Leonard William Clampett v Magistrate S Cornack

[2013] HCASL 81

LEONARD WILLIAM CLAMPETT

v

MAGISTRATE S CORNACK & ANOR

[2013] HCASL 81
B11/2013

1. The applicant was charged with driving at a speed of 73 kph in a 60 kph zone after being detected by a speed camera.  On 2 September 2011, the first respondent found the applicant guilty of a traffic offence.  The applicant was convicted, fined $200, and ordered to pay court costs and the prosecution's out of pocket expenses for an expert witness.

2. On 22 September 2011, the applicant sought judicial review of the first respondent's decision under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) in the Supreme Court of Queensland (Daubney J) on the ground that the photographic evidence produced by the speed camera failed to comply with the National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth). The second respondent applied to strike out the application for judicial review. In upholding the second respondent's application, Daubney J held that the applicant failed to advance a good reason for having instituted the application to the Supreme Court, rather than exercising his right of appeal in the District Court of Queensland under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). His Honour held further that s 222 made adequate provision for the applicant to seek review of the first respondent's decision. The applicant sought to argue that he was precluded from appealing to the District Court because this would have required him to make a payment in Australian currency which is not legal tender. That contention has long been discredited; and so this argument was also dismissed.

3. The applicant applied for leave to appeal against Daubney J's decision to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland (McMurdo P, Fraser JA and Boddice J).  Boddice J held (McMurdo P and Fraser JA concurring) that the applicant did not demonstrate any error of law on the part of Daubney J.  As there was no basis upon which an appeal could succeed, leave to appeal was refused.

4. The applicant seeks special leave to appeal to this Court on grounds similar to those agitated in the Court of Appeal.  The application does not raise any question of principle; it enjoys no prospects of success. Special leave should be refused.

5. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

S.M. Kiefel
5 June 2013 P.A. Keane