Legal Services Commissioner v Ball

[1999] NSWADT 45

CITATION:	Legal Services Commissioner v Ball [1999] NSWADT 45
DIVISION:	Legal Services
APPLICANT:	Michael Lee Ball
RESPONDENT:	The Legal Services Commissioner
FILE NUMBER:	9813
HEARING DATES:	03/29/1999
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	03/29/1999
DATE OF DECISION:	29 June 1999
BEFORE:	G Molloy Presiding Judicial Member C Staff - Judicial Member D Mahon - Member
PRIMARY LEGISLATION:	Legal Profession Act 1987
APPLICATION:	Professional misconduct - solicitor ; Unsatisfactory professional conduct - solicitor -
MATTER FOR DECISION:	Interlocutory application for particulars by Respondent
REPRESENTATION:	Applicant: M Marien of counsel instructed by the Legal Services Commissioner Respondent: J Sacker QC of counsel with A Payne instructed by Minter Ellison
ORDERS:	1. The informant provide further and better particulars of the Grounds of Complaint in the Information, as requested by the legal practitioner in his solicitors’ letter dated 4 June 1998 on or before 30 July, 1999. 2. Costs reserved. 3. Liberty to either party to restore the Application to the list at a time convenient to the Tribunal to agitate any other matter raised in the legal practitioner’s Application filed 29 March 1999 and/or any other matter for which reasonable notice is given

1 It goes without saying that there is, in the Commissioner for Legal Services and in the Law Society, "no absolute duty to bring proceedings against a legal practitioner ….(and that any such proceedings must only be brought) after very careful deliberation and carefully weighing up the evidence and the chances of success and only after a careful investigation, careful interview of the witnesses and a professional assessment of the chances of success .....(it) is a very serious matter to bring disciplinary proceedings against a (legal practitioner)( as it is) a very serious matter to find a (legal practitioner) guilty of any sort of professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct ..... and it is also a very serious step for the Society or the Commissioner to file (an Information) against a legal practitioner alleging professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct. The consequences to a legal practitioner who is served with such (an Information) are highly traumatic. At the very least his/her professional reputation is being put at risk and, at the most, he/she is likely to have their name removed from the Roll. Furthermore, the result can be extremely expensive because the legal practitioner should properly obtain independent legal advice as to his/her position, be legally represented and generally be put to a great deal of time and expense in resisting the (Information) if it is to be contested. Consequently, it must follow that proceedings should only be brought in this Tribunal after careful consideration and weighing up all the facts" (see re Mark Philip Symonds (1995) 2 LPDR 10 at 12).

2 The proceedings against this legal practitioner have, thus far, been strenuously contested. There have been three interlocutory directions hearings (two before the Chairman of this constituted Tribunal sitting alone) and one before the full bench. These hearings have been devoted solely to the question of the provision of particulars by the Commissioner to the legal practitioner pertaining to the grounds of complaint preferred against him by the Commissioner. It is fairly trite law to observe that "allegations of professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct must be pleaded and particularised..." (Cofini (1997 1LPDR 1 at 3). See also re Dun (1994 3LPDR 5 at 10) where the Tribunal said:

"It is trite law, however, that the conduct complained of must be particularised (R v Saffron 1988 17 NSWLR 395 at 447) so that the legal practitioner knows the case he has to meet (see also Reza v General Medical Council (1991) 2 All ER 796)".

3 It is further worth referring to the unreported decision of this Tribunal in Attorney General of NSW v Gouder (No 23 of 1995 delivered 11 November 1996) at pp 23-29 where the Tribunal dealt with an argument that a referred complaint by the Attorney General did not require to be particularised. In that case, and in reliance upon a decision of the Tribunal in a barrister matter of Gruzman (No 1 of 1991, No 8 of 1992, 16 February 1994, unreported) it was submitted that the conduct alleged to have occurred is to be found in the complaint and somehow that meant it ought not to be confined or particularised. The Tribunal analysed the decision in Gruzman and said "If it is suggested that the Gruzman decision simply means that the whole of the complaint by member of the public is to be dumped upon the lap of the Tribunal for it to try and distill from it alleged breaches of professional conduct, then we simply reject that interpretation. In our view what Gruzman says is simply that where you have a referral of a complaint then you distill from the complaint the alleged breaches of professional misconduct. In Gruzman the problem was, as we see it, that the distillation by the Bar Council was reflected not in the particularisation of the alleged breaches but in the orders sought......it is plain that, however, whatever view one forms about a referral as distinct from a complaint by a Council of its own motion, the plain fact is that any complaint made against a legal practitioner must be particularised. In our view there is an absolute obligation on the referring Council or the referring Attorney to distill from the complaint made by a member of the public the issues of alleged breaches of professional misconduct that require response from the legal practitioner. If this were not the case and one simply had to weigh through sometimes voluminous correspondence, then that would impose an unwarranted and unfair burden upon a responding legal practitioner. It would also impose an unwarranted and unfair burden upon members of the Tribunal and it may lead the Tribunal into error by it failing to identify a professional conduct matter or it being misled by the documentation".

