on 5 March 2019, the father contends:
On 2 February 2018 the first weekend of school term (the father’s weekend) I attended the meeting point ([Suburb T] McDonald’s) at 4pm where the Respondent Mother called me on the telephone and said that I cannot have the children in breach of order 6a. She did not attend the agreed and usual location for changeover.
In applying for the Contravention Application to be dismissed, the mother contends that the father has led no evidence that the relevant weekend was a weekend when the children should have been spending time with him, pursuant to the orders. In that respect, the mother contends that difficulty arises by virtue of the wording of the orders made on 8 December 2017. Specifically, it is noted that the orders include two potential commencement dates for the children to spend time with the father, which are:
a)“8 December 2017 … if that weekend falls as the father’s weekend with the children pursuant to the orders in place immediately before these orders being made”; and
b)“In term one of 2018”.
The mother firstly contends that, in the absence of the father providing evidence as to whether he spent time with the children on 8 December 2017, the Court cannot be satisfied that the children were due to spend time with him on 2 February 2018 and accordingly, the Court cannot be satisfied that she contravened order 6(a) made on 8 December 2017.
In terms of the alternative construction, that is, that the children’s time was to commence with the father “in term one of 2018”, the mother contends that it is not clear from those orders whether the children were to commence spending time with the father on the first or second weekend of Term One of 2018. Accordingly, the mother contends that the Court cannot be satisfied, on the evidence before it, that on the weekend commencing 2 February 2018, the children were due to spend time with the father, pursuant to Court orders.
On that basis, the mother contends that the contravention alleged at item 8 and 9 of the application to have occurred on 2 February 2018 must be dismissed.
The father contends, however, that the particulars provided by him in respect to events that occurred on 2 February 2018, as well as each of 3, 16, 18 and 30 May 2018 are sufficient to satisfy the Court that there has been a contravention of the relevant orders by the mother on those dates.
In determining this issue, in the absence of evidence as to whether the children did or did not spend time with the father on 8 December 2017, I am unable to determine whether the orders of 8 December 2017 provided for the children to spend time with the father on the weekend commencing 2 February 2018.
I also, respectfully, agree with the solicitor for the mother that, in any event, order 6a is unsatisfactorily ambiguous in specifying whether the children were to spend time with the father on the first or the second weekend commencing term one of 2018.
It is a fundamental principle that “if the court is to punish anyone for not carrying out its orders the order must in unambiguous terms direct what is to be done”: Iberian Trust Ltd. v. Founders Trust and Investment Co. (1932) 2 KB 87 at 95.
Consistent with that principle, in Hale & Hale [2011] FMCAfam 1107 at [57] Brown FM, as his Honour then was, stated:
If there is an ambiguity arising from the order or orders, which give rise to the contravention application in question, such ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the person facing the contravention. It being fundamental that he or she can only be found responsible for an act or omission if he or she knows precisely what is required of him or her pursuant to the applicable order.
I respectfully agree with that analysis.
Accordingly, for these reasons, I am satisfied, in terms of s 45A(2) of the Act, that the father has “no reasonable prospect of prosecuting” that part of the proceedings set out at items 8 and 9 of his Contravention Application. Accordingly, I make a decree to that effect and dismiss that part of his claim.
In so doing, I note that, in addition to the allegations made by the father in respect to events that occurred on 2 February 2018, he also sought to rely on events that occurred on 3, 16, 18 and 30 May 2018. However, as those events postdate the particulars of date, time and place relevant to the contravention asserted to have occurred on 2 February 2018, they are irrelevant to the only contravention that the father has identified at the commencement of item 9 of the application. I have, therefore, disregarded the father’s reference to those additional events, as set out at item 9 of the Contravention Application, which postdate 2 February 2018.

Orders

Having struck out those alleged contraventions set out at item 7 of the father’s Contravention Application and, having made a decree that the contravention alleged at items 8 and 9 has no reasonable prospects of success, I must dismiss the father’s Contravention Application filed on 14 September 2018.

