Leckie v Department of Human Services

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

LECKIE v DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

[2012] SASC 197

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley

7 November 2012

MAGISTRATES - APPEALS AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS

SOCIAL WELFARE - OFFENCES - FALSE STATEMENTS AND FRAUD - PENALTY

Appellant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court to five counts of obtaining a financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity contrary to s 135.2(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) - appellant was sentenced to nine months imprisonment, to be released after serving two months imprisonment, upon entering into a recognisance to be of good behaviour for 12 months - the magistrate further ordered reparation of the full amount - appellant contends that sentence is manifestly excessive and seeks to have the sentence set aside.

Held: Appeal allowed - sentence set aside - appellant resentenced to nine months imprisonment, but the appellant is to be released forthwith upon entering into a recognisance bond in the sum of $500 to be of good behaviour for 12 months, and reparation of the full amount is to be made - magistrate erred by failing to give consideration, or at least proper consideration, to the appellant's rehabilitation, and in requiring the appellant to serve part of the term of imprisonment there was a miscarriage of justice - magistrate failed to properly regard the interests of society and of the appellant in her rehabilitation - requiring the appellant to serve the sentence imposed would have put her at risk of losing her employment, which would have thrown her back onto the social security system - appellant is most unlikely to reoffend.

Criminal Code (Cth) s 135.2; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A, referred to.
R v Ferrer-Esis (1991) 55 A Crim R 231, applied.
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; Dinsdale v The Queen (2002) 202 CLR 340; Kovacevic v Mills (2000) 76 SASR 404, discussed.

LECKIE v DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
[2012] SASC 197

STANLEY J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal against sentence.

  2. The appellant, Emma Leckie, pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court to five counts of obtaining a financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity contrary to s 135.2(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) (the Code).

  3. The respondent is the Department of Human Services.  Pursuant to statute the respondent provides various allowances and benefits where claimants meet prescribed criteria. 

  4. The offences relate to the appellant fraudulently taking advantage of allowances offered by the respondent from a period between 11 September 2008 and 3 May 2011, namely the Newstart Allowance and the Disability Support Pension. 

  5. The amount of overpayment from the respondent to the appellant totalled $50,236.23. 

  6. The magistrate convicted the appellant and sentenced her to nine months imprisonment, to be released after serving two months imprisonment, upon entering into a recognisance to be of good behaviour for a period of 12 months.  Further, the magistrate ordered reparation in the amount of $50,236.23.

  7. The appellant…

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Details
Case
[2012] SASC 197
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Leckie v Department of Human Services, the appellant appealed against a sentence imposed by a magistrate in the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The appellant had pleaded guilty to five counts of obtaining a financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity by making false statements, in contravention of section 135.2(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth). The appellant was sentenced to nine months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two months, and ordered to pay reparations of the full amount. The appellant argued that the sentence was manifestly excessive and sought to have it set aside.

The legal issues before the court were whether the sentence imposed by the magistrate was manifestly excessive and whether there was a miscarriage of justice in requiring the appellant to serve part of the term of imprisonment. The court examined whether the magistrate had failed to consider relevant factors, including the appellant's rehabilitation, and whether there had been a miscarriage of justice by imposing a sentence that would have put the appellant at risk of losing her employment, thereby throwing her back onto the social security system. The court also considered the likelihood of the appellant reoffending.

The court found that the magistrate had erred by failing to give consideration, or at least proper consideration, to the appellant's rehabilitation and in requiring the appellant to serve part of the term of imprisonment there was a miscarriage of justice. The court concluded that the magistrate had failed to properly regard the interests of society and of the appellant in her rehabilitation. The court emphasised that the crime for which the appellant had been convicted was serious, and ordinarily, an order for imprisonment would follow a conviction of this kind. However, in the particular circumstances of this appellant, a sentence requiring even a part of the term imposed actually to be served, disclosed an error on the part of the sentencing magistrate in the approach taken and constituted a miscarriage of justice. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence imposed by the magistrate, and resentenced the appellant to nine months imprisonment, but released forthwith upon entering into a recognisance bond in the sum of $500 to be of good behaviour for 12 months, and ordered reparation in the amount of $50,236.23.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, Leckie, pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court to five counts of obtaining a financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity contrary to section 135.2(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth). She was sentenced to nine months imprisonment, with the condition that she would serve two months and then be released upon entering into a recognisance to be of good behaviour for 12 months. Additionally, the magistrate ordered that Leckie make reparation of the full amount, which totalled $50,236.23. The appellant, however, contested that the sentence was manifestly excessive and sought to have it set aside.

Leckie argued that the magistrate had erred in imposing the sentence, particularly by not giving proper consideration to her rehabilitation and the potential impact of imprisonment on her employment and social security status. She contended that the requirement to serve any part of the sentence would put her at risk of losing her job, which would force her to return to the social security system, making reoffending more likely. Furthermore, the appellant submitted that she was unlikely to reoffend and that the sentence was disproportionate to her circumstances.

