Legal Services Commissioner v Nichols

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Legal Services Commissioner v Nichols [2018] QCA 158

PARTIES:

LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER
(appellant/cross-respondent)
v
GEORGE NICHOLS
(respondent/cross-appellant)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 9789 of 2017
SC No 3668 of 2015

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2017] QSC 175

DELIVERED ON:

6 July 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

22 March 2018

JUDGES:

Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Flanagan J

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   The appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3.   Cross-appeal dismissed.

4.   The respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the cross-appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS – JURISDICTIONAL ERROR – where the appellant exercised a discretionary power under s 448 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) to dismiss a complaint against two legal practitioners – where the appellant had delegated investigation of the complaint to a Senior Investigator – where the appellant had accepted the Senior Investigator’s recommendation that the complaint be dismissed – where information included in the Senior Investigator’s report was incorrect – where the learned primary judge held that the appellant had committed jurisdictional error in exercising the s 448 power – whether the learned primary judge erred – whether the appellant impermissibly imposed pre-conditions on the exercise of his statutory function – whether the appellant did not in fact exercise his statutory function

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – PREROGATIVE WRITS AND ORDERS – MANDAMUS – GENERALLY – where the learned primary judge made an order in the nature of mandamus under part 5 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) – whether the learned primary judge made an express finding, requisite to mandamus, that the appellant had failed or refused to exercise jurisdiction – whether the learned primary judge should have refused to grant an order of mandamus, because any jurisdictional error was immaterial and would not affect any future outcome

Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 41
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 448

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146; [2008] HCA 32, cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21, applied
R v Connell; Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 407; [1944] HCA 42, applied
Re Operative Plasterers Workers Federation of Australia; Ex parte Brown (1992) 67 ALJR 179; (1992) 46 IR 53, considered
Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 257 CLR 22; [2015] HCA 51, applied

COUNSEL:

G R Rice QC for the appellant/cross-respondent
M D Martin QC, with B J Kabel, for the respondent/cross-appellant

SOLICITORS:

Legal Services Commissioner for the appellant/cross-respondent
Mills Oakley for the respondent/cross-appellant

  1. FRASER JA:  I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Flanagan J.  I agree with those reasons and with the orders proposed by his Honour.

  2. McMURDO JA:  I agree with Flanagan J.

  3. FLANAGAN J:

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Details
Case
[2018] QCA 158
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Legal Services Commissioner appealed a decision of the Queensland Supreme Court which had quashed the Commissioner’s decision not to investigate a complaint against two legal practitioners. The complaint alleged that the solicitors had applied trust moneys to their fees, knowing that they were not entitled to do so. The solicitors had argued that the moneys were actually matrimonial property, and that they had no reason to suspect that they were trust monies. The Commissioner had dismissed the complaint, accepting the recommendation of a senior investigator. The Court of Appeal was asked to decide whether the Commissioner had committed jurisdictional error in dismissing the complaint and whether the mandamus remedy was appropriate. The Court found that the Commissioner had not committed jurisdictional error and that the mandamus remedy was not appropriate. The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The primary issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the Commissioner had committed jurisdictional error in dismissing the complaint against the two solicitors. The Court found that the Commissioner had not committed jurisdictional error because he had considered all relevant information and had made a rational decision. The Commissioner had accepted the recommendation of the senior investigator, who had considered the applicant’s submissions and had concluded that there was no basis for further investigation. The Court found that the Commissioner had not imposed any pre-conditions on the exercise of his statutory function and that he had exercised his function in accordance with the relevant legislation. The Court also found that the mandamus remedy was not appropriate because the Court could not make a determination as to whether the funds in question were trust funds or matrimonial property. The Court held that the mandamus remedy was not available where the jurisdictional error was immaterial and would not affect any future outcome.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. The appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3. Cross-appeal dismissed.