4 That Tribunal referred to the observations of Kirby P in R v Birlut (1995) 39 NSWLR 1 at 5, where His Honour said:

"Criminal procedure in our tradition is generally strict. The peril of liberty and the risk of reputation have imposed on criminal trials over the centuries a rigorous discipline so that procedural requirements are strictly complied with in the defence of the regularity of criminal process and the acceptability of its outcome. Rules of practical commonsense and flexibility, which have become increasingly acceptable in civil trials, must be viewed with reservation and care in the context of criminal trials. The fact that a point may be "technical" is irrelevant. The strict application of the rule of law in criminal proceedings is the essence of the way in which, in our legal system, courts have defended due process. The comment that the argument raised is "unmeritorious" is also beyond the point: c f Meagher JA in R v Perry (1993) 29 NSWLR 589 at 594. If the matter raised has legal merit, that is enough".

5 The Tribunal went on to make this observation:

"Although references to criminal standards of proof are sometimes unwarranted, professional disciplinary matters can often have grave consequences for the practitioner. They may affect his/her reputation and livelihood and one should view "with reservation and care" any attempt to remove from a respondent practitioner the protection of procedural fairness to which the practitioner is entitled".

6 When the application for particulars came on for hearing before the Chairman sitting alone on 13 August 1998, the Commissioner through his counsel resisted the application. It is worth quoting from the Chairman’s ex tempore judgment 13 August 1998:

"The Commissioner in his information has alleged a number of quite serious matters of conduct against the legal practitioner in or to the effect that the practitioner set out on a course of deception in that he did not reveal to LawCover that there was a major obstacle to an agreement reached in principle and that he set out on a course of conduct for the purposes of placing improper pressure on Dr Rajski to determine certain criminal proceedings, and that the legal practitioner in his correspondence and communications has lied.

I have not considered the information in detail but I think that is the gravamen of the allegations. They are, indeed, serious allegations and, in my opinion, at least at this stage, if found against the legal practitioner, are capable of constituting professional misconduct. In my view it would be wrong for me to embark upon an analysis of the material thus far filed and served. These are early days and one’s experience shows that as matters progress issues in dispute are refined and even sometimes eliminated. The provision of particulars often assists in this process.

It would be difficult, in my view, therefore, to form an opinion on what material or information would be relevant to the issues to be debated before the Tribunal at the hearing of the information. This Tribunal deals with professional conduct. The range of matters that the Tribunal can look at in determining the quality of the conduct of a legal practitioner should not be limited by denying to a legal practitioner access to material and information on which the practitioner, at the hearing, may wish to rely.

I should not try to second guess the evidence or the submissions the practitioner may wish to put before the Tribunal at hearing. Conduct that prima facie appears professionally objectionable may, viewed in a different light, be not so regarded and I should not, in the exercise of my discretion, seek to limit (within reason) the practitioner in endeavouring to elicit from the informant matters that may go towards explaining or negativing, or even putting a different hue upon, the alleged professionally offensive conduct.

Proceedings in this Tribunal are serious. The issues are grave and weighty and an adverse finding against a legal practitioner may result in that practitioner’s name being removed from the roll. Consequently, in my view, it is important that the practitioner be permitted to seek from the informant particulars that may not necessarily fall strictly within the ambit of the filed information but which may affect the view that the Tribunal forms of the alleged conduct at hearing.
It is my understanding that particulars may be ordered, even if they are not strictly necessary, to limit the extent of the evidence given at the hearing or to prevent surprise at the hearing and are merely supplemental to the particulars. This Tribunal, in my view, has a wide discretion to order further particulars wherever the proper administration of justice requires. It involves a balancing of the interests of the parties and, in my view, that balance weighs in favour of the legal practitioner today.