I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Deputy Chief Justice McClelland delivered on 28 May 2019.

Associate:

Date: 28 May 2019

Extracts from Annexure “A”

Item 7

On 02/02/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children - I attended the meeting point ([Suburb T] McDonalds) at 4pm the agreed and usual change over location where the Respondent Mother did not attend and instead called me on the telephone and said that I cannot
have the children. This was in breach of order 6a.

On 25/03/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children – [Y] told me that her mother told her that I would not take them to the party. Notwithstanding my reassurances the mother dissuaded the children to come with me and the children did not get in my car and come and spend time with me. This was in breach of order 6a.

On 12/04/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse attended the school to collect the children and take them home because she was not happy that I collected them from school the previous day as per order 6a.

On 03/05/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse attended the school to collect the children and take them home because she was not happy that I collected them from school the previous day as per order 6a.

On 09/05/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children. the mother attended the school and was in the school car park when I was due to collect the children. The children ran to the mothers car and got in her car as she had told them to do that in the morning in
breach of order 6c(ii).

On 16/05/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children she collected the children at 2pm so they were not there for me to pick them up and I was advised by the school. This was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On 18/05/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with [Y]. The children again did not attend school but a pick up was arranged for the two other children at 4pm at [Suburb T] McDonalds. this was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On 23/05/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children she collected the children from school at 2.30pm so they were not there for me to pick them up.
This was in breach of 6c (ii)

On 30/05/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children as all children were kept home from school on this day. This was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On 06/06/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children as the children were kept home from school again. This was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On 13/06/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children because the mother attended the school and contacted the police. She claimed I was abducting the children. This was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On 15/06/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with [Y]. The children did not attend school agian on this day. However the mother attendd [Suburb T] McDonalds to give me two children at 4pm. This was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On 20/06/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children. She attended the school and the children ran to her car. This was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On 27/06/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children as I attended the school and so did the mother and she told the children to get into her car. This was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On 04/07/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the child e the children were not at school m breach oforder 6c(ii).

On 25/07/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children because the children were not at school again. This was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On 1 August 2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children because she attended the school again and attempted to take the children home herself. Two children went with her and [X] came home with the applicant father. This was a breach of order 6c (ii)

On 8 August 2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children as the children were distressed to come home with the applicant father so I took them back to the office.

On 15 August 2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the applicant to spend time with the children because she attended the school as well and the children went home with her. This was a breach of order 6c.
On 04/05/2018 The Respondent Mother disagrees with child support regarding the times the Applicant Father has with the children in order to be paid more child support

On 13/01/2018 The Respondent Mother registred children in weekend sport without the Applicant Father's permission. This is in breach of order 3e.

Item 8

Order of 8 December 2017 Orders breached are 6a, 6b, 6c and 3e.

Item 9

On 02/02/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children – I attended the meeting point ([Suburb T] McDonalds) at 4pm the agreed and usual change over location where the Respondent Mother did not attend and instead called me on the telephone and said that I cannot have the children. This was in breach of order 6a.

On 25/03/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children – [Y] told me that her mother told her that l would not take them to the party. Notwithstanding my reassurances the mother dissuaded the children to come with me and the children did not get in my car and come and spend time with me. This was in breach of order 6a.

On 03/05/20 l 8 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse attended the school to collect the children and take them home because she was not happy that I col1ected them from school the previous day as per order 6a.

On 23/05/20 l 8 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children she collected the children from school at 2.30pm so they wrere not there for me to pick them up. This was in breach of 6c (ii)

On 06/06/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse with the children refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children as the children were kept home from school again. This was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On 04/07/2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children because the children were not at school again. This was in breach of order 6c(ii).

On l August 2018 the Respondent Mother without reasonable excuse refused to allow the Applicant to spend time with the children because she attended the school again and attempted to take the children home herself. Two children went with her and [X] came home with the applicant father. This was a breach of order 6c (ii)

(As per original)