Lembo v Lutton

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Registry: Toowoomba

Number: S 170 of 1996

Before Justice Wilson

[Lembo v Lutton]

Plaintiff:  KAY ANN LEMBO

AND

Defendant:                NEVILLE JAMES LUTTON

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT : WILSON J

Delivered:    21 January 2000

CATCHWORDS:     LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAR – EXTENSION OF PERIOD – CAUSE OF ACTION IN RESPECT OF PERSONAL INJURIES – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS – WHETHER REASONABLE STEPS TAKEN TO ASCERTAIN FACTS – MATERIAL FACTS OF A DECISIVE CHARACTER – whether material facts giving rise to a cause of action for personal injuries were within the plaintiff’s means of knowledge within the limitation period – what constitutes material facts of a decisive character – relevant considerations for determining the means of knowledge of the plaintiff            

Counsel:  Mr G M Egan for the plaintiff
  Mr D H Tait for the defendant

Solicitors:                   Grasso Searles Romano for the plaintiff
  Flower & Hart for the defendant      

Hearing date:             25 October 1999

  1. This proceeding was commenced by writ issued  on 28 October 1996 by which the plaintiff claims “damages for personal injuries and subsequent loss sustained on and after October 29, 1993 by [the plaintiff] as a result of the negligent provision of medical advice and treatment of the defendant.” 

  1. A statement of claim was delivered on 20 March 1998 and a defence on 5 May  1998.  The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff’s cause of action arose more than three years prior to the issue of the writ and that the proceeding was barred by s 11 of the Limitation of Acts Act 1974.

  1. There are two applications for determination – one by the plaintiff seeking an extension of the limitation period pursuant to s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act and the other by the defendant seeking judgment pursuant to r 293 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules.

  1. The plaintiff claims that it was not until her solicitors received a medical report dated 17 October 1997 that certain material facts of a decisive character were within her means of knowledge.  She seeks an extension of the limitation period to 17 October 1998 or alternatively to 28 October 1996 (the date the writ was issued).  I note that in Opacic v Patane [1997] 1 Qd R 84 the Court of Appeal confirmed that s 31(2) is applicable in circumstances where a material fact of a decisive character was not within the applicant’s means of knowledge until a date after the issue of proceedings.

  1. The plaintiff was born on 8 December 1965.  She is a teacher by profession.  The defendant is a general practitioner practising in Toowoomba.

  1. According to the plaintiff’s case she consulted the defendant on or about 19 June 1992 about a lump on her nose.  He diagnosed it as a blocked gland and did not advise that further consultation or treatment was necessary.  In or about January 1993 she consulted him further because of the persistence of the lump.  He deferred surgery because she was pregnant.  (Her second child was…

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Details
Case
[2000] QSC 6
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lembo v Lutton is a case in the Supreme Court of Queensland where the plaintiff, Kay Ann Lembo, sued the defendant, Neville James Lutton, for damages due to personal injuries and subsequent losses that she sustained following negligent medical advice and treatment. The defendant argued that the proceedings were barred by the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 as they were initiated beyond the three-year limitation period. The plaintiff sought an extension of the limitation period under s 31 of the Act, arguing that certain material facts were not within her means of knowledge until after the limitation period had begun.

The legal issues that the court had to decide included whether the material facts of a decisive character were within the plaintiff's means of knowledge within the limitation period, what constitutes material facts of a decisive character, and what relevant considerations should be taken into account in determining the means of knowledge of the plaintiff. The court had to consider whether the plaintiff had taken reasonable steps to ascertain facts and whether the facts could have been reasonably ascertained before the limitation period began to run.

The court held that the plaintiff had not satisfied the test that the material facts were not within her means of knowledge until after July 1995, which was after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the limitation period. The court found that the plaintiff had an obligation to keep in touch with her solicitors and act on their advice, but there was no evidence that she did so between August 1994 and July 1995. The court inferred that it was her decision, based largely on financial considerations, not to obtain a report until sometime after July 1995. The plaintiff's application for an extension of the limitation period failed.

The final orders regarding the form of orders and costs were to be determined at a later date.

Background

Background to the litigation

The plaintiff, Kay Ann Lembo, alleges that she sustained personal injuries and subsequent loss due to the negligent medical advice and treatment provided by the defendant, Neville James Lutton, a general practitioner. The plaintiff first consulted the defendant in or around June 1992 regarding a lump on her nose, which the defendant diagnosed as a blocked gland without advising further consultation or treatment. She consulted him again in January 1993 due to the persistence of the lump, but surgery was deferred due to her pregnancy. In July 1993, the defendant surgically excised the lump, but it recurred, leading to further consultations and treatment by other medical professionals, including a plastic surgeon who diagnosed the lump as a malignant dermatofibrosarcoma. The plaintiff underwent multiple surgeries and radiotherapy between October 1993 and April 1994 and further hospitalization in June 1994 due to complications from the malignancy. The plaintiff first sought legal advice on 25 July 1994, and her solicitors obtained a medical report on 17 October 1997, which detailed the deficiencies in the defendant's treatment and suggested negligence.

The proceeding was initiated by the plaintiff on 28 October 1996, with a writ issued claiming damages for personal injuries and subsequent loss due to the defendant's negligence. A statement of claim was delivered on 20 March 1998, and the defendant responded with a defence on 5 May 1998, asserting that the plaintiff's cause of action arose more than three years prior to the issue of the writ, rendering the proceeding barred by section 11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The plaintiff applied for an extension of the limitation period under section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act, and the defendant sought judgment under rule 293 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. The case was heard on 25 October 1999.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether a material fact of a decisive character relating to the plaintiff's right of action was not within her means of knowledge until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action.
2. Whether there is evidence to establish the plaintiff's right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation.
3. Whether the court should extend the limitation period for the plaintiff's action under section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act.

Held
1. The court found that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the plaintiff's right of action was not within her means of knowledge until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action.
2. The court found that there was evidence to establish the plaintiff's right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation.
3. The court decided that the court should not extend the limitation period for the plaintiff's action under section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the application for an extension of the limitation period for the plaintiff's action under section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act. The court noted that the plaintiff had to demonstrate that a material fact of a decisive character was not within her means of knowledge until after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the limitation period. The court considered the plaintiff's evidence and found that she had not satisfied the court that the material facts were not within her means of knowledge until after July 1995, which was after the limitation period had begun to run. The court found that the plaintiff had an obligation to keep in touch with her solicitors and to act in accordance with the advice they gave her from time to time. The court also found that there was evidence to establish the plaintiff's right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation. However, the court decided that it should not extend the limitation period for the plaintiff's action under section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act because the plaintiff had not satisfied the court that the material facts were not within her means of knowledge until after the limitation period had begun to run.

The court relied on the authorities of Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v McPhee [1979] Qd R 469 and Randel v Brisbane City Council [1984] 2 Qd R 276 to determine the test for whether a fact was within a plaintiff's means of knowledge. The court also relied on the authority of Opacic v Patane [1997] 1 Qd R 84 to confirm that section 31(2) is applicable in circumstances where a material fact of a decisive character was not within the applicant's means of knowledge until a date after the issue of proceedings.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a material fact of a decisive character was not within their means of knowledge until after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the limitation period for the action in order to be granted an extension of the limitation period under section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act. The court distinguished the authority of Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234 and Dick v University of Queensland [1999] QCA 474; CA No 3204 of 1999, 12 November 1999, which concerned the distinction between knowledge of a matter of fact and knowledge of the legal effect of facts.