Mr Marien, for the informant, has properly identified the role of the informant as akin to that of a prosecutor so that the informant should put before this Tribunal all material (akin to the principles that govern the obligation to give discovery) that favours the case put forward by the informant or otherwise. Often material and information is only within the knowledge of the informant and not available to the practitioner. This Tribunal has in the past made comment to like effect".

7 The Chairman on that occasion made a number of various directions including an order that the "Commissioner of Legal Services ....provide to the legal representatives of the legal practitioner on or before 10 September 1998 the best particulars that he can presently give from his own knowledge and from the knowledge of the complainant to him, as requested by the legal practitioner in his solicitor’s letter dated 4 June 1998, with the exception of requests 23, 27 and 28", those requests being rejected on that occasion and not renewed before us.

8 The Commissioner supplied particulars which, in his view, complied with the directions/orders. The legal practitioner, on the other hand, was of the view that the particulars supplied were not sufficiently precise so that they did not comply with the legal requirements generally expected of parties providing particulars.

9 The matter came back before the Chairman sitting as a single member on 18 December 1998, primarily on the application of the legal practitioner for orders that the Commissioner provide further and better particulars on the basis that the particulars supplied were defective. The legal practitioner, through his senior counsel, complained that instead of specificity and precision and replies to the point, they were "given lengthy argumentative and somewhat rambling references to a series of events and documents many of which .... do not even involve the legal practitioner". There was some discussion at this hearing and the Chairman observed that this Tribunal proceeds on evidence, is bound by the rules of evidence, the matters brought against the practitioner were serious grave and weighty and therefore must be proved properly and that, as he understood it, the Commissioner relied upon a series of documents and an affidavit of Mr Basten QC, that was his case in chief and it appeared, at least on 18 December 1998, that what the legal practitioner was saying was that in one or more of the grounds alleged against him the Commissioner had not made out a prima facie case.

10 The result of that distillation was that the matter was adjourned for the purposes of determining that issue as a separate question. It was thought appropriate to convene a full bench.

11 When the matter came before the Tribunal on 29 March 1999 it appeared clear that the issue to be debated was, in reality, the sufficiency of the particulars supplied pursuant to the orders/directions initially made 13 August 1998.

Analysis
12 By letter dated 4 June 1998 the solicitors for the practitioner sought from the Commissioner further and better particulars of the various grounds of complaint against the practitioner as set out in the filed Information 24 May 1998. In that document there were five specified grounds. There is no requirement to set them out in detail. The grounds of complaint arise out of an allegation that the solicitor inserted certain terms in a draft deed which terms are said to be "improper", were designed to put improper pressure upon the complainant (Dr Rajski) and were designed to make the payment of certain civil settlement moneys contingent upon the termination of certain criminal proceedings. Contiguous with that alleged scenario it is alleged that the legal practitioner, on behalf of his firm, sought and obtained certain insurance moneys by deceiving the insurer by non-disclosure of the alleged improper terms, retained those moneys by deception and misappropriated those moneys.

13 The legal advisers for the legal practitioner sought further and better particulars of these various claims and generally sought "the usual particulars" which they described as follows:

"(a) Is it alleged that it is in writing or partly in writing? If so, please let us have a copy of the writing or advise where and when it may be inspected.

(b) Is it alleged that it was oral or partly oral? If so, please advise:


(i) when, where and between which persons the conversation or conversations relied on took place; and

(ii) the material substance of what was said and by whom in each conversation.

(c) Is it alleged that it was implied or partly implied? If so:


(i) what are all the acts, facts, matters, things and circumstances alleged to give rise to that implication; and

(ii) insofar as they are not set out in the Information or First Schedule (referring to the First Schedule to the Information), what are the precise agreements, statements, transactions or things, terms or parts of them, alleged to be implied?"


14 There is nothing terribly remarkable about that description of the "the usual particulars". In addition, where "the usual particulars" were not sought then the request referred to precision. For example, request 4.2 requested identification of "the precise content of" the alleged duty to inform the professional indemnity insurer. And again, 10.2 sought identification of "the precise basis" of the alleged lack of entitlement of the legal practitioner on behalf of his firm to retain the insurance settlement funds.