The Supreme Court heard the appeal and found that the magistrate had erred in not giving proper consideration to the appellant's rehabilitation and the potential impact of imprisonment on her employment and social security status. The court held that the sentence imposed was a miscarriage of justice as it failed to properly regard the interests of society and the appellant in her rehabilitation. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the sentence was set aside, and the appellant was resentenced to nine months imprisonment, but with the condition that she be released forthwith upon entering into a recognisance bond in the sum of $500 to be of good behaviour for 12 months. The court also ordered that reparation be made in the amount of $50,236.23.

The matter of Leckie v Department of Human Services originated in the Magistrates Court of South Australia, where the appellant, Leckie, pleaded guilty to five counts of obtaining a financial advantage from a Commonwealth entity, contrary to s 135.2(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth). Following the guilty plea, the magistrate sentenced Leckie to nine months imprisonment, with a non-custodial term of seven months, subject to conditions of good behaviour for twelve months. Additionally, the magistrate ordered full reparation of the amount obtained fraudulently, amounting to $50,236.23. Dissatisfied with the sentence, Leckie appealed to the Supreme Court of South Australia, arguing that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The appeal was heard, and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the original sentence. In its place, the Supreme Court imposed a new sentence of nine months imprisonment, but ordered that Leckie be released immediately upon entering into a recognisance bond of $500 to be of good behaviour for twelve months, and required reparation to be made in full. The Supreme Court held that the original sentencing magistrate had erred by not sufficiently considering the appellant's prospects for rehabilitation, which was crucial to both the interests of society and the appellant herself. The Court determined that requiring Leckie to serve part of the term imposed would have put her at risk of losing her employment, thereby increasing the likelihood of her returning to the social security system and potentially reoffending.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In imposing this sentence I wish to emphasise that the crime for which the appellant has been convicted is serious. Ordinarily, an order for imprisonment would follow a conviction of this kind, but I am satisfied that in the particular circumstances of this appellant, a sentence requiring even a part of the term imposed actually to be served, discloses an error on the part of the sentencing magistrate in the approach taken and constitutes a miscarriage of justice. Conclusion I allow the appeal. I set aside the sentence imposed by the learned magistrate. I sentence the appellant to nine months imprisonment, but the appellant is to be released forthwith upon entering into a bond pursuant to s 20 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) in the sum of $500 to be of good behaviour for 12 months. I order that reparation be made in the amount of $50,236.23.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This approach was further explained in Dinsdale v The Queen[3] by Kirby J, who said:[4]As on appeal from discretionary decisions, it will sometimes not be possible to identify, with exactness, an error of the foregoing kind; yet the result that is challenged may be so manifestly unreasonable or plainly wrong that the appellate court will be able to infer that, in some unidentified way, there has been a failure to exercise the power properly. In appellate review of sentencing, it will commonly be the case that the appellate court’s authority to intervene will derive from a conclusion that the resulting order is so disproportionate to the matter to which it relates as to afford the foundation for concluding that, in some way, the exercise of the powers of the primary judge has miscarried.[3] (2000) 202 CLR 321.[4] (2000) 202 CLR 321 at 340 [59].Consideration Section 16A(2) of the Crimes Act sets out a list of factors that are to be considered when passing sentence. It is not an exhaustive list. It does not require a sentencing magistrate to refer to each of the matters when explaining the sentence imposed.[5] [5] R v Ferrer-Esis (1991) 55 A Crim R 231 at 237 – 238. In any event, I consider the learned sentencing magistrate had proper regard to the appellant’s good character and lack of prior convictions, her contrition, her making reparations, her cooperation with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of her offences, and the probable effect that the sentence would have on her health, in imposing sentence. He referred several times to her guilty plea, and indicated a three-month discount for the same. He also took into account her admissions to the Department, and the repayment that had been made totalling $3,880.55. In fact, the learned magistrate had been misinformed as to the extent of the repayment at that time which, in truth, was only $3,300. The appellant is making reparation by way of a fortnightly payment of $100. Subsequent to the hearing of the appeal, she made a further lump sum repayment of $10,000 with the assistance of her family. Counsel for the appellant informed the Court that the appellant’s family was endeavouring to make additional lump sum repayments on her behalf in the near future. I take this into account. I am also satisfied that the learned magistrate had proper regard to her limited cooperation with the law enforcement agency investigating her offending when she freely made admissions outside a formal interview process. The learned magistrate did not refer to the impact a term of imprisonment would have on the appellant’s family, but I do not understand any submission was put to the learned magistrate on that subject. In any event, I am satisfied there is no proper basis for the learned magistrate to have taken this into account. There is no suggestion that the appellant has any dependents who might be adversely affected by the term of imprisonment imposed. The learned magistrate did take account of the appellant’s health. He had regard to the fact that her ill health would make a custodial sentence more difficult, but properly, he considered that this was not a basis upon which he could find that the appellant should be spared a custodial sentence in circumstances where he was satisfied that her health issues could be appropriately managed in prison.