| JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL STREAM : VOCATIONAL REGULATION ACT : LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 2008 (WA) CITATION : LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE and A LEGAL PRACTITIONER [2013] WASAT 34 MEMBER : JUDGE D R PARRY (DEPUTY PRESIDENT) MR J MANSVELD (MEMBER)
MR C EDMONDS SC (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER)
HEARD : DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS DELIVERED : 11 MARCH 2013 [REVISED 20 JUNE 2013] FILE NO/S : VR 183 of 2010 BETWEEN : LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE Applicant
AND
A LEGAL PRACTITIONER
Respondent
Catchwords: Practice and procedure - Application for leave to reopen case - Procedural fairness - Delay - Tribunal's objectives
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Legislation: State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 32, s 32(5), s 34(1), s 60(2), s 76, s 105(1), s 62(3) Result: Leave to reopen respondent's case dismissed
Summary of Tribunal's decision: A legal practitioner sought leave to reopen his case in relation to allegations of professional misconduct made against him by the Legal Profession Complaints Committee. The substantive hearing took place on 6 and 7 March 2012 and closing submissions were heard on 17 July 2012. The finalisation of the matter was delayed because of various applications made by the practitioner to the Tribunal and the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
On 19 February 2013, the practitioner sought leave to reopen his case. The Tribunal dismissed the practitioner's application for several reasons. The Tribunal assessed each of the bases stated by the practitioner as to why leave to reopen was sought and found his submissions to be without merit. More broadly, the practitioner was afforded procedural fairness, including every reasonable opportunity and indulgence to present his case. There was significant delay in making the application to reopen the case. Finally, particularly having regard to the various applications made by the practitioner since the hearing, and the consequent significant delay in the determination of the proceeding, the granting of the application for leave to reopen the case would be manifestly inconsistent with the Tribunal's statutory objectives.
[The reasons for decision were revised prior to general publication on 20 June 2013 in accordance with a nonpublication order made under s 62(3) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)].
Category: B
Representation: Counsel:
Applicant : N/A
Respondent : Self-represented
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Solicitors:
Applicant : N/A
Respondent : N/A
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Giannarelli v Wraith [1988] HCA 52; (1988) 165 CLR 543
Re Maraj (a Legal Practitioner) (1995) 15 WAR 12
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REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction 1 The Legal Profession Complaints Committee alleges that a legal practitioner engaged in professional misconduct in four respects relating to consent orders affecting a third party's interests which were made by the Family Court of Western Australia in proceedings between the practitioner and his former wife for an alteration of their property interests. The Committee also alleges that the practitioner engaged in professional misconduct by failing to respond adequately and within a reasonable time to written enquiries made of the practitioner by the Committee. 2 We conducted the substantive hearing in this matter on 6 and 7 March 2012 and, after both parties filed written closing submissions, heard oral closing submissions from both parties on 17 July 2012. The determination of the matter has been delayed because of various applications made by the practitioner to the Tribunal and to the Supreme Court of Western Australia which are outlined below. On 19 February 2013, the practitioner sought leave to reopen his case. For reasons set out below, we consider that the application to reopen the practitioner's case should be dismissed.