4. The respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the cross-appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, both the appeal and cross-appeal should be dismissed.Background The learned primary judge summarised the background facts, noting that they were “relatively uncontroversial”:[2][2]Nichols v Legal Services Commissioner [2017] QSC 175 at [4]-[26], AB Vol 3, pages 1219-1223; Appellant’s Amended Outline of Argument, [7].“[4] In 2009 the applicant and his family were engaged in the subdivision and construction of a number of homes. The development was pursued through a company called Asden Developments Pty Ltd which was responsible for the payment of builders and contractors. Its sole director was the applicant’s daughter-in-law. She separated from his son in 2010.[5]The applicant’s son commenced proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court against his wife with respect to custody and property and the applicant and other members of his family were joined to those proceedings on the basis that the property comprising the development was matrimonial property.[6]The applicant paid $270,000 in December 2010 at the request of his daughter-in-law to Asden for the purpose of paying its creditors. That money was banked into a bank account with Suncorp in the name of Asden. The daughter-in-law then caused $264,531.02 to be withdrawn and to be deposited into another account in the name of Asden with the Bank of Queensland. On 21 December 2010 she withdrew $236,500 from the Bank of Queensland account and deposited it into another Bank of Queensland account in the name of Urban Property Consulting Pty Ltd whose director was a ‘pre-insolvency expert’ advising her.[7]Of the $236,500 deposited into the Bank of Queensland account in the name of Urban Property, $180,000 was withdrawn and deposited into a bank account in the name of TGI Investments Pty Ltd, again with the Bank of Queensland. That company’s sole director was the daughter-in-law.[8]Between 8 February and 11 May 2011 the sum of $173,831.53 was transferred from the bank account in the name of TGI Investments to the daughter-in-law’s solicitors. The sum of $30,000 was deposited on 8 February 2011 and $143,831.53 on 11 May 2011. Thereafter approximately $92,000 was transferred from the trust account to the firm in payment of the daughter-in-law’s legal fees.[9]On 16 December 2010 the applicant’s then solicitors had demanded the return of the $270,000 from the daughter-in-law on the basis that it had not been used towards the cost of construction of the development property. The daughter-in-law gave that letter to the employed solicitor at the practice acting for her to receive advice about it. The entitlement to repayment of the $270,000 was said to be based upon the existence of a resulting or Quistclose trust in favour of the applicant given that the specific purpose for which the money had been paid, the payment of Asden’s creditors, had failed. On 22 December 2010 the daughter-in-law had caused Asden to be wound up on a voluntary basis.[10]On 1 May 2012 the matrimonial proceedings came on for trial before Federal Magistrate Jarrett. During the course of her cross-examination the daughter-in-law admitted that between 8 February 2011 and May 2011 she told her solicitor that she had caused the deposits and transfers of the money to which I have referred to be made ending with the deposit of $173,831.53 into the trust account of the firm of whom her solicitor worked.[11]The matrimonial proceedings were then adjourned to allow the partners of the firm to be joined on the basis that they knowingly received trust property or knowingly assisted in a breach of trust by Asden or the daughter‑in-law. It was also alleged against the solicitors that they applied $91,967 towards their fees knowing that such money was subject to a trust for the interests associated with the applicant and not his daughter-in-law.[12]When the matrimonial proceedings came back on for trial on 13 March 2013, the partners in the solicitors’ firm consented to judgment against them in respect of the claim brought by the applicant and his family including an amount for interest and costs on the standard basis. The hearing proceeded and judgments were also obtained on the merits against the daughter-in-law, Urban Property and the “pre-insolvency expert” who had advised the daughter-in-law about these steps. The daughter-in-law and the adviser were subsequently declared bankrupt and Urban Property was wound up.[13]On 9 August 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint with the respondent with respect to the employed solicitor’s conduct in applying the relevant funds towards payment of legal fees when, it was alleged, he knew that the funds had been paid by the applicant for the purposes of paying creditors of Asden.[14]The complaint was investigated by reference to the Queensland Law Society pursuant to s 435 of the Legal Profession Act 2007. The QLS investigator prepared a report on 2 September 2014 which recommended that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to s 448(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act.[15]The daughter-in-law did not wish to cooperate with the investigation but the cross‑examination to which I have already referred was provided to the investigator. From that cross-examination it should have been clear that the daughter-in-law’s evidence had been that she told her solicitor that the applicant had provided $270,000 to Asden to pay its creditors but that the daughter-in-law did not use it for that purpose.[16]The employed solicitor did provide a written response to the complaint in a letter dated 21 August 2014 in which he asserted that the money received from the daughter-in-law when received by the firm was money belonging to the matrimonial property pool. That was said to follow from the daughter‑in‑law’s involvement in the family group behind the development. He also said that the money placed into the trust account was verified by the daughter‑in‑law and her adviser as having the character of matrimonial property, not the species of trust property alleged by the applicant. He argued that, therefore, the drawing down of those funds to pay legal fees was completely regular. He went on to say that the allegations that the property had a particular character were not made until 5 April 2012 which was leading up to a trial on 1 May 2012 where the money had been in the firm’s trust account since February 2011.