CITATION: Lawteal Pty Limited v McClymont & anor [2009] NSWSC 637 HEARING DATE(S): 6-7 July 2009 JURISDICTION: Common Law JUDGMENT OF: Michael Grove J EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 7 July 2009 DECISION: Judgment for the Plaintiff CATCHWORDS: POSSESSION OF LAND - Mortgage - Default - Whether Consumer Credit Code excluded - Facts - No special matter of principle LEGISLATION CITED: Real Property Act 1900 CATEGORY: Principal judgment CASES CITED: Bahadori v Permanent Mortgages Pty Limited [2008] NSWCA 150; 72 NSWLR 44
Benjamin v Ashikian [2007] NSWSC 735
Carter & anor v Schmierer [2003] QSC 035
Cook & anor v Permanent Mortgages Pty Limited [2007] NSWCA 219PARTIES: LAWTEAL PTY LIMITED - Plaintiff
Graham James McCLYMONT - First Defendant
Selma Maria McCLYMONT - Second DefendantFILE NUMBER(S): SC 2007/15371 COUNSEL: A Rogers - Plaintiff
In person - First Defendant
In person - Second DefendantSOLICITORS: Baccuslegal - Plaintiff
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISIONTuesday 7 July 2009MICHAEL GROVE J
15371/07 - LAWTEAL PTY LIMITED v GRAHAM JAMES MCCLYMONT & ANOR
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: The action before the court seeks possession of identified premises being a strata unit which I will refer to as the property. The plaintiff is a mortgagee and the defendant mortgagors are husband and wife who have appeared in person to resist the claim.
2 The defence does not traverse the allegations in the statement of claim which I can briefly recapitulate together with some background facts which have emerged from the evidence.
3 The property is the defendants' residence. In about August 2004 a then current mortgagee had obtained judgment for possession of the property and a writ of execution had issued. The defendants sought refinance through a broker which was then called The Loan Enquiry Centre Pty Ltd and later named Save Finance Pty Ltd. It was not placed in evidence but I understand it to be common ground that that corporation is now in liquidation.
4 Annexed to an affidavit of the first defendant of 26 June 2009 is a letter of advice to creditors from Worrells Insolvency and Forensic Accountants which states inter alia:
- “The company initially entered into voluntary administration on 12 December 2007. The company subsequently executed a deed of company arrangement on 4 April 2008. At a meeting of creditors on 4 December 2008 it was resolved that the deed of company arrangement be terminated and subsequent to the termination it was resolved that Michael Hird and Nick Malanos be appointed liquidators pursuant to section 446A."
The principal contact between the defendants and the broker was between a Mr Shoostovian and the first defendant. A loan, and I will later refer to a dispute about the sum, of $290,500 was obtained by the defendants and secured by a mortgage over the property in favour of the plaintiff.
5 Pursuant to the terms of the mortgage the principal was repayable on 10 November 2005. It has not been paid.
6 An affidavit…
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- Case
- [2009] NSWSC 637
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the Consumer Credit Code applied to the mortgage agreement, and if so, whether this precluded Lawteal from seeking possession of the land. The key issue was whether the Consumer Credit Code, which imposes certain protections on consumers, could be excluded by the parties through the terms of their agreement. The court also needed to examine the facts of the case to ascertain whether the agreement was indeed a consumer credit contract within the meaning of the Code.
In its decision, the court held that the Consumer Credit Code did not apply to the mortgage agreement in question. The court found that the loan was not primarily for personal, domestic or household purposes, which is a key criterion for determining whether a contract falls within the scope of the Code. Consequently, the Code did not exclude Lawteal from seeking possession of the land upon the defendants' default. The court also noted that the facts did not present a special matter of principle that would warrant further judicial consideration.
Accordingly, the court granted Lawteal's application for possession of the land. The defendants were ordered to vacate the premises and return possession to Lawteal. The court further directed that the defendants pay Lawteal's costs of the proceedings. The decision underscores the importance of carefully examining the terms of mortgage agreements and the applicability of consumer protection legislation to ensure that the rights and obligations of all parties are clearly understood and enforced.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Supreme Court of New South Wales in the Equity Division. The Plaintiff filed an originating application seeking an order for possession of the property. The Defendants filed a defence, asserting that the Consumer Credit Code applied to the mortgage and that they were entitled to certain protections and rights under the Code. The Defendants also filed a cross-claim seeking a declaration that the Consumer Credit Code applied to the mortgage and that the Plaintiff was required to mitigate damages by taking possession of the property. The Plaintiff filed a reply to the cross-claim, denying that the Consumer Credit Code applied. The case proceeded to a final hearing before a judge of the Supreme Court, who heard arguments from both parties and considered the evidence and submissions before making a determination on the issues.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the mortgage is subject to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) and, if so, whether the Defendants are entitled to the protections and rights provided by the Consumer Credit Code.
2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to an order for possession of the property, and if so, whether the order should include a requirement for the Plaintiff to mitigate damages by taking possession of the property.
Held
1. The court held that the mortgage was not subject to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) and, accordingly, the Defendants were not entitled to the protections and rights provided by the Consumer Credit Code.
2. The court held that the Plaintiff was entitled to an order for possession of the property but did not consider it appropriate to include a requirement for the Plaintiff to mitigate damages by taking possession of the property.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the nature of the mortgage transaction and determined that it was not a consumer credit transaction as defined by the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth). The court found that the Defendants were sophisticated parties involved in the transaction and thus the protections under the Consumer Credit Code did not apply. The court relied on the distinction between consumer credit transactions and commercial transactions, emphasizing that the former involves a credit contract for personal, domestic, or household purposes. Since the Defendants were entities involved in a commercial mortgage transaction, they did not qualify for the consumer protections.
Regarding the order for possession, the court found that the Plaintiff had a right to possession following the mortgagee's default. The Plaintiff had fulfilled the requisite conditions under the mortgage, triggering the right to possession. The court acknowledged the Plaintiff's position but chose not to impose a requirement to mitigate damages by taking possession of the property immediately. The court reasoned that such a requirement could impose undue burdens on the Plaintiff and did not align with the equitable considerations in the circumstances of the case. This decision reinforces the principle that while a mortgagee is entitled to possession upon default, the court retains discretion to tailor the remedy to ensure fairness in specific contexts.