Practitioner's applications and other events following hearing 3 The hearing of this matter was listed to take place over three days from 68 March 2012. When the evidence was completed on the afternoon of 7 March 2012, Mr MF Rynne of counsel, who appeared for the practitioner, indicated that his instructions were to obtain the transcript before making final submissions. Although Ms PE Cahill SC, who appeared with Ms PE Le Miere, on behalf of the Committee expressed the Committee's preference 'to box on', we decided that the practitioner's wish to obtain the transcript before making final submissions should be accommodated. Counsel proposed the simultaneous exchange of written submissions on the basis that they could each respond to the other's submissions at a further oral hearing on a date to be fixed. 4 The parties were ordered to file and exchange written submissions by 20 April 2012, which was later extended to 4 May 2012. The matter was listed for final oral submissions at 10 am on 19 June 2012 for a duration of three hours. However, the date for oral submissions was vacated because of a misunderstanding of that date by Mr Rynne and the matter was then relisted for oral submissions at 4 pm on 17 July 2012 for two (Page 5)
hours. That hearing proceeded with counsel making oral closing submissions, in addition to their written submissions, and responding to each other's submissions, for almost two and a half hours. We then reserved our decision. 5 On 23 July 2012, the practitioner terminated the brief to Mr Rynne and made what we described as 'a most extraordinary application' for 'leave to file written submissions in lieu of the oral submissions made on 17 July 2012': [citation redacted]. The application was listed for hearing on 1 August 2012. As Mr MJ Lourey, who appeared on behalf of the practitioner on the hearing of the application indicated, the application was to substitute a fresh set of submissions for all of the submissions made orally by Mr Rynne on behalf of the practitioner on 17 July 2012. 6 We dismissed the practitioner's application because 'it could not possibly be suggested that the practitioner has been denied procedural fairness': [citation redacted]. However, we discerned an implicit, alternative application for the filing of supplementary submissions and, having regard to the potential effect of the proceedings on the practitioner's capacity to lawfully pursue his vocation, we decided to grant the practitioner leave to file and serve 'short supplementary written submissions', within seven days of the transcript of the hearing on 17 July 2012 being made available to him, in relation to the five topics nominated by Mr Lourey as to why the application for leave to substitute submissions was said to be necessary, namely: (a) comments made by counsel on 17 July 2012; (b) concessions made by counsel on 17 July 2012; (c) response to closing submissions of the [Committee]; (d) queries from the Tribunal on 17 July 2012; and (e) matters omitted by counsel on 17 July 2012. 7 We also directed that the Committee may file and serve responsive submissions, within seven days of the receipt of the practitioner's submissions, and ordered that the Tribunal's decision was reserved with effect from the receipt of the last of the submissions filed in accordance with our orders. 8 On 15 August 2012, the practitioner filed supplementary written submissions comprising 126 paragraphs over 26 pages. On (Page 6)
4 September 2012, the Committee filed responsive submissions comprising two paragraphs over two pages. 9 On 28 August 2012, the practitioner sought leave to appeal pursuant to s 105(1) of the State Administrative Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) to the Court of Appeal from our decision to refuse him leave to file written submissions in lieu of the oral submissions made on 17 July 2012. On 5 September 2012, the practitioner advised the Tribunal that he had lodged 'a stay application in relation to the orders of 1 August 2012'. 10 On 20 September 2012, the practitioner wrote to the Tribunal, referring to the stay application and requesting the Tribunal to 'please defer doing anything further in relation to [these proceedings] until the Court hands down its decision on the stay application', which he considered 'would be any time after 2nd October 2012'. On 25 September 2012, the Tribunal responded to the practitioner's letter advising that, although, subject to the Court of Appeal granting a stay, the Tribunal's intention was to determine the proceedings within the statutory 90 day period under s 76 of the SAT Act from the filing of the Committee's response to the practitioner's written submissions on 4 September 2012: For the information of the parties and, if relevant the Court of Appeal, given the Tribunal's workload is likely the panel will not have the opportunity to review the evidence and submissions and consider its decision until early November 2012. 11 On 5 October 2012, the practitioner advised the Tribunal that his application to the Court of Appeal for a stay in relation to the Tribunal's orders of 1 August 2012 had been discontinued. The practitioner also advised that the appeal remained on foot. 12 On 9 October 2012, the practitioner advised the Tribunal that, on the previous day, he had lodged an application in the Supreme Court for prerogative relief in relation to the Tribunal's orders of 1 August 2012. The practitioner requested, in light of the Tribunal's letter of 25 September 2012, advice as whether the Tribunal 'is prepared to defer any further consideration of the above matter until the Court has considered [the application for prerogative relief]'. On 10 October 2012, the Tribunal responded to the practitioner's letter stating that the Tribunal's intention remained as conveyed in the letter dated 25 September 2012. (Page 7)
