6. The Tribunal make and transmit a report on the findings of professional misconduct to the Supreme Court of Western Australia (full bench) with a recommendation that the name of the practitioner be removed from the roll of persons admitted to the legal profession under the Legal Profession Act 2008. 7. Pursuant to s 438(3)(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), the respondent's local practising certificate is suspended from 28 November 2014 until the determination of the Supreme Court (Full Bench).
8. The practitioner pay the applicant's costs fixed in the sum of $3,000.
9. The amount specified in order 7 is to be paid to the Legal Practice Board by the practitioner within 30 days or as agreed by the applicant.
5 The parties agreed that the matter be determined on the documents and therefore a hearing was unnecessary.The legal principles
6 In Legal Profession Complaints Committee v in de Braekt [2013] WASC 124, the Full Court stated at [24] - [26]:
… The court's jurisdiction with respect to the regulation of the legal profession in this [S]tate is to be exercised with the interests and protection of the public, and the reputation of the legal profession as its primary objects, and not for the purpose of punishing the practitioner: Re Maraj (a legal practitioner) (1995) 15 WAR 12, 25 (Malcolm CJ, Kennedy and Franklyn JJ agreeing); Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales [1957] HCA 46; (1957) 97 CLR 279, 286 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ agreeing); Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Masten [2011] WASC 71 [16] (Martin CJ, Murray and EMHeenan JJ); Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Brennan [2010] WASC 198 [10] (Martin CJ, Murray and Hall JJ agreeing). Where the motion is to strike a practitioner from the Roll, the critical question for the court is whether the practitioner is shown not to be a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner: Ziems (297 - 298) (Kitto J, Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ agreeing); A Solicitor v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2004] HCA 1; (2004) 216 CLR 253 at [15] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ); Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Thorpe [2008] WASC 9 at [43] (Steytler P, Wheeler JA and Newnes J). Fitness to practice law requires that the practitioner must command the personal confidence of his or her clients, fellow practitioners and judges: In re Davis (1947) 75 CLR 409, 420 (Dixon J); Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Thorpe at [43] (Steytler P, Wheeler JA and Newnes J); Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Brennan at [11] (Martin CJ, Murray and Hall JJ agreeing).
Striking off is an order reserved for very serious cases, where the character and conduct of the practitioner is seen to be 'inconsistent with the privileges of further practice': Barristers' Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 253; (2000) 112 A Crim R 438 [38] (Thomas JA, McMurdo P and White J agreeing). Integrity and honesty are essential characteristics expected of a practitioner, and therefore, the court has generally taken a very serious approach when dealing with dishonesty by a practitioner: Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Bachmann [2011] WASC 309 at [47] (Martin CJ, EM Heenan and Jenkins JJ); Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Palumbo [2005] WASCA 129 at [22] (Steytler P, Wheeler and McLure JJA agreeing); Kyle v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [1999] WASCA 115; (1999) 21 WAR 56 at [69] (Parker J); Re Maraj (25) (Malcolm CJ, Kennedy and Franklyn JJ agreeing). In Barristers' Board v Darveniza, Thomas JA observed at [33] that:
[T]he quality most likely to result in striking off is conduct which undermines the trustworthiness of the practitioner, or which suggests a lack of integrity or that the practitioner cannot be trusted to deal fairly within the system which he or she practices.
7 In Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v McKerlie [2007] WASC 119, the Full Court said at [8]:
Honesty and integrity are considered essential prerequisites to the right to practise law. Conduct most likely to lead to a practitioner's name being struck off the roll of practitioners is that which undermines the trustworthiness of a practitioner or which suggests a lack of integrity, so that the practitioner cannot be trusted to deal fairly within the system in which he or she practises.
8 In Kylev Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [1999] WASCA 115; (1999) 21 WAR 56 (Kyle) at [6], Ipp J stated:
It is the essence of a charge of unprofessional conduct involving misleading the court that the practitioner concerned is guilty of having done something dishonourable: see Re Cooke (1889) 5 TLR 407 at 408, per Lord Esher MR (with whom Fry and Lopes LJJ agreed). The dishonourable quality lies in knowingly misleading the court: see Tombling v Universal Bulb Co Ltd [1951] 2 TLR 289 at 297, per Denning LJ; Vernon v Bosley (No 2) [1997] 3 WLR 683; [1997] 1 All ER 614. A practitioner who knowingly misleads a court will do so dishonestly. Therein lies the unprofessional conduct …
9 Parker J (with whom Ipp J, at [1], and Steytler J, at [22], agreed) held in Kyle at [66] that:
The duty of counsel not to mislead the court in any respect must be observed without regard to the interests of the counsel or of those whom the counsel represents. No instructions of a client, no degree of concern for the client's interests, can override the duty which counsel owes to the court in this respect. At heart, the justification for this duty, and the reason for its fundamental importance in the due administration of justice, is that an unswerving and unwavering observance of it by counsel is essential to maintain and justify the confidence which every court rightly and necessarily puts in all counsel who appear before it.