15 When one looks through the terms of the Request for Particulars one sees quite clearly that what is being asked of the Commissioner is information and facts with precision.

16 It is not unfair to summarise the submissions on behalf of the Commissioner being in or to the effect that the Commissioner has supplied to the legal practitioner every document upon which he would seek to rely and every piece of information that is available to him so that he has in fact complied with his requirements to provide particulars. In the Commissioner’s submission he has provided all necessary documentation that he has so that the legal practitioner cannot be surprised and so that he knows the nature of the evidence that he will be met with at the trial. The Commissioner goes even further: he says that he has provided all the evidence, as well as the particulars and that he really cannot go any further because, not only has he complied with the law pertaining to particulars but in addition he has submitted as part of his particulars and in other correspondence his submissions/arguments pertaining to the various grounds of complaint.

17 There is no need for us to set out the principles in detail yet again because those were set out by the Chairman in his ex tempore decision 13 August 1998. The thrust of the directions on that occasion was based upon the understanding that the Commissioner’s grounds of complaint are themselves based upon the Commissioner’s own enquiries and the information/allegations that may have been provided to him by Dr Rajski and/or others.

18 The key to a proper understanding of this matter is whether the proper administration of justice requires the Commissioner to be vastly more specific than he has been in responding to the questions so that he truly answers "the usual particulars" with specificity and precision.

19 Mr Sackar QC and his legal team carefully carried out a cut and paste exercise in which they set out firstly the actual ground of complaint, secondly the request for particulars, thirdly the answer given by the Commissioner and, in some cases, fourthly the assumption that is perhaps to be drawn from the particulars supplied.

20 To take one example: in respect of the first ground of complaint it was asked, "Is it alleged that a legally binding settlement agreement of the 1985P was ever reached between AAH on the one hand and Raybos and Rajski on the other?" and the Commissioner replied: "It is alleged that on 16 September 1994 an oral in-principle settlement agreement was reached between Allen Allen & Hemsley ("AAH") and Raybos and Dr Rajski. It is not alleged that the settlement agreement was "legally binding" (11.9.98)." Mr Sackar then says that he assumes the answer to the question was: "No".

21 Just dealing with that question alone, it seems to us, and we say so with great respect, that the answer given by the Commissioner to what is really a very, very simple question, is either "Yes" or "No".

22 It seems that the Commissioner may have mis-understood the purpose, from the point of view of a legal practitioner in this Division, of particulars. Taking the above example alone, it seems to us that the Commissioner has tried to answer the request by mounting an argument or making a submission, perhaps on the basis that a simple answer "Yes" or "No" might somehow prejudice the Commissioner’s case.

23 However, the Commissioner is not running a case. He is not winning or losing but he is conducting a matter in this Division in the interests of the public. And, with respect, the public (which includes the legal practitioner) is not assisted by a failure to answer what is really a very simple request for particulars.

24 A similar observation can be made with respect to request 2.1. As Mr Sackar points out, the answer to that question is also a simple "Yes" or "No" but in answer to that the Commissioner provides seven lines of material referring to various paragraphs of the First Schedule and the documents filed with the Commissioner’s affidavit 1 May 1998. We are unable to see the purpose of that exercise. If, in the case of questions 1.1 and 2.1 there is no "legally binding" (settlement) agreement then why not simply answer the question in the negative? No prejudice flows to the Commissioner by providing a simple answer.

25 A further example is question 3.2 where the Commissioner was requested to "please provide the usual particulars of the alleged "contingency"", and the Commissioner answered:

"The paragraphs upon which the contingency is based are referred to in paragraphs 13-23 of the First Schedule of the Information, and the documents referred to therein as filed with my affidavit of 1 May 1998".

26 The legal practitioner queried that answer stating that the Commissioner "should specify how the termination of the criminal proceedings was contingent as requested in the particulars, or if it is now your case that (he) "made payment" contingent upon termination of the criminal proceedings, you should provide the usual particulars of how he did so" and the Commissioner answered:

"With respect to this request for particulars I have provided full particulars which are within the knowledge of myself and the complainant in the First Schedule to the Information and in my letter to you dated 11 September 1998. Paragraphs 13-23 of the First Schedule to the Information and the documents referred to therein as filed with my affidavit of 1 May 1998 fully set out the particulars upon which the contingency is based."