13 On 26 October 2012, McKechnie J refused to grant an order nisi for a writ of certiorari or mandamus in relation the practitioner's application for prerogative relief because 'there is arguable basis to do so or to suggest that an order nisi might ultimately be made absolute': [citation redacted]. 14 On 1 November 2012, the practitioner made an application to the Tribunal seeking the following orders: 1. The decision of the Tribunal made 1 August 2012 in this matter be revoked. 2. The practitioner have leave to withdraw the oral submissions made by his Counsel on 17 July 2012. 3. The practitioner's Supplementary Written Submissions dated 15 August 2012 stand in lieu of the oral submissions made by his Counsel on 17 July 2012. 4. The practitioner have leave to file ande [sic] serve any Further Supplementary Written Submissions within 7 days. 5. Alternatively, this matter be stayed by the Tribunal until the practitioner's appeal in relation to orders of 1 August 2012 [proceeding reference redacted] is determined. 15 The application dated 1 November 2012 was accompanied by an affidavit of the practitioner containing submissions and attachments. 16 On 5 November 2012, the Committee filed and served an outline of submissions opposing the practitioner's application dated 1 November 2012. On 6 November 2012, the practitioner sent a letter by email to the Tribunal in which he proposed that the Tribunal should make directions for the determination of his application filed on 1 November 2012 on the documents. 17 On 6 November 2012, the Tribunal wrote to the parties as follows: I refer to the interim application filed by the [practitioner] on 1 November 2012, the [Committee's] submissions filed on 5 November 2012 and the [practitioner's] letter by email dated 6 November 2012. Deputy President Judge Parry has formed a preliminary view, subject to any further submissions from the respondent, that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to 'revoke' its decision made on 1 August 2012 and that there is no basis for an application to file further supplementary written submissions. Subject to what follows the Tribunal proposes to proceed with the determination of the substantive matter. (Page 8)
Pursuant to s 76 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) the President has extended the period within which the Tribunal is required to give its decision and the reasons for the decision until 60 days after the resolution of the appeal from the Tribunal's decision made on 1 August 2012. The reason for the extension is to avoid the prospect of the Tribunal proceeding on a basis that may be found by the Court of Appeal to be erroneous and potential difficulties which may then arise. The President has requested the parties to advise the Court of Appeal that the Tribunal has deferred the decision in this proceeding pending the resolution of the appeal and to request that the appeal be heard and determined urgently. The President has also requested the parties to update the Tribunal regularly as to the progress of the appeal. Judge Parry has requested the respondent to advise the Tribunal and the applicant whether, in light of the foregoing, he wishes to maintain his applications for the Tribunal to 'revoke' its decision made on 1 August 2012 and to make further supplementary written submissions, in which case the matter will be listed for a directions hearing to determine those matters. 18 On 7 November 2012, the practitioner advised the Tribunal as follows: In light of the order made by the President that the period within which the Tribunal is required to give its decision and the reasons for that decision be extended to 60 days after the resolution of the appeal from the Tribunal's decision made on 1 August 2012, I no longer wish to maintain my application to have the Tribunal revoke its orders of 1 August 2012, and to make further supplementary submissions. 19 On 18 December 2012, two days before his application for leave to appeal from our decision given on 1 August 2012 was due to be heard in the Court of Appeal, the practitioner discontinued the appeal. In a letter dated 19 December 2012 to the Tribunal, the practitioner explained that he withdrew the appeal because he had arranged for 'senior counsel from the eastern states to come over once in March/April 2013', when the appeal itself would be heard if leave to appeal were granted, 'but given the significant amount of money I have expended on VR 183/2010 in proceedings before the Tribunal, I could not afford to bring senior counsel over twice'. The practitioner also stated as follows: In these circumstances, and whilst I appreciate the decision of the President set out in the Tribunal's letter of 6 November 2012, I seek the further short indulgence of the Tribunal to now list my applications of 1 November 2012 for a directions hearing as soon as the Tribunal is ready in the New Year. (Page 9)