Analysis 10 The practitioner acted dishonestly and in breach of his duties as an officer of the Court.
11 The admitted misconduct that took place in relation to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the consent orders involve intentionally misleading others in the practitioner's professional capacity.
12 The misconduct that took place in relation to paragraph 3 of the consent orders is of a particularly serious nature since it involves the filing of an affidavit sworn by the practitioner with the intention of misleading the Court.
13 Although the particular instances of misleading conduct were not all made to the same body or persons, the practitioner's misleading conduct occurred on six occasions. In addition, the misleading conduct occurred over an extended period of time: 21 December 2011 (paragraph 4.2 and 4.3), 25 February 2012 (paragraph 4.4), 3 May 2012 (paragraph 3), 10 December 2013 (paragraph 5.1) and 25 October 2013 (paragraph 5.2). The practitioner's conduct cannot be seen as an isolated act of misjudgement.
14 The practitioner's conduct is, therefore, serious because it is repeated (Legal Profession Complaints Committee and in de Braekt [2012] WASAT 58(S); (2012) 80 SR (WA) 134 at [22] and [25]; The Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Wright [2001] QCA 58 at [67]).
Recommendation
15 The misleading conduct would of itself be sufficient to justify a recommendation to the Full Court that the practitioner be struck off.
16 In addition, the practitioner's other conduct is serious.
17 Every client is entitled to expect that a practitioner dealing with his or her claim will do so expeditiously. A practitioner has a duty to the client and to the court to progress a client's claim expeditiously. No reason was offered for the failure by the practitioner to progress the claim between July 2008 and October 2012.
18 Similarly, a client is entitled to be informed of the progress of his or her claim, irrespective of whether, or not, the client makes enquiries. Litigation is stressful. Keeping a client informed of the progress of a claim is one way of reducing the stress. A failure to keep the client informed of the progress of the claim may have reflected the fact that the practitioner was not progressing the claim. The practitioner repeatedly failed to respond to the client's enquiries. In this instance the practitioner not only failed to keep the client informed of his own volition, but failed to respond to the client's enquiries.
19 As a result of the conduct identified in the minute of consent orders, neither the court nor the client could have any confidence in the honesty or integrity of Mr Waters. Mr Waters cannot be trusted to deal fairly within the system in which he practises. Plainly, the public need to be protected. Mr Waters is not a fit and proper person to remain a legal practitioner.
20 It is to the credit of Mr Waters that he apparently recognises and accepts both the seriousness of his conduct and its consequences and has consented to the order set out above that the Tribunal transmit a report on its findings to the Supreme Court with a recommendation for removal of the practitioner's name from the Roll.
21 Based on his admissions by way of his signature on the minute of consent orders submitted to the Tribunal on 19 November 2014, we are satisfied and find that the practitioner engaged in professional misconduct within the meaning of s 404 of the LP Act in the way identified in paragraphs 1 to 5 of the consent orders set out above. We consider that the order proposed by the parties, namely, that the Tribunal transmit a report on its findings to the Supreme Court (Full Bench), with a recommendation for removal of the practitioner's name from the Roll, is an appropriate disposition of the matter by the Tribunal, and make the orders proposed by the parties.
22 These reasons constitute the report.
Orders
The Tribunal makes the following order: 1.Pursuant to s 438(4)(b) the Tribunal makes and transmits a report on the findings of professional misconduct to the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Full Bench) with a recommendation that the practitioner's name be removed from the roll of persons admitted to the legal profession under the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA).
2. The practitioner pay the applicant's costs in the sum of $3,000 to the Legal Practice Board within 30 days of this order unless other terms have been agreed by the applicant.
I certify that this and the preceding [22] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal. ___________________________________
JUSTICE J C CURTHOYS, PRESIDENT