27 With respect, that is simply not a proper answer to a request for particulars. Not only should inadmissible material not be put before a court or tribunal (see, for example, re Daly (1991) 5LPDR1 and the observations in Gouder above) but it is quite inappropriate and in our view improper to put the burden upon the legal practitioner to somehow divine from a bundle of material the precise allegation that is being made. In Etherton v Public Service Board of NSW (1983) 3NSWLR 297, the plaintiff faced a disciplinary charge being heard by the defendant Board. He complained that he had at no time had specific matters put to him and ultimately he was charged with a breach of discipline under S.83(e) of the Public Service Act which provided that a public service officer who "is negligent, careless, inefficient or incompetent in the discharge of his duties ...... is guilty of a breach of discipline". It was pleaded that the particulars of the breach was that the plaintiff "failed to carry out (his) duties as a senior district officer ..... in a satisfactory manner". At the hearing before Hunt J the Board maintained that it was under no obligation to supply any particulars of the charge. A quite extraordinary submission and not in any way advanced by the Commissioner in the matter before us. The Board then said that particulars already supplied were sufficient. It conceded that the plaintiff "was entitled to have the requirements of natural justice complied with but ....that it was not a requirement of natural justice in relation to administrative tribunals that a person charged with a disciplinary offence is entitled to particulars of that charge. It is sufficient ..... that the plaintiff is told of the charge itself and of the general nature of the case against him and that he is given in advance of the hearing copies of all the documents to be tendered against him .... (but) the Board is not obliged .... to identify the precise acts or omissions of the plaintiff upon which it relies to establish the charge or to affix a label to each such act or omission in order to identify to which part of S.85(e) it is said to relate. The plaintiff .... knew what his duties were. The documents identified for him the complaint which had been made to the Department concerning the way in which his district office had operated. He should, therefore, .... be able to work out for himself what the case was which he had to meet".

28 Hunt J, after reviewing authorities, said that,

"It is clear from all of (the authorities) that the plaintiff is entitled to particulars of the specific acts or omissions relied upon by the Board as establishing the truth of the charge against him".

One authority in point and relied upon by His Honour was Forest v La Caissse Populaire de Saint- Boniface Credit Union Society Limited (1962) 37DLR(2d) 440, a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal where Freedman JA said at 445:

"The person whose rights may be adversely affected by a contemplated procedure should be given prior notice thereof. Notice here means adequate notice. It should be clear and definite so that its recipient will know precisely what he has to meet. Certainly where expulsion is contemplated the notice should so state, and leave nothing to guesswork".

29 It is plain from the authorities that a plaintiff is not required to meet insubstantial and non-specific material. As Hunt J pointed out in Etherton at page 307:

"At some time during the course of this disciplinary enquiry, someone who is responsible for presenting the case against the plaintiff is going to have to settle down and do the hard work which is necessary to sort out from this mass of material precisely what that case is (our emphasis). It is quite wrong for a prosecutor to put a mass of material into evidence and only then, when it is all in, select from that mass of material that which looks to have come out worst for the officer charged .... nor should it be left to the Board (or its delegate) to do that work".

30 It is plain that "precision" is the key word in the provision of particulars. In this regard, in our view, the Commissioner’s particulars fail the test. A good example is question 4.2 dealing with the alleged duty of the legal practitioner to inform the professional indemnity insurer of any contingency concerning the termination of criminal proceedings. The Commissioner responded:

"The duty arises under the ethical rules, obligations and duties applicable to legal practitioners arising from the common law and under statute .... "

and referred to three well known cases and Section 127 of the Legal Profession Act 1987. In our respectful opinion that is a quite inadequate answer to a query that asks for identification of the precise content of the duty to inform.

31 The legal practitioner’s legal team queried this answer and suggested to the Commissioner that he "should identify the precise content of the duty alleged. It is not sufficient to rely upon the general rules, obligations and duties applicable to legal practitioners in the circumstances ....". In answer the Commissioner responded at considerable length, 56 lines in fact, referring to, inter alia, the "duty imposed on all legal practitioners not to depart from particular professional standards", the duty "not to engage in conduct which legal practitioners of good repute and competency would reasonably consider disgraceful or dishonourable", the duty "not to engage in conduct which amounts to grave impropriety affecting the legal practitioner’s professional character being conduct which is indicative of a failure to either understand or practise the precepts of honesty or fair dealing in relation to the courts, his clients or the public" and the duty "not to engage in conduct which may reasonably be held to violate to a substantial degree the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of a profession of good repute and competency".