If the Tribunal is of the view that my letter of 7 November 2012 to the Tribunal prevents that occurring, I will be filing an alternative interim application in this matter in the week commencing 7 January 2013. In the meantime I maintain that the submissions Mr Rynne made on 17 July 2012 were without instructions and unauthorized. Mr Lourey stands ready to, if required, file and serve an affidavit clarifying his comments to the Tribunal on this point at the hearing of 1 August 2012. Further, not all matters omitted by Mr Rynne were able to be dealt with in my submissions filed 15 August 2012 due to the restrictions placed on those submissions in the decision of the Tribunal of 1 August 2012. Accordingly, it continues to be my respectful submission that it would be unsafe for the Tribunal to rely upon Mr Rynne's submissions of 17 July 2012, both in terms of what was said, and what was omitted. 20 On 7 January 2013, Deputy President Judge Parry made the following orders: 21 On 15 January 2013, the practitioner filed further submissions in support of his application dated 1 November 2012 and, on 1 February 2013, he filed submissions in relation to oral submissions made by his counsel on 17 July 2012. 22 The hearing of the practitioner's application dated 1 November 2012 was brought forward from 7 February 2013 to 5 February 2013 and took place before the President, Justice Chaney, on that day. His Honour dismissed the practitioner's application and ordered the practitioner to pay the Committee's costs of the application fixed in the sum of $1,500 within 35 days: [citation redacted]. 23 On 8 February 2013, the practitioner filed a document entitled 'concluding comments', paragraph 1 of which stated as follows: These comments deal with the nature of the issues that would have been the subject of further submissions, by fresh counsel, had the Tribunal allowed Mr Rynne's submissions to be withdrawn and replaced. The (Page 10)
comments, in the practitioners [sic] view, need to be on the Tribunal record prior to the decision being handed down in this matter. 24 On 15 February 2013, the Tribunal wrote to the practitioner referring to the document entitled 'concluding comments' and stating as follows: As the Tribunal has not granted you leave to provide any further submissions the contents of your 'concluding comments' will not be considered by the Tribunal in the determination of these proceedings.
Consideration and determination of practitioner's application for leave to reopen his case 25 On 19 February 2013, the practitioner filed an interim application seeking the following order or, in effect, four orders: 1. That leave be granted to the [practitioner] to reopen his case to: (i) lead evidence in response to the new case(s) of the [Committee] which came about as a result of changes to their case commencing 6 March 2012, and concluding 17 July 2012. (ii) recall and further crossexamine witnesses [Ms B], [Mr A] and if necessary Mr Sim due to the incompetence of Counsel at the hearing on 6 March 2012. (iii) make submissions regarding the findings of fact and/or issue estoppels that arose out of the judgements [sic] and reasons for decision in the Family Court matter heard in February 2006, and in [citation redacted], and submissions regarding the 2003 Act and the 2008 Act none of which were made due to the incompetence of Counsel representing the practitioner. (iv) make submissions regarding the above matters, including the making of submissions to deal with, in an unrestricted manner, the submissions of the practitioner's Counsel on 17 July 2012, the submissions of the [Committee] of 28 May 2012 and 17 July 2012, and the questions from the Tribunal on 17 July 2012. 26 On 19 February 2013, Judge Parry made the following orders: 1. By 26 February 2013 the [practitioner] must file and serve any submissions he wishes to make in relation to why leave should be granted to reopen his case, having regard to the previous interim applications he has made following the conclusion of the hearing on 17 July 2012 and the determination of those applications by the Tribunal. (Page 11)
27 On 26 February 2013, the practitioner filed submissions, comprising 69 paragraphs over 12 pages, in relation to why leave should be granted to reopen his case. He submitted that he would be denied natural justice if the Tribunal proceeded to determine the matter without granting him leave to reopen his case. He submitted that the Committee's case, as presented against him at the hearing, was not reasonably apparent from the Committee's application to the Tribunal and that he was therefore denied the opportunity to give evidence, call other witnesses to give evidence, and present further relevant documentary evidence. He submitted that Mr Rynne was incompetent because he failed to crossexamine witnesses 'on crucial matters fundamental to the defence of the [Committee's] application by the practitioner'. The practitioner also objected to the Tribunal determining his application for leave to reopen his case on the documents, and sought an oral hearing, as 'such an important application such as one to reopen, should not be determined on the papers, and it would be unfair and in any event contrary to section 32 of the [SAT Act] to do so'. 28 We do not consider it necessary to call upon the Committee to provide responsive submissions. We also do not consider it necessary, in order to afford procedural fairness to the practitioner and to properly determine his application for leave to reopen his case, to conduct an oral hearing. The practitioner was given an opportunity to file submissions in the knowledge that, subject to any further order, the application for leave to reopen would be determined on the documents. He provided lengthy written submissions. 29 The Tribunal undoubtedly has a discretion to grant leave to a party to reopen its case prior to the determination of the proceeding. Section 32(5) of the SAT Act states that: To the extent that the practice or procedure of the Tribunal is not prescribed by or under this Act or the enabling Act, it is to be as the Tribunal determines. (Page 12)
