Lawson v The State of Western Australia [No 2]
[2017] WASCA 189
•16 OCTOBER 2017
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: LAWSON -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [No 2] [2017] WASCA 189
CORAM: MAZZA JA
HEARD: 28 SEPTEMBER 2017
DELIVERED : 28 SEPTEMBER 2017
PUBLISHED : 16 OCTOBER 2017
FILE NO/S: CACR 130 of 2017
BETWEEN: SHAUN PHILLIP LAWSON
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :CORBOY J
File No :INS 213 of 2015
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Application for bail pending appeal - Exceptional circumstances
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Ms G Beggs
Solicitors:
Appellant: In person
Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Lawson v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 137
MAZZA JA:
(These reasons were delivered extemporaneously and have been edited from the transcript.)
Before the court is the appellant's application filed on 11 September 2017 for bail pending his appeal against sentence. This is his second such application, the first having been dismissed on 5 July 2017: see Lawson v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 137. The relevant factual background to this case is set out in those reasons and does not require repetition. These reasons should be read in conjunction with that decision.
This being a second application for bail pending appeal where the first was refused, the appellant must demonstrate that since 5 July 2017 circumstances have come to light which were not previously known or circumstances have changed to justify me reconsidering the question of bail.
The appellant recognises this requirement. In his brief affidavit in support of the application sworn 11 September 2017, the appellant deposes to the following four matters, which he says are sufficient to enable me to reconsider the question of the bail:
(1)He has received news that there is a 'high possibility' he may be the father of a three‑year‑old boy born to his former partner. He says she is barely coping, and he wishes to help her bring up the child.
(2)Since 5 July 2017, the appellant's mental health has deteriorated.
(3)On 30 August 2017, this court granted leave to appeal on ground 2 of his appeal.
(4)If he is granted bail, he will be better able to secure legal representation for his appeal.
Even if I accept the information concerning the first and second matters on their face, none of the four matters, either individually or in combination, are sufficient to justify a reconsideration of my earlier decision.
As to the first matter, imprisonment has an inevitable impact on an offender's family. Assuming that bail pending appeal could be granted on this basis, it would only be in a rare case. The circumstances deposed to by the appellant are, sadly, not uncommon, and fall a long way short of being such a case.
As to the second matter, the appellant's mental health issues are well known, and are not to be lightly dismissed. However, they are treatable in prison and they are being treated in prison.
As to the third matter, ground 2 concerns only the appellant's motor driver's licence disqualification. The other grounds, being grounds 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, concern the sentence of immediate imprisonment that was imposed by the sentencing judge. Those grounds have been referred to the hearing of the appeal. I remain of the view that, on a preliminary basis, these grounds do not enjoy sufficient prospects of success to justify a grant of bail.
As to the fourth matter, while I am well aware of the practical difficulties prisoners have in securing legal representation and preparing appeals, the reality is that, despite these difficulties, appeals are frequently presented to this court by prisoners in the appellant's position.
For these reasons, the application of 11 September 2017 must be dismissed, and I so order.
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