[17]He believed the allegation that there had been a Quistclose trust was raised on the first day of the hearing on 1 May 2012, some 18 months after the money was advanced to the daughter-in-law. He pointed out also that the firm by which he was employed was required to withdraw as the daughter‑in‑law’s solicitor on the record as a result of the allegations that were then made about the use of those funds.[18]He asserted legal professional privilege in respect of his communications with the daughter-in-law and claimed privilege in respect of the allegation that he had misappropriated trust moneys.[19]It was submitted for the applicant in this case that the solicitor admitted receiving the letter of demand from the applicant’s then solicitors dated 23 December 2010 but did not say what he was told by the daughter-in-law in respect of it nor the advice that he gave. No doubt his concern about legal professional privilege would have been relevant to that response by him. He was criticised however for not saying what he was told specifically by the daughter-in-law or her adviser that constituted verification that the money placed into the trust account had the character of matrimonial property.[20]The Queensland Law Society’s investigator concluded his report by seeking directions from the respondent regarding the commencement of a further investigation against the partners of the law practice for failing to supervise their employed solicitor’s conduct after April 2011 regarding the payment of the daughter-in-law’s legal costs and outlays from the trust money. As the Queensland Law Society’s investigator said: ‘After this date, it appears [the employed solicitor] knew or ought to have known that the nature of the trust money had changed and that it should not be applied towards the cost liability’ of the daughter-in-law.[21]That conclusion was available because the daughter-in-law had provided her solicitors with a chronology on 28 April 2011 identifying the source of the funds paid into their trust account.[22]The respondent forwarded that investigation report and a letter from the Law Society to the applicant on 30 September 2014 agreeing with the investigator’s report, the Queensland Law Society’s recommendation and informed the applicant that no further action would be taken with respect to his complaint. That letter raised the possibility of also investigating the female partner of the solicitors’ firm in respect of a concern about her supervision of the employed solicitor but said that it would not be in the public interest to undertake such an investigation.[23]On 13 April 2015 the applicant applied for an earlier review of the respondent’s decision to take no further action with respect to the initial complaint communicated in the letter of 30 September 2014. That application was dismissed by consent by an order of 28 July 2015 on the respondent undertaking to revoke the decisions the subject of that application and to reconsider them taking into account the matters raised in the applicant’s written submissions filed 21 July 2015.[24]It is apparent that the respondent delegated his review of the complaint to a senior investigator who, by an affidavit filed in these proceedings, recorded that she had considered those written submissions. That was a conclusion available also from a comparison of her report with the content of the written submissions. She, nonetheless, recommended that neither the female partner of the firm nor the employed solicitor be further investigated. The respondent by his letter dated 9 September 2016 accepted those recommendations.[25]There were responses from both the employed solicitor and the partner to the senior investigator’s inquiries which are criticised by the applicant as not addressing the issue of when the employed solicitor and/or the firm were led to believe that the money in the trust account was matrimonial property and available for payment of the fees. The partner’s contention was that whatever degree of supervision might be thought to have been reasonable, she would not have discovered that the money paid into the trust account was impressed with a trust of the nature alleged by the applicant. The reconsideration by the respondent’s senior investigator of the complaint pointed out that the applicant’s argument in his complaint against the employed solicitor and in his previous application to this court was that the employed solicitor knew that the money received by the firm into its trust account was the subject of a trust in favour of the applicant. The investigator then went on then to say:‘I have completed a reconsideration of [the applicant’s] complaint against [the employed solicitor] and I have noted therein that it would have been the court that decided in the end whether it was or wasn’t matrimonial property. In this respect I am in agreement with the statement made about the position being one that needed to be determined on evidence at trial.However, in this matter, there has been no determination made by the Court as to whether or not the moneys paid to [the daughter‑in-law] were “impressed with a trust” or formed part of the “matrimonial” property.Furthermore, this is not a determination that can now be made by you, the Commissioner. It is simply not within your powers under the Act to make.’[26]Unfortunately, however, for her proper consideration of the issue, there had been a determination made by the Federal Magistrates Court of this very issue albeit after the judgment by consent had been entered against the solicitors.[3] In his decision Federal Magistrate Jarrett made it clear that he was satisfied that the funds paid to the daughter-in-law were paid for the specific purpose of paying the creditors of Asden. He referred to the cross‑examination of the daughter-in-law to that effect which I have already mentioned and concluded that a Quistclose trust had been established for the purpose of paying the creditors of Asden. His Honour also concluded that the daughter-in-law received the funds on behalf of Asden and dealt with them inconsistently with the basis on which they were given to Asden. He also concluded that this was a case where there had been a very clear breach of trust.”[3]See Nichols & Nichols & Ors [2013] FCCA 1296.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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