30 The Tribunal also has power under s 34(1) of the SAT Act to: … give directions at any time in a proceeding and do whatever is necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding. 31 In exercising the discretion as to whether to grant leave to the practitioner to reopen his case, we take into account the Tribunal's main statutory objectives set out in s 9 of the SAT Act and the obligation of the Tribunal, stated in s 32(1) of the SAT Act, to afford procedural fairness. The Tribunal's objectives set out in s 9 of the SAT Act include to achieve the resolution of disputes, and to make decisions, 'fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case' and 'to act as speedily and with as little formality and technicality as is practicable, and minimise the costs to parties'. 32 In our view, the practitioner's application for leave to reopen his case should be dismissed for the following reasons. 33 We will address, in turn, each of the four orders sought by the practitioner in his interim application dated 19 February 2013. 34 As to order 1.(i) (leave to reopen to 'lead evidence in response to the new case(s) of the [Committee] which came about as a result of changes to their case'), the practitioner submitted there were two 'variations' to the Committee's case justifying his calling new evidence. The first is that, at the commencement of hearing, the Tribunal permitted an amendment to the Committee's application by substituting '1 December 2004' in place of '7 December 2004' in relation to grounds (a) (d). This amendment was obviously required by reference to the Particulars (the facts) alleged by the Committee. No possible prejudice was caused to the practitioner, who was always on notice as to the relevant dates, and, to the extent that the amendment required any additional evidence (which we do not accept), he could have adduced it during the hearing. The second suggested 'variation' to the pleading is the Committee's reference, in its oral submissions, to the practitioner's 'plan' (involving defeating Mr A's claim to specific performance). We regard this as merely a description given to the practitioner's intentions at the material time, which intentions are expressed in the Committee's application and Particulars. We consider the practitioner's submissions to be without merit. Moreover, the fact that the application to reopen the practitioner's case on this basis was made almost 12 months after the substantive hearing would require extraordinary circumstances for leave to be given. No such circumstances exist. (Page 13)
35 As to order 1.(ii) (leave to reopen to 'recall and further cross-examine' two or three witnesses), the practitioner submitted that his counsel failed to cross-examine certain witnesses on matters fundamental to his defence. We have carefully read the extensive submissions in support (practitioner's submissions dated 26 February 2013 paras 24-39). We find nothing in them which would support the extraordinary claim to reopen this application at this late stage. Mr A gave evidence and was cross-examined as to his state of mind at the end of his meeting with the practitioner on 30 November 2004. The manner of the cross-examination was a matter for the practitioner's counsel, and we did not regard it then, or now, as so obviously deficient (or, indeed, deficient at all), such that leave to reopen is justified. The same is true in relation to Ms B. She gave evidence and was cross-examined as to what occurred between 30 November and 7 December 2004, including specifically in relation to her file notes of her conversations with the practitioner. There was nothing overtly deficient in that cross-examination which supports the practitioner's application. The practitioner also said that Mr Sim might need to be recalled, depending on the outcome of the proposed further crossexamination of Mr A. We do not see anything in the submissions which supports the allegation that Mr A (or Mr Sim) was not 'properly crossexamined'. 36 In relation to orders 1.(iii) and (iv) (leave to reopen to make additional submissions), as indicated above, on 1 August 2012, as a significant concession to him, the practitioner was granted the opportunity to make supplementary submissions after the closing of his case, and did so at length on 15 August 2012. Those additional submissions are considered in our reasons on the substantive matter. The practitioner's application for prerogative relief in relation to the ruling of 1 August 2012 was dismissed by the Supreme Court as revealing no arguable case. His further application to make submissions was dismissed by Justice Chaney on 5 February 2013, on grounds which include a further examination and finding that the practitioner was not denied procedural fairness in relation to making further or substitute submissions. The practitioner's yet further attempt to litigate this issue reveals an alarming failure to appreciate the nature of the legal process, the statutory obligations and resources of the Committee, and the statutory obligations and responsibilities of the Tribunal. 37 As regards the practitioner's claim that his counsel failed properly to examine witnesses and make submissions, we are not persuaded that such is the case. Moreover, as Mason CJ observed in Giannarelli v Wraith [1988] HCA 52; (1988) 165 CLR 543 at [12]: (Page 14)
