Le v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Le v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 27  

File number(s): MLG 3907 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS
Date of judgment: 25 January 2024
Catchwords:  MIGRATION –Student visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the primary applicant could satisfy the genuine temporary entrant criterion under cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – where primary applicant had provided material directed at her personal ties and economic circumstances in her home country and her incentive and preference to return to Vietnam– whether Tribunal failed to have regard to factors identified in Ministerial Direction No. 69 – whether Tribunal required to explicitly engage with and answer the question posed by paragraph 9(b) of Ministerial Direction No. 69 – where Tribunal did not find primary applicant’s evidence and contentions concerning ties to Vietnam convincing – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed with costs
Legislation:

 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 499(1), 499(2A)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cl 500.212(a) Ministerial Direction Number 69  

Cases cited:

 Bala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2019] FCA 600

Jan v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1837

Kaur v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2026

Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

(2020) 274 FCR 646; [2020] FCAFC 16

Maviglia v Maviglia [1999] NSWCA 188

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 96 ALJR 497; [2022] HCA 17

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 68
Date of last submission/s: 10 October 2023
Date of hearing: 10 October 2023
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr N Mutton
Solicitor for the Applicants:  AR Law Services
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Barrington
Solicitor for the Respondents:  Mills Oakley

ORDERS

MLG 3907 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

THI HONG MINH LE

First Applicant

HONG THAI PHAM

Second Applicant

MINH ANH PHAM

Fourth Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE SYMONS

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JANUARY 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”.

2.The amended application filed on 12 September 2023 be dismissed.

3.The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or in default of agreement in accordance with the scale prescribed in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) as at the date of hearing.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 27
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, members of a Vietnamese family, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming the Minister's refusal to grant them student visas. The primary applicant, a Vietnamese national, had previously been granted student visas and sought another to study a Bachelor of Business. The Tribunal upheld the Minister's decision, finding that the primary applicant did not satisfy the genuine temporary entrant criterion under cl 500.212(a) of the Migration Regulations 1994. The applicants argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider factors outlined in Ministerial Direction No. 69, specifically questioning whether the Tribunal was required to explicitly address and respond to each factor. The applicants also claimed that the Tribunal did not sufficiently consider the primary applicant's evidence regarding her ties to Vietnam.

The court had to determine whether the Tribunal erred by failing to consider all relevant factors identified in Ministerial Direction No. 69 and whether the Tribunal was required to explicitly address and respond to each factor. The Full Court in Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection clarified that while decision-makers must have regard to relevant factors, they are not obliged to explicitly address each one in their reasons if they determine the factor is not significant. The court noted that the Tribunal was within its authority to limit its written record to findings on material questions of fact.

The court found that the Tribunal did not make a jurisdictional error by not explicitly addressing each factor in Ministerial Direction No. 69. The Tribunal had considered the primary applicant's evidence and circumstances, including her ties to Vietnam, and concluded that she did not convincingly demonstrate her intention to return. The court rejected the applicants' argument, finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

By an amended application filed on 12 September 2023, the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) made on 30 November 2018. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the applicants a Student (Temporary) (class TU) (subclass 500) visa (the visa) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The Minister opposes the application. The Tribunal entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs, and has not participated in the proceeding.BACKGROUND The applicants are members of a family unit from Vietnam. The second applicant is the first applicant’s husband, and their child is the fourth applicant. Another child of the parties was originally the third applicant in this matter, however orders made by consent on 26 November 2020 removed the third applicant as a party to the proceeding. The first applicant (referred to in these reasons as “the primary applicant”) arrived in Australia on 7 October 2008, as a dependent on the second applicant’s then current student visa (CB 82). She continued as a dependant on a subsequent student visa granted to the second applicant which was valid until 2 September 2013 (CB 82). On 2 September 2013, the applicant was granted her own student visa to study a Certificate IV in Spoken and Written English leading to a Bachelor of Business (Accounting) (CB 82). On 15 February 2017, the applicant made an application for a further (temporary) student visa (the subject of this application) to study a Bachelor of Business (CB 1-63). Pursuant to cl 500.2 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) it was a condition for the grant of the visa that the primary applicant satisfy a number of primary criteria, including what is referred to as the “genuine temporary entrant” (or GTE) criterion which is contained in cl 500.212(a) and expressed as follows:500.212The applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:(a) the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, having regard to:(i) the applicant’s circumstances; and(ii) the applicant’s immigration history; and(iii) if the applicant is a minor—the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and(iv) any other relevant matter; and(b) …(c) … In an accompanying statement addressing the GTE criterion, the primary applicant stated that she was applying for the visa for the purpose of undertaking a Bachelor of Business from 20 March 2017 to 31 December 2018. The primary applicant explained that she had been studying continuously from Certificate III in Hospitality to a Diploma of Hospitality and that the Bachelor of Business course would assist her to gain knowledge in Business Management which would help her “go further” in her future career (CB 37). On 5 June 2017, the delegate refused to grant the applicants the visa on the basis that they were not satisfied that the primary applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia, and therefore cl 500.212 was not met by her (CB 100 -109). It followed that the second, third (at the time) and fourth applicants were unable to satisfy cl 500.213 and were refused a dependent visa on that basis.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister’s written submissions also suggested that because the decision of the Tribunal was delivered on the same day of the hearing (justifying the label of “ex tempore”), the observations made by Mason P in Maviglia v Maviglia [1999] NSWCA 188 at [1], where his Honour cautioned against “picking over” an ex-tempore judgment, were apposite. At hearing, counsel for the Minister, Mr Barrington, explained that the submission involved an application of the Wu Shan Liang principle that the reasons for decision are not to be construed minutely and with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error. This was said to be capable of particular application to a decision given orally.CONSIDERATION OF GROUND ONE The case of Kumar involved alleged errors in a decision of the Tribunal relating to the application of Direction 53, a predecessor direction to Direction 69. The Full Court considered submissions including one not dissimilar to that advanced here by the applicants that where a factor identified in the Direction posed a question, the Tribunal was obliged to answer it, not merely think about it. Kumar involved an implicit rejection of this submission. Instead, the Full Court found that the obligation reposed in the Tribunal took on less absolute dimensions. As noted earlier, Derrington and Thawley JJ found instead that the phrase “must have regard to” means that the decision-maker should turn his or her attention to each factor during the decision-making process and consider whether and how it should be brought to bear in reaching the decision (Kumar at [83]). The Full Court referred in this context to the following passage of Colvin J in Jan v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1837 where at [26] his Honour explained:[T]he Tribunal must advert to [the factors] for the purpose of considering whether they should be brought to bear, but if the Tribunal forms the view that they are not significant in the particular case then they can be put to one side based upon that assessment. The Tribunal is not obliged to go down and check off each one irrespective of the circumstances and bring it to account in its reasons. The Full Court considered it a matter of some significance that paragraph 1 of Part 2 of Direction 53 contained the following statement:Decision makers should not use the factors specified in this Direction as a checklist. Rather, they are intended to guide decision makers to weigh up the applicant’s circumstances as a whole, in reaching a finding about whether the applicant satisfies the genuine temporary entrant criterion. A similar statement appears in Direction 69. Although the Full Court acknowledged that it was desirable for an administrative decision- maker to expressly refer to factors which have been made mandatorily relevant by statute so as to provide assurances to the parties that a case has been properly considered, it nonetheless accepted that it was within the authority of the decision-maker to limit its written record of decision to findings on material questions of fact which would in turn, entitle the inference to be drawn that a matter not mentioned in the statement was not considered by the decision- maker to be material, rather than its omission revealing that the matter was overlooked.