32 With respect, none of that advances the matter one iota. With respect, we agree with Mr Sackar’s observations to the effect these are generalisations but the question related to the precise content of (the) duty to "inform" the professional indemnity insurer. Somebody has to sit down and formulate the content of that duty, how it arises and the source of the duty/obligation, and how it is that the legal practitioner breached that formulated duty/obligation.

33 There is no need for us to go through each of the balance of the cut and paste schedule so carefully prepared by Mr Sackar QC and the practitioner’s legal team. Suffice it to say that it demonstrates, in our respectful opinion, the failure to be precise, the failure to identify with precision the conduct that is alleged to be improper and the failure to identify in the manner reasonably request by the practitioner the facts supporting the contentions. For example in ground 2, question 9.1 asks whether it was alleged that the settlement funds were retained by the practitioner by deception of the professional indemnity insurer. The answer to that question was "Yes". The next question (9.2) asks for the provision of "the usual particulars of that deception". It is not up to us (and as a general rule a court or tribunal should not attempt to draft documents for parties) to identify what information ought to have been supplied by the Commissioner in answer to "the usual particulars of that deception" but it is plain from the letter for June 1998 (the initial request for particulars) that it really cannot be too hard for the Commissioner to answer paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) dealing with whether the deception was in writing or partly in writing, oral or partly oral, implied or party implied.

34 There was a great deal of argument before us in reliance upon Meissner v R (1994-5) 184CLR 132 on whether the complaint against the practitioner that he was "involved" (whatever that means) in the insertion and maintenance of improper terms in terms of settlement making the payment of settlement moneys contingent upon the termination of certain criminal proceedings amounted to a crime being conduct which had the tendency to pervert the course of justice and did so with the intention of perverting the course of justice. At this point in these proceedings we are of the respectful view that we do not need to embark upon an analysis of the High Court’s decision. We do not necessarily put it aside permanently but if the argument requires to be agitated at a later date then it certainly can be. However, in our view, it is not necessary for our determination on the issue now before us because we have formed the very clear view that, although the Commissioner has gone to considerable trouble to set out the particulars as he saw them, those particulars are not the particulars which should have been supplied consistent with the requirements of natural justice with the precision and specificity that is reasonably required when providing "the usual particulars" as defined in the legal practitioner’s solicitors’ letter 4 June 1998.

35 The solicitor’s Application filed 29 March 1999 is therefore successful in that this Tribunal is prepared to and now makes an order/directions in accordance with paragraph (c) of that Application.

36 There are a number of other orders/directions that the practitioner seeks. These were not dealt with on 29 March and leave is granted to the parties to re-list this matter at a convenient time should either party wish to agitate any other paragraph in the practitioner’s Application or any other matter for which notice is reasonably given.

37 For the sake of completeness the practitioner asked for orders that the Information be permanently stayed on the ground that it was oppressive, embarrassing and otherwise an abuse of process. Alternatively that the proceedings be stayed until proper particulars of the allegations have been provided. The Commissioner made certain written submissions on those aspects but it seems to us that there is no need at this stage to embark upon a consideration of those aspects having regard to the orders for particulars that are made hereunder.

38 Costs should be reserved.

39 Since preparing the above Walton VP. sitting in the Industrial Relations Commission of NSW in Court Session delivered judgment on 3 May 1999 in Matters No. IRC 3235 and 3236 of 1998 on an application by the Defendant for particulars. Walton VP. reviewed much of the law pertaining to particulars and declined to make the orders sought having regard to the peculiar statutory regime (Section 15(1) Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1983) under consideration. We do not understand anything in this judgment to affect in any way the reasoning and conclusions reached by this Tribunal.

ORDERS
1. The informant provide further and better particulars of the Grounds of Complaint in the Information, as requested by the legal practitioner in his solicitors’ letter dated 4 June 1998 on or before 30 July, 1999.

2. Costs reserved.

3. Liberty to either party to restore the Application to the list at a time convenient to the Tribunal to agitate any other matter raised in the legal practitioner’s Application filed 29 March 1999 and/or any other matter for which reasonable notice is given.

Last Updated: 09/29/1999