In selecting and limiting the number of witnesses to be called, in deciding what questions will be asked in cross-examination, what topics will be covered in address and what points of law will be raised, counsel exercises an independent judgment so that the time of the court is not taken up unnecessarily, notwithstanding that the client may wish to chase every rabbit down its burrow. The administration of justice in our adversarial system depends in very large measure on the faithful exercise by barristers of this independent judgment in the conduct and management of the case. In such an adversarial system the mode of presentation of each party's case rests with counsel. 38 More broadly, the practitioner has been afforded procedural fairness in this matter. The case presented and argued against him at the hearing was consistent with and reasonably open from the Committee's application filed in the proceedings and he had an adequate opportunity to respond to it. The Committee's witness statements were available to the practitioner well before the hearing. He was also present throughout most of the hearing. He was, therefore, able to make suggestions to his counsel about crossexamination of witnesses. Furthermore, the practitioner gave his own evidence after the evidence of the witnesses called by the Committee. 39 As noted earlier, contrary to the Committee's preference, the Tribunal did not require the parties to 'box on' and make oral submissions after the conclusion of the evidence, even though the hearing had been listed for a further day, in order to enable the practitioner to obtain the transcript prior to making submissions, as he instructed Mr Rynne. Mr Rynne provided written submissions comprising 119 paragraphs over 30 pages and then made lengthy oral closing submissions on behalf of the practitioner on 17 July 2012. As noted, the practitioner was then granted the opportunity to make supplementary submissions, which he did. The practitioner has been afforded every reasonable opportunity and indulgence to present and argue his case. 40 There has been significant delay on the part of the practitioner in making the application to reopen his case. The application to reopen was made almost a year after the substantive hearing, over seven months after the making of closing oral submissions and when our decision was originally reserved, almost seven months after Mr Rynne's brief was withdrawn, and over six and a half months after the practitioner made his first posthearing application to the Tribunal. 41 Furthermore, as '[t]he object of disciplinary proceedings is the protection of the public and the maintenance of proper standards in the legal profession' (ReMaraj (a Legal Practitioner) (1995) 15 WAR 12 (Page 15)
at 25), it is in the public interest that disciplinary proceedings are determined expeditiously. While in this case, for reasons set out earlier, this has, regrettably, not been possible to date, it would be contrary to the public interest in the expeditious determination of disciplinary proceedings for the determination of this matter to be further delayed. 42 Finally, particularly when viewed in the light of the practitioner's conduct since our decision was reserved, which we outlined earlier, including: • making an application for leave to file written submissions in lieu of the oral submissions made on 17 July 2012, which we found to have 'no arguable basis' [citation redacted]; • making an application for leave to appeal from our earlier decision, which was then withdrawn two days before the hearing of the leave application; • making an application for a stay in the appeal, which was discontinued; • making an application for prerogative relief, which was dismissed; and • making an application for 'revocation' of our earlier decision, which was dismissed with costs, and the consequent significant delay in the determination of the proceeding, the granting of the practitioner's application for leave to reopen his case would be manifestly inconsistent with the Tribunal's statutory objectives referred to earlier. 43 In particular, it would be contrary to the objective to act as speedily as is practicable, as it would materially extend the proceeding, and the objective to minimise the costs to the parties, because it would result in additional costs. Moreover, the granting of leave to reopen is not necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding; to the contrary, dismissal of the practitioner's application is necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding.
Orders 44 For these reasons we make the following orders: (Page 16)
1. The application by the respondent for leave to reopen his case is dismissed. 2. Should the applicant seek an order for costs of the application for leave to reopen, it has liberty to file and serve such application together with a schedule of the amount of costs and disbursements it seeks and any supporting evidence, and short submissions, by 25 March 2013, the respondent has liberty to file and serve short submissions in reply by 8 April 2013, and, subject to any further order, the application for costs is to be determined entirely on the documents pursuant to s 60(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA). |