Lea and Repatriation Commission
[2007] AATA 1358
•24 May 2007
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2007] AATA 1358
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q200600358
VETERANS’ APPEALS DIVISION ) Re ROBERT LEA Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr P McDermott, RFD, Senior Member
Dr GJ Maynard, Member
Date 24 May 2007
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review insofar as it decides that post traumatic stress disorder is not related to service. The Tribunal substitutes a decision that Mr Lea has post traumatic stress disorder, which is a war-caused condition. This decision is to have effect from 25 February 2004. The matter is remitted to the respondent to assess the appropriate rate of pension. ................[SGD]............................
SENIOR MEMBER
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ ENTITLEMENTS – operational service with Royal Australian Navy – claim that post traumatic stress disorder was war-caused – consideration of Statements of Principles – whether claimed stressful events amount to ‘experiencing a severe stressor’ – medical evidence considered
Veterans’ Entitlements Act (1986) (Cth) ss 6C, 9, 13, 120, 120A, 196A, 196B
Repatriation Commission v Cooke (1998) 52 ALD 1
Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
Stoddart v Repatriation Commission (2003) 197 ALR 283REASONS FOR DECISION
24 May 2007 Senior Member P McDermott RFD
Dr GJ Maynard, Member
Introduction
1. Mr Robert Lea was engaged in operational service with the Royal Australian Navy in Vietnam, Malaya and Singapore waters. We have to consider whether his claimed condition of post traumatic stress disorder is a war or defence service caused condition.
Decisions
2. On 25 May 2004 Mr Lea lodged a claim for post traumatic stress disorder. On 11 November 2005 the Repatriation Commission (“the Commission”) made a decision that post traumatic stress disorder was not a war or defence service related condition. The Commission also determined that Mr Lea’s disability pension should continue at 30% of the general rate.
3. Mr Lea sought a review of this decision from the Veterans’ Review Board. On 12 May 2006 the Veterans’ Review Board affirmed the decision under review in relation to the claim for post traumatic stress disorder. The Board also consented to the withdrawal of the application for review of assessment of the rate of disability pension.
4. Mr Lea has now applied to this Tribunal to review the decision of the Veterans’ Review Board.
Issues Before The Tribunal
5. We have to decide whether the claimed condition of post traumatic stress disorder is correctly diagnosed, and, if so, whether this condition is a war or defence service related condition for the purposes of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”).
Date Of Effect
6. We consider that if Mr Lea is successful in his application, the date of effect is 25 February 2004.[1]
[1] Respondent’s submissions 23 April 2007, paragraph 22.
Background
7. Mr Lea served in the Royal Australian Navy from 16 January 1965 until 28 October 1973 when his period of enlistment terminated.
8. Mr Lea has operational service in Vietnam and Malaya/Singapore waters from 27 May 1965 to 26 June 1965; from 11 August 1965 to 25 September 1965; from 20 September 1965 to 3 October 1965 (overlap with Malaya/Singapore service); from 26 October 1965 to 24 December 1965; and from 4 January 1966 to 2 March 1966.
9. No submission was made by the Commission that the stressful events raised by Mr Lea did not occur during the eligible service of the veteran.
10. Mr Lea currently has a 30% disability pension for his hearing condition.
11. Mr Lea gave oral evidence. He verified the contents of a statement that was admitted into evidence [exhibit A, folios 18-22]. In his statement he remarks that as a youth he was not allowed to drink before he joined the Navy. His mother in her statement of 23 May 2004 describes him as a non-drinker before entering the Navy just after his seventeenth birthday, but a heavy drinker by the time he was eighteen years old [exhibit A, folio 43].
12. Mr Lea has asserted in these proceedings that certain stressful events occurred during his operational service, and caused the condition on which his claim is based.
13. Mr Lea referred to three stressful events:-
(a)Sentry duties on HMAS Duchess;
(b)Gun turret duties including misfire; and
(c)A collision with a Kumpit.
(a) Sentry duties on HMAS Duchess
14. Mr Lea gave evidence of his duties upon a RAN “Daring” class destroyer, HMAS Duchess. He stated that whilst they were waiting for HMAS Sydney to unload, HMAS Duchess was anchored close to shore. During this time he performed the duties of the upper deck sentry. Mr Lea stated that these duties were “lone sentry” duties and required the patrolling of particular areas of the ship. Mr Lea stated that he had to patrol on the forecastle. While performing these patrolling duties he had a full view of the activity on the shore. He could see the “choppers”, the magnesium flares, gunfire and tracer fire.
15. Mr Lea stated that on patrol he carried a Thompson submachine gun. He was required to carry the weapon unloaded. The ammunition clip was secured in a webbing pouch which was attached to his waist belt.
16. Mr Lea stated that on one particular evening when he was on duty he was looking over the side of the ship for bubbles, divers and boats as he was required to do. He was then approached from behind by a petty officer and tapped on the shoulder. Mr Lea stated that he had been completely unaware of the presence of the petty officer. Mr Lea stated that once again he felt vulnerable. His vulnerability was obvious because if the petty officer had been the enemy, Mr Lea had little chance of defending himself with an unloaded weapon.
(b) Gun turret duties including misfire
17. Mr Lea gave evidence of his duties on the upper deck of HMAS Duchess. His action station was “X Ray Turret”. This was a 4.5 inch revolving turret on the aft section of the ship. He stated that he performed two different duties in that turret. In the turret he was loading the cordite charge into the breach. At other times he would be directly under the turret in the gun bay, feeding the cordite to the turret above. Mr Lea stated that he willingly performed these duties; but that he was extremely anxious about a misfire and the consequences should a projectile explode in the confined area of the turret as it was being ejected.
18. Mr Lea stated that he felt vulnerable in his duties in loading cordite. He felt that he had no control over his vulnerability. He never asked anybody if they felt the same way and he kept his feelings to himself.
19. Mr Lea gave evidence of a misfire on the turret. In cross-examination Mr Lea was unable to state when the misfire occurred or where the ship was when the misfire occurred.
20. Mr Rodney Nott, a retired gunnery officer, stated in evidence that Mr Lea may well have performed turret duties. He stated that if a misfire had occurred, details of the particular shell casing would be recorded for reference purposes before the shell would have been disposed of.
21. In view of this evidence we considered that in order for us to give proper consideration to Mr Lea’s claim, we should adjourn the proceedings to ascertain whether a misfire was recorded in the logs of HMAS Duchess.
22. Writeway Research was able to obtain copies of the ship’s log of HMAS Duchess for the period when Mr Lea served on the HMAS Duchess. These documents were provided to both the applicant and respondent. No misfire incident was recorded in the log.
(c) Collision with a Kumpit
23. Mr Lea gave evidence of a collision with a Kumpit. We consider that there is much force in the submission of the respondent that Mr Lea has given conflicting accounts of this incident. In one interview with Dr Carter, Mr Lea had stated that “he witnessed people who were drowned near him when there was a collision with a kumpit” [exhibit A, folio 60]. He also told Dr Young that he “reported at the time believing there may have been some people overboard who may also have been involved in the shark attack, although subsequently it was found that all the personnel were accounted for” [exhibit A, folio 68]. He also told Dr Young that “sharks tore the rats to pieces in a frenzied attack” [exhibit A, folio 68]. The records of HMAS Duchess note that the ship provided assistance by coming alongside the vessel, bringing on board the cargo, and 45 crew and passengers. Mr Lea also told Dr Young that there were some 44 gallon drums in the front of the Kumpit. He was unaware of whether the drums contained explosives or not [exhibit A, folio 68].
Medical Evidence
24. Dr Leong, a consultant psychiatrist, provided two reports dated 6 February 1996 [exhibit A, folios 9-10] and 5 March 1996 [exhibit A, folio 11]. In those reports Dr Leong gives his opinion that the applicant suffers from post traumatic stress disorder. Dr Leong, in his latter report, concludes that the service of Mr Lea on Vietnam waters is the cause of his condition.
25. Dr Leong described some ongoing symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder. He also offers some comments on a report prepared by Dr R James, consultant psychiatrist, deceased, dated 29 April 1985 [exhibit R2] in which Mr Lea was diagnosed as having a personality disorder with problems in controlling aggressive tendencies.
26. However, Dr Leong remarked that at the time when Dr James wrote his report, the DSM did not then contain a condition of post traumatic stress disorder. Dr Leong agreed that there may have been some elements of personality disorder present in Mr Lea’s condition but nevertheless considered that post traumatic stress disorder was present. On cross-examination, Dr Leong stood by his diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder.
27. Dr Anne Young, a consultant psychiatrist, made a report on 30 September 2004 which was prepared at the request of the respondent. That report was admitted as evidence [exhibit A, folios 67-72]. Dr Young had reviewed reports by Dr James, Dr Leong, Dr Evans and Dr Carter. Dr Young had diagnosed the applicant as suffering from post traumatic stress disorder and alcohol abuse utilising DSM IV Criteria. Unfortunately, Dr Young now resides overseas and was unable to give evidence by telephone.
28. Dr J Carter, psychiatrist, had three reports presented in the documentation and she gave evidence by telephone. Her reports were admitted into evidence: report, 30 July 2004 [exhibit A, folios 55-57]; report, 17 June 2004 [exhibit A, folios 58-66]; report, 8 September 2006 [exhibit A1]. In each Dr Carter is constant in her diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder and alcohol abuse.
29. Dr Carter remained firm in her diagnoses during cross-examination and rejected the diagnosis of personality disorder because of lack of evidence presented to demonstrate personality problems before entry into the Navy. It was her belief that the experiences in Vietnam were sufficient in a seventeen year old to cause post traumatic stress disorder. All of her reports are those of a treating doctor and are based on numerous consultations.
30. A report by the late Dr Larry Evans, psychiatrist, was admitted into evidence: report, 9 April 1996 [exhibit R4]. Dr Evans did not see the patient in preparing this report, using only referred documentation. Dr Evans did not agree with the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder because the applicant’s experiences were no different from that experienced by other seamen serving in combat zones. Dr Evans preferred the view of Dr James who diagnosed Mr Lea as having a personality disorder.
Legislative Background
31. Section 9 of the Act provides for when an injury or disease is taken to be war-caused, and provides relevantly as follows:
“9 War-caused injuries or diseases
(1) Subject to this section, for the purposes of this Act, an injury suffered by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused injury, or a disease contracted by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused disease, if:
(a)the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran resulted from an occurrence that happened while the veteran was rendering operational service;
(b)the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran arose out of, or was attributable to, any eligible war service rendered by the veteran; …”
32. The expression “operational service” is defined in ss 6 to 6F of the Act. Under s 6C, a person renders operational service if he or she has, inter alia, rendered continuous full-time service in an operational area. There is no issue that the applicant has not rendered operational service.
33. Section 13(1) of the Act provides, in effect, that where a veteran has become incapacitated from a war-caused injury or a war-caused disease, the Commonwealth is liable to pay a pension by way of compensation to the veteran.
34. As the applicant has performed operational service, as defined in s 6 of the Act, the determination of whether his asserted conditions are war-caused is to be made by applying ss 120(1) and 120(3) of the Act. Those sections provide relevantly as follows:
120 Standard of proof
(1) Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
…
(3) In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:
(a) that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;
(b) that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or
(c) that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;
as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.”
35. Under s 120A of the Act, in the case of applications lodged after 1 June 1994, where the Repatriation Medical Authority (“RMA”) has made a Statement of Principles (SoP) in respect of a particular kind of injury or disease, the reasonableness of an hypothesis is to be assessed by reference to that SoP. This follows from s 120A(3), which provides:
“(3) For the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:
(a)a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(2) or (11); or
(b) a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A(2);
that upholds the hypothesis.
Note: See subsection (4) about the application of this subsection.”
36. Subsection (4) of s 120A excludes the operation of subsection (3) in certain circumstances which are not relevant to the present proceedings.
37. Section 196A of the Act provides for the establishment of the RMA. Section 196B of the Act provides that if the RMA is of the view that there is sound medical-scientific evidence that indicates that a particular kind of injury, disease or death can be related to operational service rendered by veterans, the RMA must determine a SoP in respect of that kind of injury, disease or death setting out the factors that must as a minimum exist, and which of those factors must be related to service rendered by a person, before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting an injury, disease or death of that kind with the circumstances of the veteran’s service. The reference in s 196B(2) to a particular kind of injury, disease or death being “related to operational service” is expounded in s 196B(14). This provides relevantly, in effect, that a factor causing an injury is “related to service” rendered by a person if it resulted from an occurrence that happened while the person was rendering that service, or if it arose out of, or was attributable to, that service.
Consideration
38. We have to initially give consideration to whether the claimed condition of Mr Lea has been appropriately diagnosed.
39. In considering this application we are bound by a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia that the issue of whether a disease exists is to be decided to the reasonable satisfaction of the Tribunal: see Repatriation Commission v Cooke (1998) 52 ALD 1 at 6. This is the standard that is prescribed by s 120(4) of the Act, which is the civil standard of proof: see Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327.
40. We are reasonably satisfied that Mr Lea has post traumatic stress disorder.
41. In this case, Mr Lea has relied upon reports from psychiatrists who have recent knowledge of the patient and have examined him in depth. Three agree on the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder. We consider that the evidence of Dr Carter and Dr Leong withstood cross-examination.
42. The respondent relied on reports from two psychiatrists who are both deceased. We consider that there is much force in the submission of the counsel for Mr Lea who pointed out that these psychiatrists could not now be cross-examined. Although we recognise that Dr Evans was a respected diagnostician, we consider that it would not be fair to prefer the reports of authors who could not be cross-examined.
43. The applicant in the statement of facts and contentions dated 14 August 2006 only raised a claim for the condition of post traumatic stress disorder. We, however, appreciate that the material before us raises for consideration the issue of whether Mr Lea has sustained the condition of alcohol abuse. Having regard to our inquisitorial function we have carefully examined the material before us. After reviewing the evidence before us, we have taken the view that we are not reasonably satisfied that Mr Lea suffers from the condition of alcohol abuse.
44. The condition of post traumatic stress disorder is the subject of a SoP.
45. We have to consider whether the contentions of the applicant satisfy the following SoP:
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Instrument No 3 of 1999 as amended by Instrument No 54 of 1999.
46. Where a SoP exists we are bound to apply the test which is prescribed by s120A(3) of the Act, as explained in Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82 at 97-98:
“1 The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail.
2 If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force an SoP determined by the Authority under s 196B(2) or (11). If no such SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and, in consequence, the application must fail.
3 If an SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the "template" to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person’s service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be “reasonable” and the claim will fail.
4 The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.”
47. We are satisfied that the evidence before us points to a hypothesis connecting Mr Lea’s post traumatic stress disorder condition with his operational service. Accordingly the “first step” in Repatriation Commission v Deledio is satisfied.
48. The “second step” in Repatriation Commission v Deledio requires us to ascertain whether there is a SoP which has been determined by the RMA.
49. We have already mentioned that a SoP has been determined by the RMA pursuant to s 196B(2) of the Act in respect of the condition in question:
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Instrument No 3 of 1999 as amended by Instrument No 54 of 1999
50. We must now turn to the third step as enunciated in Deledio. This entails determining whether the relevant hypothesis complies with one or more of the factors referred to in the relevant SoP.
51. Under clause 4 of the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder SoP at least one of the factors set out in clause 5 must be related to the relevant service (being operational service) by the veteran.
52. In clause 5 the relevant factor which is in contention is factor 5(a) which refers to the veteran experiencing a severe stressor prior to the clinical onset of post traumatic stress disorder.
(a) Sentry duties on HMAS Duchess
53. Mr Lea states that he patrolled the upper forecastle of the ship by himself armed with a Thompson submachine gun. On his belt was the magazine. We appreciate that to place the magazine on the machine gun takes some time. Mr Lea told Dr Young that it took eight seconds to load the gun [exhibit A, folio 68]. In an emergency situation time is of the very essence. We appreciate that as a very junior seaman the applicant could see this as a very threatening situation. It is understandable that this fear could be enhanced by the presence of helicopter gun ships operating on shore. His anxiety was made worse by his being startled by a petty officer coming up behind him. If that petty officer was an enemy soldier, Mr Lea would have been unable to load his weapon in sufficient time to defend himself.
54. Mr Nott, a former gunnery officer who served on the HMAS Duchess, but not at the same time as the applicant, gave evidence. When commenting on the Writeway report [exhibit A, folios 75-115], Mr Nott said that escort vessels had Gunnery Officer Temporary Memorandum (GOTM). These GOTMs detailed the way the ship’s defence would be arranged to ensure maximum security. They were usually based on a template of previous ships’ GOTMs. Unfortunately Writeway Research was unable to find copies of the GOTM for the HMAS Duchess on that first voyage.
55. Mr Nott gave what we regard as an accurate summary of the operation of sentries and it supports the applicant’s claim to some extent.
56. We consider that this sentry duty event would satisfy the requirements of the SoP as a severe stressor. We conclude that Mr Lea experienced or was confronted with an event that involved threat of death or serious injury, or a threat of the serious injury, or a threat to physical integrity.
57. We have been guided by the observations of Mansfield J in Stoddart v Repatriation Commission (2003) 197 ALR 283 at [55]. We consider that this event judged objectively from the point of view of a reasonable person in the position of the applicant was capable of and did convey (on a subjective basis) the risk of death or serious injury or to physical integrity. We are also mindful that Mr Lea was an inexperienced seventeen year old youth at the time of this event.
(b) Gun turret duties including misfire
58. We have already mentioned that Mr Lea had stated that he was employed in the gun turret of the 4.5 inch gun loading ammunition. He states that he was rather afraid of the consequences of a misfire.
59. In evidence Mr Brecht the author of the Writeway Report, said it would be unusual for an Ordinary Seaman to be employed as stated by the applicant. He also said that if there were no injuries it would be unlikely for a misfire to be recorded. He stated the applicant was more likely to be employed below the turret supplying stores up to the gun crew.
60. Mr Lea’s description of how he was employed in the gun turret is full of detail and would seem to have been based on experience rather than on hearsay. Mr Nott who had experience as Gunnery Officer on HMAS Duchess, in his report (exhibit A, folio 128-146) gave us a detailed account of how an Ordinary Seaman would be employed during fire missions. This largely supports the applicant’s description. Contrary to the evidence of Mr Brecht, Mr Nott said misfires were very rare but all were recorded and investigated, identifying batch numbers, suppliers of ammunition etc.
61. We consider that the sense of danger felt by an inexperienced seventeen year old youth probably was very real but we doubt whether it would be sufficient to satisfy the criteria of a severe stressor for the purposes of the SoP.
62. We have mentioned that we adjourned the hearing to ascertain whether the ship’s log had a report of the misfire. We have already mentioned that Writeway Research obtained copies from the ship’s log of HMAS Duchess for the period of 23 April 1965 to 20 March 1966. This document was provided to both the applicant and respondent. No misfire incident was recorded on the log. We draw no adverse inference against Mr Lea because no record of a misfire was found in the records.
(c) Collision with a Kumpit
63. We do not consider that the collision with the Kumpit and the so called shark feeding frenzy would satisfy the SoP as being a severe stressor. We, however, acknowledge that the events were unpleasant.
64. For these reasons we consider that the “third step” in Repatriation Commission v Deledio is satisfied.
65. We must now proceed to consider the “fourth step” in Repatriation Commission v Deledio. We are required to consider whether we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the psychiatric condition was not war-caused within the meaning of s 9 of the Act. The claim will succeed unless one or more of the facts necessary to support the hypothesis is disproved beyond reasonable doubt or the truth of a fact inconsistent with the hypothesis is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
66. We have come to the conclusion that Mr Lea has given a truthful account of his sentry duties. We also mention that Mr Brecht who prepared the Writeway report has remarked that it is probable that Mr Lea, as an ordinary seaman, was required for duty as an armed upper deck sentry as he claims [exhibit A, folio 78]. The report of Mr Brecht also contains a contemporary document for another vessel (HMAS Sydney) which verifies that the foremost duty of a sentry was to keep a sharp eye out for any signs of underwater activity such as “bubbles rising to the surface”. That document also records that “[r]ifles are only to be loaded and fired if the ship is being directly menaced by an observed swimmer, and on instruction from an officer” [exhibit A, folio 96]. We consider that the Writeway report is consistent with Mr Lea’s account of his duties as a sentry.
67. We have also borne in mind that we are required to consider that there are both objective and subjective elements in assessing what are alleged to be stressful circumstances: see Stoddart v Repatriation Commission (2003) 197 ALR 283.
68. We are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the veteran’s psychiatric condition was not war-caused within the meaning of s 9 of the Act.
69. In view of the fact that the various “stressors” which have been raised by Mr Lea occurred during his operational service [exhibit A, folio 31-34], we have not considered the operation of any SoP to which s 120B of the Act applies.
Decision
70. For the above reasons, we set aside the decision under review insofar as it decided that the post traumatic stress disorder is not related to service. We substitute a decision that Mr Lea has post traumatic stress disorder, which is a war-caused condition, our decision to have effect from 25 February 2004. The matter is remitted to the respondent to assess the appropriate rate of pension.
I certify that the preceding 70 paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr P McDermott, RFD, Senior Member and Dr GJ Maynard, Member
Signed: ................[SGD]..............................................................
Fiona Kamst, Legal Research OfficerDate/s of Hearing 21, 22 November 2006
Date of Decision 24 May 2007
Date of close of submissions: 26 April 2007
Counsel for the Applicant Ms B Carter-Nicoll
Solicitor for the Applicant Haney Lawyers
For the Respondent Mr B Williams, departmental advocate
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